17th- and 18th-century Philosophy

This paper contains an investigation of Leibniz’s ontology of time. Standard debates on Leibniz’s theory of time hinge upon the question whether the nature of time is relative or absolute and focus mainly on the Leibniz-Clarke correspondence. Focusing instead on Theodicy and referring to the contemporary frame and debate, I address some different questions: whether Leibniz is an A-theorist or a B-theorist, or an advocate of a hybrid form of an A/B-theory; and whether he is a presentist (who think that only present things and states of affairs exist) or an eternalist (who claims that past, present and future things and states of affairs are equally real). After careful analysis of several passages that seemingly support a presentist interpretation, I conclude that under the most charitable interpretation Leibniz should be considered as an eternalist, and precisely as a dynamical one. I further argue that Leibniz’s peculiar view on modality mirror this hybrid theory of time.

Course Description: A continuation of the Classical Mind, the Modern Mind is an introduction to modern philosophy focusing on texts from selected early modern and modern thinkers. The class builds upon the history, thought concepts, and themes developed in the Classical Mind and traces the development of Western philosophical thought from the seventeenth to the twentieth century. In particular, this course deals with philosophers that consider the nature of thinking and reasoning, the idea of metaphysics and the foundations of human knowledge, the idea of a universal moral law, the nature of political society and the concept of right, and the idea and value of historical thinking. This course utilizes canonical philosophic texts situated in the history of philosophy to establish the structure and methodology of philosophical thinking. As the second course of the introductory sequence of philosophy classes, this class culminates not only in the identification of philosophic issues, concepts, and questions, but also the practical examination and analysis of fundamental human questions as preparation for students' continuing engagement with their liberal arts education. — Prerequisite for PHIL 202: successful completion of PHIL 201.

En el siguiente trabajo presentamos una reflexión acerca de la cuestión del lenguaje en Descartes, considerando que el lenguaje es la prueba fundamental que establece para diferenciar al ser humano de los animales y el reconocimiento de la posesión de una mente. El lenguaje, como veremos, trata de un elemento de distinción ontológica fundamental en la filosofía del pensador francés y plantea importantes preguntas acerca de la naturaleza de los animales.

The present book is devoted to a cultural phenomenon in the form of a collection of musical manuscripts written with a specific instrument in mind in a monastic milieu, but one which contains no liturgical compositions. The collection in question comprises handwritten lute tablatures from the Cistercian Abbey of Krzeszów (German: Grüssau). The author presents the Baroque lute in a humanistic perspective, a perspective of selected social phenomena in European culture of the
second half of the seventeenth century and the first half of the eighteenth century, as well as selected questions relating to performance practice. This concerns the functioning of the lute particularly in the musical culture of Silesia, the context of musical life in the Cistercian Abbey of Krzeszów and questions relating to musical source studies, questions like concordance based on European sources.
The book draws on a doctoral dissertation, written under the guidance of Professor Remigiusz Pośpiech at the Institute of Musicology, University of Wrocław, which in 2017 brought Dr G. Joachimiak the first prize in the Professor H. Feicht Competition, awarded by the Musicological Section of the Polish Composers’ Union.
The manuscripts of lute tablatures from the Krzeszów Abbey have never before been the subject of holistic research, which has required a number of detailed studies over many years. The author has used both the method of a music historian and a perspective based on experiences in music performance. Readers will find here the results of the author’s research, with details of the research process to be found in the doctoral dissertation. Given the limited publication possibilities, the material presented in the book has had to be reduced, which has affected largely ensemble music.
The analysed collection comprises fifteen manuscripts, which are currently dispersed. It contains over 2000 individual works, which makes the collection one of the largest of this kind in the world. The surviving sources contain only pieces for the lute in a popular eighteenth-century tuning. These are solo and ensemble pieces in which missing instrument parts are sometimes filled by concordances. The results of the research into the reconstruction of selected compositions make it possible to prepare the material for performance and to explore selected elements of monastic life in the eighteenth century, especially the music performed by the monks. This concerns, for example, the Tafelmusik
practice as well as limitations relating to the performance of this kind of music at the monastery or the way in which the Cistercians used the lute and secular compositions to develop monastic piety.
The book also contains information originating in the correspondence of monks from the Krzeszów abbey, including lute-playing monks like Father Hermann Kniebandl. In the last stage of his life he was associated with the Cistercian provostship in Cieplice Śląskie (German: Bad Warmbrunn), where his duties included, in addition to pastoral work, the running of the thermal springs which the monastery had received from the Schaffgotsch family. However, the relations between the family and the Krzeszów Cistercians are limited here to the context of musical patronage and support of musical activities associated with the analysed lute collection.
The lute tablature manuscripts also contain information which is significant from the perspective of the history of music theory — information in the form lute playing instructions, strictly practical
elements like marking of fingering for both hands in the various pieces, examples of playing exercises or explanation of the notation and embellishments in lute playing. This makes the whole material
twice as valuable, because every such “didactic source” is the best source in modern historically informed performance, providing scholars with an insight into reception of the repertoire and styles of playing. On the other hand it sheds light on the Krzeszów Cistercians’ actual participation in the cultivation and development of secular Baroque lute repertoire, popular at royal courts and among townsmen, irrespective of their confessional affiliation.
Compositions from the analysed collection include pieces which show that the Krzeszów Cistercians were stylistically well-versed in the solo or ensemble repertoire as well as pieces which are unique in Europe. This is undoubtedly linked to the great popularity of the lute in the first half of
the eighteenth century in Central Europe, where Silesia served as one of the most important European centres of lute music. This was the place from which came and where were educated the most sought-after lutenists in royal and courtly ensembles, lutenists like Esaias Reusner the Younger, Silvius Leopold Weiss, Ernst Gottlieb Baron and many others. This situation undoubtedly had a huge impact on the interest in the lute among the Krzeszów Cistercians. That is why the author of the book takes into account compositions not only by well-known composers and patrons of their music, but also pieces by local composers, including those from among the Krzeszów Cistercians. In the last chapter the author devotes some attention to the use of the lute in work associated with Cistercian spirituality, taking into account the specificity of the Krzeszów Cistercians — to be more precise, in spiritual exercises. The Krzeszów Cistercians took over the Exercitia spiritualis from the Silesian Jesuits and carried them out in accordance with St. Ignatius Loyola’s method.
All these elements provoke questions of why the Cistercian Abbey of Krzeszów became a friendly place for the making of lute tablature manuscripts and interest in the lute, an instrument used mostly
in court circles. How to describe the phenomenon of the Baroque lute in the monastery in the context of the musical culture of Silesia in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries? Is the Cistercian Abbey in Krzeszów the only such example of musical activity in the history of music? Answers to these and other questions can be found in the four chapters of the present book supported by an extensive introduction and three appendices.

Książka poświęcona jest kolekcji 15 rękopisów muzycznych z pierwszej połowy XVIII w., zapisanych specyficzną notacją muzyczną tabulatury lutniowej w odmianie francuskiej (literowej). Jest to jeden z największych zbiorów tego typu. Dlaczego zatem powstał na Śląsku i w środowisku opactwa cystersów w Krzeszowie? To pytanie towarzyszyło autorowi tej książki przez cały okres jej przygotowania. Odpowiedź jest złożona, dlatego w książce pojawiają się informacje wskazujące na specyfikę kultury muzycznej Śląska XVII i XVIII wieku, potwierdzające wyjątkowość tego regionu dla kultywowania muzyki lutniowej. W omawianych źródłach nie ma przykładów muzyki liturgicznej. Większość tego repertuaru wykonywano na dworach królewskich niemalże całej ówczesnej Europy, ale są też przykłady utworów kompozytorów działających wyłącznie lokalnie, w tym również z grona cystersów. W książce znaleźć można informacje o muzyce lutniowej przedstawione w perspektywie humanistycznej, z uwzględnieniem metodyki gry, wybranego repertuaru i zagadnień źródłoznawczych. Jak zatem scharakteryzować określenie zjawiska „fenomenu lutni barokowej w klasztorze”? Odpowiedzi na te i inne pytania znajdują się w czterech rozdziałach niniejszej książki, wspartych rozbudowanym wstępem i trzema aneksami.

Free download: http://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/y3DipH2m3WDBKSa2QB65/full

One of the most renowned pages of Pascal's Pensées offers an astonishing phenomenology of the all-powerful action of imagination in human life. This article retraces the genesis of this text and reassesses the sources of Pascal's conception of imagination. It argues that Pascal builds up his definition of the imagination as an ‘anti-theodicy’ which carefully recalls and then criticizes the Cartesian ‘theodicy of error’ and the foundation of the ‘general rule’ of truth proposed by the Fourth Meditation. In doing so, Pascal undermines the major aim of Descartes's Meditations, which is to secure human nature against any doubt as to its intrinsic perfection. Where, according to Descartes, human knowledge is finite yet perfectly secured in its accomplishments when we use the faculties of our mind correctly, Pascal describes imagination as a deceptive faculty that seems to have been given to us specifically to lead us into necessary error.

If the greatness of a philosophical work can be measured by the volume and vehemence of the public response, there is little question that Rousseau's Social Contract stands out as a masterpiece. Within a week of its publication in 1762 it was banished from France. Soon thereafter, Rousseau fled to Geneva, where he saw the book burned in public. At the same time, many of his contemporaries, such as Kant, considered Rousseau to be “the Newton of the moral world,” as he was the first philosopher to draw attention to the basic dignity of human nature. The Social Contract has never ceased to be read in the 250 years since it was written. Rousseau's “Social Contract”: An Introduction offers a thorough and systematic tour of this notoriously paradoxical and challenging text. David Lay Williams offers readers a chapter-by-chapter reading of the Social Contract, squarely confronting these interpretive obstacles, leaving no stones unturned. The conclusion connects Rousseau's text both to his important influences and those who took inspiration and sometimes exception to his arguments. The book also features a special extended appendix dedicated to outlining his famous conception of the general will, which has been the object of controversy since the Social Contract's publication.

Enlightenment is an approach that is based on the mind and the individual by purifying the world from the effects of superstitions associated with religion, and it has caused great changes in the way of thinking and social life of Western societies, especially since the eighteenth century. Enlightenment, which is focused on the use of the individual's mind with an analytical approach to the advancement of mankind, is a process which has reached its daily impacts as a phenomenon with its own characteristics, based on specific values and principles.

Locke endorses a distinction between passive reflection and voluntary attentive reflection, which he occasionally labels contemplation. Failure to recognize this distinction properly has had an effect on interpretations of Locke’s theory of reflection, and caused puzzlement about the relation between reflection and consciousness. In particular, the function of reflection as a passive internal sense that produces simple ideas of mental operations has been downplayed in favour of the view that reflection in one manner or another involves attention and/or presupposes consciousness of mental operations. This has led a number of scholars to maintain, implicitly or explicitly, that Locke in fact abandons either his doctrine of sensation and reflection as the two exclusive sources of ideas or his doctrine of ideas as the only immediate objects of experience.

With the help of a distinction between reflection as a source of ideas and reflection as an operation about ideas I aim to show how Locke can hold to his empiricist maxim about the two sources of ideas and also endorse ideas as the only immediate objects of experience. A proper understanding of Locke’s theory of reflection requires that reflection and consciousness be delineated with respect to one another. I will show how Locke’s notion of consciousness differs from both types of reflection.

Here I have uploaded the final draft of my long introduction to the correspondence. Anyone wishing to quote etc., will need to get hold of the book. However, content-wise it is pretty much what appears in the final version and includes my best efforts to provide an account of Leibniz's views on substance and body at that time.

This volume as whole contains a new critical edition of the correspondence between Leibniz and Burcher de Volder (based on manuscript sources), a translation of the correspondence into English, and an 80 page introductory essay which advances a number of novel theses regarding Leibniz's metaphysics. Also included is a selection of letters from the intermediary correspondence between Leibniz and Johann Bernoulli. Many of the letters by Leibniz (and all those by De Volder) are translated into English for the first time.

Jean-Jacques Rousseau: Fundamental Political Writings includes the Social Contract, Discourse on the Sciences and the Arts, Discourse on the Origins of Inequality, and “Preface to Narcissus.” Each text has been newly translated, and includes a full complement of explanatory notes. The editors’ introduction offers students diverse points of entry into some of the distinctive possibilities and challenges of each of these fundamental texts, as well as an introduction to Rousseau’s life and historical situation, from his early years in Geneva to his final years in relative solitude. Each text is accompanied by images from the original editions. The volume also includes annotated appendices that help students to explore the origins and influences of Rousseau’s work, including excerpts from Hobbes, Pascal, Descartes, Mandeville, Diderot, Voltaire, Madame de Staël, Benjamin Constant, Joseph de Maistre, Kant, Hegel, and Engels.

This is an introductory essay to a critical edition of Hale's MS treatise on natural law (British Library, MSS Add. 18235, Harley 7159, and Hargrave 485). Chapters 1-5 were published along with this introduction. An edition of the entire treatise (chapters 1-13) is now available in the Sources in Early Modern Economics, Ethics, and Law series published by CLP Academic (2015).

In this paper I argue that there is an important sense in which we should regard Leibniz as an advocate of mysticism. I make the case for this claim by considering the complex phenomenon of mysticism itself and Leibniz's discussion of what he terms 'false mysticism' (I.e., quietism) and what he refers to as the "true mystical theology" in an article of that name. The principle claim is that Leibniz is a "rational mystic", i.e., one who thinks that we have the capacity to be directly acquainted with God via our innate idea of God.

The concept of inner sense plays a prominent role in Kant’s attempts to define the character and scope of anthropology. Moreover, Kant denounces the terminological confusion between inner sense and apperception as a source of paralogisms. Who were his targets? In recent years, scholars have pointed to the existence of a German tradition on inner sense (perhaps independent from Locke) as a plausible source for Kant’s elaboration. However, some specific aspects of the German treatment of inner sense have been so far completely overlooked. This paper focuses on Jungius, Leibniz, Wolff, and Lambert, to show that they all referred to inner sense or inner experience as a privileged source of knowledge, immune to error and free from the ontological limits of the external senses. In this tradition, inner sense was ascribed with the epistemological function of providing a foundation not only for psychology but also for logic and metaphysics. Such a radical empowerment of the role of inner sense, which culminated in Lambert’s work, is the most plausible target of Kant’s criticism. Relegating the contribution of inner sense to the fields of anthropology and empirical psychology was part of Kant’s effort to purify logic and metaphysics from any reference to inner experience or sensation.

This book contains the first complete interpretation of all aspects of Hobbes’s philosophy which treat religious convictions and practices. Not only his philosophy of religion and his philosophical theology, but also his biblical theology are treated in extense. The main thesis is that, according to Hobbes, neither philosophy nor politics in any way need a religious fundament; but since religions establish institutions and thus accumulate means of power, they are necessarily an object of politics. It is for this reason that religious convictions and practices are a – for a long time neglected – main topic of Hobbes’s philosophy.

We propose to read Francis Bacon's doctrine of the idols of the mind as an investigation firmly entrenched in his mental-medicinal concerns and we argue that an important role therein is played by the imagination. Looking at the ways in which the imagination serves to pinpoint several crucial aspects of the idolic mind permits us to signal the explicit or implicit cross-references between what in Bacon's tree of knowledge appear as distinct branches: the various faculties and their arts; the mind, the body, and their league; natural philosophy, moral philosophy, and the philosophy of man. The consequence of this rich picture of the diagnosis of the mind is an equally rich conception of the cure, which comprises both epistemic and physiological aspects. We extract the features of this integrated view out of Bacon's epistemological and medical natural historical writings, which we propose to read in tandem. We also propose a number of sources for Bacon's views on the imagination, whose variety accounts for the multivalent, sometimes elusive, but surely pervasive role of the imagination in the Baconian diagnosis and cure of the mind.

Ideas about soul and body – about thinking or remembering, mind and life, brain and self – remain both diverse and controversial in our neurocentric age. The history of these ideas is significant both in its own right and to aid our understanding of the complex sources and nature of our concepts of mind, cognition, and psychology, which are all terms with puzzling, difficult histories. These topics are not the domain of specialists alone, and studies of emotion, perception, or reasoning have never been isolated theoretical endeavours. As Francis Bacon described human philosophy or ‘the knowledge of our selves’, within which he located the study of body, soul, and mind, it ‘deserveth the more accurate handling, by how much it toucheth us more nearly’ (1605/ 2000: 93). The history of ideas in these domains is
particularly challenging given the practical dimensions and implications of theories of mind. Because theories of human nature and debates about body and mind do ‘touch us’ so ‘nearly’,
they attract and can thus reveal, in specific historical contexts, interconnected discourses or associations which may be quite unlike our own. This chapter retains a focus, however, on the history of theories of mind: we address an array of distinctive positi
ons inmetaphysics and psychology which emerged in wider British debate, each with potential religious, moral, and political implications. We proceed by selectively surveying the conceptual inheritance and challenges for British philosophers in the early seventeenth century with regard to both the soul and the humoral temperament of body and mind. We look at some of the eclectic systems developed by British philosophers of the soul in the mid-century period, and at different ways new ideas in both medicine and metaphysics were integrated.

Монография составлена из ранее опубликованных автором статей и материалов по истории и методологии исследования российского дворянства конца XVIII — начала XIX века. В книгу вошли результаты более чем двадцати лет работы. Предлагается постановка различных проблем изучения дворянства, case studies из жизни влиятельного клана Воронцовых, сделана попытка соединить государственное служение, личную жизнь и метафизику одного из ярчайших представителей российской аристократии — М.С. Воронцова.

The monograph is composed by the author from already published papers and studies in history and methodology of the Russian nobility at the end of the 18th and the beginning of the 19th century. The book presents the results of more than twenty years of the author’s research. He suggests interpretations of various problems in nobility studies, of some cases from powerful Vorontsov clan’s life, and attempts to put together outstanding aristocrat M. Vorontsov’s public service, private life and metaphysics.

Table of Contents

Introduction ix
by Nazif Muhtaroglu

Timeline for Occasionalism xviii

Part One: Occasionalism in the Islamic Tradition
1. Al-Maturīdī’s View of Causality 3
by Nazif Muhtaroglu
2. Al-Ghazālī’s View on Causality 22
by Aladdin M. Yaqub
3. Ibn ʿArabī and the Ashʿarites on Causality 41
by Ozgur Koca
4. Ibn Khaldūn and Occasionalism 61
by Edward Omar Moad
5. Late Ottoman Occasionalists on Modern Science 83
by Nazif Muhtaroglu and Ozgur Koca


Part Two: Occasionalism in the Western Tradition
6. Ashʿarites, Cartesians, and Occasionalism 105
by Nazif Muhtaroglu
7. Cordemoy and the Motives for Cartesian Occasionalism 139
by Andrew Platt
8. Malebranche and Suarez on the Power of Secondary Causes:
A Contemporary Consideration 167
by Fred Ablondi and J. Aaron Simmons
9. Occasionalism and the Powers of Minds 186
by Walter Ott
10. Berkeley’s Strange Semi-Occasionalist Mystery: Finite Minds as Causes 197
by Marc A. Hight
11. Divine Compositionalism as Occasionalism 219
by Walter J. Schultz and Lisanne D’Andrea-Winslow

Appendix: Selected Readings on Occasionalism in English 237

Bibliography 247

Contributors 271

Index 273

This chapter is from a volume of papers devoted to providing introductions to many of Leibniz's key philosophical writings. It provides an overview of one of Leibniz's most impenetrable works, the Theodicy. I argue that the Theodicy is best understood against a careful reading of the Preface, in which Leibniz suggests that the primary aim of the book is to provide the means by which natural theology and Leibniz's conception of God as a being deserving of our love may be maintained in the face of objections that stem from considering the nature of freedom and the so-called 'problem of evil'. The chapter contains a detailed presentation of the main discussions in the book, including the Preliminary Dissertation in which Leibniz spells out his conception of the relationship between faith and reason.

This is a critical discussion of the literature on Leibniz's Pre-established harmony written in 1997. Whilst primarily a discussion of previous approaches, it contains some original thoughts and I hope it might provide a useful guide to the geography of this topic, albeit a little outdated and with some omissions (e.g., there is nothing on the PEH of the kingdoms of nature and grace).

Adam Smith closes the first chapter to Theory of Moral Sentiments, 'Of Sympathy', with a harmless enough assertion: 'We sympathize even with the dead'.  Death is not a topic that much interests Smith in Theory of Moral Sentiments. With the exception of a few miscellaneous thoughts in the text, the one paragraph Smith devotes to it is the extent of his interest. It is, however, a matter of interest in his Glasgow lectures on jurisprudence. To the extent we wish to observe the rights of the dead, how far may we extend these rights without infringing upon the rights of the living?  Which is the question: what are the demands the dead may make upon the living?

Hobbes’s political philosophy starts from a number of premises that are supposed to be self-evident, supplemented by various observations from experience. These statements are examined critically and in their interrelatedness in order to find out to what extent Hobbes provides a convincing system of thought. The importance of the basis of man’s actions, his self-interest, is inquired, since it serves as the basis of his practical philosophy. After this, Hobbes’s views on ‘moral’ notions are expounded. As it turns out, Hobbes maintains a number of concepts that have such a connotation, but interprets these in a specific way. The article is concluded with a modest systematic reconstruction of Hobbes’s main thoughts in practical philosophy.

Tra i pensatori settecenteschi, Denis Diderot è senz’altro tra quelli di più difficile classificazione. Autore di romanzi, opere teatrali, testi scientifici e di critica d’arte, oltre che di filosofia. È difficile separare le sue opere propriamente “filosofiche” dal resto della sua produzione. Né, del resto, avrebbe senso farlo, perché la filosofia di Diderot emerge proprio dall’intreccio tra le molteplici sfere a cui egli si dedica. Il trentacinquesimo numero de Lo Sguardo intende indagare la figura di Diderot in tutte le sue diverse sfaccettature: filosofo, romanziere, drammaturgo, scienziato, critico d’arte, promotore culturale (con il grande progetto dell’Encyclopédie). Obiettivo della raccoltà è quello di indagare come interagiscono tra loro questi aspetti della sua opera e come contribuiscono alla filosofia che ne emerge. E ancora, stabilire cosa, ancor oggi, abbia da dire questa complessa eredità filosofica alla contemporaneità.

Spinoza is known for his radical views on freedom. In this article, it is explored to what extent this reputation is justified. He integrates human actions in the necessary development of the universe and seems to leave no room for human freedom. The position of God is relevant, since it is Spinoza’s starting-point in general and appears to require an intricate conception of freedom; it may be demanded whether this can be clarified. In the case of man, the difficulty lies primarily in the degree to which Spinoza takes his own characterization of necessity seriously; there seems to be an inconsistency here. The final section provides a possible way out of this conundrum, by focusing on the possible basis of an action.

This paper is a new translation and interpretation of an essay known as Leibniz's Philosophical Dream, which was written around 1693.

The essay consist of an autobiographical sketch followed by a dreamscape - reminiscent of Plato's allegory of the cave - in which Leibniz is led by a celestial messenger to a form of enlightenment which is presented as an antidote to 'the problem of evil'.

The dissertation examines the meaning of the public or common good considered as an end or purpose of government in the public debate over the adoption of the U.S. Constitution. Federalists and Anti-Federalists assert that the purpose of government is to both promote the public good and protect individual rights. What did they mean by the “public good” and related phrases? An extended commentary and textual analysis of the published writings of five Federalists (John Dickinson, Oliver Ellsworth, Noah Webster, Tench Coxe, and James Wilson) and five Anti-Federalists (Agrippa, Centinel, Federal Farmer, Impartial Examiner,and Brutus), the dissertation examines the way in which the notion of the public good played a significant part within the larger themes of federalism, representation, liberty versus licentiousness, and union during the ratification period.

Neither side’s understanding of the protection of individual rights as the purpose of government completely forecloses the notion of the promotion of the public good. The uniquely federal nature of the Constitution obscures the deeper understanding of the public good of Anti-Federalists and Federalists alike, but both sides—especially the Federalists—provide plenty of evidence. The Anti-Federalist view of representation emphasizes that the public good must be truly public without making clear how the public good differs from majority will; the Federalists emphasize the public good must be truly good, the product of sound deliberation. The Federalist argument includes the explicit claim that liberty is not license, but tied to a common notion of virtue, or what is truly good for all. The Federalists argue that there is a public good for all the states combined and thus the federal government must have supreme power over matters relating to commerce—and commerce is spoken of as intrinsically connected to morality and virtue—for the sake of this national public good. Although the Federalist notion of the public good is severely limited in scope, remaining in some way open as to the final purpose of human beings or the ultimate questions about what is truly good, it is nonetheless much more than the notion of an interdependent collection of private goods.

Comprender la modernidad filosófica como un período signado por dos grandes corrientes, la racionalista y la empirista, se ha consolidado como un relato canónico que nos ha permitido un acceso fácil a los temas centrales del período. Pero esta imagen de la filosofía moderna ha sido acusada de ocasionar serios malentendidos e, inclusive, de dar una visión distorsionada de la época. Por ese motivo, para evaluar la pertinencia de las críticas de las que ha sido blanco en los últimos años, consideramos que es necesario analizar con cierto detenimiento en qué consiste este relato de la filosofía de los siglos XVII y XVIII, y hacer una revisión de sus fuentes, que en buena medida son libros de texto ampliamente usados en la enseñanza de la historia de la filosofía. Este examen nos permitirá mostrar que si bien la visión canónica de la filosofía moderna no está exenta de problemas, a la hora de recorrer algunos de los textos que se consideran representativos de esta perspectiva, no se encuentra una exposición tan estandarizada como pretenden sus detractores. Por otro lado, se podrá apreciar que hay divergencias en cuanto al criterio utilizado para distinguir el empirismo y el racionalismo, lo que nos llevará a reconsiderar qué se entiende por ambas posturas e, inclusive, a cuestionar su pretendida oposición.

L'étude des officiers de marine et des officiers des galères est un sujet principalement méconnu. L'article se propose de se concentrer sur les chefs d'escadres des galères afin d'offrir une première vision de ces officiers sous le règne de Louis XIV