“The Themes of Fear, Honor, and Interest in Thucydides”
Tyler Richard Evans
History 4990: Peloponnesian War
University of Utah, Salt Lake City, Utah
December 2014
Within Thucydides’ history of the Peloponnesian War there are several themes
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that can be discovered, interpreted, and analysed. Within my main focus of study, the
Corcyraean debate, modern scholars have commented often on the themes of justice
and expediency.2 In reading the Corcyraean debate, I however wanted to look past the
themes of justice, expediency and morality and see what other themes could be found. I
also wanted to look beyond the Corcyraean debate to see what themes may also apply
to it. Three themes in particular caught my attention, during the Athenian envoys
speech before the Spartan assembly in 432/1, as they are defending the reasoning for
their growing empire, the three themes being: fear, honor, and interest [Thucydides,
1.76.2]. I soon realized, in a moment of revelation in the middle of one night, that these
three themes related clearly to my topic. And as I read further, I realized that the themes
could be seen not just in the Corcyraean debate, but throughout Thucydides work.
Putting such themes as morality and justice aside, I came to the conclusion that these
other themes play just as crucial as a role. I argue that in the Corcyraean debate the
three themes of fear, honor, and interest are represented by Corcyra, Corinth, and
Athens, and that this first debate establishes a foundation for these themes for much of
the rest of Thucydides’ work.
The first questions that need to be answered are how Corcyra, Corinth and
Athens represent the themes of of fear, honor, and interest in the Corcyraean debate.
Kagan relates briefly these three notions in relation to the Corcyraean debate in an
Luginbill, R D. Thucydides on War and National Character. (Boulder, 1999), p. 83. Here Luginbill refers to
themes of national character, as well as imperialism, mentioning that Thucydides does not personally
comment on the themes found within his work.
2
Orwin, C. The Humanity of Thucydides. (Princeton, 1994), p.38.
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article written on international relations, and I agree with his assessment that the
themes are an important, and visible aspect of the debate.3 It seems only fitting that
these states are aligned in order of their appearance within the debate in the same
order as the themes themselves are found later on. One may wonder if Thucydides did
this purposely, however, it is impossible to know this for certain. Whether or not this is
truly the case, I will begin with Corcyra and how they are representative of the theme of
fear. Previous to the debate itself, Thucydides explains how Corcyra and Corinth came
into conflict due to the civil unrest between the leaders and the citizens of the the colony
of Epidamnus, with Corinth eventually siding with the citizens, and Corcyra coming to
the aid of the exiled leadership [Thuc.,1.2425]. After several battles Corcyra was able
to defeat Corinth and maintain supremacy at sea in the region, but became concerned
with the Corinthian response as Corinth spent the next two years rebuilding her fleet in
an effort to prepare once again take on the Corcyraeans. With this preparation, Corcyra
soon realized that they were without any allies at all, having remained neutral amongst
the allies and confederates of Athens and Sparta.
Fearing retaliation from Corinth, Corcyra appealed to Athens for an alliance of
support, and Corinth, seeing that Corcyra has sent envoys to Athens, did the same in
an attempt to prevent Athens from allying with Corcyra [Thuc.,1.2931]. And it is with
this appeal for Athenian support that the theme of fear first begins to show itself within
the actions of Corcyra. They realized that, like a lone hunter who with only a small
Kagan, D. “Our Interests and Our Honor.” Commentary 103, no. 4 (New York, 1997), p. 42. One important
note about this article is that Kagan clearly recognizes the individual themes of fear, honor, and interest in
the Corcyraean debate, however, he does not seem to make the connection of the three states and their
symbolic representations of the three themes, as I argue.
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amount of ammunition wounds a bear rather than kills it, they were in need of
assistance far greater than their current situation offered them. In their speech, the
Corcyraeans appear unsurprisingly desperate and apologetic. Understanding that their
previous stance as neutrals compels them to “satisfy certain preliminary conditions” and
if they are granted the alliance they seek, “they will retain a lasting sense of the
kindness” [Thuc.,1.32.1,4]. They go on to admit that their previous isolationism has
“proved to be folly and weakness” and was the “consequence of an error in judgment”
[Thuc.,1.32.4,5]. Such language is spoken out of fear, by a desperate state coming to
terms with its suddenly bad predicament. Corcyra, fearful of what will happen, paints
itself not as the aggressor in the conflict with Corinth, rather as a “victim to the injustice
of others” [Thuc., 1.33.1] It is clear that Corcyra wants to undermine its own role in the
previous conflict, and appear as a victim of Corinthian bullying. Corcyra is afraid of the
damage that a reinvigorated Corinthian fleet is capable of inflicting upon them, and it
shows in the way in which they nearly beg Athens for their support.
After explaining their situation, the Corcyraeans then argue why an alliance with
themselves would be advantageous to Athens, compellingly mentioning their naval
power is only second to Athens, and that combining their sea power together would be
unlike anything ever seen in history [Thuc.,1.33.2]. They then attempt to convince
Athens of the inevitability of war with Sparta, as well as inform them of the fact that they
were the first to ask for arbitration regarding the conflict between themselves and
Corinth in Epidamnus [Thuc.,1.33.3, 1.34.2]. Once again, they play to the idea that they
are victims in the situation, and fearful of further conflict. Near the end of their speech,
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they emphasize the fact that an alliance between the two would not be breaking the
treaty of the thirty years peace between Sparta and Athens [Thuc.,1.35.12, 1.36.1]. It is
this part of the their speech that I argue that Corcyra attempts to push its own fear upon
Athens, persuading them that just as they fear Corinth, so ought Athens fear an
ostensibly oncoming war with Sparta. It is interesting, and yet not surprising to see
Corcyra in their frightened and alarmed state, trying to push their own motives of fear
upon Athens, hoping that such fear will also play into their arguments appealing to
Athens’ interests.
Lending more support to the argument that Corcyra represents the theme of fear,
is the response by the Corinthians. Concerning the claim of arbitration, the Corinthians
tell the Athenian assembly that it was only after besieging Epidamnus that Corcyra
“understood that we would not tamely suffer it, that they thought of the specious word
arbitration” [Thuc.,1.39.2]. Here Corinth is making the case to Athens that Corcyra is
reacting out of fear, and Corinth is trying to turn such apparent fear into a weakness
against the Corcyraeans argument. The Corinthians’ own speech supports the
argument that in this debate, Corcyra represents fear, as they not only recognize it
within the Corcyraeans’ speech, but use it against them in their own. In both the
Corinthians’ and the Corcyraeans’ speeches the theme of fear, and how Corcyra
represents and embodies that fear, can clearly be seen.
The next question to be answered is how the Corinthians represent the theme of
honor in the debate. The answer essentially comes out of the subtext of their speech in
two ways: first, dishonor in in the relationship between Corcyra and Corinth; and
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second, honor in the relationship between Corinth and Athens. In the beginning of their
speech, the Corinthians outline how Corcyra held their policy of isolationism not for their
own protection or safety, but rather out of a desire for material gain and essentially what
Corinth deems dishonest, criminal activity [Thuc.,1.37.24]. The Corinthians then explain
that because of this dishonesty, Corcyra has not been a respectful colony, but one of
“estrangement, and is now one of hostility” [Thuc.,1.38.1]. They then claim that the
Corcyraeans’ behavior towards their mother country has been unlike any of the other
colonies within their realm, stating that “our other colonies honor us, and we are very
much beloved by our colonists” [Thuc.,1.38.3]. They further comment that because their
other colonies are happy with they way Corinth has treated them, Corcyra has no real
reason to be unhappy with they way they have been treated by Corinth [Thuc.,1.38.4]. It
is here we begin to understand the Corinthians viewpoint and perspective concerning
their relationship with their colony of Corcyra. It is a relationship that has always been
difficult, and a relationship that according to Corinth has been a one sided affair, with
Corcyra unjustifiably dishonoring their mother state. This relationship is the first main
point in the argument that Corinth represents the theme of honor in the Corcyra. The
Corinthians are arguing to Athens that the honorable justification for war against
Corcyra is the dishonor and disrespect which they themselves have been shown.
The second relationship to examine in the Corinthians’ speech is the one
between they and Athens. After raising points about the Corcyraeans’ dishonorable
nature, as well as the inaccurate interpretation of the their ability to enter with Athens
into alliance while maintaining the Thirty Years Peace treaty, Corinth then expounds
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upon their own relationship with Athens [Thuc.,1.3940]. Corinth argues that Athens
should not form any alliance with Corcyra, but instead should be willing to side with
Corinth due to the fact that Athens has no previous relationship or treaty with Corcyra,
but certainly is in treaty with Corinth [Thuc.,1.40.4]. They then argue further that they
are the ones deserving of an alliance due to the fact that Corinth stood by Athens during
the defection of Samos, as well as the support they rendered during the war with the
Aeginetans [Thuc.,1.41.2]. Within their argument for why their relationship with Athens
should take precedence over an alliance with Corcyra, the theme and role of honor can
be seen just beneath the surface of what is actually being said. Corinth wants Athens to
honor their friendship, to honor past kindness, and to honor what is right politically
through this alliance between the two. Corinth has argued how and why the
Corcyraeans are wrong, how they have been dishonorable, and they appeal to Athens
to not do further dishonor by choosing Corcyra over themselves. The Corinthians
certainly hope that such ideals of honor and friendship will win out among the Athenians
over that which will be discussed next, the theme of interest.
In relation to Corinth and Corcyra, Athens is apparently at a crossroads when it
comes to choosing between the two. Both have stated their case and made fairly
intriguing arguments as to why Athens should align with one or the other. They have
also tried to refute the positions of one another, seemingly trying to play a rhetorical
game of he said she said. However, I argue that the one thing that Corcyra does far
better than Corinth, is in appealing to Athen’s interests. Corinth is content to try to sway
Athens by appealing to their sense of honor, of justice, of right and wrong, but beyond
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that they have not made a case for why it would be in the Athenians best interest to side
with them. To be sure, they try to refute the Corcyraeans argument concerning the two
naval powers joining together, but only can muster a rebuttal by claiming that Athens
should not give up the support of larger states because “Abstinence from all injustice to
other firstrate powers is a greater tower of strength than anything that can be gained by
the sacrifice of permanent tranquility for an apparent temporary advantage”
[Thuc.,1.42.3].
On the other hand, I would argue that the proposal the Corcyraeans make
concerning the joining of their navy with the Athenians’ is the strongest point that they
have. Like the Corinthians, they attempt to appeal to Athenians’ sense of justice,
claiming to be the victim in the Epidamnus situation, pleading for help, and ultimately, as
seen previously, appeal to underlying fears about the impending war with Sparta.
However the most convincing point, in my mind, is the opportunity to ally the
Corcyraean and Athenian navies together. This opportunity, above any other points
Corcyra makes, is what I believe appeals most to Athenian interests. More importantly,
it helps explain how Athens represents the theme of interest in the Corcyraean debate.
The Athenians’ willingness to potentially involve themselves with the conflict between
Corcyra and Corinth speaks directly to their interest and desire in furthering their empire
to the west. Athens is placed between the two bickering sides, and cannot simply
choose between right or wrong, or who deserves their help, but Athens must be getting
something out of the deal, and it has to coincide with their wants and desires.
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Thucydides himself gives an explanation as to why Athens ultimately chose
Corcyra. He states that many Athenians, like Corcyra, felt that the war with Sparta was
inevitable, and that Athens hoped to let Corcyra and Corinth weaken each other, and
that such action would be beneficial in the oncoming war [Thuc.,1.44.2]. He then points
out, almost in passing, that “the island seemed to lie conveniently on the coasting
passage to Italy and Sicily” [Thuc.,1.44.3]. Conford questions Thucydides’ assertion that
it is the Athenians alone making such a decision without the influence of Pericles.4
Cornford wonders aloud why Pericles is never mentioned by Thucydides during the
narrative of the debate, but ultimately concludes that Thucydides is right in stating that
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the Athenians acted without Pericles influence or approval. I would agree with
Cornford, adding that I believe that the decision made spoke more to the Athenians’
interests as a whole group within the assembly, rather than simply relying on or being
influenced greatly by the advice or opinion of Pericles.
Kagan argues that Athenian interest in allying with Corcyra was a strategic
interest, rather than a material one.6 Kagan’s argument is interesting, at least when one
considers the fact that the Assembly first was inclined to ally with Corinth, but later they
chose to ally with Corcyra instead, with the stipulation that the alliance was to be a
defensive rather than offensive one [Thuc.,1.44.1]. I would agree with Kagan that it is
because of their strategic interest in Corcyra, rather than any material interest was the
reason for allying with Corcyra. For the Athenians at this point in their empire, fear of
war with Sparta, or obligations of honor to a neighbor such as Corinth do not outweigh
4
Cornford, F. M. Thucydides Mythistoricus. (London, 1907), p. 4043.
Cornford, p. 43
6
Kagan, D. The Outbreak of the Peloponnesian War. (Ithaca, 1969), pg. 240241.
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such strategic interest in allying Corcyra as an opportunity to move their empire further
west into Sicily or elsewhere. It can be seen, with this point in mind, how Athens
represents the theme of interest with the Corcyraean debate.
Thus far, I have argued that the subtext of the Corcyraean debate places
Corcyra, Corinth, and Athens as symbolic representations of the themes of fear, honor,
and interest. The next part of my argument is that this first debate acts as a foundation
for these themes throughout Thucydides’ writing. I will next discuss these themes
separately, analyzing and highlighting examples within the work and then explain why I
feel they are important to work as a whole.
The first theme of fear does seem to fit naturally within the context of a long,
difficult, violent war between many states. One can imagine the horror one might feel
the first time they saw a fellow soldier stabbed or bludgeoned to death, or the terror one
might feel realizing that you were going to drown as your ship is destroyed during a sea
battle. As fear is a natural consequence of war, it also makes sense that it would be
discussed among those involved in the war. One of the first instances that fear is
discussed beyond the Corcyraean debate is the Corinthians speech after Sparta has
voted for war against Athens in 432 [Thuc., 1.120]. After recognizing Sparta has finally
come around to their way of thinking, the Corinthians urge the other states of the
Peloponnesus to also vote for war, and state simply, in relation to war plans and their
execution being successful or not, that “when it comes to action, fear causes failure”
[Thuc.,1.120.5]. What the Corinthians are saying is that the Peloponnesian states
cannot not allow fear to cripple or stop them from choosing to go to war with Athens, nor
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can they allow fear to overcome individual plans or courses of action during such a war.
They also understand that some states will join the fight because of fear, while others
will join out of interests, as they mention later in their speech [Thuc.,1.123.1]. The
Corinthians understood the motivating factors of fear, honor, and interest. As we saw
earlier in the Corcyraean debate, they argued the importance of honor, while also
playing off of the fears of Corcyra, and at the same time, attempted to appeal to
Athenian interests. In this speech, Corinth knows that fear will be a motivator, but they
also know that the interests of specific states will also be factor.
As we saw with Corcyra in relation to Corinth, fear is something that can motivate
a state to action, however, in the above example, Corinth is arguing that the opposite is
true as well, that fear can unmotivate or push a state into inaction or indecision. One
example of this dynamic of fear is seen in the reactions of both the Hellenes and
Athenians near the beginning of the war. Many young Hellenes were motivated to ally
with Sparta and go to war due to the fear and apprehension they felt in being overrun by
the growing Athenian empire [Thuc., 2.8.5]. On the other hand, there were Athenians
living in the country outside the city, who were unsure, fearful, and hesitant with having
to leave their homes and move into the walled capital [Thuc., 2.16.2]. This dynamic of
action and inaction can again be seen much later, when the Syracusan general
Hermocrates hopes that fear will not stop Camarina from uniting to fight the Athenians
[Thuc., 6.79.3]. Fear, in this case, may motivate Camarina to try to ally with Athens, but,
as can be seen, fear may also cause Camarina to stand still and refuse to fight against
them with the other states of Syracuse.
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One of the more interesting things to notice in the text is that no one is immune to
fear, and sometimes it is not only side involved in a battle that is fearful of the other, but
both sides are found fearful of one another. It makes sense however, because from a
top down perspective, commanders are charged to rally their troops and to show
courage in face of the dangers of war. From a bottom up perspective, it logically follows
the soldiers of both sides of a conflict will be afraid of those dangers. Such is the case in
429 when the Peloponnesians battle at sea with the Athenians near the mouth of the
Crisaean Gulf [Thuc., 2.8789]. After losing a previous battle to Athens, the
Peloponnesian soldiers were afraid to go out to battle against them again, but the
commanders wanted not to wait for reinforcements, and realized it was necessary for
them to try to quell such fear [Thuc., 2.86.6]. The commanders tell their men that the
previous defeat gives them “no just ground for apprehension” [Thuc., 2.87.1], that
“brave hearts must always be brave” [Thuc., 2.87.3], and that “a faint heart will make all
art powerless in the face of danger. Fear takes away presence of mind, and without
valor art is useless” [Thuc., 2.87.4].
One thing that is clear in this speech is that the commanders know all too well
that their men are afraid of another battle. What is most intriguing however, is that the
commanders clearly also know that their forces are inferior to those of the Athenians,
yet they try to persuade their men to believe that in spite of this inferiority, they still
should not be fearful because they have numbers on their side. “Against the fear
induced by defeat...remember too, that you have always the advantage of superior
numbers...number and equipment give victory” [Thuc., 2.87.56]. The Peloponnesian
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commanders try their best to convince their soldiers that their fears are unfounded, and
that previous defeat means nothing in relation to future victory. The Athenian
commander Phormio, likewise, realizes his men are afraid of another battle, and
attempts in a similar fashion to encourage his men to fight without fear, noting that that
Peloponnesian numbers are not a match for their superiority at sea [Thuc., 2.8889]. It is
apparent that fear, according to the commanders on both sides, is simply an emotion
that has to be overcome in order to be successful in battle. However, fear is not always
so easily overcome, and one of the consequences of fear which I will touch next on
briefly, is panic.
Fear, as we have seen earlier, can be a motivator as well as a cause for stasis or
inaction; and fear, if strong enough can even cause panic. Panic within the
Peloponnesian War occurs on numerous occasions, but I wish to highlight just one
example, and that is during the harbor battle between Syracuse and Athens in 413
[Thuc., 7.75]. After a long campaign of fighting, the Syracusans now hope to capture the
entire Athenian fleet by blockading the entire harbor entrance, which as Thucydides tells
us is almost a mile in width [Thuc., 7.59.3]. Having blockaded the length of the harbord
with various ships, the battle thus commenced, and terror and panic quickly spreads
throughout the Athenian ranks [Thuc., 7.70.6, 7.71.7]. In reading the account of this
battle, one cannot help but feel sympathy for those involved. Thucydides describes a
battle that appears as violent, chaotic, and uncertain as anything else one could
imagine. It seems only logical that such panic would break out amongst the soldiers, as
they are fighting among such noise and confusion, that it would be nearly impossible to
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have any sort of real coordination amongst themselves, and any strategy previously
devised would have been quickly useless to them. Fear and panic in the Peloponnesian
War as Thucydides describes them can and will often go hand in hand, at least when
the fear is great enough. The fear that often times a factor in the decision leading up to
war, can also at times be a deciding factor within a war or battle itself.
The theme of honor, as we have seen with fear, plays an equally important role
in Thucydides work. Honor is a principle found within all stages of the war among both
Athenians and Spartans, from preparation and the persuasive speeches, through the
battles themselves, and within the grim aftermath of conflict. The first example I wish to
examine is that of preparation for war, specifically in the persuasive speech of those
who are in favor of taking up arms.
During an assembly in Sparta after the siege of Potidaea, the Corinthians
admonish Sparta to realize that Athens is hurting its allies, and urge them for this
reason to vote for war against their enemy in common [Thuc., 1.68.12]. Athenian
envoys happen to be present at the assembly, and ask to respond to the accusations
against them made by the Corinthians, a request which is granted [Thuc., 1.72]. After
both parties had made their claims, the Spartan king Archidamus then addresses the
assembly, urging for caution, yet also urging for preparation in case war does ensue
[Thuc., 1.8086]. After having heard all three of these speeches, one of the Spartan
ephors, Sthenelaidas, then addresses the assembly [Thuc., 1.86]. He boldly declares
that Sparta should immediately declare war on Athens, exclaiming “Vote therefore,
Spartans, for war, as the honor of Sparta demands, and neither allow the further
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aggrandizement of Athens, nor betray our allies to ruin...” [Thuc., 1.86.5]. Honor, as a
precursor to war, is used with great effect here in this example. After all that was said
and after all the long speeches by Corinth, the Athenians, and the king himself, it seem
that all that was needed to get the Spartans to vote for war was to shout at them that
the honor of Sparta demanded that they do so. To be fair, they must have believed
some if not much of the Corinthians had said, and they did not wholly ignore the advice
of Archidamus, but they certainly were also highly motivated by the ideal of Spartan
honor. And it is with this ideal of honor that Spartan soldiers were expected to fight.
In Amphipolis in 422, the Spartan leader Brasidas found himself in a favorable
position to launch a surprise attack on the Athenian troops stationed there, and decides
to explain his plan to his inferior number of troops [Thuc., 5.8.4]. In the speech, Brasidas
tells his men that now is the time to attack, because as he puts it, “the most successful
soldier will always be the one who most happily detects a blunder...seizing the
opportunity of the moment” [Thuc., 5.9.4]. He then admonishes his men to fight with the
honor that is befitting a Spartan soldier, saying “Show yourself a brave man, as a
Spartiate should; and do you, allies, follow him like men, and remember that zeal,
honor, and obedience mark the good soldier..” [Thuc., 5.9.9]. Indeed, of all Spartan
attributes, honor, according the Brasidas is one of the most important traits that an
individual can have, and it shows not only in the decisions and speeches leading up to
war, but ought to be present amongst the soldiers during battle.
It follows that as honor is trait amongst the leaders and soldiers before and
during a battle, that honor should be sought in the aftermath as well. I would argue that
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there is no better example of a state searching for honor than in the funeral oration of
Pericles in 431/0. In this speech, Pericles extols the virtues of Athenian politics, culture,
society [Thuc., 2.37, 2.38, 2.40] and most importantly, mentions frequently the ideal of
honor and respect which the soldiers who have died earned in battle [Thuc., 2.42.4,
2.43.1]. He eloquently marks the importance of such honor when he says, “It is only the
love of honor that never grows old; and honor it is, not gain, as some would have it, that
rejoices the heart of age and helplessness” [Thuc., 2.44.4]. It is this love of honor that
both Sparta and Athens, as well much of the rest of Greek world clings to. It is
fascinating to think that this ideal of honor, supposedly attained by great deeds or hard
won victory, or in defeat as is the case with the Athenians Pericles is speaking of, can
only truly be conferred upon an individual by others. Honor cannot be simply be
bestowed on oneself with such deeds or heroics, someone else must recognize such
acts or deeds as honorable. It is strange to think how honor is placed between fear and
interest, two things which seem in comparison, selfish and individualistic. However that
does not mean honor is not strived for by individuals, despite it’s inherent objectivity,
certainly it has been shown in the previous examples how those involved in the
Peloponnesian War strove to attain honor in many aspects of the conflict.
The last theme in my argument is that of interest. Of all the examples of interest
in relation to war itself, none summarizes it more succinctly than Hermocrates, while he
addressed the various groups and stats of Syracuse in 424, when he says, “I suppose
that no one will dispute that we went to war at first in order to serve our own individual
interests, and that we are now, in view of these same interests, debating how we can
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make peace” [Thuc., 4.59.3]. Hermocrates is speaking here of several states on the
island of Sicily who, for their own individual interests and reasons, have become
involved in the conflict with Athens. He is saying, what I would argue, is one of the most
simple, yet important lines in the whole of Thucydides’ work. Nations, states, and
polities large and small, go to war for their own interests, and when the war is over, they
want to find peace, because of those same interests. They do this because it serves
only themselves. Polities of all kinds have to look out for their own interests, otherwise,
there is almost no point in their existing. If a polity or state does not look out for their
own interests, they might well be swallowed up or encompassed by a larger, more
powerful polity who is looking out for it’s own interests, and hopefully, the interests of its
newly incorporated citizens.
Within the Spartan confederacy there also existed the importance of realizing
how another state’s interests could support or diminish your own state’s interests. Such
is the argument made by the Corinthians during their speech at the beginning of the war
in 432/1 [Thuc., 1.120] In this speech they speak directly to the inland states of the
Peloponnesus, warning them that their interests may be in danger if they do not take
part in helping the coastal powers in the war effort [Thuc.,1.121.2] Within this context,
we can understand that much like the Corcyraeans previous policy of isolationism, a
state’s interests can and will be affected by outside influence and power, and a state
must be aware and carefully consider how its own interests may be affected or affect
others.
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I would argue that one of the best examples of this interplay of states’ interests is
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found in the dialogue between Athens and the small island of Melos. Within the Melian
dialogue, we see Athenian interests completely overshadow and dominate those of the
people Melos. In fact, one of the most telling lines concerning interest comes from the
Melians themselves, when they state that the Athenians have forced them to “let right
alone and talk only of interest” [Thuc., 5.90.1.] The Melians argue that the Athenians
have completely set aside any discussion of what is morally right or wrong, and are only
willing to consider their own interest. The Athenians have justified their position and plan
to attack the island by simply proclaiming that “the strong do what they can and the
weak suffer what they must” [Thuc., 5.89]. Whatever the arguments between right and
wrong that have been discussed previously concerning the Melian dialogue, the
argument I make here is that Athens has come to a point in this war where they are
willing to completely ignore all others’ interests in attempting to secure their own. They
refuse to listen to any argument the Melians attempt to make, and are certain that their
own power justifies the ultimatum that they offer to them. The Melians interests of
course, at this point lay in getting out of this situation in any way possible, however, they
refuse to simply submit, and then suffer the consequences [Thuc., 5.112.2, 5.116].
Interest rather than justice or mercy of any kind, win out in this situation, but such
selfinterest wins out over and over again throughout the Peloponnesian war.
7
Lebow, R. N. “Thucydides and Deterrence.” Security Studies 16, no. 2 (April, 2007), p. 180. Lebow, in a fascinating
article in which he argues that Thucydides frames many of the speeches around compellence and deterrence,
discusses the Melian dialogue, pointing out how the dialogue features the themes and motives of fear, interest, and
honor, and how those themes interact with one another between the Athenians and Melos.
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The question now is why these examples of fear, honor, and interest matter,
especially in relation to the Corcyraean debate. Why, as I argue, does Thucydides place
Corcyra, Corinth, and Athens, symbolically representative of these themes as the first
speech in his work? I conclude that he did this simply because he was an Athenian. As
an Athenian general, he himself was influenced by Athens’ foreign policy of defending
their empire through these three principles. He wrote his work from an Athenian
perspective, and as objective as he was with his work, such an influence is not hard to
imagine nor, as I have shown, is it overly difficult to see within the work itself. To be
certain, there are many themes that permeate Thucydides work; there are themes of
justice, violence, military strategy, religion, morality, political expediency, and so on. But
the themes of fear, honor, and interest, I believe that they are at the beginning, in the
Corcyraean debate, because Thucydides knew they could serve as a foundation for the
rest of the work, serving as a constant reminder of the motivations and the justifications
of war, and how such justifications and motivations, and the violence that follows them,
not only affect individuals, but entire states and peoples.
18
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Tyler R Evans