Anth 340 Coast Salish Trench Embankment Defensive Sites: Evidence for Siege Warfare in the Late Pacific Period Jeremy Buddenhagen 3/15/2011 If we are to gain any appreciable knowledge of pre-contact warfare on the Pacific Northwest Coast (PNWC) we must evaluate not only the injury, weaponry and symbolism of war but also the “architecture of war” (Martindale and Supernant, 2009). This essay will explore one aspect of defensive combat; trench embankment fortified sites dating from the late Pacific period, 1500 BP to 500 BP. An analysis of these sites will reveal insights into precontact Kwakwaka’wakw offensive warfare. Drawing on evidence primarily from the archaeological record but also from ethnography and history, we will look beyond small scale conflict “such as raiding, ambush and surprise attacks that tend to characterize tribal warfare” (Lambert, 2002) and explore the possibility that in the late period Kwakwaka’wakw war followed more formal siege battles typical of state-level warfare (Keegan, 1993; Keeley, 1996). Precontact warfare on the PNWC has received a considerable amount of attention over the past 20 years (Ames and Maschner, 1999; Angelbeck, 2007, 2009; Coupland, 1989; Cybulski, 1990, 1992, 1994, 1999; Donald, 1997; Lambert, 2002; Lowrey, 1999; Lovisek, 2007; MacDonald, 1989; Maschner, 1996, 1997, 1998; Moss and Erlandson, 1992; Reedy-Maschner and Maschner, 1998; Schaepe, 2006). Skeletal evidence suggests a long history of violence on the coast (Cybulski, 1990, 1992, 1994, 1999). The development of larger villages and war paraphernalia supports the theory that violence was on the rise between 1500 B.C. and 500 A.D. (Ames and Maschner, 1999; Fladmark et al., 1990). After about 800 A.D. there also appears to be an increased concern with defense (Cybulski, 1992, 1994). Around 400-500AD a shift occurred in settlement patterns in the lower Alaskan Panhandle from “convoluted shorelines with good canoe haul outs and productive shellfish beds” to “refuge rocks, fortifications and less accessible village locations indicative of concern with defense” (Lambert, 2002, 212-213; Ames and Maschner, 1999, MacDonald 1989, Maschner, 1992; Maschner, 1996; Maschner 1997; 2 Maschner and Reedy Maschner, 1998; Maschner and Stein, 1995; Mitchell, 1990; Moss and Erlandson, 1992). During this same period approximately 1580-510 BP trench embankment defences appeared on the South coast in Coast Salish territory (Keddie, 1984, 1995, 1996; Angelbeck, 2009). The appearance of small arrow points on the south coast and tapered bone points in the north after 200-500 A.D. heralds a new form of warfare, from primarily hand to hand combat to longer distance and siege tactics (Ames and Maschner, 1999, 200; Maschner, 1997). Experimentation with tapered bone points showed they were more fragile but also more likely to penetrate common armour used in the historic period (Lowrey, 1999). This interpretation adds considerable depth to our understanding of siege warfare. The appearance of bone points with more durable ground slate suggests violence was common enough that arrows were specifically manufactured for war. Their co-occurrence with defensive sites marks a significant change in the tactics of war. Coast Salish trench embankment sites typically are small refuges placed atop a geographic feature with a high level of defensibility, for example, Angelbeck (2009:190-195) lists high bluffs, rocky headlands and peninsular spits as the most common locations for these sites. Keddie (1984: 7) describes trench embankment sites around Victoria as: …located on the point of a raised peninsula partially separated by an intentionally dug trench about two metres deep and several metres wide. Others were located on the edge of a steep bluff. The dirt from the trench was piled on the seaward side to support the base of a wooden palisade. The combination of trench and palisade made access to the inside more difficult for attackers. Because these fortifications required significant amounts of labour, natural geographic features, such as ravines, were utilised whenever possible to minimise the necessity of digging extensive trench networks. Trench embankments represent a substantial archaeological record, yet no significant battlefield analysis as to why this style of fortification was adopted has been performed. To date the analyses tend to rely on the dominant theories of war, petty raiding and 3 blood feuds (Codere, 1950; Hirsch, 1999; Callaway, 1978; Lovisek, 2007; Donald, 1979; Donald, 1984; Donald, 1987; Mitchell, 1984; and many more). However, the lack of analytical depth at the battlefield level leaves too many obvious questions unanswered. The first and most obvious question is why trenches? Moss and Erlandson (1992: 76) tell us that trench embankments “seem largely confined to Coast Salish territory.” North coast defensive sites may utilise palisades but they do not seem to have trenches (Moss and Erlandson, 1992: 74-75). This suggests there is something particular about the nature of battle in Coast Salish territory to warrant trenches. Twelve trench embankment sites have been dated from 1500 BP to 500BP, unfortunately seven of the twelve are from the immediate Victoria area and the remainder of dated sites do not stretch farther North than Gabriola Island (Angelbeck, 2009: 262). No dates have been recorded for the sites near the Coast Salish Kwakwaka’wakw border. Additional chronological studies at fort sites in the Northern reaches of Coast Salish territory are necessary before we can definitively state that trench embankments were born out of conflict with the Kwakwaka’wakw. We can, however, make some reasonable speculations based on what we do know. Angelbeck tells us that the Coast Salish shifted their fortification style from trench embankment to stockades, in the historic period. These trenches surrounded villages rather than serving as refuges. What was different in the post contact era that warranted abandoning trenches? Three reasons seem most apparent, first, the arrival of gunpowder must have had profound effects on Indigenous warfare (Collins, 1950; Worcester and Shiltz, 1984). Second, the population decline caused by the smallpox epidemic possibly led to the reduced size of offensive forces; therefore, defences were no longer required to be as ‘thick.’ Thirdly, this decline in population caused a rise in raiding to replenish populations similar to the effects on the 4 Haudenosaunee (Iroquois) “Morning-War” tradition (Richter, 1983). Angelbeck (2009) considers that the increased traffic of ‘Northerners’ “add[ed] an element of insecurity for the Salish that was not present before contact” (Ferguson 1984: 299). He considered “stockaded residential villages [to] have the advantage of being in convenient locations and full-time protection but had weaker defenses than trench-embankment sites” (Angelbeck, 2009: 273). But, this begs the question why not construct trenches in addition to the stockade? The heightened sense of insecurity surely warranted additional defensive measures. Furthermore, why abandon trench embankments? The main inconvenience of trench embankment sites, lack of water, could have been easily solved in the post contact period with European containers. The answer lies in the evolution of battle tactics, trenches were no longer necessary because battle had moved from siege assaults to musket skirmishing. Devastated population numbers could no longer sustain the numbers needed for assaults. The increased lethality of musketry rendered traditional armour, which had been moderately successful against arrows, useless. Angelbeck (2009) posits that trench embankments served as temporary strongholds. He comments, “As refuges [were] occupied for short durations, these sites indicate that a group resorted to them because a threat was known beforehand” (Angelbeck, 2009: 272). It is difficult to reconcile this theory with his invocation of Mitchell’s (1968: 45) statement that: “... [T]he aboriginal fighting pattern rarely involved siege, being instead, dependent almost entirely upon surprise as a tactic.” Angelbeck commented that Mitchell “provided an insight to the trenchembankment strategy, commenting that such a defensive structure would have served well given the nature of warfare practices in the region:” (Angelbeck 2009: 271). How can a trench embankment serve as a refuge only when forewarning of an attack is given, yet at same time the dominant war strategy is surprise attack? Moreover, if villagers have forewarning of an imminent 5 attack, why not flee into the woods? Why go to all the trouble of building these elaborate fortresses? In reality, South coast Late Pacific battle did not follow the patterns set out by Mitchell or Angelbeck. I want to suggest a more historically sensitive argument. Battle evolved alongside the developments in technology as well as in response to Coast Salish enemies, namely the Kwakwaka’wakw. As we have already seen, the archaeological record suggests violence was on the rise from 500 A.D. to contact (Ames and Maschner, 1999; Fladmark et al., 1990), at the same time archery began to influence the course of war (Ames and Maschner, 1999: 200). If we consider that pre-archery warfare was largely characterised by melee weapons it is reasonable to suspect that by the Late Period there was a significant period of overlap whereby warfare utilised both archery and melee weapons. War often has a variety aims and causes, which are beyond the scope of this paper, however, the bias to petty raids and blood feuds in PNWC scholarship has blinded scholars to a fundamental principle of war --decisive victory. The aim in war is not to raid for slaves or steal stores of food, but rather to defeat the enemy. This is not to say these things didn’t occur, but in true war these are secondary goals. Angelbeck’s (2009: 229) recounting of the Coast Salish alliance against the Lekwiltok exemplifies this point succinctly. The Coast Salish wanted to send a clear message to the Lekwiltok. To accomplish this they had to defeat a large portion of Lekwiltok warriors, not raid Lekwiltok villages. This suggests trench embankments are specific counter-measure to decisive defeat. As Angelbeck (2009) suggests the important members of a village and its warriors could retreat to the refuge. However, unlike Angelbeck I would suggest the offensive forces would lay siege to the fort. If offensive forces were there only to raid the nearby village then what is the purpose of digging labour intensive trenches? Could palisades not 6 serve just as effectively as they did in the North? Similarly, as stated before, why not simply evacuate the whole village to a well camouflaged refuge in the woods and wait out the attack? Why place trench embankment fortifications in prominent positions with high visibility for both the attacker and defender? Trenches and their location imply a different style of combat. Specifically, they were designed to reduce the kinetic energy from a charge and they may also have served to complicate the use of battering rams or incendiary devices. More generally, they suggest a more formal code of war. Siege warfare with specific codes of conduct exist in the ethnographic record for the Kwakwaka’wakw. In a siege battle for Hekums 1 between the besieged Guauaenok and the Kueha, the Kueha were called out to “not fight with slings, but man to man with spears” (Curtis, 1915: 115). The ensuing battle that followed was characterised by formal battle tactics. First a rush of spears, followed by war clubs 2 to dispatch the wounded, and archers were deployed on the flanks for covering fire. The narrative concludes by stating “since that time the Guauaenok have been last among the tribes, whereas they formerly were first” (Curtis, 1915: 115). This narrative suggests two things: first, war followed set patterns or codes, and certain types of war were ‘unmanly.’ Second, the objective of war was decisive victory, evidenced by the Guauaenok lowly position after the battle. Decisive victory was a central component to the “Kwakwaka’wakw art of war” (Buddenhagen, 2011). Common interpretations of palisades allude to defensiveness against arrows, however, arrows in war are rarely shot straight, rather they are shot in an arc to maximise range and 1 Now know as Hopetown (http://maps.google.com/maps?hl=en&safe=off&rlz=1G1GGLQ_ENCA280&q=hopetown+british+columbia&um=1 &ie=UTF-8&sa=N&tab=wl), for historical map see Galois (1994: 93, map 2.4, Gw7). 2 War clubs tend to look more like swords and are sharpened causing one observer to note “tapered down so sharply as to have made the weapon a formidable one in the hands of a headhunting Kwakiutl warrior” (Hollingsworth, 1924: 200-201) 7 lethality. Therefore, we can speculate that straight palisades would have been somewhat ineffective against an arched volley of arrows. This is not to say they did not afford some protection, but it is reasonable to conclude that trench embankment defensive strategies represent an attempt to defend against projectile and melee weapons in siege styled battle. The abundance of bone point artifacts, fifty six in total, at the at Rebecca Spit defensive site (Mitchell, 1968: 3738) combined with Lowrey’s (1999) conclusions on the penetrating power of bone points suggests defenders were fighting armoured soldiers. Kwakwaka’wakw armoured soldiers are a common occurrence in the historic record (Newcombe, n.d.; Curtis, 1915: 98; Jones, 2004). The combination of the above war narrative and armoured soldiers indicates siege style warfare was common. The cultural organisation of the Kwakwaka’wakw was also particularly well suited to siege warfare. Historic and ethnographic sources typically characterise the Kwakwaka’wakw, in particular the Lekwiltok, as well organised for war (Mitchell, 1989, 5-6), whereas, the Coast Salish are virtually, though wrongly, reduced to passivism (Angelbeck, 2007). It is clear from historical records the Lekwiltok were able to overpower the Coast Salish much of the time. Mitchell (1989) stated they were a “superior fighting organisation” because Kwakiutl extended households, however, were additionally associated as members of welldefined descent groups––numayms––as important sub-units of the local group. These divisions were linked through the formal ranking system to provide a structure for Kwakiutl society lacking for the Salish (Mitchell 1989:6). Angelbeck concludes: In the Lekwiltok case, the warriors form part of a ranked institution that extended beyond and existed separate from the organization of households. Consider the difference in effectiveness with organizational power: one can put one’s energy into canvassing individuals to your cause in warfare, appealing to their self-interests or convincing them of its justification––in such cases, the power to join is heavily in the control of the free individual. Or, the secret society of warriors pursuing this attack can demand that its members participate in the attack, or be barred from membership in that institution––the weight is on side of the institution, or the secret society. For the Lekwiltok, their warrior 8 societies were already an institution––already organized and at the ready––whereas Coast Salish war parties were formed after efforts of organizing for each occasion (Angelbeck, 2009, 91). In addition, during the historic period the Kwakwaka’wakw tended to have a much higher population from which to draw warriors (Harris, 1994). Lastly, Kwakwaka’wakw technology conferred advantages as well. For example, Kwakwaka’wakw possessed a variety of canoe styles closely associated with war (Newcombe, n.d.; Curtis, 1915, 109). The WhitExglE or war canoe was the most important. These canoes could easily facilitate long distance assaults with a capacity of 60 occupants; even just five canoes could provide a decent siege force. One profound problem with analysing warfare on the PNWC is that historical accounts have influenced war narratives and are not necessarily reflective of pre-contact realities (Ferguson and Whitehead, 1992). Historic and ethnographic accounts of war on the PNWC tend to emphasize petty raiding and blood feuds over sieges. This may be in part the result of population decline due to smallpox. Lambert (2002, 208-9) stressed that the variability of historical and ethnographic accounts of war meant that archaeology gives us an “unparalleled capacity” to understand pre-contact warfare. Lambert is perhaps too optimistic about the ability of archaeology to transcend the problems of subjectivity in scholarship, but her enthusiasm was echoed by Schaepe (2006) and is cautiously shared by this author. Cleary more archaeological research on trench embankments is needed. I do not want to suggest that surprise attack or ambushes were not significant parts of the Kwakwaka’wakw warfare, however, the monumental effort to construct trench embankments sites is not warranted by petty raiding and blood feuds. Sneak attack likely was a significant part of the warrior’s repertoire but, the substantiality of trench embankment defensive sites suggests they were constructed to repel more than simple sneak attacks. This leads us to consider that siege warfare was part the Kwakwaka’wakw of warfare in the Late Pacific Period. 9 References Cited Angelbeck, William 2007 Conceptions of Coast Salish Warfare. In Be of Good Mind: Essays on the Coast Salish edited by Bruce Miller. UBC Press, Vancouver. Angelbeck, William 2009 They Recognize no Superior Chief: Power, Practice, Anarchism and Warfare in the Coast Salish Past. University of British Columbia PhD Thesis, Department of Anthropology. 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