Cyprus in Late Antiquity was a thriving and densely populated province. During the sixth and seventh centuries, the growing affluence of the island is conspicuous in comparison to other regions of the Eastern Roman Empire. In the traditional historical view, the late antique period on Cyprus ended abruptly as a result of the Arab raids of the mid-seventh century. The original focus of urban archaeology on monumental structures and Christian basilicas tended to stress the impact of these raids further; layers of destruction were often uncritically associated with the Arabs, overshadowing archaeological evidence that hinted at continuities beyond the mid-seventh century. In recent decades, archaeological research on late antique Cyprus has shifted its focus away from urban centres and single monuments in favour of a more contextual perspective. Building on well-established traditions of field prospection, diachronic survey projects and small-scale excavations are revealing a complex web of settlement patterns. They have shown that economic, political and cultural contacts between the island and the wider eastern Mediterranean were continued. Moreover, they also suggest that the end or transformation of occupation on individual sites cannot always be explained by catastrophic events, but should be interpreted in terms of local adaptation to changing needs and contacts. This symposium brings together archaeologists and historians engaged in the study of Cyprus between the sixth and eighth centuries. They will collate the results of recent and past research to arrive at a comprehensive, interdisciplinary reconstruction of life on the island in the Long Late Antiquity. Registration link: https://www.eventbrite.co.uk/e/cyprus-in-the-long-late-antiquity-registration-132113090811

Cyprus has always been perceived as a stepping-stone of cultural and economic communication joining various areas of East Mediterranean. The Location of Cyprus is usually dealt with in terms of cultural and trade exchange. In first half of 7th century CE the strategic significance of Cyprus on Near East was clearly highlighted. Even partial control over the Island, isolated Egypt, thus making the defense of this province extremely difficult unless impossible. This report is to draw attention to the military importance of the island in the first half of 7th century CE.

The victory of the Ottomans at Djerba (1560) and the Great Siege of Malta (1565) were perceived as a serious threat to the West and led the Pope to mobilize the Catholic states to build an alliance against the Ottomans. Although the Malta siege was fended off successfully by the West, it was obvious that the Ottomans would continue their expansion in the Mediterranean. The toppling in 1570 by the governor of Algeria, Uluç Ali Paşa, of the ruler of Tunisia, a vassal of Spain, and his open support for the Morisco revolts in Spain, was the best proof of it. In the face of Ottoman expansion, it did not appear easy to build an alliance which would counter the Turks both on sea and land by incorporating also the Habsburgs' Austrian branch, but at least a Christian fleet could be formed led by Spain and Venice. In this respect, Spain, ruled by Philip II, would obviously not oppose it. The real issue for the Pope was to convince the Republic of Venice, which had a large fleet in terms of sea power. Venice, using its commercial relations with the Ottomans as an excuse, initially opposed the Pope's proposal. However, in the summer of 1570 after the Ottomans had commenced their siege of Cyprus, which was under the domination of Venice, this time it was the Venetians who came up with the proposal of an alliance. Eventually, a Christian alliance (the Holy League) was formed in order to save Cyprus first of all and then to ensure that the Ottomans would no longer be a threat to the West in the Mediterranean. While this study was prepared comparatively from both Turkish and Western sources, rather than describing the anatomy of a war, it examines the relative causes leading to the conquest of Cyprus and their effects.Öz Osmanlıların Cerbe zaferi (1560) ve Malta Muhasarası (1565) Batı’da ciddi bir tehdit olarak algılandı ve Papa’nın Osmanlılara karşı bir haçlı ittifakı meydana getirilmesi hususunda Katolik devletleri harekete geçirmesine yol açtı. Malta kuşatmasının Batı tarafından başarıyla savuşturulmasına rağmen Osmanlıların ilk fırsatta Akdeniz’deki ilerleyişlerini sürdürecekleri ortadaydı. Cezayir Beylerbeyi Uluç Ali Paşa’nın 1570’de Tunus’un İspanya’ya tâbi hükümdarını devirmesi ve İspanya’daki Morisko isyanlarına açıkça destek vermesi bunun en iyi kanıtıydı. Osmanlı ilerleyişi karşısında, Habsbugların Avusturya kolunu da dâhil ederek hem karadan hem de denizden Türklere karşı saldırıya geçecek bir ittifak gücünün kurulması kolay gözükmese de en azından İspanya ve Venedik’in başını çektiği bir Hıristiyan donanması meydana getirilebilirdi. Bu hususta II. Felipe’nin yönettiği İspanya’nın muhalefet etmeyeceği ortadaydı. Papa için asıl mesele deniz gücü bakımından büyük bir donanmaya sahip olan Venedik Cumhuriyeti’ni ikna edebilmekti. Venedik, Osmanlılarla sahip olduğu ticari ve ekonomik ilişkileri bahane ederek Papa’nın teklifine başlangıçta karşı çıktı. Fakat Osmanlıların 1570 yazında Venedik hâkimiyetindeki Kıbrıs adasını kuşatmaları üzerine bu sefer ittifak önerisi ile sahneye çıkan Venedikliler oldu. Neticede öncelikle Kıbrıs’ı kurtarmak ve Osmanlıları Akdeniz’de Batı’ya karşı bir tehdit unsuru olmaktan çıkarmak adına bir Hıristiyan ittifakı kuruldu. Bu çalışma, Türk ve Batılı kaynaklarla karşılaştırmalı olarak hazırlanmış olup bir savaşın anatomisinden çok, tarafları savaşa götüren sebepler ve sonuç ilişkisi irdelenmiştir.

A straightforward narrative in chronological order apart, the study seeks to reevaluate in detail, as the evidence allows, a number of key events and issues in the history of ancient Cyprus at the time of the kingdoms. The nature of Cypriot kingship, the ethnicity of the Cypriots (Appendix 1), the position of Cyprus within the Persian Empire, the role of the island in the Ionian Revolt, its relation to the Hellenic League and Athens and the Delian League, what the Peace of Callias entailed for it, the reign of Evagoras etc., are amongst the topics examined.

The victory of the Ottomans at Djerba (1560) and the Great Siege of Malta (1565) were perceived as a serious threat to the West and led the Pope to mobilize the Catholic states to build an alliance against the Ottomans. Although the Malta siege was fended off successfully by the West, it was obvious that the Ottomans would continue their expansion in the Mediterranean. The toppling in 1570 by the governor of Algeria, Uluç Ali Paşa, of the ruler of Tunisia, a vassal of Spain, and his open support for the Morisco revolts in Spain, was the best proof of it. In the face of Ottoman expansion, it did not appear easy to build an alliance which would counter the Turks both on sea and land by incorporating also the Habsburgs' Austrian branch, but at least a Christian fleet could be formed led by Spain and Venice. In this respect, Spain, ruled by Philip II, would obviously not oppose it. The real issue for the Pope was to convince the Republic of Venice, which had a large fleet in terms of sea power. Venice, using its commercial relations with the Ottomans as an excuse, initially opposed the Pope's proposal. However, in the summer of 1570 after the Ottomans had commenced their siege of Cyprus, which was under the domination of Venice, this time it was the Venetians who came up with the proposal of an alliance. Eventually, a Christian alliance (the Holy League) was formed in order to save Cyprus first of all and then to ensure that the Ottomans would no longer be a threat to the West in the Mediterranean. While this study was prepared comparatively from both Turkish and Western sources, rather than describing the anatomy of a war, it examines the relative causes leading to the conquest of Cyprus and their effects.

In this dissertation I draw on a variety of Venetian and Ottoman visual, architectural, narrative and poetic sources to shed light on how groups and individuals in these two imperial polities imagined the political significance of conquering and possessing Cyprus. The period under scrutiny is between the island’s Venetian annexation in 1489 and the aftermath of its Ottoman conquest in 1571. In investigating the ways in which different Venetian and Ottoman actors attached historical, mythological, political and eschatological connotations to Cyprus or exploited the already existing ones for their political ends, I pick apart various early modern discursive threads about the Venetian and Ottoman occupations of Cyprus, and then study how they were entangled within and across religious and political boundaries in the early modern Mediterranean and beyond. The result is the only cultural study of how the two major sixteenth-century Mediterranean empires contested the island and what it meant for their respective imperial projects.