Clausewitz states that it is far more difficult to understand strategy than tactics since things move very slowly in strategy and the principal actors are far away from the heat and friction of the battlefield. Thus strategy is a hundred more times difficult to comprehend and conduct than tactics. In this final chapter which sums up all that happened we will endeavour to arrive at a strategic summing up. The first fact that stands out is that the men who dominated the Indo-Pak scene, in the period that we have studied, both soldiers and politicians, were all tacticians, none being a strategist! They, some of whom were great men, were caught in historical currents, which were too strong to be manipulated! On one side was a Jungian situation with deep hatred of communalism firmly ingrained in the unfathomed and mysterious subconscious of the vast bulk of the populace! An irrational albeit substantial hatred that increased with leaps and bounds as ambitious middle and higher classes fought for jobs and legislative council seats! These men were clever in a tactical way, having been to some British University or a Legal Inn and were driven by burning egos to be the successors of the British Viceroys! Initially they borrowed some leafs from Europe's Nationalism and talked about India and India's independence as a country! Politics, however, remained in the drawing rooms of rich businessmen and feudals and chambers of barristers and lawyers till the First World War. The First World War constitutes a watershed in world history! It destroyed five Empires, four i.e the Romanoff, Hapsburg, Hohenzollern and Ottoman totally and one i.e the British who won the war but theirs was a Pyhric victory! They lost the will to retain their empire since the flower of its youth was destroyed on the battlefields of France! This fact was indirectly acknowledged by Alan Brooke the British Warlord once he admitted in writing that Britain lost its best men in the First World War. The First World War aroused great expectations in India and the mild lawyers who dominated the Indian political scene before the war saw far greater opportunities in the near future! If Lenin could mobilize the masses in the name of revolution and Kemal could do it in the name of Turkish Nationalism, why not mobilize the Indian masses too over some slogan! Alas India was only a geographical expression! A mosaic of complicated ethnic groups, castes, religions, sects! Who could be the Indian Lenin or Mustafa Kemal! How to bring a revolution! A Hindu called Gandhi discovered one cheap tactical response! A melodramatic employment of ancient Indian/Hindu slogans and names! This wily man tactically outwitted the outwardly

25 CAVALRY IS DEPLOYED BY PATIALA PATHAN, COL NISAR ON THE MOST FATEFUL AND DECISVE 8TH SEPTEMBER 1965 , WHEN INDIAN ARMY WAS IN A POSITION TO DEFEAT PAKISTAN IN A FEW HOURS April 2023 DOI: 10.13140/RG.2.2.29434.57282 Agha H Amin MAJOR SHAMSHAD ALI KHAN KAIMKHANIS DESCRIPTION ABOUT DEPLOYMENT OF 25 CAVALRY ON 8TH SEPTEMBER 1965 We had barely finished our tea, when the Technical Officer of the Regiment, Captain Farrukh Khan (later CGS) appeared on the scene and passed the following message "Indian tanks have crossed the border at Charwa. Advance immediately on Pasrur - Chawinda - Charwa track, behind B squadron, and stop the enemy where ever contacted. The Squadron Commander ordered me to lead and move with full speed. Due to excitement, I did not not realize that I was standing on Shehzada Level crossing and moved on track leading to shehzada village after negotiating the level crossing. The Squadron followed. It was only after covering quite a bit of distance that Major Raza realized that I was moving in the wrong direction. He ordered me to stop and turn left and hit Chawinda track. I flashed back "on my left are sugar cane fields, I cannot turn left". It was impossible to over run a sugarcane field in peace time. While making that transmission, it did not occour to me that war had started. Back came the reply from Major Raza "forget about the bloody sugarcane field, it is war, turn left". I immediately turned left and as the tank track crushed the four feet high sugarcane, it was confirmed to me that war had started. After hitting Chawinda track, I turned and moved with full speed behind B squadron. While we were going in direction of Chawinda, civilian population was moving towards Pasrur, mostly on foot, men, women and children. It was a pathetic sight. Most of them so scared that when our tank approached them they went to ground or hid behind trees. Probably they took us as Indians. Our infantry which was deployed on the border was also withdrawing towards Pasrur. A course mate of mine from 3 FF, who later became a full Col recognized me on the tank and waved at me. It was a strange sight. Elements of the same force were moving in opposite direction in a hurry. Our advance positions were subjected to intense artillery fire throughout the night. It was only in the morning that the Indian armour crossed the border and moved unopposed in the absence of our anti-tank weapons which unfortunately could not sustain the heavy bombardment and abandoned their positions before Indian armour showed up to be shot. Had our troops shown a fraction of tenacity as compared to the German soldiers who opposed the Allied forces in the battle of Kasserine pass, the situation today would have been quite different. As we passed through Chawinda, I noticed that the inhabitants were greatly relieved. Now they knew that the Indians would not be able reach their homes. They threw flowers on our moving tanks which gave us a feeling of strength and raised our spirits and morale. On the outskirts of Chawinda I saw my CO Lt Col Nisar Ahmed in his Jeep who had followed the leading B Squadron and was returning to Pasrur. He asked me about Major Raza. I informed him that he was following behind. The CO asked me to leave the track and move cross-country, keeping left of the track. My CO had followed the leading squadron which was now out of my sight. However, he knew the location of B squadron and the fact that enemy had been contacted and tank to tank battle had started. I now feel that he should have given that information to me. I acquired this information through a strange phenomenon. In tank warfare, eyes are more useful than ears. Suddenly I noticed that branches of trees were falling down. I ordered the driver to halt and picked up my binoculars. I noticed the little amount of dust which was raised when a tank shot hit the ground. I also noticed disturbances created in the sugarcane fields when a shot was fired, which otherwise was standing still. These observations indicated that I had reached very close to the enemy who was engaging our B squadron which was still out of my sight. Due to heavy vegetation, interspersed hutment, maize / sugarcane fields, observation was limited to 50 yards. The squadron had advanced non-stop in line ahead formation to contact the enemy from Pasrur till such time we hit Sialkot - Phillora track. Thereafter I controlled the movement of my Troop by adopting leap frog battle formation and made extensive use of binoculars. The enemy had reached the area much before us and was engaged in a firefight with B Squadron. It was the enemy which initiated the firefight with C squadron by firing a shot at my tank at about 8.00 am,2 which fell a few yards short of the tank. My instant reaction was to reverse my tank as I had not yet located the tank which had fired that shot. I took position behind a raised ground, probably a deserted kiln. I then passed message "hello 61, fired at from Gadgor side, I am safe, out". I tried to locate the enemy through binoculars but did not succeed. The squadron commanders tank was not visible, but he had directed the squadron not to go ahead of my tank, but to spread left of my tank. And then the squadron got deployed in extended line formatiom, left of Phillora - Charwa track. 'A' Squadron, which was following us was directed toward right of track and eventually got deployed right of B squadron. And thus 25 Cavalry adopted three squadrons up battle formation. I cannot say what was the frontage covered by B and A squadrons, but I can say that C squadron did not cover more than a 1000 yards on the left of the track, On our left, it was all unprotected. 2 Various published accounts state that C Squadron 25 Cavalry was launched at about 1130 Hours , so we assume that this may be a memory failure of Major Shamshad , although not really significant to this narrative , and in no way reduces the great significance of Major Shamshad’s narrative. While my Troop was deployed between the track and village Josun, it did not cover more than 500 yards frontage. The visibility was limited to 50 yards and I was more than satisfied if visual contact with one of my tanks could be maintained.

I was surprised that British artillery historians simply hoodwinked and whitewashed the brilliant handling of the company’s artillery in this battle ! The only reason that I could deduct was “professional jealousy” . Colonel Tombs commanding the company’s artillery in this battle was an outstanding soldier , who had excelled at the two battles of Ghaziabad as well as at Badli as an artillery leader ! He had already won a VC at Delhi and his role in the great cavalry action of 9th June 1857 was crucial. Dictionary of Indian Biography by Buckland described the real artillery hero of this battle as below:-- “BLUNT, CHARLES HARRIS (1824-1900) Major General : entered the Army, 1842 : was in the Bengal Horse Artillery : was in the Satlaj campaign, 1846, at Sobraon : also in the Panjab campaign : in the mutiny, raised " Blunt's Horse," was at the siege of Delhi, battle of Najafghar, action at Agra, (Lord Clyde's) relief of Lucknow, where he was the hero of a very dashing performance with the guns at the Sikandarbagh, at the action of Shamsabad, the capture of the fort and town of Kalpi : Brevets of Major and Colonel : C.B : Lord Roberts refers to his splendid courage in leading his guns in the advance on Lucknow : his troops suffered severely at Delhi and Agra, seldom, if ever, has a battery and its commander had a grander record to show " - died. Aug 15, 1900.” 25 Later Lord Roberts who was also from the Artillery and won a VC in 1857-59 war described Blunt as below:--26 “At the commencement of the Mutiny Blunt was a subaltern, and in ten months he found himself a Lieutenant-Colonel and a C. B. Quick and great rewards indeed, but nothing more than he richly deserved; for seldom, if ever, has a battery and its commander had a grander record to show.” However sadly Robert’s also totally whitewashed the role of Blunt at Najafgarh ! But we find Stubbs, Buckle and Gimlette simply ignoring this great man. Blunt who apart from Tombs played most crucial role in this battle was also simply ignored. Forrest cannot be blamed as he was a civilian but Kaye and Malleson also were guilty of ignoring artillery in this most decisive battle of 1857 rebellion ! In this situation of ignoring great achievements of leadership in deploying artillery” one British author came to our rescue. This anonymous officer who was a direct participant in siege of Delhi thus preserved for us and thus stated:-- “They hadnine guns to the right front, which now began to play. Their leaders no doubt expected, that our troops would immediately form and advance across the fire of their artillery. Nicholson, however, having stationed his guns on the road, which was pretty well covered, marched the infantry past. He then ordered four guns of Captain Blunt’s troop to move on their nine to keep them in play, and, covering his flanks with some cavalry and artillery, led the infantry against the serai on the left, near which were four guns.” 27 This crucial paragraph saved Blunt’s role for us at Najafgarh, which the so called respectable artillery historians of British artillery TOTALLY WHITEWASHED ! In a larger context the account reaffirms that Tombs commanding artillery was one of greatest artillery commanders of 1857-59 battles. I have left race , nationality and religion in an interim connecting room when I entered the chamber where I am writing this history , to structure time of my retired life ! Another writer came to our rescue in understanding where were Blunt’s two remaining guns ! Cave Browne thus described:-- “The village of Nujuffghur, beyond the serai, on our right, was consigned to Lumsden with Ids Rifles (Coke’s); that on the left, which seemed more strongly occupied, was made over to Captain Blunt, with four guns and a small detachment of cavalry, to watch till the infantry should bo available for an attack. The reserve was composed of Blunt’s two remaining guns and tlie rest of the Mooltanees under Lieutenant Lind”.28 Nicholson’s force crossed the nala by 1700 hours in the evening and Nicholson meanwhile already across with HM 9 lancers squadron and Guides carried out a quick appreciation and decided to attack the serai which he assessed was the key to the rebel position. Nicholson’s plan was to deploy 10 horse artillery guns on left flank , four on right flank and two guns in reserve. 2nd Punjab Infantry on left , 1st European Fusiliers of the company in centre and wing of HM 61 Foot on right. While 1st Punjab Infantry was to clear Najafgarh village on left which was not occupied by rebels. The baggage was left on northern bank of the nala with an escort of squadron of 2nd Punjab Cavalry and 200 Multani Horse. 100 men from each infantry battalion , which came to 400 and two horse artillery guns were kept as reserve. Nicholsons attack plan is depicted in map below:- The attack was astonishingly successful with Nicholson leading from the front. The brunt of the action was born by wing of HM 61st Foot who lost six killed including one officer.1st Europeans lost only three killed and 2nd Punjab Infantry had NIL killed ! HM 9 Lancers squadron on left suffered NIL casualties .29 Guides on right flank lost only two killed and the horse artillery lost two killed which included one man from HM 6th Dragoons who was performing duty as a gunner. The harsh reality of Najafgarh was that the real hero of this battle was Tombs and Blunt who by masterly planning as well as execution had already neutralized the Neemuch Brigade ! Thus the very low casualties suffered by the three battalions attacking the Serai ! However as happens in war , infantrymen take all the credit while the really crucial artillery is ignored.Such was the fate of Tombs and Blunt as far as the battle of Najafgarh was concerned. 1st Punjab Infantry (Coke’s) successfully cleared Najafgarh village without any opposition . However Nicholson later ordered it to clear Nagli village which it surrounded . Number of rebels defending this village was few in number but they became desperate being surrounded. Thus 1st Punjab Infantry suffered considerable casualties while occupying it which numbered twelve including its gallant acting commanding officer Lieutenant Lumsden.30 Nicholson ordered 1st Punjab Infantry to clear the village Nagli where the rebels although few in number offered desperate resistance as surrounded thus 1st Punjab Infantry suffered highest losses in this action. i.e 12 killed including Lieutenant Lumsden. The reformed infantry now advanced towards the bridge while the rebels brought guns on the east bank of Najafgarh and engaged the companys troops.Nicholson ordered Tombs to deploy on west bank of the drain and silence these guns which Tombs did most effectively.

THE ROT OF FLEEING THE BATTLE , WRONG WORDS OF COMMAND AND TACTICAL FIASCOS WAS A SPECIAL TO BRITISH ARMY FEATURE IN INDIAN BATTLES June 2022 DOI 10.13140RG.2.2.28701.18405 Project MILITARY HISTORY Agha H Amin

In contrast to recent historiographical trends that seek to emphasise ideological judgements about the use of South Asian labour by colonial authorities, or the rather nostalgic way some tend to view the old Indian Army, this was a force born of necessity and forged by very pragmatic conditions appropriate to its tasks. It was also a force that retained distinct cultural identities, with British encouragement, which reinforced its cohesion. This paper traces the evolution of the army, emphasising the necessity of the changes, to produce, by 1947, a highly successful organisation.

Colonial armies unquestionably proved the most durable of all the institutions left behind by the British and French empires. Most postcolonial states (with the notable exception of India) have spent time under military rule. Governments have fallen and states have collapsed , but armies have rarely disintegrated during de-colonization. Daniel Marston's careful study looks at a period when the British Indian Army was deeply strained by defeat and yet held together during extreme turmoil. Even more strikingly, it remained cohesive in the face of a partition of its own ranks between India, Pakistan, and a residual British Empire. He argues that the army's role in " preventing total societal breakdown during the transfer of power has generally been overlooked or underestimated " (p. 5). This story is clearly and effectively told and contains much rich detail and telling anecdotes. Marston has also done the historical profession a service by interviewing a large number of veterans before they and their memories are lost to history.