History of Warfare

This paper, for a conference on figures of Vojvodina in the context of European history, deals with field marshal Count András Hadik (1710-1790). Hadik belonged to a
noble family whose members held prominent positions in the Evangelical Church and the army. He began his military career in the Hussars, and distinguished himself in the many
Austrian wars of the 18th century. Stories abounded of his un
flinching courage and heroic exploits, best exemplified by the taking of Berlin in 1757. In 1763, Empress Maria Theresa granted him a patent for lands including the settlements of Gložan, Pertovač, Kisač, Rumenka, Begeč and —
ten years later — Čerević. To his military exploits, Hadik added significant political activity. As commander - general and governor of Transylvania from 1764 to 1768, Hadik was the first Hungarian official to propose abolishing serfdom. In 1769 he was royal commissioner at the Serbian Ecclesiastical assembly in Sremski Karlovci; in 1774 he was promoted to
field marshal and named head of the imperial war council. In 1776 he was appointed guvernor of Bács-Bodrog county. After injuries sustained during the 1789 siege of Belgrade,
Hadik was replaced as commander in chief of the Austrian army by Marshal von Laudon. The following year Hadik died. He is buried in Futog.

Гроф Андраш Хадик, (1710−1790) дао је богат прилог историји Аустријске монархије, Угарске и Футога, а стекао је славу и у европским размерама. Заслугама стеченим
у 23 похода Аустријске монархије, од ситног племића и заставника у хусарском пуку уздигао се до титуле грофа Немачке империје, односно маршала аустријске војске. Као председник Дворског ратног савета значајно је допринео осавремењавању аустријске војске. Краљица Марија Терезија поверила му је деликатне војнополитичке задатке: био је гувернер Будимпеште, Ердеља, Галиције; бавио се статусом и проблемима православних. Као
велики жупан Бачко-бодрошке жупаније и властелин футошког поседа унапредио је привреду јужне Бачке, помогао је насељавање Словака и Немаца, изградио је цркву, школу и замак у Футогу. Иза себе оставио је богату архивску грађу од значаја и за јужнословенске
народе.

Coins, Artists, and Tyrants contains the first fully translated and revised text of Lauri Tudeer, Die Tetradrachmenprägung von Syrakus in der Periode der signierenden Künstler, as well as a biography of Tudeer, plus a completely new evaluation of signed coin dies and the artists who produced them. Over 100 years after its first publication, the author completely updates the scholarship and bibliography on signed Syracusan tetradrachms, making this book the single most important source on the subject. The book includes plates, a full-color die-link chart, and three pull-outs featuring Syracusan tetradrachms and hoards.

Ouvrage publié avec le soutien du Centre national du Livre et de l'Institut d'Histoire du droit Jean Gaudemet (Paris 2 - CNRS - Archives Nationales). 2022. 1 016 p., 2vol., broché, 15,5 x 23,5 cm. ISBN 978-2-7453-5648-2. Histoire et archives N° 21.

This PhD dissertation is accessible via the link below.

ABSTRACT

There are arguably two ways of understanding the fundamental processes of military history. One emphasizes unchanging principles in warfare and that conduct of war is largely dictated by the physical realities. The other claims that the ways of war are more-or-less cultural constructs. I approach this “military culture debate” by analysing the land and naval warfare in the area that surrounded the Aegean Sea, which had belonged to the Byzantine empire in the late twelfth century. The period discussed extends from the Fourth Crusade (1202–1204) to the early 1420s.

The region and era in question are suitable for testing different understandings of military history. It is a geographical and geopolitical region where two major groups of conquerors arrived in the thirteenth century. The Catholic Christian Latins represent the western European ways of war of the time and the military traditions of the Muslim Turks originated from the steppe and from the east. Both settled in the region and founded realms. Therefore, they had to adjust themselves to the environment. Similarly, local Orthodox Christian, mostly Byzantine, rulers had to adapt to the situation.

I compare the composition of armed forces and willingness to engage in battles of the above-mentioned three groups fighting in the region. My study analyses what influence their cultural background had on their conduct in these matters. I provide new information about the warfare of the study era and increase our understanding of why the Ottoman Turks were able to conquer most of the region.

I found that the “culturalist” understanding of military history usually had the best explanatory potential in the scope of my research. The belligerents tried to construct their armed forces and fight their wars in a manner guided by their cultural background. To a certain extent they had to adapt to the local conditions, but in the issues dealt with here it was mainly a question of adapting to the social structures and the adversaries, rather than to the climate and geography of the region. The armies shared a growing number of similarities as time went by, but the influx of troops from outside the region and religious doctrines contributed to differences in the composition of armed forces and thus how wars were waged.

The Ottomans apparently made the best use of the military potential of regions they controlled. This was probably one of the key reasons why they prevailed in the study area. For cultural reasons, the Christian powers tended to neglect the use of certain groups of people in the military. Thus their forces were more often supplemented with mercenaries and allies whose reliability was uncertain and this had adverse consequences, particularly for Byzantium.

As regards engaging in battles, an important issue was how reliable the people living in fortified towns were perceived to be, which influenced how necessary it was to fight in the open. Transporting of siege-equipment, on the other hand, hampered the possibility of  avoiding battles. The Latins showed more battle-willingness in their warfare than the other belligerents in the conflicts of the region. There were cultural reasons behind this. It should nevertheless be noted that there was variation in the battle-willingness of the Byzantines depending on commanders, circumstance, period, and adversary. Much of the Turkish and steppe nomad warfare consisted of raids in which battles were usually avoided. However, battle-willingness was more apparent in the conflicts of the great Muslim dynasties, and when the Muslim leaders faced one another, or when they repulsed invasions of Christian powers in their own regions. This battle-willingness of the Turks could come as surprise to the latter.

In academia.edu you can read the introduction and content. The full work is in the address: https://helda.helsinki.fi/handle/10138/335952?fbclid=IwAR2fdr-1l31x5qX2exQLkuHGMRLUqe8mHxNQUe_VFEoHcg7NvygTINZ-1rM

16. yüzyıl ortalarında yazıldığı düşünülen ve Osmanlı askerî literatürünün göz ardı edilmiş bir eseri olan O. 50 numaralı anonim askerî yazma 16. yüzyılda yazılmış bazı askerî yazmalar ile mukayese edilerek incelenmiştir. Bu çalışma ile söz konusu eser tanıtılmaya ve askerî tarih çalışmaları içerisindeki yeri konumlandırılmaya çalışılmıştır.
Anahtar Kelimeler: Müsellahnâme/ Silahşornâme, Tuhfetü’l- Guzât, O. 50 Numaralı Anonim Eser, askerî yazmalar, atlı tüfekçilik, Askerî Devrim.



O. 50 Anonym military manuscript which is thought to be written in the middle of 16th century is a disregarded source that I examined by comparing with some other military manuscripts which were written in the 16th century. This study aims to introduce this anonym book and evaluate its place in the military history literature.
Keywords: Müsellahnâme/ Silahşornâme, Tuhfetü’l- Guzât, 0.50 Anonym Book, military manuscripts, mounted musketeers, Military Revolution

ABSTRACT in English (the book is written in French):
This book presents a thorough analysis and a case study upon the "petite guerre" in the 18th century Europe - tactical and operational levels dealt with, as also relations between war and society (with a substantial historical reminder, in a large chapter exclusively devoted to the 17th century).

The “petite guerre“ was a type of warfare consisting in skirmishes and ambushes which, next to the sieges and battles, filled the theatre of operations during the conventional wars between princes. The locution "petite guerre" with this meaning was always used in the singular, and has to be used so today. The first treatises on the art of the “petite guerre” were published in France, from the mid-eighteenth century onwards. The locution “petite guerre” wasn’t translated into English in the eighteenth century, even in treatises published in Great Britain or America (on the contrary, it was translated into German).

Next to the case study of the Flanders during the War of the Austrian Succession (1740-1748), the book makes an analysis of the thoughts on the “petite guerre” throughout the eighteenth century, in France and in the most important countries of Europe. A special chapter is devoted to the thoughts in Great Britain throughout the 18th century, and to the case study of the actions of British light troops in Flanders (example of 1747), because this topic has not been dealt with before - On the contrary, one book already dealt with the case study of Austria's and another, with the case study of Prussia's use of the "petite guerre" in the eighteenth century.

Besides the tactical level, the book shows how the use of the "petite guerre" was necessary to contribute to the victory in a military campaign at the operational level. In Flanders between 1745 and 1748, the Marshall of Saxe (commander of the French Army) and the Allies (Austrian, British and Dutch armies and their commanders) understood the advantage and importance of the "petite guerre" at this level. A case study shows in detail how the "petite guerre" strongly contributed to the main aims of the French army in August 1746.

However, the topic of the book goes beyond the scope of a tactical and operational study. By showing the impact of the “petite guerre” on civilians and on the activity of the provincial administration, by analyzing the French government policy towards light troops (the light troops were the specialists of the “petite guerre”), by approaching the opinions of the Parisian society (and of the elite as a whole) towards such military tactic and the troops specializing in it, what is at stake is also the possibility to grasp the ideas and sensitivity of society towards the “petite guerre”. This work is thus a contribution to a larger study ‒ that of an era's mentalities towards military issues.

The conclusion of the book offers the beginning of an analysis of the transformations in the use of the “petite guerre” during the revolutionary and Napoleonic wars.

Цель данной статьи - выявить основные элементы процесса тотализации войн в XX в. и определить специфику взаимодействия этих элементов друг с другом. Выделяются три подобных элемента (технологии, идеологии, государства) и рассматривать их взаимосвязь на различных примерах из истории войн XIX - XX вв. с особым вниманием к периоду с 1914 по 1945 гг.

This article explores the role of postcards in the maintenance of relationships between combatants and civilians during the First World War. By drawing on untapped archival material found during wider research into the morale of English infantrymen, it concentrates on the multiple uses of this medium in correspondence between the Western and Home Fronts. Following the ‘cultural turn’ in military history it has become increasingly apparent that the gulf between those fighting and those left at home was much narrower than previously assumed. This analysis charts the variety of ways in which postcards helped to bridge this divide.

There is much detailed information about the organisation and strength of the army that Jan III led on their march to relieve Vienna: the structure, weapons and equipment of the units, even down to company level. All formations, from the winged hussars to artillery, are covered. The background of the commanders – including not just the King but other high-ranking officers – are also presented. However, the book does not focus solely on the relief of the city. The remaining actions of the campaign in 1683 are also described, such as both battles of Párkány and the arrival of the Lithuanian army, together with Polish and Cossack actions in Podolia and Moldavia, which were forever in the shadow of the main events of 1683. Finally, the organisation and military actions of the troops under the command of Hieronim Augustyn Lubomirski, and raised as Imperial auxiliary division in Poland, is also covered.

The book is based on many primary and secondary sources, including diaries, letters and surviving muster rolls of  individual units and the whole army. Many of these have not previously been available in English, and provide an extremely interesting insight into the seventeenth century views and observations of the army and the campaign.

Using case studies extracted from primary sources produced predominantly in Brazil and Cuba, this article contends that West African military commanders and troops in both regions during the first half of the nineteenth century exhibited an ethical behavior associated with war, which was strongly tied to their cosmologies of the world. Since these actions were all staged against either slavery or enslavement, it argues that the central ethical issue of whether it was right to take arms and kill people they considered enemies (jus ad bellum), was a non-issue from the moment the protagonists' and participants' plans took shape. Further ethical issues that could and would arise once each of these armed movements was underway, which were more ambiguous, are also considered in this article.

Changes in the Early Modern military technologies have fundamentally
affected the transformation in urban space: fortifications, planning, life style
of the inhabitants. At the same time, the development of new defense fortresses
and the modernization of the old ones, the providing it by garrisons and
artillery have become important elements of state policy. All these innovations
were part of the «military revolution» in Europe. Its features in this had
important place in Eastern European states among them and the Cossack
Hetmanate.
The theater of military operations on which the main enemy for a long time
were the Tatars had led to the fact that most fortifications were wood-earthen.
However, the development of firearms gradually forced to abandon brick
and wooden fortifications of the frontal type. They were supplemented with
elements of Western European fortification (bastions and ravelins), which
increased the firepower of the fortress and its defensive capacity.
At the same time, the Hetmanate did not have sufficient resources for largescale
reconstructions of fortresses and the maintenance of permanent
garrisons in them. The combination of these factors led to the fact that in the
XVIII century fortification building in the Cossack Hetmanate passed into the
hands of Russia and began to used in the interests of the Empire.

History of the Wagenburg (tabor) on the battlefields from the time of Alexander the Great to the Hussite wars in Bohemia (1420-1434).
Research paper written at the seminar "Armies and Societies" (University of Paris IV-Sorbonne) under the direction of André Corvisier, Philippe Contamine and Jean Chagniot.

In his Discorsi Politici (1599) the Venetian Ambassador Paolo Paruta (1540-1598) analyzes several topics from ancient and modern History. Writing during the passage from Late Renaissance to the Age of Raison d’État, Paruta has the opportunity to face the new Renaissance warfare: mercenary troops, modern State armies, gunpowder and fortifications. As Ambassador of the Most Serene Republic in Rome, he announced to Pope Clement VIII the building of Palmanova fortress (1593); as political writer, he shows a deep aware of this historical turning point for Venice. The Lion Republic, harshly defeated in the Battle of Agnadello (1509), can aim no more for an offensive war, it has just to try to defend its territory from the Hapsburg and the Turks. So politics and military tactics match together: as mouthpiece of the Venetian neutrality, he opts for defensive tactics. This basic choice works as historiographical criteria, too: Charles V was right in not attacking Suleiman the Magnificent during the two Sieges of Vienna (1529, 1532); the Venetian Republic was betrayed during the Italian Wars by its offensive commanders, such as Bartolomeo d’Alviano. The last sentence of Paruta’s book («[W]here the business is doubtful and difficult, we must rather adhere to that which holds us from doing any thing, then to what eggs us on») is very far from the final, offensive exhortation of Machiavelli’s Principe: Venice and Florence have different points of view not only in the Parliament, but in the battlefield too. Yet the whole Italian Renaissance is on its last legs, under the Spanish dominion of the Peninsula. No more place for Scipio Africanus: the wise Parutian politician should follow the example of Fabius Maximus in his struggle to save the borders of the State.

Among the different topics developed by S. Picaud-Monnerat, Eric Schnakenbourg selects first a difficulty for the historian, who must grasp a scattered phenomenon made of a series of actions which are not much spectacular; actions often forgotten from the “great history”. Then E. Schnakenbourg underlines and summarises the main points of view adopted by S. Picaud-Monnerat to study her subject: the military culture, with the contrast between the seventeenth century and the eighteenth century; the military operations and the contact with the civilians; the role of the state and of the general in the field. E. Schnakenbourg pays tribute to the method followed in the book, which makes this book a good example of the dynamism of military history today.

This study looks at the wars fought between Sweden Denmark, Muscovy-Russia and Poland-Lithuania from the collapse of the Livonian Order in 1558-60 to the Peace of Nystad in 1721. It uses the concept of the Military Revolution to analyse the dramatic effects of military change and prolonged warfare  on state and society in all these states.

Володіючи монополією на виробництво найсучасніших видів зброї, маючи чисельну перевагу над сусідами, трипільці в період енеоліту були на території України домінуючою військовою силою. Не
може бути жодної мови про виключно «мирний» характер давніх хліборобів та виняткову «войовничість» так званого степового населення.
К л ю ч о в і с л о в а: трипільська культура, енеоліт, сокира-молот, клевець, булава
Having a monopoly on the production of advanced weapons, having numerical superiorityover its neighbors, Trypilians neolithic period in the territory of  Ukraine were the dominant military force betveen
5000—3000 BC. Here we consider issues related to the development
of armaments and military affairs in the cultural community representatives Trypillia-Cucuteni, detail focusing on the major components of complex military weapons that were the basis of military power Trypilians for nearly two thousand years. Details will focus on the
potential reconstruction of armamentand armor protection with regard to archaeological and ethnographic materials.
We can consider development of weapons, such as hammer-axes, daggers, spreading of effective copper weapons. The appearance of armor and shields led to the development of offensive weapons suitable for destruction of well protected enemy. So we can observe that, as well as inthe following century, the copper age was endless race of attack and defense. The study and reconstruction of armament from
Copper Age now looks promising if the use of not only the data of archeology, but also arheometrychnyh studies, involving a wide range of ethnographic data, including the adequate understanding and evaluation of materials derived from archaeological research.

In Public Doman Review.  January, 2018
http://publicdomainreview.org/2018/01/24/the-dreams-of-an-inventor-in-1420/
and republished in: The Public Domain Review: Selected Essays, vol. VI, edited by Adam Green (Public Domain Review Press, 2019).
An illustrated look at peruses the sketchbook of 15th-century engineer Johannes de Fontana, a catalogue of designs for a variety of fantastic and often impossible inventions, including fire-breathing automatons, pulley-powered angels, and the earliest surviving drawing of a magic lantern device.

No-one disagrees that Western warfare is worthy of examination, but one
wonders if this story needs to be told yet again (European military success is, after all, a far from neglected theme in the literature and the coverage here, especially in the second half of the volume is very familiar ground indeed) at the expense of the rest of the world. The space devoted to the emergence of Western warfare in the present volume could have been substantially reduced to provide room for non-Western developments. Perhaps, a good beginning could have been made with at least one chapter on non-Western warfare, contrary to Parker’s initial suggestion, to allow the non-Western world some space in their own history. Regarding Parker’s third justification, the present reviewer has reservations as to whether the success of the West can really be understood without a more thorough investigation of how indigenous warfare emerged and why, in numerous encounters, Western warfare failed. The ability of the Burmese to delay the British advance in the First Anglo-Burmese War, the length of time it took to conclude the Java War, the much longer Aceh war, and a significant Dutch defeat in Bali in the mid-nineteenth century, all stress the need to understand the inadequacy of European armies in dealing with indigenous armies at the time and how Europeans were forced to develop new tactics and strategies, sometimes drawing upon indigenous technologies and tactics to do so. Further, as indigenous armies adapted themselves to Western warfare, many ‘Westernized’ indigenous armies fell very quickly and easily to European forces in the late nineteenth century. Afterwards, however, their rural (and hill) compatriots were able to hold off the Europeans for many years by falling back on indigenous tactics and technology.