History of Warfare and Military Thought

A native of Bruges (now part of Belgium), Jacques de Coutre was a gem trader who spent nearly a decade in Southeast Asia in the early 17th century. In addition to a substantial autobiography written in Spanish and preserved in the National Library of Spain in Madrid, he wrote a series of memorials to the united crown of Spain and Portugal that contain recommendations designed to reverse the decline in the fortunes of the Iberian powers in Southeast Asia, particularly against the backdrop of early Dutch political and commercial penetration into the region. Translated into English for the first time, these materials provide a valuable first-hand account of the bigger issues confronting the early colonial powers in Southeast Asia, and deep insights into the societies De Coutre encountered in the territory that today makes up Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand and the Philippines.

The Book of Lord Shang (4th-3rd century BCE), commonly identified as a major work of the so-called Legalist school, is also an important, albeit much neglected treatise in the history of Chinese military thought. Beyond specific recommendations concerning both defensive and offensive warfare, the book presents a coherent view that the state should restructure its socioeconomic and cultural policies in order to turn every man into a valiant soldier. The book epitomizes the ideology of " total war " in which the differences between civilian and military affairs are blurred. The society is profoundly militarized and the army, in turn, is profoundly bureaucratized. This article explores military thought in the Book of Lord Shang and focuses on its views of mobilization, indoctrination of soldiers, military discipline, rules of military engagement, and military command. I further deal with the question of why the book's military ideology has been all but neglected after the end of the Han dynasty.

Understanding operational art in American doctrine helps to illustrate a critical stage in American military history when the notion of fighting campaigns transformed into what many considered waging war. This change can also be described as a transition from warfare, fighting a series of battles, to war, developing strategy to achieve a political aim. In a global society with rapid communications and multiple media outlets, today’s practitioners of the operational art must be able to plan tactical engagements and understand, interpret, and implement policy as a military strategy in order to fight a winnable battle. The US Army, recognizing this, revised its definition of the operational art in 2015 to include the development of strategy, and the integration of ends ways and means. This change elucidates a fundamental difference in the Army’s understanding of the theory of war and warfare, and how it plans and executes campaigns. This paper will show that the Army theory of war has transitioned from a procedural, Jominian interpretation, to a Clausewitzian theory that addresses the complex strategic and political implications of a new global environment. The change is seen through American military history as operations became more complex and ambiguous for military leaders. The essay will provide historical evidence using the theorists of Baron Antoine-Henri Jomini, Carl von Clausewitz, Georgii Isserson and operations during the American Civil War, World War II and today’s Global War on Terrorism to support this idea.

16. yüzyıl ortalarında yazıldığı düşünülen ve Osmanlı askerî literatürünün göz ardı edilmiş bir eseri olan O. 50 numaralı anonim askerî yazma 16. yüzyılda yazılmış bazı askerî yazmalar ile mukayese edilerek incelenmiştir. Bu çalışma ile söz konusu eser tanıtılmaya ve askerî tarih çalışmaları içerisindeki yeri konumlandırılmaya çalışılmıştır.
Anahtar Kelimeler: Müsellahnâme/ Silahşornâme, Tuhfetü’l- Guzât, O. 50 Numaralı Anonim Eser, askerî yazmalar, atlı tüfekçilik, Askerî Devrim.



O. 50 Anonym military manuscript which is thought to be written in the middle of 16th century is a disregarded source that I examined by comparing with some other military manuscripts which were written in the 16th century. This study aims to introduce this anonym book and evaluate its place in the military history literature.
Keywords: Müsellahnâme/ Silahşornâme, Tuhfetü’l- Guzât, 0.50 Anonym Book, military manuscripts, mounted musketeers, Military Revolution

In his edition of Caesar's Gallic Wars, Andrea Palladio imagines that the ancient model could bring military skill back to contemporary Italy. through many drawings (large engravings) he tries to represent Caesar's great battles. The article studies Palladio's intention and the precision of the images.

Birinci Dünya Savaşı’nın her iki tarafında memleketlerinden farklı yerlerde müttefikleriyle birlikte savaşan  askerler,  çeşitli  akademik  çalışmalara  konu  olduğu  halde  Avrupa’daki  Türk  askerlerinin varlığı göz ardı edilmiştir. Birinci Dünya Savaşı’nda Doğu Avrupa’da  görev  alan  15.  ve  6.  Türk Kolordularının Avrupa’daki varlıkları ve faaliyetleri çağdaş dünyanın savaş tarihi açısından önemlidir.
“Birinci  Dünya  Savaşı'nda  Avrupa'daki  Türk  Cephelerinden  Galiçya - Romanya” örneğinde,  askerî tarih kaynaklarından elde edilen tespitler bu çalışmanın gündemini oluşturmaktadır. Öncelikle savaş tarihine  dair  kavramsal  bir  çerçeve  çizilerek Askerî  Tarih  ile  Savaş  Tarihi  arasındaki  ilişki  ele alınmıştır. Bu kavramsal çerçevede Galiçya ve Romanya (Dobruca) cephelerindeki Türk birliklerinin durumu,  çalışmanın  genel  kapsamını  teşkil  etmektedir.  Çalışmanın  işlenişinde  arşiv  belgeleri  ve konuya ilişkin diğer kaynaklardaki bilgiler irdelenmiştir. Çalışmanın gündemi doğrultusunda oluşan metindeki her bir başlık iki boyutlu olarak Galiçya ve Romanya cephelerine açılan pencereler olarak şekillenmiştir. Her başlık, arşiv belgeleri ve diğer kaynakların sağladığı imkân doğrultusunda savaş tarihine dair tespitleri barındırmaktadır. Savaş tarihinin prensiplerinden olan hedef, komuta birliği, taarruz, kitle gibi unsurlar ekseninde, savaşın çeşitli boyutlarına değinilmiştir.

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The  soldiers  of  both  blocks  fighting  abroad  with  their  allies  in  WWI  have  been  subject  to  various  academic researches, but the adventure of the Turkish soldiers in Europe during the same period has been overlooked.  The  presence  and  the  operations  of  the  Turkish  15. and  6.  army  corps  in  Europe, however, is of importance of the war history of contemporary World. The topic of this research is the results derived from the sources of military history with regard to the Turkish Galicia-Rumania fronts in  WWI.  The  current  research  draws  a  theoretical  framework  about  war  history  at  first,  and  then  examines the relationship between “military history” and “war history”. Within the same framework, the  general  situation  of  Turkish  troops  in  European  fronts  will  be  handled  in  outline. During  the research, the archival documents and other material relevant to the topic were utilized. Throughout the main  text,  each  subtitle  was  arranged  so  as  to  be  placed  under  either  of  the  dual  topic  of  European fronts.  Each chapter  with  separate  titles,  as  far  as  the  archival  documents  and  secondary  sources allowed,  involves  findings  about  war  history.  The  study  as  a  whole,  touches  various  aspects  of  war history within the framework of such elements as mission, unity of command, attack and masses, all being the principles of war history.

The application of mathematics to a problem or question often leads to a deeper understanding of the problem or question and sometimes to an answer to the problem or question. The application of mathematics to warfare is possible in many situations, especially in relation to matters that involve the range, rate of fire, accuracy and effectiveness of missile weapons such as bow and arrows and firearms. This enables us to explain the results of many battles in the past and to predict the results of many battles in the future as many battles in the future may involve missile fire.

ABSTRACT in English (the book is written in French):
This book presents a thorough analysis and a case study upon the "petite guerre" in the 18th century Europe - tactical and operational levels dealt with, as also relations between war and society (with a substantial historical reminder, in a large chapter exclusively devoted to the 17th century).

The “petite guerre“ was a type of warfare consisting in skirmishes and ambushes which, next to the sieges and battles, filled the theatre of operations during the conventional wars between princes. The locution "petite guerre" with this meaning was always used in the singular, and has to be used so today. The first treatises on the art of the “petite guerre” were published in France, from the mid-eighteenth century onwards. The locution “petite guerre” wasn’t translated into English in the eighteenth century, even in treatises published in Great Britain or America (on the contrary, it was translated into German).

Next to the case study of the Flanders during the War of the Austrian Succession (1740-1748), the book makes an analysis of the thoughts on the “petite guerre” throughout the eighteenth century, in France and in the most important countries of Europe. A special chapter is devoted to the thoughts in Great Britain throughout the 18th century, and to the case study of the actions of British light troops in Flanders (example of 1747), because this topic has not been dealt with before - On the contrary, one book already dealt with the case study of Austria's and another, with the case study of Prussia's use of the "petite guerre" in the eighteenth century.

Besides the tactical level, the book shows how the use of the "petite guerre" was necessary to contribute to the victory in a military campaign at the operational level. In Flanders between 1745 and 1748, the Marshall of Saxe (commander of the French Army) and the Allies (Austrian, British and Dutch armies and their commanders) understood the advantage and importance of the "petite guerre" at this level. A case study shows in detail how the "petite guerre" strongly contributed to the main aims of the French army in August 1746.

However, the topic of the book goes beyond the scope of a tactical and operational study. By showing the impact of the “petite guerre” on civilians and on the activity of the provincial administration, by analyzing the French government policy towards light troops (the light troops were the specialists of the “petite guerre”), by approaching the opinions of the Parisian society (and of the elite as a whole) towards such military tactic and the troops specializing in it, what is at stake is also the possibility to grasp the ideas and sensitivity of society towards the “petite guerre”. This work is thus a contribution to a larger study ‒ that of an era's mentalities towards military issues.

The conclusion of the book offers the beginning of an analysis of the transformations in the use of the “petite guerre” during the revolutionary and Napoleonic wars.

SUMARIO: 1. EL ACUERDO ENTRE EL NORTE Y EL SUR DE IRLANDA – 2. LA OPOSICIÓN A LLOYD GEORGE – 3. SOBRE LA SUPUESTA ENFERMEDAD DE LENIN – 4. LOS GASTOS DE OCUPACIÓN NORTEAMERICANOSPORACIÓN – 5. LENIN QUIERE RETIRARSE – EL MUNDO MUSULMAN – 6. FALLECIMIENTO DEL EX – EMPERADOR CARLOS – 7. LA NOTA DEL GOBIERNO FRANCÉS– 8. LA MUERTE DEL EX – EMPERADOR CARLOS – 9. LA CUESTIÓN RUSA ANTE LA CÁMARA DE COMUNES –  10. DECLARACIONES DE CHICHERIN – CARLOS DE AUSTRIA – EL ERMITAÑO DE CRICCIETH – 11. COMUNICACIÓN DE LA COMISIÓN DE REPARACIONES – 12. REUNIÓN PRELIMINAR DE LA DE GÉNOVA – 13. LA SITUACIÓN POLÍTICA [FRANCESA] – 14. FRANCIA EN GÉNOVA – 15. FRANCIA APOYA A LA PEQUEÑA ENTENTE – 16. LA PRENSA FRANCESA COMENTA EL DISCURSO DE LLOYD GEORGE – 17. DECLARACIONES DE COLLINS Y DE DE VALERA– 18. DEL DISCURSO DE LLOYD GEORGE – LOS DOS BOLSILLOS – PRUSIA Y BAVIERA –  19. PREPARANDO LA CONFERENCIA DE GÉNOVA – 20. ¿ASISTIRÁ LENIN [A LA CONFERENCIA DE GÉNOVA]? – 21. LOS CRÉDITOS CONTRA RUSIA – 22. EL CÁDAVER DEL EX – REY CARLOS – 23. EL JAPÓN RETIRARÁ SUS TROPAS DE SIBERIA – 24. REORGANIZACIÓN DEL EJÉRCITO RUSO – EL MODERNO CARRO DE ASALTO – 25. COMENTANDO LAS DECLARACIONES DE LLOYD GEORGE – 26. LA RESPUESTA DEL GOBIERNO [ALEMÁN] – 27. LA CONSTITUCION DE EGIPTO – 28. LA DEUDA ALIADA – 29. LA FAMILIA DEL EX – EMPERADOR CARLOS – HALLE – 30. EL DISCURSO DE POINCARÉ – 31. LA DEUDA DE GUERRA – EL RETABLO DE GÉNOVA – 32. LOS ESTADOS UNIDOS Y LA CONFERENCIA – 33. LA ENTREVISTA DE LLOYD GEORGE Y POINCARE – UNA BABEL DIPLOMÁTICA – 34. DECLARACIONES DE LOS BOLCHEVIQUES – 35. LA PRENSA ALEMANA – 36. LOS BOLCHEVIQUES CONTRA LA IGLESIA RUSA – 37. COMENTARIOS DE LA PRENSA ALEMANA – 38. COMENTARIOS A LA PRIMERA SESIÓN – 39. GESTIONES DE RATHENAU – AL LEVANTARSE EL TELÓN I – EL AVIÓN DE GUERRA – 40. LA CONFERENCIA DE GÉNOVA – 41. COMENTARIOS DE LA PRENSA ITALIANA – 42. LA ACTITUD DE LOS DELEGADOS ALEMANES – 43. LA PEQUEÑA ENTENTE – AL LEVANTARSE EL TELÓN II – EL SISTEMA TER MUELEN – 44. LA CUESTIÓN DEL DESARME – 45. LA INTRANSIGENCIA DE LOS DELEGADOS RUSOS – 46. LOS DELEGADOS ALEMANES – 47. LA ACTITUD DE CHICHERIN – AL LEVANTARSE EL TELON III – 48. COMUNICADO DE LA DELEGACIÓN DE LOS SOVIETS – 49. LOS ALEMANES EXPLICAN EL ACUERDO CON RUSIA – EL AVIÓN LANZADO POR CATAPULTA – 50. RESPUESTA DE LOS DELEGADOS RUSOS – LA FIERA DOMADA – 51. DECLARACIONES DE CHICHERIN – 52. LOS REPRESENTANTES DE LA PEQUEÑA ENTENTE – 53. ALREDEDOR DEL ACUERDO ENTRE ALEMANIA Y RUSIA – 54. LA ACTITUD DE LOS RUSOS – 55. LA OPINIÓN INGLESA – 56. DECLARACIONES DE LLOYD GEORGE – LA SOLEDAD DE FRANCIA – 57. CONTRAPROPOSICIONES RUSAS – 58. LA OPINIÓN DEL GOBIERNO NORTAMERICANO – 59. DECLARACIONES DE LLOYD GEORGE – 60. RESPUESTA DE LOS DELEGADOS RUSOS – 61. LA ESTABILIDAD EUROPEA – 62. LA PRENSA ALEMANA – 63. TEXTO DE LA RESPUESTA ALEMANA – 64. LA GÉNESIS DEL TRATADO GERMANO – RUSO – FRANCIA Y POINCARÉ – DIOS LOS CRÍA – 65. MEMORÁNDUM RUSO – 66. EL TRATADO SECRETO RUSO ALEMÁN – 67.  LA PRENSA ALEMANA Y EL TRATADO DE RAPALLO – 68. EL PROYECTO DE RESPUESTA A LA NOTA ALEMANA – 69. LA NOTA OFICIOSA [ALEMANA] – 70. LA CARTA DE LOS DELEGADOS RUSOS – 71. UNA POSICIÓN ALEMANA – 72. ACTITUD DE LOS RUSOS – TÚNEZ Y FRANCIA – EL BOLCHEVIQUE Y EL REY – 73. NOTA OFICIOSA [ALEMANA] – 74. LA CLÁUSURA DE LA CONFERENCIA – 75. EL PACTO ANGLO – FRANCÉS  – 76. LA INTRANSIGENCIA RUSA – INGLATERRA Y GÉNEVA – LA MANO DE ORO – 77. DECLARACIONES DE CHICHERIN – 78. LAS NEGOCIACIONES CON DELEGADOS RUSOS – 79. UNA OPINIÓN RUSA – 80. LOS RUSOS EN GÉNOVA – 81. DECLARACIONES DE CHICHERIN – 82. LA COMISIÓN ECONÓMICA – 83. GUERRA CIVIL EN IRLANDA – LOS MENDIGOS – 84. LA ACTITUD DE LOS RUSOS – 85. RUSOS Y ALEMANES – LAS NUEVAS FORMAS DIPLOMÁTICAS – LOS SATÉLITES – 86. LA CONFERENCIA DE GÉNOVA – 87. LLOYD GEORGE EN LA COMISIÓN RUSA – 88. LA CUESTIÓN DE LAS REPARACIONES – 89. EL PROYECTO BRITÁNICO – 90. EL PROYECTO FRANCÉS – 91. LA SUBCOMISIÓN DE ASUNTOS RUSOS

History of the Wagenburg (tabor) on the battlefields from the time of Alexander the Great to the Hussite wars in Bohemia (1420-1434).
Research paper written at the seminar "Armies and Societies" (University of Paris IV-Sorbonne) under the direction of André Corvisier, Philippe Contamine and Jean Chagniot.

ACCESO A NÚMERO COMPLETO: https://doi.org/10.14201/shha202139

RESUMEN: Este artículo ofrece una perspectiva poco explorada sobre
las funciones y evolución de un cuerpo especial perteneciente al ejército
romano, los frumentarii. Asociados a la categoría de principales, al abastecimiento y distribución de suministros, y especialmente de grano, como su nombre parece indicar, fueron prontamente encargados de una gran cantidad de actividades adicionales. Misiones para transportar materiales de lujo a Roma, «espionaje», vigilancia, servicio de policía, asesinatos, recogida de tributos y supervisión de la defensa en las provincias fueron algunos de los dispares, aunque esenciales, cometidos que la tropa llevó a cabo hasta finales del siglo III. Aunque al parecer su pésima reputación propició la disolución del cuerpo, durante muchos años fueron los ojos y oídos de los emperadores. Intentaremos explicar su desarrollo e importancia en la sociedad romana, haciendo hincapié en la pervivencia de sus habilidades militares.

ABSTRACT: This article offers a fresh perspective about the role and
evolution of one of the sections of the Roman army, the Frumentarii.
Linked with the rank of principales, and with the supply and provisions,
especially grain, as their name seems to indicate, this squad took at an
early date a great deal of additional functions. Missions to drive and protect luxury stuff to Rome, «espionage», surveillance, police duties, murder, collecting taxes and provincial defense supervision, were some of the unalike but key functions carried by them until the end of Third Century. Although it seems as their infamous reputation fostered their disbandment, for long years they were the emperors’ ears and eyes. We will try to explain their development and importance in the Roman society, highlighting the survival of their military skills.

The Eastern Türk Qaghanate seemed to enjoy the zenith of its power during the 620s, until it suddenly weakened and fell within a very short time between the years 627 and 630 because of ecologic, economic, military, administrative and social problems. The death blow to this qaghanate was struck by General Li Jing, who commanded a field army of the Tang Dynasty of China and brought destruction upon it. Even though several reasons caused the decline of this qaghanate, Li Jing's military abilities caused its final fall. A work titled Questions and Replies Between Tang Taizong and Li Wei Gong, one of the Seven Military Classics of China, is claimed to be a collection of dialogues between the Chinese emperor Tang Taizong and his general Li Jing. While some scholars believe it to be forged, others think that it is based on original drafts kept in the imperial archives. This work is actually very significant as it contains the military thought of Li Jing, but until now, it still has not been evaluated in the studies focusing on Türk history. Thus, examining the general's military thought in this work also helps us to better understand how he managed to defeat the Eastern Türk Qaghanate in the campaign of 630. In this study, we have examined Li Jing's military thought and we have compared his statements in this work with his actions during the Türk campaign of 630 recorded in the Chinese sources. Our opinion is that because his statements in this work coincide mostly with his actions during the campaign of 630, the Questions and Replies is mostly based on original drafts that had only a few later amendments to it.

Among the different topics developed by S. Picaud-Monnerat, Eric Schnakenbourg selects first a difficulty for the historian, who must grasp a scattered phenomenon made of a series of actions which are not much spectacular; actions often forgotten from the “great history”. Then E. Schnakenbourg underlines and summarises the main points of view adopted by S. Picaud-Monnerat to study her subject: the military culture, with the contrast between the seventeenth century and the eighteenth century; the military operations and the contact with the civilians; the role of the state and of the general in the field. E. Schnakenbourg pays tribute to the method followed in the book, which makes this book a good example of the dynamism of military history today.

ABSTRACT in English (résumé en français plus bas): "Introduction to the thinking on the ‘petite guerre’ in Switzerland in the 19th century"
In comparison with other European countries, the Swiss thinking about the "petite guerre" ("kleinen Krieg") did appear and develop quite late, from 1830-1840 onward. Publications from some Swiss thinkers, well known in the military world of the time, like Dufour and Wieland, approach the question of the "petite guerre". However, authors who wrote real treatises on the "petite guerre" and on "partisan warfare" are less known (the "petite guerre" changed towards "outpost warfare" at the beginning of the 19th century, in order to protect the armies; "partisan warfare" describes warfighting through surprise actions on the rears of the enemy). Let us mention for instance the book of Gingins-La Sarraz, "Les partisans et la défense de la Suisse", published in 1861. The article lists the five more relevant works upon the subject. Several of them show the influence of Prussia, which took the lead in the thinking about the "petite guerre" in Europe from the beginning of the 19th century onward. But what makes these treatises specific and interesting is the adaptation of the principles of the "petite guerre" to the context in Switzerland of the 19th century: armed neutrality; preparation of the defense of a small territory against powerful neighbours that could become threatening; military organisation with a militia army; a frequently mountainous territory; the progress of the industrial society, especially with the railway.

RESUME en français :
Comparativement à d’autres pays européens, la pensée suisse sur la petite guerre est apparue et s’est développée tardivement, à partir des années 1830-1840. Des écrits de certains penseurs suisses réputés dans le monde militaire, comme Dufour ou Wieland, abordent en partie la petite guerre. Ce sont toutefois des auteurs moins connus aujourd’hui qui ont écrit de véritables traités sur la petite guerre (devenue alors « guerre d’avant-postes », protection de l’armée), et sur la guerre de partisans (au sens d’actions offensives par surprise sur les arrières de l’ennemi) – Citons par exemple Gingins-La Sarraz et son livre « Les partisans et la défense de la Suisse », paru en 1861. L’article présente les cinq ouvrages les plus pertinents sur le sujet. Plusieurs sont marqués par l’influence de la Prusse, qui a pris la tête de la réflexion sur la petite guerre en Europe à partir du début du XIXe siècle. Mais ce qui fait surtout la spécificité, et l’intérêt, de ces traités est l’adaptation des principes de la petite guerre aux conditions de la Suisse du XIXe siècle : neutralité armée ; préparation de la défense d’un petit territoire contre de puissants Etats voisins potentiellement menaçants ; organisation militaire marquée par l’armée de milice ; géographie souvent montagneuse ; progrès de la société industrielle, notamment du chemin de fer.

Dans une série d’entretiens avec le géopoliticien Gérard Chaliand, le général Lucien Poirier, l'un des penseurs de la dissuasion nucléaire à la française, se dévoile sous un angle presque familier. Le Chantier stratégique présente la boîte à outils d'une pensée originale et exigeante, en perpétuelle construction.

The present article analyses conceptions of self-interest and motivation as reflected in precepts about rewards and punishments – Han Fei’s 'two levers' of power – which are discussed in military writings of the pre-Qin to Han periods (ca. 3rd c. BCE – 2nd c. CE). On a fundamental level, military theorists grappled with the problem of how to establish control and exert power over defiant subjects, like the Legalist works Han Fei zi and Shang jun shu. Whereas the Legalist philosophers proposed exclusively to exploit people’s self-interest, manipulating them through the 'two levers', some military theorists espoused a more nuanced understanding of motivation. They acknowledged the significance of non-selfish obligations and emotional bonds in both horizontal and vertical relationships, and in doing so considered the wider social nexus of military activity. Historiographic records indicate furthermore that commanders employed certain performative strategies suggested by military writers in order to build rapport with their troops. Surprisingly, then, a more complex notion of human nature took shape within the confines of military specialism than in the political philosophy of the Legalists.


Cet article analyse les conceptions de l’intérêt personnel et de la motivation telles qu’elles apparaissent dans les préceptes sur les châtiments et les récompenses (les «deux manipules» de pouvoir de Han Fei) qui sont discutés dans les écrits militaires antérieurs aux Qin jusqu’à la dynastie Han (environ du troisième siècle avant JC jusqu’au second siècle de notre ère). Fondamentalement, les théoriciens militaires étaient confrontés au problème de savoir comment établir un contrôle et exercer leur pouvoir sur des sujets récalcitrants, tels que les ouvrages légistes Han Fei zi et Shang jun shu. Alors que les philosophes légistes proposaient exclusivement d’exploiter l’intérêt personnel des gens, en les manipulant à travers les deux manipules, certains théoriciens militaires ont adopté une conception plus nuancée de leurs motivations. Ils ont reconnu l’importance des obligations altruistes et des liens affectifs dans les relations horizontales et verticales, aboutissant ainsi à une vue plus large des liens sociaux de l’activité militaire. Les sources historiographiques indiquent en outre que dans la Chine ancienne, pour créer des liens affectifs avec leurs troupes, les chefs militaires ont eu recours à certaines stratégies performatives suggérées dans des écrits spécialisés. De manière surprenante, chez ces spécialistes des armées, il se dégage une notion plus complexe de la nature humaine que dans la philosophie politique des légistes.

Les évolutions comparées dans les armées françaises et allemandes de l'Armistice à 1936, sous l'angle de la doctrine et de son adaptation au progrès technique. Le livre est en vente sur cette page http://lasabretache.fr/produit/larmee-francaise/