Legal Theory

La descrizione generica delle condotte e degli stati di cose ai quali si applicano le norme risulta particolarmente
rilevante per valutare la completezza o l’incompletezza nonché la coerenza o l’incoerenza dei
sistemi giuridici. Il presente articolo intende discutere queste due questioni centrali della teoria del
diritto e le implicazioni di tale genericità. Si comincerà dall’analisi della struttura della norma in generale,
concentrandosi in particolare sulla genericità dell’antecedente. In seguito, dopo aver illustrato le
principali caratteristiche di tale proprietà, si valuterà il concetto di genericità come criterio per distinguere
tra regole e principi. Si passerà poi alla valutazione di tutte le norme in base alle rispettive condizioni,
sia per quanto riguarda l’(in)coerenza sia per quanto riguarda l’(in)completezza dei sistemi
giuridici. Confutata la chiusura logica dei sistemi, si illustrerà il ruolo fondamentale della rappresentazione
generica delle condotte da parte del sistema giuridico, come strumento per riferirsi (in maniera
contingente) a tutte le condotte concepibili. Infine, si illustreranno i punti di forza e di debolezza della
tesi dell’equivalenza pragmatica tra le non proibizioni e i permessi, in caso di silenzio del sistema. Anche
per quanto riguarda questo punto la genericità sembra ricoprire un ruolo importante. L’ammissibilità di
un’equivalenza pragmatica si tradurrà sempre nella regolazione più generica possibile, con implicazioni
sulla (e relative spiegazioni della) debolezza dei permessi da questa risultanti.

This paper responds to continuing commentary on Velmans (2002a) “How could conscious experiences affect brains,” a target article for a special issue of JCS. I focus on the final question dealt with by the target article: how free will relates to preconscious and conscious mental processing, and I develop the case for preconscious free will.  Although “preconscious free will” might appear to be a contradiction in terms, it is consistent with the scientific evidence and provides a parsimonious way to reconcile the commonsense view that voluntary acts are freely chosen with the evidence that conscious wishes and decisions are determined by preconscious processing in the mind/brain.  I consider alternative interpretations of how “conscious free will” might operate by Libet and by Mangan and respond to doubts about the extent to which the operations of mind are revealed in consciousness, raised by Claxton and Bouratinos. In reconciling commonsense attributions of freedom and responsibility with the findings of science, preconscious free will can be shown to have practical consequences for adjudications in law.

"Andreas Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos opens the book with his latest contribution to his comprehensive project of re-theorising spatial justice with a piece titled ‘Spatial Justice in a World of Violence’. Through a close reading
of the photographic series Fortunes of War, Life Day by artist Eric Lesdema,
Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos is interested in how these images reveal peripheral
spaces at the edge of violence which impose an ethic of spatial responsibility on the
viewer in the act of turning away and looking elsewhere. While no acts of explicit
violence are shown in the images, we are left with no doubt that violence is ubiquitous
along the spatio-temporal continuum. This continuum of violence between
bodies raises questions of complicity and responsibility. Do we submit to a state
of affairs in which space is saturated with the everyday and immobilised violence
of the ‘engineered atmosphere’ – or is it also possible for bodies to withdraw from
the atmosphere, through ruptures and folds within the continuum? Such a notion
raises the ethical possibility of the ‘emergence of spatial justice’." Chris Butler and Edward Mussawir (eds)

This biographical entry reports, through the reconstruction of the various stages of Alessandro Levi's life, the main theoretical developments of his juridical-philosophical doctrine. Particular attention is paid to his idea of law, evolved from rigorous youth positivism to correct idealism in maturity, as well as to his concept of normative power in the theory of legal relationship.

El presente artículo, partiendo de la concepción de
la teoría práctica de las reglas y, en cocnreto, de la
regla de reconocimiento de Herbert Hart, trata de
abordar dos problemas iusfilosóficos fundamentales
que aún hoy quedan abiertos en el estudio de la
regla de reconocimiento, los cuales afectan tanto a
sus posibilidades de existencia como a su viabilidad
como instrumento normativo. Así, y a pesar de
apuntar algunas otras cuestiones, se abordará, por
un lado, la viabilidad conceptual de una regla de
reconocimiento que incorpore criterios morales de
validez y, por otro, los diferentes enfoques desde los
que se puede entender que una regla de
reconocimiento es una regla obligatoria.

The Role of Temporary Marriage (TM) in Promoting Early Child Marriage (ECM) in Iran

Kameel Ahmady

Published by (Preprint): Springer Nature Scientific Publishing
Email: Kameel.ahmady@gmail.com
URL: www.kameelahmady.com   

Abstract

This study aims to deepen understanding of the phenomenon of temporary marriage (TM) and its role in promoting early child marriage (ECM) in Iran. The research reveals that traditional families wish to control the sexual behavior of boys and girls and avoid the social pressure on them at mixed gatherings, by making them mahram (In Islam, a mahram is a member of one's family with whom marriage would be considered haram (illegal in Islam); from whom purdah, or concealment of the body with hijab, is not obligatory; and who may serve as a legal escort of a woman during journeys longer than three days) to one another through temporary marriage. It demonstrates that while temporary marriage has a role in legalizing illicit relationships, it also facilitates the ECM narrative in Iran. ECM, however, is not the only by-product of the temporary marriage but contributes to stigmatizing the younger generation in various ways. Moreover, religion is only one contributor to the popularity of temporary marriages, which is more about the control and power exerted by Iran's patriarchal society and male-dominated culture over the most vulnerable segment of the population: the women.

I INTRODUCTION In recent years, the legal academy has begun to tell itself the story of how and why legal theory was marginalized in the wake of critical legal studies and the theory debates of the 1970s and 1980s. Despite the volume of work written on the subject and the many anxieties expressed about the (im)possibility of critical legal theory's revival, the narratives of what led to this juncture are deeply conflicted. There is even debate about what precisely has been lost. Some argue that it is just the very visible, radical critical legal studies movement that has passed from the legal theory scene. (1) Others contend the leftist project more generally has run out of steam. (2) And still others assert that theory has been marginalized within the humanities and social sciences as well, making the disappearance of legal theory just one instance of this larger trend. (3) What seems beyond dispute is that "legal theory is out." (4) Comparing the current intellectual...

Nel rigido quadro sistematico implicato dal principio di legalità durante i secoli XIX e XX, molteplici sono stati gli itinerari teorici svolti intorno al problema del rapporto tra diritto e società e sul come concepire, tramite la giurisprudenza, dinamiche di manifestazione del diritto autonome dalla mediazione del potere politico. Il saggio si propone di considerare percezioni della questione su due terreni chiave. Il primo è quello rappresentato dal dibattito sull’interpretazione del diritto, che, soprattutto nel periodo a cavallo dei due secoli, esprime una varietà di orientamenti favorevoli rivalutazione del ruolo del giurista. Il secondo terreno è quello dei profili sistematici della giurisdizione che, in diverse realtà nazionali (qui vengono considerati i casi della Francia, della Germania e dell’Italia), tendono ad essere ripensati per favorire una valorizzazione del momento giurisprudenziale. Anche su questi terreni però le declinazioni del discorso sembrano restare condizionate dal persistere di un orizzonte precomprensivo di tipo monistico. Le pagine conclusive del saggio, nel seguire la parabola di tale impostazione, portano l’attenzione sui caratteri del diritto giurisprudenziale nella fase attuale; si intende con ciò valutare se, in uno scenario europeo ormai connotato da un quadro ordinamentale pluralistico, può essere rinvenuta nell’autonomia del diritto una nuova prospettiva di senso.

Storytelling pervades almost every aspect of the law. Many narrativistic legal elements, however, have in fact been little more than historically transitory. Given the precarious status of narrative at law, I argue we should focus instead on one of the most historically consistent acts of legal storytelling: the judicial opinion. Here I examine in particular the invocation of precedent in legal opinions, what I call “judicial emplotment,” as an almost archetypal act of formalized storytelling. As I go on to argue, the courts justify legal outcomes by invoking precedent, thereby placing decisions within a specific and heavily formalized legal-narrative structure.

Since 1976, the VSBO disciplinary board has been only a body oF unauthorized individuals with no judicial authority created by fiat by the Supreme Court of Virginia.

Current research and evidence supports that Supreme Court of Virginia and the Virginia State Bar Organization routinely commit violations of the laws of the Commonwealth of Virginia.

The interests of justice demand an impartial tribunal , but the Court refused to request that the Virginia General Assembly to preside over the appeal of the Appellant’s matters and the appeals of all other misconduct and impairment matters involving attorneys practicing law in the Commonwealth of Virginia.

On June 25, 2019, the Supreme Court of Virginia refused to ask the Virginia General Assembly appoint an impartial tribunal and dismissed all related Motions for the same.

This chapter attempts to analyse the way in which insights from the Marxist tradition can illuminate international human rights law. It begins by outlining the key elements of historical materialism. It then selects three key analytics – class, ideology and the structure of capitalism – and shows how they can illuminate the general phenomenon of human rights. In particular, it argues that human rights law is a social relation that mediates the struggles between classes. However, the particular form that this takes is one which tends to recast social conflict as a matter of individual rights violations and to draw attention away the root causes of social problems.

The chapter then goes on to apply these insights to the RMT v United Kingdom case, concerning the issue of secondary strikes in industrial disputes. It argues that aside from directly advantaging the capitalist class in its judgement, the European Court of Human Rights also reproduced the ideological effects of human rights law. In particular, it recast the political-economic logic of class conflict as a technocratic clash of individual rights. The chapter closes with an attempt to think through whether it would be possible to articulate a vision of human rights which takes on board the political-economic issues flagged up by Marxist analysis.

Full book available here - https://www.crcpress.com/Research-Methods-for-International-Human-Rights-Law-Beyond-the-traditional/Gonzalez-Salzberg-Hodson/p/book/9781138603554

The projected inclusion of the subsidiarity principle and the margin of appreciation doctrine in the preamble to the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) is a legal turn that deserves special attention. Is it a welcomed reform which will enhance the Strasbourg Court’s often-questioned legitimacy vis-à-vis member states? Does it represent, as some non-governmental organizations have claimed, a setback for human rights in Europe? This article elaborates on these questions by first entering into the current debate on the nature of human rights. I suggest that a “cooperative” political understanding of these rights, which is based on claims of relational justice, is a suitable ground for a normative theory of international human rights adjudication. I then use this political conception to present a non-statist reading of the subsidiarity principle, which is in accord with an incrementalist approach to human rights requirements and with a rationalized version of the margin of appreciation doctrine. My holistic reading is consistent with the axiological aims of the ECHR system as a regional driver of human rights protection without damaging Strasbourg’s legitimacy.

THIS IS NOT MY (FAJRI's) WORK, BUT OF DR MAJDAH ZAWAWI, I AM UPLOADING THIS ON HER BEHALF Legal analogy is the most common method of legal reasoning in most legal systems. However, there are differences in the application of legal analogy in the civil legal system if compared to its application in the Islamic legal system. The main aim of this article is to look into the discrepancies in applying legal analogy between these two legal systems, primarily by looking into the utilization of the method of masalik al-'illah under Islamic law as compared to the theory of ratio decidendi, and distinguishing under the civil law.

The outer space becomes more approachable. As the developments occur in a row, the space launch vehicles are bigger, better, and faster, so that people can get to the outer space more quickly and efficiently. With this currency, space tourism appears which gives people special experiences, such as enjoying sight of the outer space and playing in the micro-gravity circumstances. However, the possibility of crashes also goes up. Yet the perfectly safe vehicles to carry the passengers into the outer space are not developed. Risk cannot be eliminated in the real world, especially in the case of the rocket launch vehicles, and the risk of failure in launching process is quite high. Already, there was a crash of private spaceship, which was designed to carry tourists. This article will bring forward the questions about the acceptability of the space tourism because there are similarities between the space tourism and Russian roulette game. If the risky space tourism is accepted, the other activities, which have the similar level of possibility of risks, should be accepted. This article focuses the situations and, as the conclusion, tries to suggest a solution to prevent this problem.

“Desde mi visión, la obra es en sustancia un abordaje axiológico, una construcción compleja que merece reconocimiento, pues consagra una teoría iusfilosófica de la culpa.

Pero no se debe extraer de ello que la obra ha sido escrita para el regodeo de una élite intelectual. Solemos decir que, para entender la modernidad: los clásicos; pues bien, para resolver las cuestiones prácticas nada mejor que la filosofía.

Las derivaciones prácticas del ensayo son numerosas, intramuros y extramuros de un ordenamiento particular, ya que, con base en el fundamento penal de la responsabilidad, se proyectan soluciones adecuadas, respuestas claras a muchos desvíos propiciados por los esquemas jurídicos formales, los que suelen ser empleados por los tres poderes del Estado como instrumentos funcionales a la recaudación.

En suma, está claro, y no puedo más que adherir a ello que para el Dr. Weffe un derecho sin valores es el revés del derecho, y es por ello que también recomiendo fervientemente la lectura del libro”.

Alberto Tarsitano (Argentina)
Ex Presidente del Instituto Latinoamericano de Derecho Tributario (ILADT)
Profesor de Derecho Tributario, Universidad de Buenos Aires
Profesor de Derecho Tributario, Universidad Católica Argentina
Director de la Maestría en Derecho Tributario, Universidad Católica Argentina

“No es éste un libro de Derecho Penal en el sentido frecuente, con abundancia de citas de autores, escuelas y textos sobre las distintas concepciones jurídico-penales de la culpabilidad. Tampoco es de Derecho Tributario, en el mismo sentido, ni de Derecho Administrativo, según la supradicha premisa. Entonces, ¿qué es y de qué es? ¿Cómo desarrolla su tema, cualquiera que él fuese?

En primer término, esta obra versa sobre la culpabilidad vinculada al Derecho Tributario, lo que de suyo representa continuidad con su tesis doctoral, en un área novedosa en nuestro mundo jurídico, pero –como antes dije– no es una obra sobre la culpabilidad en el Derecho Tributario del modo como se haría desde la perspectiva más frecuente del Derecho Penal, entre otras razones, porque la conexión con una rama que no es penal lo hace posible, sino también –y he ahí lo decisivo– porque los fines perseguidos se orientan desde la Teoría General del Derecho o, si se prefiere, la filosofía del Derecho, como pronto se verá.
Weffe no trata la culpabilidad mediante un simple acercamiento entre el Derecho Penal y el Derecho Tributario, sino que involucra reflexiones filosóficas que incrementan exponencialmente los méritos de su autor, pues son escasas las veces en que los juristas hacen expresamente suyas consideraciones que escapan del terreno dogmático de sus disciplinas, salvo, por supuesto, aquellos que se dedican a los temas teóricos más abstractos y generales, aunque mantienen hacia los horizontes más estrictamente técnicos del saber jurídico, una prudencial distancia, a su vez, pocas veces acortada por las ciencias jurídicas particulares.

El discurso ético-filosófico de la obra desemboca en la esfera de la culpabilidad y la triple función que el autor de ella predica: instrumental de la libertad, la dignidad y la igualdad como contenidos mínimos esenciales de todas las fórmulas jurídicas; ello, como axioma del garantismo y como límite al ejercicio del ius puniendi cada vez que el sujeto ha ejercido de forma desviada su libertad.

Los espíritus proclives a la reflexión filosófica hallarán en esas páginas ocasión para su deleite intelectual, y también para las inquietudes e incertidumbres a las que el ejercicio del pensamiento induce.

En fin, invito al lector a que inicie la aventura intelectual que significa adentrarse en estas páginas, para saciar no sólo inquietudes conceptuales de elevada abstracción, sino también para guiarlo en la interpretación y aplicación de un derecho concreto en un momento histórico específico, en un contexto sociopolítico abiertamente adverso a las propuestas garantistas del Derecho Penal moderno y liberal.

Weffe no cedió ante el desafío, seguramente usted tampoco retrocederá”.

Prof. Dr. Carlos Simón Bello Rengifo
Profesor Asociado de Derecho Penal y Procesal Penal, Universidad Central de Venezuela
Director del Doctorado en Ciencias, Mención Derecho, Universidad Central de Venezuela.

How is the global epistemic community of legal philosophers structured or patterned? How and why is the epistemic community of legal theorists unified/divided? What are the lines of division that generate exclusion/inclusion, centre/periphery?
These are some of the questions we will discuss in a special workshop at the IVR2022 world congress of legal philosophy.
Paper proposals can be submitted by 30 April 2022.

A key focus of much scholarly attention is on the (theoretical) relationship between legal orders. The practical question I intend to answer in this article is the following: how can we know who has the final say – international, European Union (EU) or national law? I proceed in three steps. First, I critically sketch major current theories – monism and dualism, as well as global legal pluralism and global constitutionalism. However, because none of them offers a satisfactory answer to the question posed, I move to the reconceptualization stage of the theoretical relationship between legal orders. In the second step, I offer my account of how to think about the relationship between legal orders by introducing the theory of the law creators' circle (TLCC). The TLCC provides a theoretical foundation for deciding on the source of the decisive norm. It does not, however, provide a general solution which fits any norm conflict stemming from overlapping legal orders. Thus, the purpose of this article is to develop a legal theory which facilitates the understanding of the interaction between international law, EU and national law. Third, I use a doctrinal analysis to show the results of the TLCC application. For instance, in the famous Kadi saga, according to the TLCC, the EU should have either claimed that the UN Security Council was acting ultra vires or considered the UN Security Council Resolution faulty because UN human rights (instead of EU human rights) had been violated.

The aim of this Article is to re-conceptualize the debate about the (theoretical) relationship between international and national law, which has been debated for centuries. Generally, the floor is divided between dualism as developed by Heinrich Triepel and monism developed mainly by Hans Kelsen. In the light of new developments since their inception, I argue that these theories can no longer comprehensively explain the relationship between international or European Union (EU) and national law. Yet, the Article is based on the conviction that a common denominator of international and national law is elementary (i.e. here " the law creators' circle, " in German, " Die Theorie des Rechtserzeugerkreises, " in short " TREK ") in order to solve possible norm conflicts between different but overlapping legal orders. Therefore, pluralism is also limited in my eyes because it does not offer a satisfying prescriptive account. This common legal framework, however, must not be understood as the “constitutionalization” of international (or EU law) either, as this easily implies too many substantial values, which are not (yet) a common reality.

Hukuk sistemindeki normlar aralarındaki geçerlilik ilişkisine göre hiyerarşik biçimde sıralanır. Buna normlar hiyerarşisi denir. “Norm” tanımına giren her hukukî işlem bu hiyerarşide bir yere yerleşir. Anonim şirket esas sözleşmesi de bu hiyerarşiye dâhildir. Esas sözleşmenin hiyerarşik yeri kanun, idarenin düzenleyici işlemleri, asliye ticaret mahkemesi kararları, anonim şirket yönetim kurulu ve genel kurul kararları ile arasındaki hiyerarşik ilişki incelenerek belirlenebilir. Esas sözleşmenin hukukî rejimi, bu normun kanun, idarenin düzenleyici işlemleri ve kesinleşmiş asliye ticaret mahkemesi kararlarının hiyerarşik astı, yönetim kurulu ve genel kurul kararlarınınsa hiyerarşik üstü olduğunu göstermektedir. Bir hukuk sistemindeki normlar hiyerarşisi hukuk sistemi hakkında genel bilgiler sağlar. Bu anlamda daha çok teorik değere sahiptir. Ancak, lex superior derogat legi inferiori ilkesinin uygulanabilmesi için öncelikle söz konusu normların normlar hiyerarşisindeki yerinin belirlenmesinin gerekmesi, normlar hiyerarşisi teorisinin pratik önemini artıran bir etken olarak görülebilir.

"Khusus menyangkut analogi, penafsiran dan hal-hal lain yang terkait, memang ... tidak mudah menemukan bahan-bahan pustaka yang membahas hingga praktiknya. Oleh karena itu, buku ini menjadi penting." - Prof. Dr. Topo Santoso, S.H., M.H.

Sinopsis:
Pandangan dominan dalam ilmu hukum pidana menyatakan bahwa penerapan analogi dilarang dalam hukum pidana, karena melanggar asas legalitas. Di sisi lain, penafsiran ekstensif justru diperbolehkan, padahal keduanya sama-sama memperluas cakupan makna ketentuan pidana dalam undang-undang, sehingga dapat mencakup perbuatan yang sebelumnya tidak termasuk dalam ketentuan pidana tersebut. Dua hal yang menjadi fokus penelitian buku ini adalah: perbedaan dan persamaan antara penerapan analogi dan penafsiran ekstensif dalam hukum pidana; dan penerapan analogi dalam Putusan Mahkamah Agung Republik Indonesia Nomor 786K/Pid/2015 dan 1417K/Pid/1997. Buku ini mengemukakan perspektif alternatif, juga baru, dalam pemahaman terhadap asas legalitas dan metode penemuan hukum, sehingga patut dibaca oleh peminat kajian ilmu hukum pidana, filsafat dan teori hukum, serta pemelajar ilmu hukum secara umum.

Pemesanan dapat dilakukan langsung melalui penulis di email berikut: dionvalerian@yahoo.com.

This paper examines the idea that commercial law has the capacity to evolve spontaneously in the absence of a clear state authority because of its unique nature. I argue that the manner of interaction implied by commerce plays a crucial role in this ability as it involves a high degree of overall engagement. This I term “high engagement,” which I divide into two elements: repetition and the creation of clear cycles of interaction. Together they produce identifiable legal norms and subsequent compliance. Game theorists have long recognized the importance of repeated interaction in inducing cooperation; however, how the manner of commercial interaction itself facilitates this process has been left largely unexamined. Part I presents a brief overview of the concept of reciprocity and spontaneous law theory. In Part II, a more detailed explanation of the notion of high engagement is offered. Here I set out exactly how high engagement is instrumental in the emergence of legal norms. Finally, the paper concludes that the element of high engagement indeed plays a decisive role in commercial law’s ability to evolve and function in a decentralized, spontaneous fashion—an important insight in terms of the future international development of the modern law merchant as it emerges in the absence of a single legislative authority.

While still fragmented, we are witnessing the emergence of a global commercial legal order independent of any one national legal system. This process is unfolding both on the macro-level of state actors as well as that of private individuals and organizations. On the macro-level, the sources of this legal order are complex international agreements; on the micro-level, private contracts employing commercial customary practices and arbitration are driving this process forward. Yet there is no comparable evolution occurring (in any substantial sense) in non-commercial areas of law such as criminal, tort, or family law. There is an overall asymmetry in the development of transnational legal order. But why is this happening? This paper argues that the emergence of a global commercial legal order may be partially attributed to the unique structural nature of trade. The paper gives a structuralist account, positing that unlike legal order of a non-commercial nature, commercial legal order has built-in mechanisms that make it particularly suited to evolve in a transnational context—i.e. to evolve and sustain itself in the absence of a central legislative or coercive authority. The paper identifies and explores these built-in mechanisms. The paper concludes that because commercial legal order is uniquely predisposed to emerge without the State, we should expect this asymmetry to not only continue, but likely grow even more extreme.

This paper explains why so much soft law is widely adopted and followed despite lacking legal and coercive force. It argues that legal standards are susceptible to network effects. Network effects occur when the value of a standard to a user increases as the number of other agents using the same standard grows, which in turn draws more users to the standard. This can trigger a spontaneous coalescence around a standard in a " snowball effect " fashion. The paper argues that many areas of soft law exhibit strong network effects, rendering such soft law uniquely calibrated to induce voluntary adoption and even compliance. The model helps explain why certain soft law gains traction, and has important implications for international governance. Finally, the paper argues that policy-makers can strategically harness this dynamic to stimulate legal harmonization, but cautions that policy-makers must also remain mindful of the negative consequences that network effects can generate.

This Paper explores and summarises the Director's Duties of the UK Companies Act 2006 with emphasis on "the duty to promote the success of the company.

Tags:
Companies Act 2006 model articles, Companies Act 2006 summary
companies act 2006 pdf
companies act 2006 model articles
companies act 2006 regulations 2013
Companies Act 2006 UK
UK Companies Act 2006

Some of Law and Economics’ basic claims have come to be criticized as a result of empirical findings that question their viability. Particularly, the premise that agents consistently act rationally and with their self-interest in mind seems problematic. What the consequences of the criticism mean for Law and Economics’ tenability depends largely on the questions whether (1) some elements are unassailable to the alternative’s objections and (2) the alternative is a systematic whole. It is argued that Law and Economics may be salvaged, if it is minimized and its ambitions are tempered. This means focusing on the stable, a priori, elements inherent to it.

İngilizce "separation of powers", Fransızca "séparation des pouvoirs" olarak bilinen anayasal ilke Türkçeye "kuvvetler ayrılığı" şeklinde tercüme edilmiş ve öylece yerleşmiştir. İlke, çokları tarafından anayasacılığın temeli olarak kabul edilmektedir. Sorun, ilkenin anahtar kelimesi olan power/pouvoir'ın mehaz hukuk geleneklerinde Türk hukukundaki "kuvvet" kelimesine karşılık gelmiyor olmasıdır. Saf hukuk sahasında kalınacak olursa doğru tercüme "yetki" olmalıdır. Zira hukuk İngilizcesindeki "power" ile hukuk Fransızcasındaki "pouvoir" güç, kuvvet ya da erk değil, doğrudan ve öncelikle yetki anlamına gelir. Benzer fakat daha önemsiz bir karmaşa "ayrılık" ve "ayrım" kelimeleriyle ilgili olarak gözlemlenmektedir. Kanaatimizce söz konusu ilkenin en isabetli tercümesi "yetkilerin ayrılması" şeklindedir. İlkenin siyaset bilimine ait güç ve kuvvet kavramlarıyla çevrilmesi problemlere yol açmaktadır. Anayasa hukukunun bizzat anayasa hukukçuları tarafından siyasileştirilmesi bu problemlerin başında gelmektedir. Her ne kadar hukukun doğası gereği siyasi bir alan olduğu söylenebilirse de günümüzde etkili olan saf hukuk doktrini açısından bu kabul ciddi bir çelişki demektir: Siyasete ait güç ve kuvvet kavramları kullanılarak saf hukuk tartışması yapılamaz. Hukukun sınırları muğlaklaşır, ortadan kalkar. Anayasa hukuku tutarsız ve kırılgan hale gelir. Tüm bu nedenlerle, algı karmaşasına ve verimsiz tartışmalara yol açan "kuvvetler ayrılığı" terimi hiçbir anayasamızda mevcut olmadığı gibi doktrinde de terk edilmelidir.

The Relationship of Law to Society in Deuteronomy:
“The Draft Constitution” (Deut 16:18–18:22) as an “Ideal Type”

This article demonstrates the overlooked contribution of the ancient Near East to the development of constitutional law.  The legal corpus of Deuteronomy provides a utopian model for the organization of the state, one that enshrines separation of powers and their systematic subordination to a public legal text—the “Torah”—that delineates their jurisdiction while also ensuring their autonomy.  This legislation establishes an independent judiciary while bringing even the monarch under the full authority of the law.  This legislation departs from all previous models, whether those extant in the legislation of the ancient Near East or ancient Israel itself.  Two of its cornerstones are fundamental to the modern idea of a constitution: (1) clear division of state powers into separate spheres of authority; and (2) the subordination of each branch to the authority of the law.  This legislation was so utopian that it seems never to have been implemented; instead, idealism rapidly yielded to political pragmatism.  Nonetheless, Deuteronomy’s draft constitution makes a powerful statement about the broader function of law within society, while also providing a corrective to the secular and Graeco-Roman bias of more standard models of constitutional legal history.

ÖZ Hukuki kesinlik ilkesi, hukukun üstünlüğünün temel görünümlerinden birisidir. Bu nedenle, " hukukun üstünlüğü " ve " hukuk devleti " bakımından bir ulusal hukuk sisteminde hukuki kesinliğin tesis edilmesi kaçınılmazdır. Bu yazı, Avrupa İnsan Hakları Mahkemesi (AİHM) ile Türk Anayasa Mahkemesi'nin (AYM) hukuki kesinlik yaklaşımları arasındaki farklılıkları ve benzerlikleri ortaya koymayı amaçlamaktadır. Bu sebeple, hukuki kesinliğin uygulamasının daha iyi anlaşılması için her iki Mahkemenin de konuyla ilgili olan davaları incelenmiştir. Söz konusu alandaki güncel vakalar, akademisyenlere ve uygulayıcılara ilkenin kavranması ile ilgili önemli ipuçları vermektedir.
ABSTRACT The principle of legal certainty is one of the fundamental appearances of the rule of law. Therefore, the establishment of legal certainty in a national legal system is inevitable in terms of " the rule of law " and " state of law ". This paper aims to reveal differences and similarities between European Court of Human Rights and the Turkish Constitutional Court regarding their approaches to the legal certainty. For this reason, the cases of both Courts have been reviewed for better understanding the implementation of the legal certainty. Recent cases in that field have given significant clues to the scholars and practitioners for comprehension of the principle.

One of Hasidism's most striking features is its centralization and intensification of emotional experiences within devotional life. The unruly ecstasy and enthusiasm characteristic of such a revivalist mystical movement, which often is coupled with a spiritualizing and even oppositional relationship to formalized, external obligations, has evinced conflicting understandings of Hasidism's relationship to Halakhah (Jewish law). Hasidism has concurrently been described as being slavishly obedient to Halakhah as well as harboring the aforementioned antinomian tendencies. This paper poses the question: how did the emotional intensity evoked by Hasidic religiosity affect one's obligation under the law?  In this paper, I will attempt to explore the seams where emotion and law intersect through the case of the writings of Rebbe Nachman of Bratslav (1772-1810). In particular, this paper will examine texts in which Rebbe Nachman responded to the possibility of being unable to muster up a sufficient amount of kavvanah (intentionality) to perform one's required worship in fitting fashion. I will argue that Rebbe Nachman, in the counsel he offered in response, was able to navigate a complex relationship between law and emotion by maintaining commitment to the formalized obligation to pray while, at the same time, making space for and even endorsing the feelings (specifically, frustration and desire) experienced by the individual. This nuanced approach evidences a moderate and complex relation to law, which I deem “therapeutic.”  By this, I mean an approach to law in which the juridical authority (Rebbe Nachman) utilizes judicial discretion to read the law in question expansively, not to overturn the ruling but rather to provide a more wide-ranging space within the bounds of the law that include the plaintiff's concerns. In his simultaneous prioritization of the emotional aspect of religious life and advocacy for a normative legal practice, we can find in Rebbe Nachman's writings a subtle middle position between legal realism and legal formalism. This paper will thus contribute to a more robust understanding of the particular nature of Jewish mysticism within the strongly normative framework of halakhic observance.

In this article, I critically examine the claim that work law is best conceived as a subspecies of contract law, arguing that this characterization is neither descriptively accurate nor normatively instructive. Rather than understanding work law as a set of restraints on freedom of contract, we should see it as creating and defining special relationships, much like the codified definitions of marriages and business partnerships. I trace the development of work relationships through the common law of " master and servant " and their more recent statutory modification. I argue that the history and present form of work law are not consistent with the contract-centered view of work law as " interfering " with an otherwise free labor market. In addition, I set the stage for a future research project in which I will argue that since work relationships permit employers to exercise authority over workers, a just work law would narrowly circumscribe employers' authority in order to achieve work law's justifiable aims while minimizing overreaching by employers.

У статті з позицій критики традиційних підходів до розуміння структури права запропоновано постструктуралістське її бачення як єдності догми права, суб’єкта, цінностей правової сфери та правової ситуації. Доведено, що правова ситуація виступає в якості динамічної складової структури права. По-новому розглянуто співвідношення між структурою права та правовою системою. Продемонстровано, що правова система є локалізованим (або глобалізованим) варіантом реалізації універсальної структури права. На основі цього запропоновано крім властивості системності виділяти властивість структурності права, що виражається через його універсальність.

Актуальні проблеми політики : зб. наук. праць. – Одеса : Фенікс, 2012. – Вип. 44. – С. 102-112.

The book presents an interdisciplinary exploration aimed at renewing interest in Luigi Einaudi’s search for “good government”, broadly understood as “good society”. Prompted by the Einaudian quest, the essays - exploring philosophy of law, economics, politics and epistemology - develop the issue of good government in several forms, including  the relationship between public and private, public governance, the question of freedom and the complexity of the human in contemporary societies.

This paper approaches the effectiveness of fundamental social rights, their justiciability, their collision with the principle of the possible reserve, the application of the principle of proportionality, the balancing of the colliding principles, the determination of the prioritary principle, and the determination of the definitive right in the concrete case.

The article is devoted to the problem of research of notion and signs of juridical facts in a civil law.
An author brings a number over of decisions about the juridical facts formed by scientists-lawyers. Existent looks on the signs of juridical facts are analysed in the article, and also deep research of signs which were not before selected in a separate group is conducted.
An author makes examples and norms of domestic legislation, that describes legal facts.

The Disciplinary Board of the Virginia State Bar is part of the Virginia State Bar under Part Six of the Rules. No language in Chapter 39 of Title 54.1 authorizes the Virginia State Bar or the VSB Disciplinary Board to impose any penalties on a licensed attorney for professional misconduct, and certainly not license revocation that takes away a right that Section 54.1-3900 grants to all licensed attorneys in Virginia. The only authority that the General Assembly has granted to the organization of the Virginia State Bar is the authority to investigate and report attorney misconduct. Again, Section 54.1- 3910 establishes the Virginia State Bar. The enabling statutes could not be clearer on the Bar's limited authority overseeing attorney misconduct:
The Virginia State Bar shall act as an administrative agency of the Court for the purpose of investigating and reporting violations of rules and regulations adopted by the Court under this article. (Emphasis added.)

Contrast this statutory language in Section 54.1-3910 that establishes the Virginia State Bar with the language in Virginia Code§ 54.1-3934, Revocation of license by Board, which expressly empowers the Board of Bar Examiners to revoke an attorney's license under specific conditions:
The Board of Bar Examiners may, for good cause, revoke any license issued by it at any time before there has been a qualification under it in any of the courts of this Commonwealth.