Military Intelligence

Communities everywhere have experienced the negative effects of street gangs. The presence of military-trained gang members (MTGMs) in the community increases the threat of violence to citizens. The problem addressed was the apparently growing presence of military-trained gang members in civilian communities in two southern states. The purpose was to determine the perceived presence of military-trained gang members and examine whether there was a relationship between the perceptions of gang investigators regarding the presence and the size of their jurisdictions, the proximity of their jurisdictions to a military installation, and the extent to which investigators participate in anti-gang activities. The Army, Army National Guard, and Army Reserve were identified as the largest sources of MTGMs and the Bloods, Crips, and Gangster Disciples were the gangs most represented. Military leaders should acknowledge the increase in gang-related crime and address the problems caused for both military and civilian communities without attempting to quantify the threat level. Military leadership should continuously examine activities of all suspected gang members for active gang affiliation for retention purposes while evaluating any gang affiliation for security clearances. Military Law Enforcement liaison for recruiters should develop effective communication with law enforcement agencies to assist with information sharing.

Questo lavoro si prefigge lo scopo di descrivere le reti di spionaggio e di sabotaggio, le missioni e gli agenti dei servizi segreti tedeschi e della RSI inviati nell’Italia centro-meridionale, tra il 1943 e il 1945, con l’obiettivo di contrastare l’avanzata Alleata nella Penisola. I due servizi segreti tedeschi, l’Abwehr e il Sicherheitsdienst, riorganizzati dopo l’Armistizio, reclutarono agenti italiani (provenienti dalla Milizia o dalle neonate Brigate Nere ma anche dalla Decima Mas di Borghese) per operazioni di spionaggio e sabotaggio oltre le linee Alleate. Anche gli stessi fascisti, tramite il neonato SID ed altri gruppi come quello del Principe Pignatelli o l’Ufficio Pucci-Del Massa, tentarono di pianificare reti spionistiche ma anche di porre le basi per la sopravvivenza del fascismo all’indomani della fine della guerra.

my theme is the question is there a US death squad?  I write about CIA assassination of honestly elected foreign leaders and of course the North American mafia make war against other families over territory.  I limit my list to only those cases with hard evidence or someone was scheduled to testify in court , at a grand jury, or at a Congressional investigative committee.

October 10, 2023 update.
After an effort of many years, I have prepared a comprehensive timeline of UFO history that will be useful to UFO researchers and historians. “UFOs and Intelligence” is an up-to-date retrospective of UFO history (from Agobard of Lyons to the newly appointed US investigation agency UAPTF), intertwined with events in US and world history concerning military and civilian intelligence agencies and the cult of secrecy. It is now 679 pages and more than 555,000 words (including a substantial “Sources and Further Reading” appendix). Readers will discover or rediscover many events, people, and UFO cases they may not be familiar with. Some will find it useful for current or planned research projects. Military cases, those involving commercial aircraft, close encounters involving physical traces and other evidence, reports involving occupants or entities, and events surrounding military and sensitive nuclear sites are emphasized, but this timeline covers the full spectrum of UFO history, from contactee experiences to misidentifications of mundane phenomena and notorious hoaxes. Links to online sources are given, and links to biographical information are provided when available. A timeline like this allows us to view events from a different perspective, letting us make connections we might not otherwise see. It forces us to view the big picture, amid the grand flow of UFO cases, military security decisions, a vast swathe of personalities, and world history.

В 1996 р. Чеська Республіка вступила до НАТО, а ще через шість років – до Євросоюзу. Ці два головні чинники привели до формування у чехів враження, ніби вони живуть в цілком безпечному просторі, що їхню свободу та демократію вже не спіткають значні виклики. Проте Росія не відкликала своїх агентів, навпаки, за останні роки російський вплив лише збільшився. Російські спецслужби створюють чеськомовні ЗМІ, що стають рупорами пропутінської пропаганди, підкупляють чи шантажують чеських політиків, і все це – через імперські амбіції. І все це для того, щоб підірвати ще нетверду чеську демократію, яка продовжує формуватися, внести безлад, загальмувати інтеграцію Чехії до оборонних та політичних структур Заходу – аби ця центральноєвропейська країна якомога довше залишалася в цупких обіймах скутої санкціями недоімперії.
Відомий чеський журналіст Одржей Кундра в кількох нарисах розповідає про діяльність російських спецслужб в Чехії та Європі взагалі.

Appendix 2 of Section D for Destruction: forerunner of SOE (Pen& Sword, 2017).  This provides brief biographical summaries of the known officers, agents and principal contacts of Section D of the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS, aka MI6). Formed in April 1938, this was given permission to commence operations in March 1939 and eventually formed the core of the Special Operations Executive (SOE).  As a branch of SIS, Section D has preserved much of its secrecy, overshadowed by the more famous SOE.  The reputation of Section D was attacked during its lifetime by political enemies who first despised its methodology  - and then sought to take it over.  It operated largely through partner anti-Nazi groups across Europe and problems arose after the war in acknowledging their work as many of these were now under communist rule and any association with British intelligence was seen as traitorous.  There was a particularly sensitive problem in Palestine where Section D had helped train the Jewish Haganah, which went on to  fight British rule over the Mandate.  For such reasons, the list is incomplete and any additions / corrections would be greatly appreciated.

This book, the first in American history to be subjected to prior
government censorship began making news even before it was written. From the time it was no more than an outline to the present, the Central Intelligence Agency has been trying to prevent its publication. To a degree, the agency has succeeded. Legal proceedings and injunctions delayed publication for close to a year. One hundred and sixty-eight passages actually censored by the agency continue to be unavailable and are thus missing from the text as published here (although nearly 200 more, first cut and then yielded up by the CIA following insistent demands by lawyers for the authors and the publishers will be found
printed in boldface type). Ironically, however, in a broader sense the agency has failed. In recent months, The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence has become more than a book, it has become a public issue of great symbolic importance —as a test of free speech and as a valuable and effective challenge to a peculiarly odious concept: the idea that any government body—even the CIA—should be permitted to exist beyond the reach of the Constitution and public control.

The thesis examines the Eisenhower administration’s decisions to use space for intelligence and military purposes. By examining significant National Security Council (NSC) documents, including reports and meeting notes, the thesis presents an argument that since the very beginning, U.S. space policy included a provision for intelligence and military applications of satellites as a matter of national security. Throughout the Eisenhower presidency, the concept of “peaceful” use of outer space, which did not preclude satellites from having certain military applications, was  never questioned at the NSC.

מאמר זה מבקש לתאר ולהגדיר את תפיסת התכסית האנושית, שהתפתחה
בצבא האמריקאי לאור ניסיונו באפגניסטן ובעיראק. המאמר יעמוד על הסיבות
שהובילו את הצבא האמריקאי לפתח תפיסה זאת; יתמקד בתשתית התיאורטית
ובזיקות שבין התכסית האנושית לבין מודיעין תרבותי ואינטליגנציה תרבותית.
כל אלה, לאור הניסיון האמריקאי והישראלי בזירות העימות השונות.

This monograph considers how a classical challenge that commanders face in war—namely, making critical decisions on the basis of limited and often unreliable information—has been exacerbated in the era of big data. Data overload complicates the intelligence community’s efforts to identify and exclude disinformation, misinformation, and deception, and thus hampers its ability to deliver reliable intelligence to inform decision-makers in a timely manner. The military commander remains responsible for making a final decision, yet the great wealth of data now available through the intelligence cycle amplifies the risk of decision paralysis. With this in mind, technological solutions tend to be considered the most appropriate response for managing data overload and disinformation. While these remain relevant, they alone may be insufficient to equip the military commander with the necessary insight to guide decisions through the uncertainty of the big data environment. Rather, the militar...

This article argues that military organizations display a more rigorous form of collective sensemaking than ordinary bureaucratic organizations. Military organizing is predicated on the rigorous modes of thinking and acting that follow from the particular military propensity to impose order on chaos. This trait is antithetical to modern notions of "the learning organization," in which exploring variety and experimenting and testing out unproven methods are central. We identify two sets of structural conditions that constitute the sociocognitive landscape of military organizations and discuss how the military logic of action might be enacted in different sociocultural contexts. Our framework is brought to bear on recent research on international military missions, and in the concluding section, we summarize our arguments and discuss their wider implications in terms of trade-offs between adaptability and other capabilities in the design of military forces.

In December 2015, then-Secretary of Defense Ash Carter changed the cultural landscape of the military by stating the U.S. military will let women serve in all combat roles beginning in 2016. Just three years prior to this announcement, the American Intelligence Journal published an article titled "The Other Fifty Percent: Psychological Operations and Women in Eastern Afghanistan," which discussed the importance of females working in combat operations as psychological operations (PSYOP) soldiers. The intent of the article was to force the discussion of how women can be a unique resource on the battlefield beyond merely manpower. The purpose of this follow-up article is two-fold: first, to review how the military has changed in reference to women participating in combat roles since 2012; and second, to discuss how the Intelligence Community (IC) has long utilized women in operations and leadership roles in a way of interest to the military.

Intelligence and counter terrorism are key elements of the contemporary global security environment. Profound changes in the nature of states fuelled by globalization, information technology, and the influence of non‐state actors are changing the structure and dynamics of intelligence. A range of global threats and conditions influence the contemporary global security and intelligence stage. These include global insurgency and terrorism (as seen in the Salafist jihadi struggle with the West), the rise of global business and civil society, global political movements, transnational organized crime, the rise of global cities, networked diasporas, global disease, and the prospect of planet‐wide climate change. Yet, while all players in this new ‘Great Game’ recognize that intelligence is essential to situational understanding, few have the institutional structure, experience, and understanding of the various types of intelligence necessary to negotiate the current and emerging security environment. This article will review the threats and conditions influencing global security environment, and discuss the roles of military, police, and strategic intelligence in understanding this environment.

: These command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) technologies are at the heart of modern warfighting. They act not only as force multipliers for the military platforms into which they are integrated, but also as the means to better link different types of forces (air, sea, land). Moreover, they can connect forces of different nationalities, enabling interoperability and the efficient use of military resources. The study analyzes the deployed and planned C4ISR capabilities of seven European countries: France, the United Kingdom, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, and Sweden. Capabilities discussions are divided into command and control (C2), communications and computers, and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR). We examine the extent to which advanced C4ISR and network doctrines figure in the defense planning of these nations and explore the extent of interoperability within and between these national for...

Le Service de santé des armées répond aux missions de soutien sanitaire des militaires mais aussi aux besoins de santé du territoire. L’encadrement paramédical des hôpitaux et centres médicaux des armées est réalisé par des cadres de santé diplômés, dont la majorité exerce sous statut militaire. La loyauté en milieu militaire n’est pas implicite, elle est clairement inscrite dans le Code de la défense. C’est un choix personnel fort, un engagement inscrit dès l’origine et constant
pour tout militaire.
Military Health Service, loyalty and management. The French Military Health Service provides healthcare services to members of the armed forces as well as meeting the healthcare requirements of the territory. The paramedical management of hospitals and military medical centres is carried out by qualifi ed healthcare managers, most of whom have military status. Loyalty in the military environment is not implicit, it is clearly written in the French Defence Code. It is a strong personal choice, a commitment made and upheld throughout the career of all members of the armed forces.

Fortunately, there is a science-based approach that can protect Pakistan from both internal and external threats. It is appropriately termed, Invincible Defence Technology (IDT), because it assures invincibility, peace and even economic progress, to the nation and the military that employ it.

Its methods have been proven and adopted as part of the training of America's future commanders at Norwich University, a nationally respected and oldest military academy in the USA. IDT is further validated by 23 peer-reviewed studies carried out in both developed and developing nations. Its coherence-creating effect has also been documented on a global scale in a study published in the Journal of Offender Rehabilitation. When large assemblies of civilian IDT experts gathered during the years 1983 - 1985, international conflict decreased 32%, terrorism-related casualties decreased 72%, and overall violence was reduced in nations without intrusion by other governments.

Гай-Нижник П. Військова розвідка і контррозвідка УНР та УД: створення, завдання, діяльність (1918 р.) // Національна спецслужба в українському державотворенні: збірник статей і матеріалів з нагоди 29-ї річниці утворення СБУ. – К.: Прометей, 2021. – С.77–102.

What is new about the WikiLeaks phenomenon and why is it important? Is WikiLeaks a form of journalism? What were the effects of WikiLeaks’ revelations? How has WikiLeaks impacted the future of the internet? Charlie Beckett and James Ball pose these and other questions in their new book.
WikiLeaks: News in the Networked Era (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2012). WikiLeaks was managed by a small team of pro-transparency hackers, including the Australian Julian Assange and a few German members of the so-called Chaos Computer Club (18). As Beckett and Ball point out, WikiLeaks founders pioneered in the development of information security, setting up hidden open-source encryption standards. “These enable WikiLeaks and its sources to hold and disseminate information unreadable by anyone else in the world, including security services” (20). In chapter two, the authors describe three of WikiLeaks’ biggest “scoops” in 2010: the Afghan war logs (including the “Collateral Murder” video), the Iraq war logs, and the American Embassy cable releases. In chapter three Beckett and Ball point out that WikiLeaks’ disclosures – in jeopardizing lives and endangering sensitive diplomatic operations – might “create a freedom-of-expression backlash,” thus helping pro-government, security-minded individuals who advocate limiting the openness of the internet. This book by Beckett and Ball – one of the first to analyze WikiLeaks with respect to the evolution of contemporary journalism – would be an excellent text to assign in courses on journalism.

Since 2001, we are seeing increasing attention being given to understanding terrorism, with a new focus on the issue of how terrorist organisations are financed. They ask important questions regarding who finances terrorism and how do they do it. However, these analyses have often ignored how terrorist organisations are able to pay for themselves to be able to continue operations in prolonged conflict situations, especially given the new norm of targeted financial sanctions and the increasingly stricter financial and banking regulations. Against this background, the paper asks how terrorists organisations fund their operations in prolonged conflicts, and how that affects the organisational structure and behaviour of the groups by looking at the way that these terrorist groups interact with the local population. The paper uses the framework of global value chains (GVCs) to understand the financing chains that are developed by the terrorist organisations, linking the terrorists with those who support them logistically and emotionally and those who financially support them. The paper underscores that the aspects of logistical, emotional and even material support often happens though the exchange of value, rather than through exchange of money, such as extortions for safety. This framework of value-chain financing is then tested on two different terrorist organisations, the Taliban and the Lashkar-e-Taiba, in South Asia. By considering available examples, we were able to see how such organisations enter into certain value chains, interact with other groups of people, which has an effect on the strategic behaviour of the group in respect to which groups it targets, when and how. Their funding mechanism and fronts for the same are detailed, demonstrating how this affected their modus operandi, including but not limited to, drug mulling, hawala, trafficking, zakat and state support.

This text gives some very small selection of details included in the forthcoming Caracalla: A Military Biography (as an advertisement) due to be published by Pen & Sword this year and in fact provides also a short overview of some of the unconventional strategies and tactics employed by Caracalla together with some quite new info regarding period equipment and military practices. A much fuller discussion of all things connected to military matters in its widest sense can be found in the book.

Currently the international military situation on the whole tend to ease, but the world is not peaceful, 21th century, international relations are complicated, various forces continue to divide the world in combination. Exchanges and cooperation, struggle and competition are intertwined, will be the basic form of the 21st century, the international security environment and military situation. With the extensive application of high technology in the military field, modern warfare has entered a high‐tech stage, due to extensive use of war weapons and senior technical leader role in the new doctrine, causing major changes in the form of war. Resulting in a change in the scale of war, styles and processes. War has been a simple contest of wisdom into a physical confrontation military geology research and explain, I published a number of one‐sided view, mainly from remote sensing technology, according to Dr. Zhang Qingxiang. Remote sensing technology is the sensor mounted on the platform, as an electromagnetic wave information media, objects in the earth's surface and a certain perception of spatial extent from distant places, the whole process ground to identify the object, he is airborne remote sensing, in the 20th century 60 years developed a new type of comprehensive immigration interdisciplinary, since the 1970s, with the launch of new aerospace remote sensing platforms, research, space remote sensing technology to develop new sensors. Applications developed from military applications to a global environment and resources for monitoring and research objectives of cutting‐edge technology.

This publication (volume 2) addresses the following Strategic lessons: (11) Strategic Messaging, (12) Leader Attributes, (13) Protection of Civilians, (14) Human Domain, (15) Radiological Hazards in Disaster Relief (16) Information Sharing in Disaster Relief, (17) USG Framework for Foreign Disaster Relief, (18) Light Footprint Approach,
(19) Blue and Green Forces Operating in Tandem, and (20) Information Gathering and Analysis (Intelligence).

The security apparatus of the Islamic Republic of Iran-that is the combination of those institutions and organizations that are responsible for internal and external security including matters of national defense and intelligence-differs slightly from other authoritarian regimes as it combines revolutionary and state institutions. Hence forces like the army and police are balanced by ideological units like the Corps of the Guardians of the Islamic Revolution (Corps), the revolutionary committees and irregular forces (Hezbollahis). The result is a cohabitation of a numerically strong but technologically obsolete conscript army and police force with an overlapping network of intelligence and paramilitary forces. Limited military capacities are compensated with anti-imperialist revolutionary rhetorics. Hence the US remains enemy no: 1 notwithstanding the completion of the nuclear agreement (JCPOA Joint Common Plan of Action) with the E3+3. Until now, US-Iranian alignements of interests in the region (the stabilization of Iraq, the fight against the Islamic State) were not sufficiently substanciated to result in strategic reassessment. National Security is largely defined as regime security. As commander-in-chief the Supreme Leader appoints the higher echelons of military commanders, some of them on suggestion of the president. Parliamentary oversight of the armed and security forces is ensured as all ministers including the ministers of defence, intelligence and interior must be confirmed by parliament. By law the minister of intelligence must be a cleric occassionally the ministry of Interior too has been led by clerics. Political oversight and ideological indoctrination are the responsibilities of the representatives of the Supreme Leader who are present at all echelons and ideological and political offices. The latter are responsible for the obligatory ideological review of all public servants (gozinesh). Additionally in all private and public organizations and institutions the establishment of security offices (daftar-e herasat) is mandatory. In military organizations protection and intelligence organizations or offices (daftar/sazeman-e hefazat va ettelaat), function as intelligence and counter-intel force. In the army, these units exist in addition to the staff positions responsible for military intelligence and security. The Corps' protection and intelligence organization (sazeman-e hefazat va ettelaat SHE) has developped an organizational and political life of its own; at the Law Enforcement Forces (police NAJA) a similar SHE exercises the functions of internal audit and state police. Additional surveillance units are the parastatal Basij and the irregular Hezbollahis. The latter act as moral police but proofed difficult to control. Since 1992, they are organized in a private umbrella organization called Ansar-e Hezbollah, whose influence the Ruhani government tries to curb. Coordination and separation of responsibilities is regulated by a number of laws. The main strategic decision making body is the "Higher National Security Council HNSR" chaired by the President. In HNSR key ministers and military commanders are represented. Sensitive security policy decisions are taken in the informal " Council of the heads of the three powers " (legislative/head of parliament, executive/president and judicial/head of justice). Matters of internal security are taken in the "State Security Council" headed by the Interior Minister. Conflicts of competence exist between the Ministry of Interior, the Corps, the Ministry of Intelligence and the Corps' intelligence service SHE. The development of the Iranian intelligence services is not yet complete it is a unification of most departments of the old SAVAK with revolutionary forces. According to the law the

In the autumn of 1962, two weeks before U-2 aerial photographs confirmed Soviet deployments of nuclear missiles in Cuba, the US intelligence community attempted to image the island with the spy satellite Corona. Insufficient image resolution and extensive cloud cover, however, prevented this photography from providing solid evidence confirming or denying the presence of offensive missiles. This event – previously unaddressed either by Missile Crisis or Corona scholars – illustrates both the promise and the limits of early satellite imagery intelligence. It further provides insight into the early imagery tasking and coordination process and demonstrates needs that drove further development of national satellite reconnaissance in the years that followed.

Responding to the uncertainty of the post 9/11 security environment and the advent of the ‘War on Terror’, Peter Gill examines how this new context has “reinforced the incompatibility of secret intelligence and respect for human rights” (Gill, 2009, p. 78). This development, in Gill’s view, has been caused by a changed perception of security risks in the context of ‘new terrorism’ (Gill, 2009, 78).

Discussing the threats posed by this new context to the place that law, rights and ethics and areas of intelligence practice have in security operations, Gill advocates for a “re-invigorated oversight necessary to protect human rights without hindering agencies’ ability to maintain public safety” (Gill, 2009, 78). Illuminating what he calls the “darkness at the heart of the ‘civilising mission’”, Gill argues “the task is to ensure that these efforts do not undermine democracy and the rule of law as much, if not more, than the threat itself” (Gill, 2009, p. 99). This endeavour results in Gill strongly advocating for broad ranging oversight, because “the actions of intelligence agencies must be scrutinised since the act in our name” (Gill, 2009, p. 99).

To use Marlow’s words, Gill’s task in this author’s view “was like a weary pilgrimage amongst hints of nightmares” (Conrad, 2002, p. 115), when considering the dark possibilities of human rights abuses in the present security conditions. This paper will attempt to critically evaluate Gill’s arguments, finding points of agreement and contention set within the context of the wider corpus of intelligence literature.

This article can be downloaded at https://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/BDIGZY2M5CE3TFY4BAZK/full?target=10.1080/23800992.2020.1839839.

The Soviet-sponsored communist takeover of Czechoslovakia in February 1948 prompted hundreds of government officials to seek opportunities to escape or to remain abroad. Among those who sought opportunities to escape were nine Czechoslovakian military intelligence officers from the Main Staff Second Directorate, who defected to American or British occupation forces in Germany and Austria from March 1948 to May 1949. Based on the lives of these officers as reflected in archival records, this article pieces together a picture of early communist Czechoslovakian intelligence targets, communist suspicion of Western allies, and the officers’ motivations for leaving their intelligence positions, to show the effects of the communist takeover of Czechoslovakia on intelligence officers and operations.

Paper was written for class during academic studies.

Introduction:

The creation, implementation, and activities of Rogers’ Rangers had a significant impact on the evolution of Special Operations warfare during the Seven Years’ War and beyond. Exploits of this elite fighting group have been so acclaimed throughout history that not only have they impacted future military strategy and training; but they also created a new admiration from the public regarding those who performed - and continue - such actions in the course of their military duties. The stories of the Rangers and their future counterparts continue to be celebrated even today across the globe through a wide variety of public mediums such as literature, movies, and television.

An example of this intense public fascination and praise can be found in the critic’s review of the novel Northwest Passage, a best-selling 1937 novel based loosely on the Ranger’s activities and members – especially their leader Robert Rogers. In the volume’s opening pages critic Charles Lee of the Minneapolis Journal states:

Towering above all else in the swirling 700 pages of Northwest Passage is that indestructible giant, Robert Rogers, a prodigious creation, a character bristling and sounding with life, a vivid portrait for your library gallery. Northwest Passage will give you three novel’s worth of entertainment.

But are these depictions accurate to the realities of the actions spawning them? Who were the Rangers? What was the true impact of the Rangers and their exploits? How was the discipline of war changed due to the unit and its unique fighting abilities? It is these questions (and others) that this research paper intends to examine.  Aspects of the unit’s creation, operations, policies, and training will be briefly reviewed with the purpose of gaining a more accurate and thorough understanding of the Rangers and their place within the historical narrative. 

In addition, a bibliography will also be presented for any further reading and research that the end-user wishes to explore.

Wojciech Skóra, Zatrzymanie polskiego jachtu „Jurand” w Ustce (Stolpmünde) w 1931 roku. Epizod z początków polskiego żeglarstwa morskiego [The arrest of Polish yacht "Jurand" in Ustka (Stolpmünde) in 1931. The episode of the early Polish sea sailing], [w:] Bezpieczeństwo Polski w Europie. Historyczne uwarunkowania bezpieczeństwa. Księga dedykowana Profesorowi Bogusławowi Polakowi z okazji 45-lecia pracy twórczej oraz 70-lecia urodzin, red. Zbigniew Danielewicz, Jacek Knopek, Michał Polak, Koszalin 2015, s. 181-197.

Technology changes warfare. In the past 17-years of war, the US and its NATO allies have been fighting against the never-ending threat from mines and Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs). If this threat was from mechanically activated mines and IEDs, much like the pressure or tilt-rod mines of WWII and the Cold War, the legacy set of equipment developed in the late 20th century could have handled the challenge. As it was, the exponential commercial development of mobile communications and the miniaturization of components that occurred in the past 20-years has created a perfect blast storm that made most of the deployed military systems vulnerable. The result was a rush to retrain soldiers to deal with the threat and then a heroic effort to enhance vehicle protection. Vehicle protection was upgraded primarily by adding more steel to existing vehicles, then by fielding special Mine Resistant Ambush Protected vehicles (MRAPs), and also by adding electronic systems to find and jam command detonated mines and IEDs.

The reform or ‘democratization’ of intelligence has been studied in many countries
essentially as a process of transition from authoritarian or ‘counterintelligence’ states to
liberal democratic regimes in which security and intelligence agencies are subject to (more
or less) democratic control and oversight.1
These studies have contributed to the growth in
comparative studies of intelligence but have often ignored some key issues, including the
conditions for the very existence of ‘state’ intelligence, the continuing significance of parallel
non-state intelligence entities and the involvement of an increasing number of corporate actors in intelligence activities. This article examines intelligence as it works within and between different ‘sectors’ and the implications for democratization

During the Great War, the Belgian ‘Second Section’ concentrated its espionage efforts on national occupied soil, operating 38 intelligence networks, and covering almost 700 agents. These networks were mainly managed from the towns of Flushing and Maastricht, in neutral Netherlands. The Belgian secret service did not coordinate its operation on occupied territory with its French and British counterparts. They even experienced a bitter concurrency with the latter. Its first but limited successes of 1914-1915 were followed by a series of disasters the following year. At the end of summer 1916, most of the resistance groups working for the ‘Second Section’ were dismantled. Subsequently, the Belgian secret service never achieved to recover its presence on national occupied soil before the end of the war.

This chapter considers the sinking of Japanese hellships carrying prisoners of war such as the Montevideo Maru and Rakuyo Maru within the wider context of the global war. It discusses international law, efforts by the Red Cross to protect prisoners transported by sea, and the ramifications for POWs - of all sides, in the Atlantic and the Pacific - of the practice of unrestricted submarine warfare in the Second World War.

On the centenary of the Belgian military intelligence service ADIV/SGRS, this article considers the antecedents of military intelligence before its foundation. Without having an organized intelligence service, the Belgian army naturally performed intelligence tasks from its earliest days in the campaign against the Netherlands. The Ministry of War had a bureau to study other armed forces, based upon open and diplomatic sources. In line with defending Belgium’s neutrality, special attention would go towards the intentions of neighbouring countries. Yet the same concern for neutrality saw policymakers very apprehensive at engaging in anything resembling foreign espionage. At times of heightened threat, such as an attempted revolution in 1848 and the war between France and Prussia in 1870, the War Ministry would rely on the intelligence capacity of the civil security service. Political wrangling about the army and conscription throughout the nineteenth century left little time for giving much thought to intelligence, while the army staff itself would base defence plans upon general assumptions, being concerned more with the actions of the Belgian Army than those of the potential invaders. At the turn of the twentieth century an organization for the surveillance of the frontiers was active. Most foreign intelligence gathering was done by the diplomatic service. As it was becoming increasingly clear that either France or Germany or both would pass through Belgium in their next war, attempts at improving security were still blocked by political opposition. Finally, a reform of the army saw the birth of an intelligence section of the general staff in 1910. Too embryonic and handicapped by internal bickering, the Agadir crisis still provided a baptism of fire. Increased vigilance came too late even if the German invasion was no surprise. The ease with which Belgium was overtaken and the need for intelligence and security at the front, gave rise to the establishment of the service still in existence today, undergoing a rapid learning process for the duration until the necessity of a military intelligence service was an acknowledged fact. In conclusion, the article considers historical parallels with Belgian complacency regarding security then and today.

Strategy is the direction and use made of force and the threat of force for the purposes of policy as decided by politics. Strategy requires decision-makers to make assumptions, critically assess these assumptions, then based on this develop the ends, ways and means triangle. This process undoubtedly requires making choices/decision based on hopefully critical analysis. This means strategy is the product of decisions i.e. it can only be as good as the decision-making process from which it is derived. Therefore, the ability to make well-informed and rational decisions is essential for the formation of any good strategy. The article examines how cognitive errors and groupthink can lead to a systematic deviation from what is considered to be a standard of rationality or good judgment resulting in flawed strategies.

I explain how to travel to the stars now, in our future, in our past using small amounts of energy to create warp drives and traversable wormhole time machines. Stephen Hawking was wrong about this not being possible because a fact has destroyed his beautiful theory. That fact is the 2017 Pentagon release of the USS Nimitz Battle Group's Close Encounter with a warp drive "alien" machine in November 2004 - the "Tic Tac" smoking gun.