Military History

ABSTRACT: El-Markha Plain is a key coastal region providing an anchorage for Egyptian expeditions traveling to the copper and turquoise mining region in South Sinai.  The University of Toronto expedition investigated a mound at Ras Budran and uncovered a late Old Kingdom, circular stone structure. It represents one of three Egyptian “forts” identified from the Early Dynastic through Old Kingdom period and augments two published Old Kingdom sites in South Sinai. It clarifies and underscores the perceived dangers in and the importance of South Sinai to Egyptian mining expeditions during this period. It displays an unusual circular design for an ancient Egyptian structure and an uncommon application of stone to a “fort”.  Its construction, occupation, possible destruction, and abandonment reflect contemporary late Old Kingdom records for Egyptian campaigns against Asiatic “Sand-dwellers” and a Bedouin massacre of an Egyptian expedition beside the Red Sea. The site illuminates multiple aspects of a period associated with the Old Kingdom’s “collapse” and the activities and cross-cultural interactions of a transitory garrison on Egypt’s eastern frontier.

During the belle epoque, many thousands of male European citizens joined military youth groups and paramilitary units, volunteer and private police forces, company defense groups, student battalions, civic militias, and shooting clubs throughout the continent. This article investigates the features, aims, and impact of armed associations in Europe in the approximately thirty years preceding the outbreak of the First World War. The legal context within which armed associations could prosper, their involvement in strikes and in the fight against crime, and the development of patriotic armed groups are the main lines of inquiry pursued in the article. Examination of armed associationism in pre-1914 Europe, a long understudied topic, has the potential to stimulate fresh thinking on crucial aspects of modern statehood, the balance between private rights and public prerogatives, crucial forms of nationalism and patriotism, and deep-seated fears and hopes, and possibly also to shed new light on the Great War and its aftermath. The article argues that armed associationism was a specific social phenomenon with a particularly European dimension and was a response to the profound reconfigurations in social and political balances that were taking place throughout the continent.

Bousquet’s landmark book examines the impact of key technologies and scientific ideas on the theory and practice of warfare and the handling of the perennial tension between order and chaos on the battlefield. Spanning the entire modern era, from the Scientific Revolution to the present, it offers a systematic account of modern warfare as the constitution of increasingly complex assemblages of bodies and machines whose integration rests upon a military assimilation of scientific thought.

Reflecting the pervasive influence of scientific conceptual frameworks upon warfare, modern armies have been successively organised by reference to the paradigmatic technologies of the clock, engine, computer, and network. Conversely, major scientific developments and technological breakthroughs have become intertwined with the experience of war, especially since the Second World War’s unprecedented mobilisation of scientific rationality and technical expertise. This increasingly tight symbiosis between science, technology, and war is at the heart of both the tremendous powers and enduring pathologies displayed by the contemporary military machine.

In this new and revised edition, Bousquet extends the analysis to encompass the latest developments in the scientific way of warfare in the midst of renewed great power competition and a wave of technological innovation in artificial intelligence and robotics.

Las órdenes militares hispanas, a pesar de su modesta contribución numérica, tuvieron un indudable protagonismo en la guerra fronteriza contra el islam, y cada vez son más los estudios dedicados exclusivamente a tratar esta función esencial. Sin embargo, existen algunos presupuestos sobre su capacidad militar que conviene matizar y complejizar. Este trabajo busca analizar la cualificación militar de los ejércitos de las órdenes, para determinar si tuvieron específicas capacidades operativas, cuál fue su eficacia real en el combate y qué imagen positiva proyectaron en torno a su papel en la materialización de la ideología de la reconquista. Palabras clave: órdenes militares; guerra medieval; cualificación militar; reclutamiento; entrenamiento militar.

Byzantine arms and armour were researched by many historians. For this reason, Byzantine military history received a dominant position in medieval historiography that provoked the situation, where the military history of small nations (under Roman influences) was written from the Byzantine perspective.
So, our task is to change this conception and bring medieval Armenian military sphere to light. The idea is to analyse the relief on the door of Msho Arakelots monastery where four equestrians and one infantryman are depicted make comparisons with other Armenian, Byzantine and Muslim sources. Unfortunately, Armenian written sources are less important for us because they give only general information about weapons and armour without their detailed description.
In this relief spherical mace head and sword with sleeve cross-guard are presented which have many parallels with Byzantine archaeological and figurative sources. No less important is the depiction of the military trumpet because it is the first image of this object in Armenian art, which we can compare to pictures from Madrid Skylitzes (XII c.). In addition, the only defensive weapon, which is presented in this relief, is round shield with flower ornament. We have many depictions of round shields in Armenian miniatures and reliefs from X–XI c.
Moreover, this relief is one of the few where stirrups and chape of the scabbard are shown. It is important information because these pictures can be compared with other Byzantine archaeological sources to reconstruct their real look.
The conclusions are that the majority of Armenian weapons have similarities to the Byzantine one but no less important are Muslim influences which we have found in some examples. Located between two civilizations (Byzantine and Muslim), Armenians adopted the best examples of military sphere creating their own culture. Moreover, thanks to the comparative analysis we will prove the idea that medieval figurative sources is a good and more or less accurate source for studying medieval military history and our research will serve as evidence for this.

This article analyzes the business organisation and activities of Genoese naval entrepreneurs who managed galleys for the Spanish Empire in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries. While conventional narratives of business history begin with the Industrial Revolution and focus on the rise of the modern corporation, this article brings to the fore early modern entrepreneurs from Italy and shows how they led family-controlled firms running permanent navies in the Mediterranean. By using private ledgers and merchant correspondence, the paper aims to understand how these naval entrepreneurs governed their affairs and managed resources internationally. We find that delegation (through family ties, hierarchy, and networks) was the main solution chosen to deal with distant commodity, labour, and capital markets. We retrace the different forms this delegation took and explain its determinants considering alternative options and providing comparative insights.

Full article: https://doi.org/10.1080/00076791.2020.1798933

The treatment of war wounds is an ancient art, constantly refined to reflect improvements in weapons technology, transportation, antiseptic practices, and surgical techniques. Throughout most of the history of warfare, more soldiers died from disease than combat wounds, and misconceptions regarding the best timing and mode of treatment for injuries often resulted in more harm than good. Since the 19th century, mortality from war wounds steadily decreased as surgeons on all sides of conflicts developed systems for rapidly moving the wounded from the battlefield to frontline hospitals where surgical care is delivered. We review the most important trends in US and Western military trauma management over two centuries, including the shift from primary to delayed closure in wound management, refinement of amputation techniques, advances in evacuation philosophy and technology, the development of antiseptic practices, and the use of antibiotics. We also discuss how the lessons of history are reflected in contemporary US practices in Iraq and Afghanistan.

This article examines the impact of transnational norms on military development. In so doing, it combines constructivism’s study of systemic norms with culturalist work on unit-level norms. I focus on two transnational norms — norms of conventional warfare and norms of civilian supremacy — and show how they shape military develop- ment through a case study of post-revolutionary Ireland. I draw on recent work by constructivists to elucidate the context, process and mechanism whereby transnational norms are diffused and empowered in new national contexts — a process called norm transplantation. Norm transplantation is particularly problematic when transnational norms clash with local norms. Drawing on studies of military culture and military innovation, I identify the conditions necessary for norm transplantation to occur in cases of cultural clash. Returning to the Irish case, I show how transnational norms of military professionalism became encoded in Irish Army culture despite the fact that its predecessor, the Irish Republican Army,

This essay examines the consequences of the wars of Leopold I. Whereas the diffusion of the “fiscal-military state” thesis transformed our understanding of central institutions over the past three decades, most studies focusing on early modern state development employ top-down perspectives. By contrast, I am interested in the interlinkages of war and taxation on the regional and local levels in one of the monarchy’s core lands, Bohemia, and how they relate to the ongoing processes of centralisation. Based on the premise that individual actions and structural developments entail differing consequences for central institutions and the geographically more remote areas, this essay argues that state integration in the centre was accompanied by decreasing of cohesion on and control over the lower administrative levels. The Eggenberg possessions around Krumau serve as the basis for an in-depth case study, out of which emerges that the establishment of the Habsburgs’ fiscal-financial-military regime led to added, not reduced institutional complexity due to the composite nature of traditional patrimonial domination, or Herrschaft.

Actors in competitive environments are bound to decide and act under conditions of uncertainty because they rarely have accurate foreknowledge of how their opponents will respond and when they will respond. Just as a competitor makes a move to improve their standing on a given variable relative to a target competitor, she should expect the latter to counteract with an iterative lagged asymmetric response, that is, with a sequence of countermoves (iteration) that is very different in kind from its trigger (asymmetry) and that will be launched at some unknown point in the future (time lag). The paper explicates the broad relevance of the newly proposed concept of " iterative lagged asymmetric responses " to the social study of temporality and to fields as diverse as intelligence and counterintelligence studies, strategic management, futures studies, military theory, and long-range planning. By bringing out in the foreground and substantiating the observation that competitive environments place a strategic premium on surprise, the concept of iterative lagged asymmetric responses makes a contribution to the never-ending and many-pronged debate about the extent to which the future can be predicted.
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1177/0961463X17752652

Military is the most organized and disciplined institution in a state structure. The Main functions of this institution are two i.e. 1. To defend the country from any attack dictated from outside. 2. To support the government in maintaining law and order within the territorial jurisdiction of the state. It only happens when government asks for their help. It is generally in emergences (natural calamities, accidents or politico-economics crises). Sometimes while performing the latter function, the military displaces the political rulers, usurps power and becomes actual sovereign. They do not go back to barracks; rather stay in power in defacto, or dejure positions. The phenomenon of military takeover has occurred in countries like Turkey, Algeria, Bangladesh, Indonesia, Philippines, Pakistan, etc. The political leaders, scholars, intellectuals and researchers began studying, observing and analyzing it. They evaluated it from several aspects, (Recruitment, structure, training, organization, discipline, functions and in different roles), which helped them to derive certain hypothesis. Some of the hypotheses which are also referred to as theories are the following.

The German Sonderweg thesis has been discarded in most research fields. Yet in regards to the military, things differ: all conflicts before the Second World War are interpreted as prelude to the war of extermination between 1939–1945. This article specifically looks at the Franco-Prussian War 1870–71 and German behaviour vis-à-vis regular combatants, civilians and irregular guerrilla fighters, the so-called francs-tireurs. The author argues that the counter-measures were not exceptional for nineteenth century warfare and also shows how selective reading of the existing secondary literature has distorted our view on the war.

Since WWI, militaries and armed groups have used remote and autonomous explosive traps – landmines, booby traps and improvised explosive devices (IEDs) – as a kind of deadly architecture to reengineer terrain inhospitable. Until recently, minefields remained analog, static, and fixed. But technological development and changes in the nature of war have made remote and autonomous violence increasingly mobile, dynamic, and robotic and, rather than being contained in a bounded Cartesian plane, diffused through the very spaces and flows that sustain civilian life. Such “unmanned” weapons are increasingly able to navigate, communicate with each other, identify targets and even kill with minimal human involvement. Mirroring broader changes in the spatial configurations of war, the architectural form of remote and autonomous killing is thus shifting from the two-dimensional minefield to multi-dimensional minespace. This poses challenges to those engaged in humanitarian efforts to demilitarize space. To illustrate these changes, the paper draws on Derek Gregory’s notion of “Everywhere War” and engages in a discursive “archeology” of the minefield as described by US Army mine, booby trap and IED warfare field manuals.

The Gallipoli campaign occupies an important place in modern Turkish history, a position reinforced by the release of new publications and the construction of additional monuments to mark the centenary of the conflict. However, these are comparatively recent developments as, just decades ago, the Gallipoli campaign was not regarded as significant to the foundation of the Turkish Republic nor as a powerful source of national identity. While popular Turkish remembrance and commemoration of the campaign began with the wartime propaganda and myth-making of the period, the Turkish War of Independence proved more significant to the national consciousness, inspiring its own particular myths and legends. Yet, with the passage of time, official military histories, personal war narratives, the construction of the Dardanelles Martyrs' Memorial in the early 1950s and the official campaign of the 1980s to create a more articulated Gallipoli history proved instrumental in establishing Gallipoli as crucial to the foundation narrative. Alongside this, recent political and sociocultural developments have also seen the creation of an alternative Islamic myth (with the controversy that accompanies it) while reinforcing the omnipresence of Gallipoli in Turkish history and national consciousness. The Gallipoli campaign occupies an important place in modern Turkish history. From both the official Turkish and popular perspective, it is regarded not only as a magnificent victory, but also as signifying the birth of the new Turkish nation which emerged from the ruins of the Ottoman Empire. The centenary of the Gallipoli campaign has prompted the publication of large numbers of Turkish language books on various aspects of the campaign – a trend that would have been most unlikely just three decades ago. Indeed Gallipoli has earned its prominent position in Turkish history only after a lengthy and arduous journey, having long remained solely of interest to Turkish military officers and a small group of enthusiasts. Only official military historians and veterans produced books and articles and these were consumed by a relatively small audience. Even the construction of monuments and cemeteries was a protracted and difficult process. In contrast to Britain, Australia and New Zealand, Turkish observance and commemoration of the Gallipoli campaign was observed on a single day – 18 March – and was for many years a local affair, only becoming

Scrutinizing and questioning contentious and failed policy decisions should result in discussing ‘ifs, buts, and maybes’, particularly when there are policy alternatives. This article scrutinizes and questions the British decision to reject Armenian proposals to form a legion of Armenian volunteers in 1914 and 1915, especially since in late 1916 the French, with British approval, established an Armenian legion (until 1919 called the Legion d'Orient); and because the first proposals for a legion were connected to British considerations, also overlooked, to land a force at Alexandretta. Nothing of substance has been published on the initial proposals to form an Armenian legion, and on its connection to the Armenian genocide and the proposed British landing at Alexandretta. By focusing on why the British rejected the proposal to form an Armenian legion and the implications, if any, for the Armenian genocide and the Allied discussions on where to attack the Ottoman empire during the first four months of 1915, this article offers important new insights into why the British and French failed to do anything to prevent the Armenian genocide, and got it wrong with their decision to land forces at Gallipoli in April 1915 instead of at Alexandretta. Imperialism lies at the heart of the explanation.

Early modern warfare in Western Europe exposed civilian populations to violence, hardship, and disease. Despite limited empirical evidence, the ensuing mortality effects are regularly invoked by economic historians to explain patterns of economic development. Using newly collected data on adult burials and war events in the seventeenth-century Low Countries, we estimate early modern war-driven mortality in localities close to military activity. We find a clear and significant general mortality effect consistent with the localized presence of diseases. During years with major epidemic disease outbreaks, we demonstrate a stronger and more widely spreading mortality effect. However, war-driven mortality increases during epidemic years are of similar relative magnitude as those in non-epidemic war years. Given the omnipresence of warfare in the seventeenth-century Low Countries, war-driven mortality was remarkably constant rather than a sharp discontinuity. The economic impact of warfare likely played out over the long term rather than driven by sudden large mortality spikes creating rapid structural change.

The participation of the Sauk and Fox (Mesquakie) Indians in the War of 1812 became a politicizing agent that resulted in an anti-American tribal faction that eventually came under the leadership of the Sauk war leader Black Hawk.  The Black Hawk War of 1832 was, in part, the product of ideological forces unleashed during the War of 1812.

This intervention contributes to recent work in urban geography that integrates the conceptual frameworks of assemblages and actor-network theory by highlighting two additional directions that require a more rigorous and detailed theorization. The first direction concerns the relationship between contingency and necessity in urban assemblages and actor-networks and this paper delineates four specific propositions as a starting point for further reflection. The second direction suggests that urban assemblages and actor-networks require a more explicit vocabulary for thinking about competition and cooperation within and between cities. To this end, the paper introduces a new concept – delayed asymmetric counterforces – that can foster a better understanding of competition-induced urban change and destabilization. The novel concept is developed in conjunction with a typology of delays in competitive urban dynamics, which helps illuminate how delayed asymmetric counterforces are both a cause and an effect of the complexity inherent in the urban realm.

Sifting through business accounts and public records, this article demonstrates the involvement of Medici Bank in the military industry of the fifteenth century, shedding new light on the final years of one of the most important companies in Renaissance Italy. By restating the relation between the public role and the private business of Lorenzo the Magnificent, this article emphasises the exploitation of government operations for his economic gain as well as the use of the family business for his political purposes - in this case, the consolidation of the new, permanent military institutions of the Florentine Republic. Developing this point further, the entire military organisation of the Medicean regime, traditionally assessed as haphazard and inefficient, is re-evaluated. Finally, this article contributes to the current debate on the military entrepreneurship of the preindustrial world, focussing on the cooperation between state administration and capitalist elites in supplying the materiel indispensable to early modern armies.

La precaria situación de oficiales y soldados en los ejércitos españoles de la Edad Moderna, unida a los problemas de meritocracia y venalidad, causaron la desafección dentro de la profesión y su desprestigio fuera de ella. Este estudio plantea el problema de la representación colectiva de la gente de guerra y las soluciones propuestas desde la administración. Nos centramos en dos de las múltiples respuestas posibles: la figura institucionalizada del «protector del soldado» de los Habsburgos y la práctica de la protección desarrollada por los inspectores de los Borbones. Las conclusiones avanzan que el «protector del soldado» fue una respuesta vacía de contenido y de poco calado; los inspectores, por su parte, se enfrentaron a una dura oposición en su práctica de la protección y en sus intentos de extensión de su jurisdicción sobre todos los cuerpos del ejército. Los límites a la representación colectiva-la reivindicada desde las tropas, por una parte, y la ofrecida desde las instituciones, por otra-nos permiten avanzar en una lectura política de la protección asistencial y la falta de recursos para cubrir las necesidades y expectativas de los militares.

The precarious situation of officers and soldiers in Early Modern Spain, and the problems of meritocracy and venality, caused professional disaffection and loss of social prestige. This contribution raises the problem of collective representation of the military and the administrative solutions proposed. We focus on two of the many possible responses: the Habsburg institutionalized figure of the ‘Protector of Soldiers’, and the protection praxis by the Bourbon military inspectors. Conclusions confirm that the ‘Protector of Soldiers’ was an answer empty of legal content, while Bourbon inspectors faced a stiff opposition in their attempts to extend their jurisdiction all over the army. Limits to collective representation claimed by the military, on the one hand, and solutions offered by the institutions, on the other, allow us to advance in a political approach to social assistance, and the lack of resources to cover the healthcare needs and professional expectations of the military.

Historians have examined the Herero genocide in German South West Africa extensively. The role of the Prusso-German general staff has received only rudimentary treatment, however. The following study focuses on the actions of this institution and its chief. Evidence indicates that initially and with varying degrees of success the general staff was heavily involved in German military actions. After the Battle of Waterberg, however, the local military commander, Lieutenant General Lothar von Trotha, fought his own war. Meanwhile, the general staff gravitated toward a different role: shielding Trotha from criticism emanating from German civilian leaders and the public. The impulse to protect sprang not only from a harmony of views about the annihilation of the Herero, but also from an urge to preserve the prestige of the German military after unexpected losses at the hands of “African savages.” In fact, the Prusso-German general staff was complicit in, if not partly responsible for, the conduct of genocidal warfare in GSWA.

The reign of Henry III (1216–1272) was pivotal in English political history. It saw the entrenchment of Magna Carta, the growth of parliament and the widening of political society, as well as England's first revolution (1258–1265), led by Simon de Montfort, earl of Leicester. Montfort and his confederates seized the reins of government from Henry III and governed by a council in the king's name, in the most dramatic political upheaval before the 17th century civil war. Blessed with a rich collection of sources, historians over the past two decades have used the tools of military, biographical, intellectual and social history, as well as sociological approaches, to analyse these events. Their work has placed 13th century politics firmly within its own society and culture, throwing fresh light on Henry III, Simon de Montfort and the events of the first revolution in English history.

This paper concentrates on the literary sources of the battle of Delion (424 BCE) and reopens the debate on the relevance of Euripides' Supplices for the narrative of this event. Thucydides is read with a particular focus on the speech of Pagondas (4.92), which can be understood through the current reconstruction of the history of Boiotia in the latter half of the fifth century BCE. Finally, Diodorus (12.69-70) is considered as a useful source for a few pieces of information on the aftermath of the battle that have previously been disregarded.

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In a search for appropriate theory, this essay inserts drug trafficking, the world’s largest illicit economic activity, within a wider analytical frame called the “covert netherworld.” Through the convergence xof three factors—covert operations, illicit commerce, and social milieu—such netherworlds can form at regional, national, and international levels, thereby transforming social margins of crime and illicit commerce into potent sources of political change. By deftly playing upon this netherworld’s politics and illicit commerce along the Burma-Thai borderlands, a regional “drug lord” amassed sufficient local power to dominate the global heroin trade for over a decade and simultaneously sustain an ethnic revolt for nearly 15 years. In the Philippines, the illicit traffic in synthetic drugs developed a parallel power to influence the character of national politics, compromising three presidential administrations and shaping the moral economy of political life. For the past 40 years in Afghanistan, an illicit commodity, opium, has shaped the fate of military intervention by the world’s sole superpower, allowing it an initial success and later contributing to its ongoing failure. Through the sum of these cases, the essay concludes that the covert netherworld can serve as invisible incubator for a range of extralegal activities and has thereby attained sufficient autonomy to be treated as a significant factor in international politics.

The aim of the article is to analyze the economic effects of the development of military logistical structures – especially food supplies ones – in the state-building process in the Early Modern period, using the Republic of Venice as case study. We will observe both the technical elements (officials, structures, laws) and the economic ones (the purchasing of grains, the contracts for the production of bread, the accounting system).
The article will also draw the features of the merchants who sold the grains to the Venetian officials and who participated in the competitions for the contracts for the bread production. The article will show that specific subjects were involved in particular moments and places, not because a precise will of the state, but because market affected the participation of merchants and entrepreneurs, playing a fundamental role in defining the evolution of the supplying structure.

Alliances remain at the heart of history, since they serve states in achieving geopolitical needs and securing grand strategic necessities. Apart from strategic considerations, the article aspires to highlight the psychological motivation for conceiving and forming alliances. It argues alliances to be the basic instrument in ensuring survival and elaborates the psychological efficacy and utility in employing the same device in gaining and sustaining the status of a functional great power. This article addresses the most significant development in modern times, i.e. rising China and its pursuit to become a pro-active great power, whilst greatly drawing from its strategic history in such endeavours. It explores the 'China Threat', and argues that China is likely to enter into alliances based on its geopolitical necessities by engaging its armed forces regionally, most likely in its near abroad. The article interprets China's Belt and Road Initiative as a soft alliance and predicts the precursors of a military alliance.

What should be the role of law in response to the spread of Artificial Intelligence in war? Fuelled by both public and private investment, military technology is accelerating towards increasingly autonomous weapons, as well as the merging of humans and machines. Contrary to much of the contemporary debate, this is not a paradigm change; it is the intensification of a central feature in the relationship between technology and war: double elevation, above one's enemy and above oneself. Elevation above one's enemy aspires to spatial, moral and civilizational distance. Elevation above oneself reflects a belief in rational improvement that sees humanity as the cause of inhumanity and de-humanization as our best chance for humanization. The distance of double elevation is served by the mechanization of judgement. To the extent that judgement is seen as reducible to algorithm, law becomes the handmaiden of mechanization. In response, neither a focus on questions of compatibility nor a call for a 'ban on killer robots' help in articulating a meaningful role for law. Instead, I argue that we should turn to a long-standing philosophical critique of artificial intelligence, which highlights not the threat of omniscience, but that of impoverished intelligence. Therefore, if there is to be a meaningful role for law in resisting double elevation, it should be law encompassing subjectivity, emotion and imagination, law irreducible to algorithm, a law of war that appreciates situated judgement in the wielding of violence for the collective.

The former Soviet military bastion, Russia’s westernmost region, the Kaliningrad Oblast, has
again re-gained its military strength. The process of re-militarization that was initiated after
2009, resulted in transformation of the area into Russia’s Anti-Access/Area-Denial (A2/AD)
zone. In the aftermath of the Ukrainian crisis (started in the late 2013) and growing alienation
between Moscow and its Western partners, the oblast has stepped onto a qualitatively new
level of militarization. At the same time, following changing nature of warfare, aside from
military-related steps, the Russian side has heavily invested in non-military aspects as well. The
analysis yields three policy implications. First, Russia’s understanding of the A2/AD concept
is different from the Western reading, and Kaliningrad exemplifies this supposition. Second,
Russia will continue using Kaliningrad as a part of its growing reliance on asymmetricity. Third,
underestimation of Russia’s resolve and/or Kaliningrad capabilities will have largely negative
conclusions for the Baltic Sea region and countries that comprise it.

“The Formation of the “Western” Strategic Gaze. A Case Study on Emotional Irrelevance in International Politics”, dans Maéva Clément et Eric Sandar (dirs..), Researching Emotions in International Relations. Methodological Perspectives on the Emotional Turn, Berlin, Springer, 2018, pp. 156-177.