Australia and the Great War 2981_Australia and the Great War.indd 1 25/09/2015 3:44 pm 2981_Australia and the Great War.indd 2 25/09/2015 3:44 pm Australia and the Great War Identity, Memory and Mythology Edited by Michael JK Walsh and Andrekos Varnava 2981_Australia and the Great War.indd 3 25/09/2015 3:44 pm MELBOURNE UNIVERSITY PUBLISHING An imprint of Melbourne University Publishing Limited 11–15 Argyle Place South, Carlton, Victoria 3053, Australia mup-info@unimelb.edu.au www.mup.com.au First published 2016 Text © Michael JK Walsh and Andrekos Varnava, 2016 Design and typography © Melbourne University Publishing Limited, 2016 This book is copyright. Apart from any use permitted under the Copyright Act 1968 and subsequent amendments, no part may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted by any means or process whatsoever without the prior written permission of the publishers. Every attempt has been made to locate the copyright holders for material quoted in this book. Any person or organisation that may have been overlooked or misattributed may contact the publisher. Text design by Phil Campbell Cover design by Phil Campbell Typeset by J&M Typesetting Printed in Australia by OPUS Group National Library of Australia Cataloguing-in-Publication entry Title: Australia and the great war : contemporary and historiographical debates / Michael J K Walsh (editor); Andrekos Varnava (editor). ISBN: 9780522869545 (hardback) ISBN: 9780522867879 (paperback) ISBN: 9780522867886 (ebook) Notes: Includes bibliographical references and index. Subjects: World War, 1914–1918—Australia—Historiography. Australia—Historiography. Other Creators/Contributors: Walsh, Michael J. K., editor. Varnava, Andrekos, editor. 940.394 2981_Australia and the Great War.indd 4 25/09/2015 3:44 pm Contents 1 Australia’s Great War: Contemporary and Historiographical Debates Michael J K Walsh and Andrekos Varnava Part I: Identities and Australianness 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 1 23 Red Crossing for War: Responses of Imperial Feminism and the Australian Red Cross during the Great War Melanie Oppenheimer 25 Establishing Australian Medical–Military Expertise: The Gallipoli Landings Alexia Moncrieff 40 From the Boer War to the Great War: Atrocity Propaganda and Complex Imperialism at the Westralian Worker 1900–1917 Emily Robertson The Enemy at the Gates: The 1918 Mystery Aeroplane Panic in Australia and New Zealand Brett Holman Saving the Australian War Effort in 1916? Global Climatic Conditions, Pests and William Morris Hughes’s Negotiations with the British Government Daniel Marc Segesser Loyalty Becoming Disloyalty? The War and Irish– Australians Before and After Easter 1916 Stephanie James ‘This is Against All the British Traditions of Fair Play’: Violence Against Greeks on the Australian Home Front during the Great War Joy Damousi 2981_Australia and the Great War.indd 5 54 71 97 110 128 25/09/2015 3:44 pm Part II: Memory and Mythology 9 Mustafa Kemal at Gallipoli: The Making of a Saga, 1921–1932 Ayhan Aktar 10 Dangerous Ground and Fatal Shore: Remediating Gallipoli Silvia Mergenthal 11 Revealing Homer, Herodotus and Thucydides in CEW Bean’s Official History Sarah Midford 147 149 172 188 12 CEW Bean’s Passchendaele Ashleigh Gilbertson 204 13 Nationalism and War Memory in Australia Carolyn Holbrook 218 14 From Competitive Memory to Comparative Commemoration: Tom Nicholson’s Palestine Monument and the Great War Centenary Ryan Johnston 240 Select Bibliography 257 Biographies of Contributors 266 Index 271 vi Australia and the Great War: Identity, Memory and Mythology 2981_Australia and the Great War.indd 6 25/09/2015 3:44 pm Chapter 9 Mustafa Kemal at Gallipoli: The Making of a Saga, 1921–1932 Ayhan Aktar After the war, some of the most brilliant generals of the Great War emerged as leaders of newly formed nation states. The founding father of modern Turkey, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk (1881–1938), was one of them. Today in Turkey, any commemoration or public event related to the Gallipoli campaign during that war glorifies Mustafa Kemal as the chief, the only, leading military figure in that theatre of war. His legacy remains intact, not only in Turkish history textbooks, but also in official military history volumes published by the Turkish chief of staff. Anybody visiting the Gallipoli battlefield today cannot help but note his presence almost everywhere. In contrast to Mustafa Kemal’s dominance in collective memory, the Ottoman victory at Gallipoli was never officially commemorated during the first ten years of the Turkish republic. Most of the senior officers who had fought there were still active within the political– military establishment. The press made no mention of any special meeting or public gathering organised by veterans. Analysis of daily newspapers published on the anniversaries of significant dates (the 18 March 1915 Allied naval assault, the 25 April Anzac landing, or the hot days of 9–28 August 1915) does not yield any special coverage 2981_Australia and the Great War.indd 149 25/09/2015 3:44 pm whatsoever. And while, every now and then, groups of Turkish citizens were reported to have visited the peninsula and to have read prayers for the souls of their fallen friends and relatives, these minor, informal gatherings were not official, state-sponsored ceremonies.1 The first such commemoration, which took place on 18 March 1934, was a very modest affair. In this chapter, I shall try to demonstrate how the saga of Mustafa Kemal at Gallipoli was first shaped abroad and then imported into Turkey during 1921–1932. (It was the authoritarian nature of the Turkish regime and Mustafa Kemal’s position as president of the republic that enabled the political–military establishment to do so.) After showing how an official Australian history (Charles EW Bean’s The Story of Anzac), Winston Churchill’s war memoir (The World Crisis 1911–1918, vols 1–2), and a British official history (Lieutenant General Cecile F Aspinall-Oglander’s Military Operations: Gallipoli) all glorified Mustafa Kemal’s role in the campaign, I shall argue that these early texts highlighted his role for first psychological and later political reasons. But I would like to start with the question of what it meant to be the ‘hero of the Dardanelles’ to Mustafa Kemal himself. Contrary to the general understanding that exists today, Mustafa Kemal was not known to the Ottoman public during the war. In the Istanbul press, the first mention of him was not before 29 October 1915—nearly at the end of the Gallipoli campaign—in a piece published by Tesvir-i Efkâr daily. This exceptional front-page article presented him and Cevat Pasha as the two heroes who had saved Istanbul and the caliphate from the enemy.2 According to the memoirs of his contemporaries, this minor mention had made Mustafa Kemal’s adversary, Minister of War Enver Pasha, furious. The censor officer who had permitted the publication of the article was jailed for few days; the editor of Tesvir-i Efkâr scolded the young journalists who had written the piece; and Enver himself threatened to send them to the Russian front.3 In 2005, the Ottoman archives administration published a compilation of nearly every piece of bureaucratic correspondence related to the Dardanelles front. These two thick volumes, which 150 Australia and the Great War: Identity, Memory and Mythology 2981_Australia and the Great War.indd 150 25/09/2015 3:44 pm included material from the civilian bureaucracy, as well as press releases and propaganda pieces prepared by the general headquarters, showed that Mustafa Kemal’s name was never mentioned in the official communiqués of the Ministry of War. Only a few documents mention his name, when he was decorated with silver and gold medals by his commanders, Esad Pasha (later Bülkat) and Otto Liman von Sanders Pasha.4 During the war, Mustafa Kemal wanted to utilise his military accomplishments as leverage for furthering his political ambitions. On 10 December 1915, he left the Gallipoli front and moved to Istanbul. Officially, he was on sick leave. Actually, he was in disagreement with von Sanders on matters related to the conduct of war. He had sensed that the Allied army was planning to evacuate the peninsula and had proposed an attack, but von Sanders had not permitted this. Long before this final disagreement, Mustafa Kemal’s unconcealed dislike for and routine maltreatment of German officers had already made him unpopular in the eyes of the German commanders in the empire. Even at the beginning of the war, just a week after the Anzacs’ landing, Mustafa Kemal had written to Enver to complain about the Germans. He had criticised von Sanders’s military competence and had argued that the Ottoman army could have pushed the enemy into the sea at the first instant if the concentration of regiments had been close to the beaches. At the end of his letter, he had recommended to Enver ‘not to trust the opinions and the reasoning power of the ones—undoubtedly Liman von Sanders foremost—whose conscience and hearts would not throb like ours’.5 He had also advised Enver to visit the front personally and get involved with the actual administration of the war. During his stay in Istanbul, Mustafa Kemal visited some Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) notables in the hope that he would be welcomed as a saviour. Quite to the contrary, he was given a cold—or at least indifferent—reception. In his interview with Minister of Foreign Affairs Halil Bey (later Menteşe), he tried to explain that it was not the Turks but the Germans who were deciding strategic matters for the Ministry of War. Bluntly, he criticised the German military mission and its selfish decisions that had resulted in defeats and great losses on several fronts. Naturally, Halil did not Mustafa Kemal at Gallipoli 2981_Australia and the Great War.indd 151 151 25/09/2015 3:44 pm like the tone of Mustafa Kemal’s complaints and recommended that he discuss military matters with Enver. Mustafa Kemal’s answer was: Are you aware, sir, that this country no longer has a national general staff, but a German general staff, whose irst action with regard to the Turkish army has been to sack a rebel soldier like myself? Are these the people whom you wish to send me?6 It was probably at this time that Mustafa Kemal reinforced his image of himself as the saviour of his nation. He must have also contemplated the removal of Enver and his German military advisers in order to save the country. On 30 November 1915, Sultan Mehmed Reşad officially decorated the regiments that had heroically resisted the Anzacs on 25 April. Photographs from the ceremony and the sultan’s official communiqué were published in Harb Mecmuası (War Magazine).7 Again, nobody mentioned Mustafa Kemal—he who had commanded the legendary 57th Regiment and had halted Anzac troops from occupying the plateau. After the evacuation of the peninsula, another important ceremony was held in Istanbul. The sultan was proclaimed ghazi (victorious warrior of Islam), and the flags and standards of the regiments active on the front were paraded, while Enver read a speech by the sultan.8 Again, Mustafa Kemal’s name went unmentioned. In parallel to his desire for fame and to someday replace Enver as minister of war, his self-proclaimed status as saviour came to fit the needs of the capital’s nationalist elites in 1917. Starting with the advance of the Russian army at the Eastern Front in spring 1916, Ottoman society was becoming exhausted by the war effort. The propaganda work of the CUP had lost its effectiveness among the urban masses. Nationalist elites were desperately in need of war heroes—or more precisely, of role models—to continue the struggle. Apart from the loss of thousands of young men in the different theatres of war, such as Sarıkamış, Gallipoli, and the Sinai Desert, wartime inflation and the shortage of foodstuffs had reached drastic proportions. Furthermore, corruption, mismanagement and famine in the cities were making life unbearable on the home front.9 152 Australia and the Great War: Identity, Memory and Mythology 2981_Australia and the Great War.indd 152 25/09/2015 3:44 pm In 1917, ideologue of Turkish nationalism and member of the CUP Central Committee Ziya Gökalp began publishing Yeni Mecmua (New Review) as part of a new, literary offensive aimed at consolidating the nationalist spirit among the elite. One year later, its editorial board resolved to publish a special issue on Gallipoli, which included literary works, memoirs, and interviews.10 Promoted to the rank of brigadier general in April 1916 (he had been made colonel on 1 June 1915), Mustafa Kemal gave his first full-fledged interview.11 Another five veterans, ranging from a corporal to officers of various ranks from that front, were interviewed as well.12 This was only the second time Mustafa Kemal was portrayed as the hero of the Dardanelles in the Ottoman press, and although the editors decided to put his photograph on the front page, Enver’s intervention stopped that from happening.13 It was obvious that all of Mustafa Kemal’s attempts at being acknowledged as a hero were being blocked by the minister of war, who perceived him as a competitor and an adversary. During one social gathering, Enver was asked by leading CUP personages when he was going to promote Mustafa Kemal to brigadier general. He took the official document from his pocket and showed it to his friends while saying, ‘Here is the document of promotion’. He continued, ‘But I want you to know something: if you promote him to pasha, he will want to be sultan. If you make him sultan, he will want to be Allah!’14 Sometime later, when Enver’s comment was revealed to Kemal, he uttered the following: ‘I would never have guessed Enver to be that intelligent and farsighted’.15 There is no doubt that these two men despised each other. During the war, Mustafa Kemal wrote short histories of two battles at Gallipoli: those at Arıburnu and Anafartalar (April and August 1915). He probably expected that writing such accounts would be instrumental in establishing his fame as the hero of the Dardanelles. He was not in a self-glorifying mood in his first account. In his Report on the Arıburnu Battles, which was completed on 25 January 1917, he narrates engagements in the northern zone of Gallipoli during 25 April–26 July 1915 in a very calm and dispassionate manner. Mustafa Kemal at Gallipoli 2981_Australia and the Great War.indd 153 153 25/09/2015 3:44 pm His adoption of this style must have been related to the fact that the Ottoman Military History Section had commissioned this text. We can follow the writing process from Mustafa Kemal’s own diaries, as well as those of Major İzzeddin (later Çalışlar), his staff officer. In autumn 1916, Mustafa Kemal was commander of the 16th Army Corps in Diyarbakır. While he was engaging with the Russian army during the day, he was busy writing his report in the evenings. In his diary, he recorded that he had begun writing on 3 December 1916.16 İzzeddin also noted in his own diary that he was working with Mustafa Kemal on this project.17 The report summarises the events leading up to the beginning of land operations. Contrary to the popular understanding in Turkey today, Mustafa Kemal, as an infantry officer, had no active role in the 18 March defence of the straits against the Allied navy. On that day, his famous 19th Division was stationed at Maidos (today’s Eceabad) as a reserve unit. When the Allied navy pushed in, Mustafa Kemal was part of the inspection tour with other commanders around the village of Kirte. He and his entourage were under heavy fire, and he was using binoculars to observe the naval battle from a distance.18 Mustafa Kemal wrote A Short History of the Battles at Anafarta, which covers the period 6–27 August, as a continuation of his first report. This book, probably written in spring 1918, is self-glorifying and full of critical remarks about Lieutent Colonel Wilhelm Wilmer (Commander of the 5th Division) and of Esad (Commander of the 3rd Army Corps). In this text, his style is more self-imposing and devoid of modesty. This short war account was published in 1943, five years after his death. From these two military treatises, we can conclude that Mustafa Kemal was trying to build up his reputation as a military leader. He was probably contemplating capitalising on this for the advancement of his political career. Mustafa Kemal was first mentioned in Anzac military intelligence reports on 26 or 27 April 1915, when an Ottoman Armenian soldier captured in the first days of the war named him as the commander of 19th Division.19 Apart from this entry, he does not appear much in British or Anzac intelligence reports. 154 Australia and the Great War: Identity, Memory and Mythology 2981_Australia and the Great War.indd 154 25/09/2015 3:44 pm After the war, Allied forces occupied Istanbul, and British diplomats returned to their pre-war duties. Andrew Ryan’s comments on Mustafa Kemal are rather interesting because he had been a dragoman (i.e., official interpreter) at the British embassy before the war and, later, a political officer to the British high commissioner between 1918 and 1922. He writes: [Mustafa Kemal] was already a distinguished soldier, but he had not up to that time played any conspicuous political role. I cannot assess the value of the accounts published after his subsequent rise to greatness … I myself had not followed Turkish affairs in any detail during the war, and I must confess that Mustafa Kemal’s name conveyed nothing to me … in April 1919.20 On 21 March 1919, the British admiralty formed a special committee, presided over by Commodore Francis H Mitchell.21 The Mitchell Committee was in charge of examining the ‘attacks delivered on and the enemy defences of the Dardanelles Straits’, and it was attached to the Dardanelles Commission formed in 1916.22 Its first five meetings were held at the admiralty’s offices in London during March 1919. It later travelled to Taranto, Italy, and from there sailed to Turkey on the HMS Triad, arriving in Istanbul on 9 April. During the commission’s stay (until 14 June), its members not only visited the battlefields of Gallipoli but also interviewed many senior Ottoman officers at the Ministry of War. One of the distinctive characteristics of the report it produced was its scope, for it was the first official British account of the war to integrate the Ottoman narrative. It remained classified until 1970. Interestingly, only two officers mentioned Mustafa Kemal in the interviews recorded in the Mitchell Report. The first was Major Zeki (later Soydemir), commander of the 1st Battalion of the 57th Regiment of the 19th Division, who actively took part in the battles just after the Anzac landings. Regrettably, the report misspelled Mustafa Kemal’s name as ‘Kiamil’. Zeki said: My Division, the 19th, was the reserve of the 5th Army under command of Liman von Sanders. General Kiamil Mustafa Kemal at Gallipoli 2981_Australia and the Great War.indd 155 155 25/09/2015 3:44 pm [sic] commanded the division. He received his orders from Essad Pasha, commanding [the] 3rd Army Corps. Both the Army and Corps Headquarters were at Gallipoli. … Before the landing took place we had had manoeuvres to practice our dispositions should a landing take place in the direction of Helles, Gaba Tepe or Suvla. General Kiamil [sic] attached great importance to Gaba Tepe. We had not anticipated a landing at Ari Burnu, as it was thought the ground was too broken and that the ships could not support attack here. The landing, therefore, came as a surprise, and no dispositions had been thought out of it.23 The second officer to mention Mustafa Kemal—though very briefly— was Captain (Mehmet) Tevfik of the 8th Division’s 24th Regiment. He said during his interview, ‘About 17th August the Turkish troops in this area were organised into the Anafarta group under Mustapha Kiamil [sic] Bey’.24 Mysteriously, apart from these two junior officers, none of Mustafa Kemal’s other comrades mentioned him. The list of officers interviewed by the committee was as follows: • Major Ahmet Zeki (later Soydemir), commander of the 1st Battalion of the 57th Regiment of the 19th Division • Captain (Mehmet) Tevik of the 24th Regiment of the 8th Division • Marshall Otto Liman von Sanders, commander of the 5th Army 25 • Major Erich R Prigge, adjutant to von Sanders26 • Lieutenant Colonel Kazım Pasha (later İnanç), chief staff oficer of the 5th Army27 • Cevat Pasha, commander of fortiications at Gallipoli and later commander of the 14th Army Corps at Helles • Colonel Selahaddin (later Adil), chief staff oficer under Cevat and later commander of the 12th Division28 • Major Osman Zâti (later Koral), member of staff under Cevat29 • Colonel Hulusi (later Conk), commander of the 9th Division • Major Muzaffer, military supplies and communications oficer • Captain Sırrı, artillery oficer • Lieutenant Commander Rauf (later Orbay) of the Ottoman navy • Lieutenant Commander Hermann Baltzer of the German navy • Enver Bey, chief staff oficer under Admiral Wilhelm von Souchon 156 Australia and the Great War: Identity, Memory and Mythology 2981_Australia and the Great War.indd 156 25/09/2015 3:44 pm • Commander Hilmi Bey, gunnery oficer of the Ottoman warship Turgut Reis Furthermore, the committee addressed more than one hundred questions to the general staff about particular details of the war. Kazım answered these himself. Because he mentioned only the names of the 5th Army’s top brass, and since Mustafa Kemal was not on active duty at the time, the latter again went unnamed. On 19 May, Mustafa Kemal moved to Anatolia to organise the Turkish national resistance against the invading Greek army. After the victory against the Greek forces and the fall of Izmir in September 1922, he no longer needed the reputation as the hero of the Dardanelles any longer. He became a national hero, saviour of his country and the founding father of the Turkish republic in 1923. The Kemal saga was constructed by Australian and British authors who published official histories on the campaign during 1921–1932. It was these Australian and British official histories that shaped the legend. In 1915 CEW Bean was selected as official war correspondent for the Australian Defence Department, and it was agreed that he would write a history of the Great War. From the outset, his aim was to not write a staff history for professional soldiers. Rather, he was determined to write a national history for the Australian people. Bean had been at Gallipoli since the beginning of the campaign, observing, taking notes, and regularly talking to officers and soldiers. In the writing process, he was able to utilise all official materials in order to create an accurate, profusely detailed, vivid and readable account. The first volume of his Story of Anzac was published in 1921. It must have been difficult to write the story of a defeat within the context of a commemorative national history. In order to make his text more readable, Bean relied mostly on eyewitness accounts. His story was based on the experiences of soldiers in the trenches. As historian Jenny Macleod argues, this commemorative purpose made his narrative more romantic. His treatment of the Ottomans also contributed to this heroic and romantic picture. He admired the military genius of Mustafa Kemal and argued that his actions had Mustafa Kemal at Gallipoli 2981_Australia and the Great War.indd 157 157 25/09/2015 3:44 pm been vital to Ottoman success. This respect for the enemy and its commander probably made the Anzac defeat seem more honourable. As Macleod states, Bean could justify the loss only by dignifying the enemy: ‘perhaps to fail against an admirable leader and admirable race is palatable’.30 As with the Mitchell Committee, Bean also had an opportunity to talk with Zeki during his visit to Gallipoli on behalf of the Australian Historical Mission in February 1919. Zeki told him about Mustafa Kemal’s role during the landing of the Anzacs on 25 April 1915. He underlined the fact that Mustafa Kemal had pushed the 57th Regiment to the battlefront without taking orders from his superiors. When Bean heard the full Ottoman account of that day, he remembered that intelligence reports had mentioned an Armenian soldier naming Kemal.31 Having learned the details of the battle and the decisive moments of the Ottoman defence from Zeki, he decided to highlight the role of Mustafa Kemal as follows: It was Kemal’s swift determination, and that alone, which had prevented the [Anzacs] from reaching … Chunuk Bair. … after an effort almost passing human endurance [they were] completely hemmed in by a formidable force under a formidable leader, in country which would have been well-nigh impassable even in peace manoeuvres.32 Bean was the first author to introduce Mustafa Kemal to the Englishspeaking world, and his official history was the first serious account of the Gallipoli operations. Churchill’s role in the creation of the Mustafa Kemal saga cannot be underestimated. While serving in Prime Minister HH Asquith’s Liberal Party government as first lord of the admiralty (1911–1915), Churchill anticipated that if the Allied navy could pass the Dardanelles in 1915, the fall of Istanbul would become inevitable. The plan of such a naval attack was his idea, but things did not unfold as expected. Churchill was forced to resign from his post in May 1915 and was severely criticised for his failure at the Dardanelles. 158 Australia and the Great War: Identity, Memory and Mythology 2981_Australia and the Great War.indd 158 25/09/2015 3:44 pm He was reminded of the defeat frequently, and it damaged his political career for nearly two decades. A major contribution to the saga came in the form of his fivevolume Great War memoir, The World Crisis, 1911–1918. Published over a period of ten years, it covered the origins of the war, the war itself and the postwar era up to the Peace Process. As his biographer Martin Gilbert underlines, it was a chronicle of ‘copious documentation, humour, irony, narrative excitement, thoughtful reflection and combative self-defence [that filled] a total of 2150 pages’.33 In the narrative structure of Churchill’s memoirs we observe a defensive tone regarding Gallipoli. He defends his plan and criticises the way it was executed by the British military establishment and the war cabinet. He tries to justify his decisions and political choices. In order to explain the defeat at certain critical moments, he simply follows Bean’s lead: he tries to rationalise the outcome by glorifying the enemy. It is necessary to underline the fact that when the first two volumes came out in 1923, Kemal was already considered the saviour of the Turkish nation and had been elected president of Turkey. It was Churchill who invented the famous cliché of Mustafa Kemal as the ‘Man of Destiny’. In his narrative, he argued that ‘fate’ had been on the side of the Turks. Here is the famous passage from his text: At the head of the 19th Division there stood in this strange story a Man of Destiny. Mustapha Kemal Bey had on April 24 ordered his best regiment, the 57th, a ield exercise for the next morning in the direction of the high mountain of Sari Bair (Hill 971) and, as Fate would have it, these three battalions stood drawn up on parade when at 5:30 a.m. the news of the irst landings came in … This General instantly divined the power and peril of the attack. On his own authority he at once ordered the whole 57th Regiment, accompanied by a battery of artillery, to march to meet it. He himself on foot, map in hand, set off across the country at the head of the leading company. The distance was not great, and in an hour he met the Turkish covering forces falling back before the impetuous Australian advance. He Mustafa Kemal at Gallipoli 2981_Australia and the Great War.indd 159 159 25/09/2015 3:44 pm at once ordered his leading battalion to deploy and attack, and himself personally planted his mountain Battery in position. Forthwith—again without seeking higher authority—he ordered his 77th Regiment to the scene.34 A similar explanation was given regarding Mustafa Kemal’s role in stopping the attacks in August: von Sanders ‘dismissed the General of the XVIth Corps and confided the vital fortunes of the whole of the Ottoman Empire to an officer of whom we have heard before—and since. “That same evening … [he] transferred the command of all the troops in the Anafarta section to Mustapha Kemal Bey, formerly commanding the 19th Division”’.35 Churchill gave Mustafa Kemal the credit Enver had always denied him: he was the saviour of Istanbul and the caliphate. In later years, Churchill consistently praised Mustafa Kemal’s military competence. In 1937, for instance, he described him as ‘the only Dictator with the aureole of martial achievement’.36 The decision to have a military history of the Great War written came from the British cabinet.37 Brigadier General James Edmonds (1861– 1956) was appointed to oversee it as director of the Military Branch of the Committee of Imperial Defence’s (CID) Historical Section. The writing process was quite bureaucratic and time consuming, involving the participation of several state agencies. Macleod summarises the process as follows: A irst narrative, compiled from primary documents, was circulated among participants and then revised to take in some of their criticisms. From the revision the historian would produce a irst draft, which, again, would be circulated among participants, this time the higher commanders. A inal draft would follow which was subject to some further alterations in preparation for publication.38 This painstaking process was considered necessary for creating an accurate, non-controversial, and non-partisan account of the war. 160 Australia and the Great War: Identity, Memory and Mythology 2981_Australia and the Great War.indd 160 25/09/2015 3:44 pm In 1923, Lieutenant General Sir Gerald F Ellison was put in charge of writing the text on Gallipoli, but he was replaced in 1925.39 Rather than aiming for a straightforward and non-partisan narrative, Ellison used his position to accuse British politicians—especially Churchill—of having caused a terrible waste of resources and manpower by pursuing ‘grand strategies’. He argued that the fundamental idea of the Gallipoli campaign—that battleships alone could force a passage through the Dardanelles—had been flawed. He also sought to counter assertions made in Churchill’s memoir that Secretary of State for War Herbert Kitchener had been responsible for not providing the troops necessary for an earlier attack against Ottoman forces.40 Unsurprisingly, the CID’s Committee for the Control of Official Histories requested major revisions to Ellison’s draft and urged him not to stray from his instructions.41 He refused! He was asked to resign in December 1924, and he published his criticisms in a book of his own two years later.42 CF Aspinall-Oglander was appointed to Ellison’s position in January 1925. Like his predecessor, he had been a staff officer at Gallipoli under General Ian Hamilton. In addition to having firsthand information about the conduct of war, he was a talented writer and an excellent researcher. His work was also subjected to review by the committee for control. Though he was asked to revise his text several times, he, too, resisted these demands. But his narrative was more balanced than Ellison’s, and he was very careful not to point to a single cause for the failure of the campaign. He distributed his criticisms evenly between many of the key political and military figures of the period, including Hamilton, General Frederic Stopford, their subordinates, Churchill, Lord Kitchener and the cabinet. In a letter to historian Liddell Hart, Aspinall-Oglander wrote that, on one occasion, he had had to ask Churchill for help: ‘I eventually had to go to Winston [Churchill], who attended a special meeting of the CI Defence [on 9 March 1928] to discuss the whole matter, with Edmonds and me as witnesses, and at which, thanks to Winston’s support, I was successful all down the line’.43 As historian Andrew Green rightly underlines: Mustafa Kemal at Gallipoli 2981_Australia and the Great War.indd 161 161 25/09/2015 3:44 pm Churchill’s one major involvement in this work, and its author’s subsequent literary freedom of expression in the face of Edmonds’ impotence, reveals a great deal about where the real authority and power of control over the oficial volumes rested. [Churchill’s] intervention was therefore to play a signiicant part in the shape and nature of this particular Oficial History, and by extension, of the Oficial History series as a whole.44 During the meeting, Edmonds maintained that Aspinall-Oglander ‘had been a little unkind to the various Generals … in an official history he thought it sufficient to state the facts and not to rub them in’. He recommended that certain parts be modified and others cut altogether, but Churchill defended Aspinall-Oglander’s narrative boldly, and he openly objected to any attempts at removing any part of the draft. He even threatened that he would not allow certain changes ‘without a Cabinet decision’.45 Churchill had such authority because, as chancellor of the exchequer, he had final say on government expenditures, including the publication of the official histories. It seems clear that he saw Aspinall-Oglander’s history as an opportunity to publicly exonerate himself. Like Bean, Aspinall-Oglander also emphasised Mustafa Kemal’s role as an outstanding leader. He even borrowed terminology from Churchill’s memoir. Here is his widely quoted passage about the landing of the Anzac troops: Fortunately for the Turks, the commander of the 19th Division was none other than Mustafa Kemal Bey, the future President of the Republic; and that Man of Destiny was at once to show an outstanding genius for command. As soon as he heard that the enemy was making for Chunuk Bair he realized that this could be no feint, but was a serious attack in strength. Appreciating at once that it constituted a threat against the heart of Turkish defence, he determined to examine the situation for himself, and throw not a battalion but a whole regiment into the ight. Accompanied by an advanced party of one company, he set off in the direction of Chunuk Bair, ordering the 162 Australia and the Great War: Identity, Memory and Mythology 2981_Australia and the Great War.indd 162 25/09/2015 3:44 pm remainder of the 57th Regiment to follow as quickly as possible … Mustafa Kemal remained on the spot long enough to issue orders for an attack by two battalions and a mountain battery as soon as they arrived.46 The first volume of Aspinall-Oglander’s history came out on Anzac Day, 25 April 1929, and the second volume was scheduled for release on Anzac Day 1932. On 14 September 1931, British diplomat Alexander Knox Helm put forward the idea of presenting a specially bound copy as a gift to President Mustafa Kemal.47 Under-Secretary of the Foreign Office Sir Lancelot Oliphant liked the idea and wrote a private letter to Ambassador Sir George Clerk in Turkey asking his approval. He underlined that the book ‘contains nothing which could possibly offend the susceptibilities of the Gazi [that is, Mustafa Kemal] or the Turks in general … the History does show that Mustafa Kemal played a large and almost decisive part in the defence of the peninsula’. He continued, ‘[The] uncertain political situation made it impossible … [for] the Secretary of State [to] give [Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs] Tevfik Rüştü a pat on the back at Geneva.48 But we have kept in mind your desire that some friendly overture should be made to the Gazi or to [the] Turkish Government’.49 British diplomats were planning a policy of rapprochement towards Turkey because Anglo-Turkish relations were strained at the time. This gift was considered a way of furthering that process. After receiving the ambassador’s approval, on 14 October, Stephen Gaselee of the Foreign Office asked Aspinall-Oglander to make certain modifications to his text regarding Mustafa Kemal’s role: We are contemplating (in so far that we have asked our Ambassador at Constantinople what he thinks of the idea), on grounds of political expediency, having a copy of the ‘History of the War—Gallipoli’ specially bound and making a presentation of it to Mustapha Kemal … That is one reason why we have been anxious that justice should be done to the Turkish Army and Turkish Generalship: and it is just possible that it may make you feel inclined to say something more about him in the epilogue. On pages 10–11 Mustafa Kemal at Gallipoli 2981_Australia and the Great War.indd 163 163 25/09/2015 3:44 pm your ine eulogy of the Turkish army and Marshal Liman von Sanders omits the part of one who is, for our present purpose, the Hamlet of the play. In earlier chapters you have shown how during at least three crises of battle, Mustapha Kemal’s leading was decisive in robbing us of success. He may have been simply a divisional general; but it may be argued that the result of his action on those occasions, particularly after he had been placed in command of all Turkish troops ‘in that part of the peninsula’ and had lung us off Chunuk Bair, would justify mention of him again on page 10 or 11, in company with von Sanders. Will you consider this? It is safe to suppose that Turkish jealousy exists even against the German Marshall.50 Reading the epilogue in question, we understand that AspinallOglander bowed to the pressure: It would be impossible to appraise too highly the assistance which Liman von Sanders received from that ‘Man of Destiny’ the present ruler of Turkey, who showed on the peninsula, at the head of an infantry division, an outstanding genius for command. It was that oficer’s ready grip of the situation on the 25th April which was primarily responsible for the failure of the Anzac corps to gain its objective on the irst day of the landing. It was his vigorous action on the 9th of August, when entrusted at a moment’s notice with the command of the northern zone, that checked and defeated the long-delayed advance of the IX Corps. And, twenty-four hours later, following a personal reconnaissance, it was his brilliant counter-attack at Chunuk Bair which placed the Turks in undisputed possession of the main Sari Bair ridge. Seldom in history can the exertions of a single divisional commander have exercised, on three separate occasions, so profound an influence not only on the course of a battle, but perhaps on the fate of a campaign and even the destiny of nation.51 On 7 March 1932, Gaselee wrote to the Stationery Office: 164 Australia and the Great War: Identity, Memory and Mythology 2981_Australia and the Great War.indd 164 25/09/2015 3:44 pm We desire, for political reasons, to put a copy of General Aspinall-Oglander’s ‘Oficial History of the Gallipoli Campaign’ into a special binding and make a formal presentation of it through our Ambassador in Turkey to the Gazi, Mustapha Kemal Pasha. Entre nous, a few lines have been included in it which make it peculiarly suitable for the purpose!52 After the exchange of a few dispatches between diplomats in London and Istanbul, it was decided to place the following dedication at the front of the volumes: Presented to His Excellency Gazi Mustafa Kemal, President of the Turkish Republic by His Britannic Majesty’s Government in honour of a great general, a noble enemy, and a generous friend.53 On 21 May, Clerk presented the book to Mustafa Kemal at a special reception organised for him and British military attaché Major O’Leary.54 He later reported that the gift had been received cordially: I said that that my Government hoped that a work of such interest, both from military point of view and for the witness it bore to the magniicent and the immortal courage of the troops on both sides, would be welcome to his Excellency, whose intervention at the decisive moment had counted for so much in the result of the battle, the issue of the campaign, and the future of his nation … The President was manifestly touched by the happy chivalrous idea of HM’s Government, and he replied by asking me to convey his most cordial thanks and appreciation.55 Mustafa Kemal at Gallipoli 2981_Australia and the Great War.indd 165 165 25/09/2015 3:44 pm A few days later, on 27 May, a close friend of Mustafa Kemal’s and the most influential journalist of his times, Falih Rıfkı (later Atay), published a column praising the British government in the semi-official daily Hakimiyet-i Milliye. He wrote of the gift that had been made: This is the act of gentlemen towards a courageous enemy and towards a brave foe. It is a fact that nations on the ield of battle learn to recognize each other’s good qualities … This great man who personiies in himself the Turkish character, the nation in all its perfection, and, in the fullest sense … Turkey itself, is today the representative of our country. We appreciate England’s courtesy towards him, we ind it natural and we are deeply touched.56 A photograph of the book with its dedication page open accompanied the piece. On 6 June, the Daily Telegraph announced that the ‘Turkish Government intends to have the British Official History of the Gallipoli campaign translated. It will be distributed to all schools and universities in Turkey’.57 Interestingly, Turkey’s foreign policy, which had previously been based on isolationism, started to change in spring 1932. Benito Mussolini’s moves to expand his influence over the Mediterranean had already been causing concern for Ankara before then. During 24 April–14 May, Prime Minister İsmet İnönü and his entourage visited the USSR, where they discussed Turkey’s wish to enter the League of Nations. They convinced Maxim Litvinov, Commissar for Foreign Affairs, not to oppose this initiative.58 İnönü then made an official visit to Italy (22–30 May) to discuss similar matters. It was as these concerns were being addressed that the British government’s gesture contributed to breaking the ice with Turkey and opening the way for the Anglo-Turkish rapprochement of the 1930s. The Ankara government applied for membership into the League of Nations soon after and was accepted on 18 July 1932.59 There is no doubt that the Mustafa Kemal saga was to a great extent shaped by the contributions of Bean, Churchill and 166 Australia and the Great War: Identity, Memory and Mythology 2981_Australia and the Great War.indd 166 25/09/2015 3:44 pm Aspinall-Oglander. Bean’s history featured a glorification of the enemy for psychological reasons. While he was constructing his narrative, he benefited from the war account of Major Zeki Bey, commander of the 1st Battalion of the 57th Regiment of the celebrated 19th Division, who was also interviewed by the Mitchell Committee at the same time. Interestingly, apart from him, no-one among the top brass ever mentioned Mustafa Kemal Pasha to the Mitchell Committee. Given this fact, we can understand why the committee misspelled Mustafa Kemal’s name as ‘Kiamil’. Churchill followed in Bean’s footsteps in his memoir and coined the image of Mustafa Kemal as the Man of Destiny. Aspinall-Oglander took the same line and composed the final work of art under, first, the influence of Churchill, who was seeking to exonerate himself in the eyes of the British public, and second, the British Foreign Office, which was seeking to emphasise Mustafa Kemal’s role for political reasons. By emphasising Mustafa Kemal’s role at Gallipoli, British imperial historiography thus connected two different success stories into one: that of one among several commanders involved in securing a victory at the Dardanelles and that of the founding father of modern Turkey. From this perspective, it becomes clear that the legend of Mustafa Kemal at Gallipoli was shaped in Sydney and London first and imported into Turkey later. It found a profoundly wide market there and has continued to shape Turkish official historiography until today. Notes 1 2 3 Ö Arzık, ‘Political Instrumentalization of Commemorations of Çanakkale Victory’, MA, Istanbul Bilgi University, 2012, pp. 42–51. TJ Pemberton mentions a gathering of thirty-ive Turks in May 1926 at Gallipoli. TJ Pemberton, Gallipoli To-day, Benn, London, 1926; cited in GF Davis, Anzac Day: Meanings and Memories; New Zealand, Australian and Turkish Perspectives on a Day of Commemoration in the Twentieth Century, PhD thesis, University of Otago, 2008, pp. 205–6. Cevat was in charge of organising the defence of the Dardanelles on 18 March 1915. He reported to Admiral Guido von Usedom, Inspector General of the Straits, and to Esad, Commander of the 3rd Army Corps, which was in charge of defending the peninsula. However, on 24 March 1915, German General Otto Liman von Sanders was appointed as the head of newly formed 5th Army. The editor of Tesvir-i Efkâr, A Daver, mentioned that an excuse was found to suspend publication for ten days just after this incident. S Borak, Mustafa Kemal at Gallipoli 2981_Australia and the Great War.indd 167 167 25/09/2015 3:44 pm 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 168 Atatürk’ün İstanbul’daki Çalışmaları: 1899–16 Mayıs 1919 [Activities of Atatürk in Istanbul, 1899–16 May 1919], Kaynak, Istanbul, 1998, pp. 75–8. TC Başbakanlık Devlet Arşivleri Genel Müdürlüğü [General Directorate of State Archives], Osmanlı Belgelerinde Çanakkale Muharebeleri [The battles of the Dardanelles in Ottoman documents], 2 vols, TC Başbakanlık Devlet Arşivleri Genel Müdürlüğü, Ankara, 2005. This collection does not include any military documents because those archives are essentially closed to the public. Kemal, letter to Enver, 3 May 1915, quoted in S Atacanlı, Atatürk ve Çanakkale’nin Komutanları [Atatürk and the commanders of Gallipoli], MB Yayınları, Istanbul, 2007, p. 145. A Mango, Atatürk, John Murray Publishers, London, 2000, p. 158. Harb Mecmuası: Kasım 1915 – Haziran 1918 [War journal: November 1915 – June 1918], Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, Ankara, 2013, p. 8. Harb Mecmuası was an oficial, illustrated propaganda magazine published by the Ministry of War. Mango, p. 158. Using the data collected by the Ottoman Public Debt Administration, Zafer Toprak has calculated that the general consumer’s price index increased eighteen-fold during the war. Z Toprak, İttihad-Terakki ve Cihan Harbi: Savaş Ekonomisi ve Türkiye’de Devletçilik, 1914–1918 [Union and Progress and the Great War: War economy and étatism in Turkey, 1914–1918], Tarih Vakfı Yayınları, Istanbul, 2003, p. 197. It probably came out in May 1918 and featured articles describing the Gallipoli battle. Young journalist Ruşen Eşref (later Ünaydın) interviewed the soldiers and oficers who had fought, including Mustafa Kemal. E Köroğlu, Ottoman Propaganda and Turkish Identity: Literature in Turkey during World War I, IB Tauris, London, 2007, p. 96. It was published as a book by the state publishing house in 1930. In the preface, Ruşen Eşref set the outline for the Mustafa Kemal’s saga and argued the following: ‘Even to remain a hero of the Gallipoli war alone would be such a great glory for a commander—not only for himself but for his entire nation. History would still be proud of him. But the victory at the Dardanelles is only a preamble for this great man who saved his nation with his determination and formed an entirely new state with his creative effort. What a glorious preamble indeed!’ R Eşref, Anafartalar Kumandanı Mustafa Kemal ile Mülâkat [Interview with Mustafa Kemal, commander at Anafartalar], Devlet Matbaası, Istanbul, 1930, p. 2. Köroğlu, p. 97. N Sağlam, Ruşen Eşref Ünaydın, Kitabevi Yayınları, Istanbul, 2004, p. 451. Atacanlı, p. 314. ibid. Atatürk’ün Hatıra Defteri [The diary of Atatürk], Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, Ankara, 2008, p. 83. İ Çalışlar, On Yılık Savaş [Ten years of war], İş Bankası Yayınları, Istanbul, 2010, pp. 268–74. Australia and the Great War: Identity, Memory and Mythology 2981_Australia and the Great War.indd 168 25/09/2015 3:44 pm 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 M Kemal, Arıburnu Muharebeleri Raporu [Report on Arıburnu battles], Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, Ankara, 1990, pp. 6–7. The National Archives (TNA), Kew Gardens, London: WO 157/6, Intelligence—Anzac Corps, 1 April–30 April 1915. See also, CEW Bean, Gallipoli Mission, Australian War Memorial, Canberra, 1948. Bean mentions that the irst time he heard the name of Mustafa Kemal was from this soldier’s testimony. A Ryan, The Last of the Dragomans, Geoffrey Bles, London, 1951, p. 131. For his service records, see NA, London: ADM 196/89/169. TNA, London: AIR 1/2323/223/41/1550, Report of the Committee Appointed to Investigate the Attacks Delivered on and the Enemy Defences of the Dardanelles Straits, 1919, p. 167. ibid., pp. 167–8. Emphasis mine. ibid., p. 262. Emphasis mine. He was interviewed while imprisoned in Malta in 1919. Although he did not mention Mustafa Kemal’s name, he did praise him very highly in his memoir published in 1920. See OL von Sanders, Five Years in Turkey, 2nd edn, Williams & Wilkins, Baltimore, 1928. In fact, he was not interviewed directly. TNA, London: ADM 116/1713, Diary of Dardanelles Committee. However, an English translation of his 1916 memoir, ER Prigge, Der Kampf um die Dardanellen, [The ight in the Dardanelles], G Kiepenheuer, Weimar, 1916; was integrated into the report. It is interesting to note that during the war, Enver requested the coniscation of Prigge’s book not only in Turkey but also in Germany. See von Sanders, Five Years in Turkey, pp. 113–14. Prigge’s account seems to be the irst Western book to mention Mustafa Kemal’s role at Gallipoli. Other German oficers also published memoirs on Gallipoli that mentioned Mustafa Kemal’s heroism; see H Kannengiesser, The Campaign in Gallipoli, trans. CJP Ball, Hutchinson, London, [1928?] (irst published in Berlin in 1927); and C Mülhmann, Der Kampf um die Dardanellen 1915, OG Staling, Oldenburg, 1927. As can be seen, all became available after Mustafa Kemal had become president. He had held this position from 25 March 1915 until the end of the campaign and became chief of staff in 1919. Therefore, the Mitchell Report placed his account under the heading ‘Answers by Turkish General Staff’. He accompanied the committee on its trip to the peninsula. TNA, London: ADM 116/1713, Diary of Dardanelles Committee. ibid. He also accompanied the committee to Gallipoli. J Macleod, Reconsidering Gallipoli, Manchester University Press, Manchester, 2004, p. 78. Bean, Gallipoli Mission, p. 133. CEW Bean, The Story of Anzac: From the Outbreak of War to the End of the First Phase of the Gallipoli Campaign, May 4, 1915, reprint of 1942 edn, University of Queensland Press, Queensland, 1981, p. 452. M Gilbert, Churchill: A Life, Pimlico, London, 2000, p. 458. WS Churchill, The World Crisis 1911–1918, Free Press, New York, 2005, p. 439. Emphasis mine. Mustafa Kemal at Gallipoli 2981_Australia and the Great War.indd 169 169 25/09/2015 3:44 pm 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 170 ibid., p. 495. Emphasis mine. WS Churchill, ‘Armistice or Peace’, Evening Standard, 11 November 1937; quoted in Churchill by Himself: The Definitive Collection of Quotations, RM Langworth (ed.), PublicAffairs, New York, 2008, p. 321. Macleod, p. 58. ibid., p. 61. He had been deputy inspector general of communications—and therefore a staff oficer—at the Mediterranean Expeditionary Force headquarters in 1915. A Green, Writing the Great War: Sir James Edmonds and the Official Histories, 1915–1948, Frank Cass, London, 2003, p. 94. See, for example, TNA, London: CAB 16/53, Minutes of Meeting of CID Subcommittee for Control of Oficial Histories, 3 December 1924. Green, p. 97; G Ellison, The Perils of Amateur Strategy as Exemplified by the Attack on the Dardanelles Fortress in 1915, Longmans, London, 1926. BH Liddell Hart, ‘Responsibility and Judgement in Historical Writing’, Military Affairs, spring 1958, p. 36, quoted at Macleod, p. 83. Green, p. 99. TNA, London: CAB 16/53, Minutes of Meeting of CID Subcommittee for Control of Oficial Histories, 9 March 1928. CF Aspinall-Oglander, Military Operations: Gallipoli, vol. 1, Inception of the Campaign to May 1915, reprint of the 1929 edn, Imperial War Museum, London, 1992, p. 185–6. Emphasis mine. TNA, London: FO 371, E4836/4836/44, AK Helm, meeting minutes, 14 September 1931. It is quite probable that Oliphant was referring here to the meetings of the League of Nations in Geneva, where Turkey was yet to be a member. TNA, London: FO 371, E4836/4836/44, Oliphant, message to Clerk, 5 October 1931. TNA, Newport Record Ofice, Isle of Wight: Gaselee, letter to AspinallOglander, Aspinall Papers, 14 October 1931, p. 112. Emphasis mine. I am grateful to JR Macleod for generously sharing this important document with me. It is partly quoted at Green, p. 126. CF Aspinall-Oglander, Military Operations: Gallipoli, vol. 2, May 1915 to Evacuation, reprint of the 1932 edn, Imperial War Museum, London, 1992, p. 485–6. Emphasis mine. TNA, London: FO 371, E 1152/1152/44, 811-2307, Gaselee, message to NC Scorgie, 7 March 1932. TNA, London: FO 371, E1153/1153/44, Gaselee, message to Clerk, 30 March 1932. There is only one scholarly article on the presentation of AspinallOglander’s oficial history to Kemal. Unfortunately, the author treats the topic within the parameters of Turkish oficial history. SR Sonyel, ‘Büyük General, Asil Düşman ve Cömert Dost … Gazi Mustafa Kemal’ [Great general, noble enemy, and generous friend … Gazi Mustafa Kemal], Belleten [Bulletin of the Turkish History Association], vol. 43, no. 171, 1979, pp. 619–34. Australia and the Great War: Identity, Memory and Mythology 2981_Australia and the Great War.indd 170 25/09/2015 3:44 pm 55 56 57 58 59 TNA, London: FO 371, E 2714/1153/44, 811-2307, Clerk, message to Foreign Secretary Sir John Simon, 21 May 1932, Emphasis mine. TNA, London: FO 371, E 2717/1153/44, 811-2307, Counsellor James Morgan, message to Simon, 28 May 1932. ‘British Gallipoli History for Use in Turkish Schools’, Daily Telegraph, 6 June 1932. This was not distributed to Turkish students, but it was released as an oficial publication of the Turkish chief of staff during 1939–1940. See CF Aspinal-Oglander, Büyük Harbin Tarihi. Çanakkale: Gelibolu Askerî Harekâtı, vols 1–2, trans. T Tunay, Genelkurmay Basımevi, Istanbul, 1939–1940. İ İnönü, Hatıralar [Memoirs], vol. 2, Bilgi Yayınları, Ankara, 1987, pp. 250–1. D Barlas and S Güvenç, Türkiye’nin Akdeniz Siyaseti: 1923–1939 [Turkey’s policy towards the Mediterranean: 1923–1939], Koç Üniversitesi Yayınları, Istanbul, 2014, pp. 176–7. Mustafa Kemal at Gallipoli 2981_Australia and the Great War.indd 171 171 25/09/2015 3:44 pm