Philosophy Of Religion

What implications does the Srin-mo, a pre-Buddhist deity who traverses across almost all of the periods of time in Tibetan religious life, have on the social status of women? Embodying the places and spaces of Tibet, a malevolent demoness called the Srin-mo has been essential in laying the formation of Tibetan Buddhism. The concept of the Srin-mo can be traced back to the pre-Buddhist religion of Tibet: Bön. The story of the Srin-mo is not a creation myth in the sense of a worldly inception,  but the story of the demoness does represent the creation of a harmonious society, spurring from the preceding time of primordial chaos found amongst the Bön religion. Looking at the origins of the demoness’ story is necessary in order to understand how and why the Srin-mo holds efficacious power over the land and people of Tibet. Here, I will investigate the case of the Srin-mo, which is controversially one of the most important beings in Tibet, but unquestionably, an irrevocable component of understanding what implications geography holds on Tibet.

""Since the latest XIX century one of the main interests of the Russian philosophy became theological questions. Even though such a questioning was violently suppressed in Russia, due to the well known historical reasons, the philosophical legacy of the Russian religious thought, flourishing at the beginning of the XX century, nowadays is still bearing fruit in Europe, after the famous scholars expulsion of 1922.
John Zizioulas (1931), metropolitan of Pergamon, is one of the most remarkable successors of the so called “neopatristic synthesis” announced by G. Florovsky. It was under the supervision of this illustrious Russian theologian that Zizioulas did his doctoral research at the Harvard University. The fundamental characteristic of Florovsky’s theology consists in its relation with the thought of the Fathers of the Eastern Church, belonging to the early ecumenical councils period, before the Church split. Zizioulas considers this great Russian theologian as his teacher, dedicating him some of his works. Indeed, many of his reflections, as those concerning Trinitarian questions, Eucharist, Church and many others, do really indicate this strong influence. In any case it would be better to get concentrated on the most important and specific point of the Zizioulas’ theological theory.
The Florovsky’s ideas of the division between the essence of God and the God’s will, of the creation of the manhood, composed by free and active persons, as a consequence of kenosis of the divine will, a result of an infinite love that God has for its creatures are all present in the Zizioulas’ own theology.
We are going to analyze one of the pivotal themes that can be found amongst the Zizioulas’ works: the ontology of the Person, strictly connected with the concept of Otherness – ideas inherited from the Russian neopatristics.
Our intention is to discuss the influence by Florovsky on the theory of Person by Zizioulas. It will be interesting to understand the birth of the same Florovsky’s theory, rooted in the diatribe against S. Bulgakov, P. Florensky and the sophiology in general as well as the controversy between Zizioulas and V. Lossky. The point of the discussion is going to be the idea of Otherness with its importance for the mankind and for the ecumenical dialogue.
""

The fall of the Muslim civilization resulted from the rejection of reason. The rejection of reason was a result of the characterization of the use of reason to know revelation as kufr. The rejection of reason became explicit in the shutting of the gates to ijtihad and was reinforced by al-Ghazali’s attack on philosophers. The rejection of reason found political expression in the repression of the rationalists by Musa al-Hadi in 786. The slaughter of five-thousand philosophers was an event analogous to the Reign of Terror of the Jacobins, under Maximilien Robespierre during the French Revolution. Sixteen thousand followers of “tradition” were beheaded at the guillotine with the emergence of the Age of Reason, touted by the European Enlightenment, a millennium afterwards. In Islam, the rejection of reason made it harder to understand and follow revelation. The perception that “all knowledge is in the Quran” did not help matters. This was an example of perfunctory thought. For it automatically withheld the designation of “knowledge” from all knowledge not in the Quran. This perception was based on a problematic understanding of epistemology or what constitutes knowledge. It was a reflection of hubris. In response to the bewilderment caused the prohibition of the use of reason, exegetes alleged that revelation features “ambiguous” passages. The rejection of reason made it hard to know and follow revelation. It also made it hard to understand key terms as “mutashabihat,” “hikma,” and “hawa.” As a result, Muslims turned to tradition, which replaced reason for the purpose of explaining revelation. But to “explain” revelation, tradition had to be elevated to an “equal” of revelation and subsequently even “above” revelation.
For the expectation that it would “explain” revelation placed tradition in the position of a “judge” of revelation. The elevation of tradition above revelation reversed the relation of revelation and tradition. The word of God was subordinated to the words of persons. The reversal of the relationship between revelation and tradition facilitated the adoption of the teaching of abrogation. The abrogation of the peace verses by the ayah as-sayf transformed Islam into “political Islam.” The abrogation of revelation by tradition transformed Islam into “traditional Islam.” The application of the teaching of abrogation warped penal law. The abrogation of revelation by tradition subjugated revelation to tradition. Hence, the process that led to this requires attention. It is necessary to restore revelation to its pre-eminence in relation to tradition, to rehabilitate reason, and to ensure that all laws are in agreement with revelation rather than based on inclination. (4 pages)

In his article ‘Divine hiddenness and the demographics of theism’ (Religious Studies, 42 (2006), 177–191) Stephen Maitzen develops a novel version of the atheistic argument from divine hiddenness according to which the lopsided distribution of theistic belief throughout the world’s populations is much more to be expected given naturalism than given theism. I try to meet Maitzen’s challenge by developing a theistic explanation for this lopsidedness. The explanation I offer appeals to various goods that are intimately connected with the human cognitive constitution, and in particular, with the way in which we depend upon social belief-forming practices for our acquisition of much of our knowledge about the world — features about us that God would value but that also make probable a lopsided distribution of theistic belief, or so I argue.

According to robust moral realism, there exist objective, non-natural moral facts. Moral facts of this sort do not fit easily into the world as illuminated by natural science. Further, if such facts exist at all, it is hard to see how we could know of their existence by any familiar means. Yet robust realists are not moral skeptics; they believe that we do know (some of) the moral facts. Thus robust moral realism comes with a number of hard-to-defend ontological and epistemological commitments. Recently, Sharon Street has claimed, in light of these commitments, that robust moral realism requires a kind of faith and “has become a strange form of religion.” I believe that Street is right. I argue at some length that robust moral realism does require faith, and is a religion. However, I further argue that it is an excellent religion. I argue that it has three principal advantages: it is avoids wishful thinking, is guaranteed not to contradict the results of natural science, and is profoundly simple in its ontological commitments. Further, robust moral realism may be rationally defensible on eviden- tialist grounds. Consequently, even if the standard arguments for traditional religions are not compelling, there might still be compelling arguments for robust moral realism.

This article will touch upon Rembrandt’s Portrait of Johannes Wtenbogaert : its
historical value, provenance, auction policy, auction price, acquisition and present
status. In 1633 Rembrandt painted the fabulous Portrait of Johannes Wtenbogaert
(aka Uytenbogaert / Uitenbogaert / Uyttenboogaard (1557-1644)). He was the
foremost clergyman of the moderate group of Protestants who followed the tolerant
tenets of Jacobus Arminius.

The design argument, also known as the teleological argument, is one of the most commonly used evidences of the existence of a Creator God. Over the centuries, the argument has taken many forms, from the pre-Socratics to Jewish rabbis to Hindu philosophy and the modern debate over Intelligent Design (ID) and theistic evolution (TE). Present day controversies seem to show that disagreements over the apparent design of nature have roots in deep historical and metaphysical differences. We believe there is much to learn from how different religious traditions (here, Judaism, Christianity and Islam) have engaged or are engaging with design discourse. So, we are arranging a two-day online closed-door workshop on the history and metaphysics of design arguments, to be hosted at the University of Helsinki.

This article sketches some of the main ideas that informed the work of the post-colonial Indian philosopher Margaret Chatterjee (1925-2019). A philosopher of language and religion, her work straddles the "frozen" traditions of the east and the west, and astutely philosophizes about Gandhian thought in the realm of religious alterity and coevality.

In You Are the Universe, the contemplative endocrinologist Deepak Chopra and the MIT physicist Menas Kafatos offer a groundbreaking, lucid work on consciousness that is refreshingly accessible without relying upon mathematical language or overspecialized jargon. In summary, their book is a serious attempt to address the fundamental contemporary question, “Is the universe made of matter that learned to think, or is the universe made of mind that created matter?” (Chopra & Kafatos, 2017, p. 154). By the end of the book Chopra and Kafatos have gone so far as to argue that not only is the universe created and sustained by an underlying mind but that we are the universe, we are that mind. In a real sense, they declare, we as an organic species have co-created this universe.

One of the most persistent and poignant human experiences is the sensation of longing—a restlessness perhaps best described as the unspoken conviction that something is missing from our lives. In this study, Drew M. Dalton attempts to illuminate this experience by examining the philosophical thought of Emmanuel Levinas on longing, or what Levinas terms “metaphysical desire.”

Metaphysical desire, according to Levinas, does not stem from any determinate lack within us, nor does it aim at a particular object beyond us, much less promise any eventual satisfaction. Rather, it functions in the realm of the infinite where such distinctions as inside and outside or one and the other are indistinguishable, perhaps even eliminated. As Levinas conceives such longing, it becomes a mediator in our relation to the other—both the human other and the divine Other.

Dalton follows the meandering trail of Levinas’s thought along a series of dialogues with some of the philosophers within the history of the Western tradition who have most influenced his corpus. By tracing the genealogy of Levinas’s notion of metaphysical desire—namely in the works of Plato, Heidegger, Fichte, Schelling, and Otto—the nature of this Levinasian theme is elucidated to reveal that it is not simply an idealism, a “hagiography of desire” detached from actual experience and resulting in a disconnect between his phenomenological account and our own lives. Rather, Levinas’s account of metaphysical desire points to a phenomenology of human longing that is both an ethical and religious phenomenon. In the end, human longing is revealed to be one of the most profound ways in which a subject becomes a subject, arising to its “true self,” and hearing the call to responsibility placed upon it by the Other.

Throughout, Dalton explicates the nuance of a number of key Levinasian terms, many of which have been taken from the Western philosophical tradition and reinscribed with a new meaning. Eros, the “Good beyond being,” shame, responsibility, creation, the trace, the il y a, and the holy are discovered to be deeply tied to Levinas’s account of metaphysical desire, resulting in a conclusion regarding longing’s role in the relationship between the finite and the Infinite.

This paper provides an initial, multidimensional map of the complex relationships among consciousness, mind, brain and the external world in a way that follows both the contours of everyday experience and the findings of science. It then demonstrates how this reflexive monist map can be used to evaluate the utility and resolve some of the oppositions of the many other “isms” that currently populate consciousness studies. While no conventional, one-dimensional “ism” such as physicalism can do justice to this web of relationships, physicalism, functionalism, dualism, neutral monism, and dual-aspect monism can all be seen to provide useful ways of understanding different aspects of the relationships among consciousness, mind, brain and the external world when these are viewed in either a first- or a third-person way from within this web of relationships by sentient creatures such as ourselves. For example, physicalism and functionalism provide a useful understanding of consciousness, mind, brain and external world when viewed from a third-person perspective, while neutral monism provides a useful way of understanding first- versus third-person views of external phenomena. On the other hand, dual-aspect monism provides a useful way of understanding first- versus third-person views of mind, including Eastern versus Western views of mind.  Dual-aspect monism also provides a useful understanding of the “unconscious ground of being” that gives rise to, supports and embeds all these observable phenomena. For an integrated understanding one needs to understand how these phenomena and relationships combine into an integrated whole.

In this book, I examine the principles that philosopher and historian of ideas, Arthur Lovejoy, considers founders of the interpretation of the world as a great hierarchical chain of being. That is to say, the “principle of plenitude”, that of ‘continuity’ and that of ‘qualitative grading’, all related to that of ‘sufficient reason’. But we deal particularly with the Middle Ages interpretation.
After considering how the ‘principle of plenitude’ arises in Platonic philosophy, then that of ‘continuity’ in the Aristotelian and also the mode of application of these principles in the Plotinian system; we select two Medieval philosophers among all those mentioned by Lovejoy: St. Augustine and St. Thomas. The first, because of its clear tendency towards Neoplatonic thinking, it is possible, indeed, to find a Christian version of the principle of plenitude, where Incoate variations of that reflection are the seed that will bear fruit in much more elaborate systems such as the Thomist. St. Augustine takes the Neoplatonic ideas of the self-diffusing high Good and the ‘principle of plenitude’ and leads them towards the constitution of a full but contingent universe. On the other hand, the second author, Thomas Aquinas, separates himself from the Platonic conception to think of a much more contingent universe, founded on the free divine gift of the esse. He elaborates a very complete and sophisticated theory about the divine Will and concludes conceiving a universe where necessity is nuanced.
There isn´t just an absolute necessity but also a hypothetical, which guarantees that the Necessary Being himself has the freedom to choose the creation of a merely contigent world. In the end we found very suggestive the theory created by Lovejoy, but irrelevant, rigorously speaking, to the philosophy of the Aquinate.

David Hume (1711-1776) ranks among the greatest of philosophers and issues of religion lie at the heart of what most concerned him. Although the exact nature of Hume’s attitude to religion is a matter of some controversy, there is general agreement that his basic stance was critical, if not hostile, to the doctrines and dogmas of orthodox religious belief and practice. There remains, however, considerable disagreement about whether or not Hume believed that there is any truth or value in religion. According to some, Hume was a sceptic who regarded all conjectures relating to religious hypotheses to be beyond the scope of human understanding – he neither affirmed nor denied these conjectures. Others read Hume as embracing a highly refined form of “true religion”. On the other side of this spectrum, it is claimed that Hume was committed to atheism, although due to social conditions at the time, this had to be (thinly) concealed or masked. The aim of this article is to provide an overview of Hume’s core concerns and arguments on this subject and to provide the reader with a framework for interpreting and assessing his various contributions.

It is hard to think of an area of Christian theology that provides more scope for interdisciplinary conversation than the doctrine of creation. This doctrine not only invites reflection on an intellectual concept: it calls for contemplation of the endlessly complex, dynamic, and fascinating world that human being inhabit. But the possibilities for wide-ranging discussion are such that scholars sometimes end up talking past one another. Productive conversation requires mutual understanding of insights across disciplinary boundaries. Knowing Creation offers an essential resource for helping scholars from a range of fields to appreciate one another's concerns and perspectives. In so doing, it offers an important step forward in establishing a mutually-enriching dialogue that addresses, amongst others, the following key questions:

- Who is the God who creates?
- Why does God create?
- What is "creation"?
- What does it mean to recognize that a theology of creation speaks of a natural world that is subject to the observation of the natural sciences? What does it mean to talk about both a "natural" order and a "created" order?
- What are the major tensions that have arisen between the natural sciences and Christian thinking historically, and why? How can we move beyond such tensions to a positive and constructive conversation, while also avoiding facile notions such as a "god of the gaps"?
- Is it feasible for a natural scientist to maintain a belief in God's continuing creative activity?
- In what ways might a naturalistic understanding of the natural world be said to be limited?
- How can biblical studies, theology, philosophy, history, and science talk better together about these questions?

At a time when the doctrine of creation - and even a mention of "creation" - has been disparaged due to its supposed associations with anti-scientific dogma, and theological offerings sometimes risk appearing a little more than reactionary exercises in naive apologetics, ill-informed by science or distinctly wary of engagement with it, it is more important than ever to offer a cross-disciplinary resource that can voice a positive account of a Christian theology of creation, and do so as a genuinely broad-ranging conversation about science and faith.

In henadological Platonism, the significance of “the One” is understood to lie, not in an eminent singular entity, but in the modes of unity and the ways of being a unit. The science of units qua units is a systematic ground and counterweight to substance-based ontology, and manifests an organic bond with theology as the science of relation to supra-essential individuals or Gods. Because of the basic nature of unity relative to being, doctrines respecting unity tend to situate themselves as critiques of ontology; they exhibit both an analytical and a soteriological value. For its part, bhakti is not a mere sectarian movement but rather an inquiry at once speculative and practical into the nature of the relationship between the human and the divine. It bridges the diverse genres of ancient Indian thought (including the theophanic/cultic, the epic, along with diverse philosophical perspectives) and displays key commonalities with henadological Platonism. This paper begins the process of identifying these common themes with particular reference to the Bhagavadgītā. Chief among its themes is the distinction between structuring cause and structured mixture, which runs through Platonism from the Phaedo to the doctrine of principles, and which parallels the account of action in the Gītā as freedom independent of result, insofar as the latter pertains to the solidarity of worldly causality heteronomous to the agency of the ātman.

Con i contributi di: Anthony Kenny · Andreas Speer · Jocelyn Benoist · Francesco Fronterotta · Enrico Berti · Riccardo Chiaradonna · Mauro Zonta · Francesco Marrone · Marco Lamanna · Paul Richard Blum · Siegrid Agostini · Igor Agostini · Alice Ragni · Francesco Campagnola · Jan Čížek · Pietro Montani · Pierluigi Valenza · Antonello D’Angelo · Jean-François Courtine · Marco Damonte · Emmanuel Cattin · Vincent Holzer · Andrea Grillo · Andrea Bellocci · Francesco Valerio Tommasi · Philippe Nouzille

This paper deals with the relation between God and the secular legal systems of Western liberal democracies. It provides a normative argument for the compatibility of God and secular legal reasoning. In our age, in which believing in God is no longer socially axiomatic and the right to religious freedom protects all kinds of theistic and non-theistic religious beliefs, creeds, and first philosophies, it seems contrary to religious neutrality for secular legal systems to single out God. This paper instead argues that, although God and religion are inextricably intertwined, they affect the legal system in different ways because they are ontologically different. God cannot be reduced to a mere component of theistic religion. This paper argues that a proper understanding of secularization might call for keeping God outside the legal system but not for driving God out of the public sphere of democratic societies. Secular legal systems are not atheist legal systems. Secular legal systems are legal systems 'without religion' but not 'without God.' Secularization implies some degree of minimal recognition of God as a metalegal concept. The specific degree of recognition of God appropriate for any given political community depends on its cultural and communitarian identity and should be subject to the rules of democratic procedures and majorities. This is the metalegal God.

This article tries to understand the prosperity gospel in a way that enables us to distinguish what is valuable and what is not in this phenomenon. The article starts by recognizing the puzzling aspects of the prosperity gospel. Someone might be tempted to dismiss it straightaway as simply unchristian and foolish. Looking at the people who are attracted to the prosperity gospel, however, helps in recognizing the prosperity gospel instead as a genuine protest against certain tendencies in the mainline churches. The article suggests that the prosperity gospel might be a celebration of the dignity in pure, spontaneous religious impulses and the dignity in enjoying or wishing to enjoy the good things in life This leaves us with the question of how we can distinguish between a genuine form of the prosperity gospel and forms that are simply is unchristian and foolish. To find answers to these questions the prosperity teaching's interpretation of Abraham is compared to Sören Kierkegaard's reading of Abraham as a knight of faith. This leads to a kind of litmus test to distinguish a genuine prosperity gospel from theologically unacceptable forms of it. Four criteria are presented: 1. Our faith should show gratitude rather than being a form of manipulation; 2. We should recognise the value of both tradition and resignation; 3. A genuine prosperity gospel would be a personal affair always enacted in fear and trembling; and 4. It should be about God and not about you. When these criteria are met, the prosperity gospel can be a theologically valid way to express dignity, so this article concludes-the dignity in pure, spontaneous religious impulses, and in enjoying or wishing to enjoy the good things in life.

Addendum: Footnote 24 on page 590 should be to pages 88-89 of the following:

Martin Heidegger. Bremen and Freiburg Lectures: Insight into That Which Is and Basic Principles of Thinking. Translated by Andrew Mitchell. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2012.

This essay was published in The Bible and Early Trinitarian Theology, edited by Christopher A. Beeley and Mark E. Weedman, for the CUAP Studies in Early Christianity (Washington DC: Catholic University of America Press, 2018); this is the uncorrected proofs. Exploring the humanity and divinity of Jesus, the Son's relation to the Father, and the agency of the Holy Spirit, it is one of five essays suggesting Johannine contributions to trinitarian discussions in the early church.

Kierkegaard and Kant on Radical Evil and the Highest Good is a major study of Kierkegaard's relation to Kant that gives a comprehensive account of radical evil and the highest good, two controversial doctrines with important consequences for ethics and religion. Fremstedal offers an original account of Kierkegaard and his role in the history of philosophy that reconstructs several of his central ideas by relating them to Kant and partially also to contemporary debates. By offering a comparative presentation, the book shows how Kant and Kierkegaard offer different solutions to the problem of evil and its complex relation to religious faith and happiness. Fremstedal sheds new light on Kierkegaard's argument against secular thinking, and shows that there are more Kantian elements in Kierkegaard than has been acknowledged. Kierkegaard's use of Kantian ideas is instructive, since it points to problems with Kant's philosophy of religion and indicates how Kantian philosophy can be used to defend religious faith and hope.

In order to better cope with the pressures and stresses of the current day, modern psychology is anxiously seeking to find new therapies to address the increasing disorders within the human psyche. In the process new fields of research, such as humanistic and transpersonal psychology, curiously appear to borrow more and more from the wisdom of the ages. This volume, containing eighteen articles by noteworthy expositors of the perennial philosophy such as Huston Smith, Seyyed Hossein Nasr, and Frithjof Schuon, presents the spiritual psychology of the wisdom traditions as a much-needed antidote to the current impasse in modern psychology.

Some Endorsements for Psychology and the Perennial Philosophy:

“[Psychology and the Perennial Philosophy] is more than an anthology. It is a wisely crafted collection of classic and contemporary scholarship noting that what many are seeking is what has always been, a perennial philosophy, that remains foundational. As one of the authors, Tage Lindbom, properly notes, ‘Secularization is a fish in troubled waters.’ This book claims the waters and is essential reading for all those who may have forgotten or are simply ignorant of the rich foundation provided by the perennial philosophy.”
—Ralph W. Hood, Professor of Psychology at the University of Tennessee at Chattanooga, past president of the Psychology of Religion division of the American Psychological Association, co-founder of The International Journal for the Psychology of Religion and co-author of The Psychology of Religion

“A necessary and bracing critique of the assumptions and limitations of contemporary Western psychology, this generous volume is also a passionate call and learned guide towards a truer perspective that embraces man's spiritual nature.”
—Gabor Maté, M.D., and author of In the Realm of Hungry Ghosts: Close Encounters with Addiction

“Knowing the nature of the mind is perhaps the most difficult undertaking, especially in today’s world. To comprehend the nature of mind one needs to turn to the domain of religion and spirituality. Yet the truth of the mind and its complexity cannot explicitly be defined in words. Inner or transcendent wisdom sees the mind’s own nature without the duality of the seer. Suchness (tathatā) of mind is only experiential and not expressible. The words used to describe thought are themselves a product of thought, which is conditioned and limited. Thus, differences and contradictions are unavoidable. Therefore, a comparative study of different viewpoints and commentaries is immensely important to awaken the inner intelligence to see the mind as it is. Psychology and the Perennial Philosophy: Studies in Comparative Religion edited by Samuel Bendeck Sotillos is an outstanding effort in this direction.”
—Samdhong Rinpoche, former Prime Minister (Kalon Tripa) of the Tibetan Government-in-exile, author of Uncompromising Truth for a Compromised World: Tibetan Buddhism and Today’s World

“The rise of psychology has impacted the study and practice of spirituality, the experiences and attitudes relevant to ultimate human values that transcend ordinary behavior. Each chapter of this remarkable book demonstrates this interaction in a unique and provocative way. But rather than using psychology to reduce and ‘psychologize’ spiritual topics, its authors demonstrate how directives from the spiritual traditions can enhance and even illuminate the enduring importance of psychology in the 21st century.”
—Stanley Krippner, Saybrook University, co-author of Spiritual Dimensions of Healing

“The work at hand is a thinking and debating man’s delight. If you have any interest at all in attempting to include an educated and enlightened view of man’s higher functions in your purview of the world, you will learn from and enjoy this collection of essays. If you already have some knowledge in this area, brace yourself: you may see some of your favorites sharply criticized. A thought-provoking work.”
—Bruce W. Scotton, University of California, San Francisco, co-editor of Textbook of Transpersonal Psychiatry and Psychology

“This book, superbly edited by Samuel Bendeck Sotillos, is a masterful critique of the field of psychology and its loss of the sacred ground in which it once was rooted. It offers depth psychologists an opportunity to contemplate timeless truths echoed through the centuries by perennial philosophers who have always claimed psyche is subordinate to Spirit. Although ignored in depth psychology’s early years due to prejudice and lack of understanding, this is a message today’s psychotherapists must take seriously. Human beings need a deeper and wider transpersonal vision of who and what we are, which the saints and sages of the world’s spiritual traditions have always pointed to. In psychotherapy with a therapist committed to such a vision, patients penetrate into their unconscious depths and not infrequently awaken to the Ground of all Being. Their suffering itself occurred because they had turned away from Spirit. Above all, this volume passionately calls upon depth psychology to remember its origin in the perennial wisdom at the core of the great religions. There is something of a polemic in these pages. It deserves to be considered by depth psychologists of all persuasions.”
—Bryan Wittine, Transpersonal psychologist and Jungian psychoanalyst

“This anthology from Samuel Bendeck Sotillos is a must reference for anyone who is interested in psychology and its relationship to spirituality, and in developing an inclusive dialogue between disciplines that favor an integral outlook on the person and his or her potential. Selections in this anthology will inspire us to reexamine the metaphysical underpinnings of psychology, and remind us how important it is to rise above science’s attempt to reduce the human being to an epistemic object.”
—Sangeetha Menon, National Institute of Advanced Studies (Bangalore, India), Board Member of the International Transpersonal Association (ITA), author of The Beyond Experience: Consciousness in Bhagavad Gita

“This anthology has some of the most discerning essays and reviews on spirituality and psychology, which provide much-needed care and caution to all those engaged in bringing them together or who wish to do so in future. Therefore, it is a must-read for all those who teach, research, consult, or study in such frontier areas as transpersonal psychology, states of consciousness, mind-body relation, holistic health, Indian psychology, and so on. It will be an invaluable textbook for courses in these and other related areas. I congratulate the editor of the book.”
—Kiran Kumar K. Salagame, University of Mysore (India), Board Member of the International Transpersonal Association (ITA), author of The Psychology of Meditation: A Contextual Approach

“One of the finest collections of essays on the Perennial Philosophy—a must-read for all psychologists who are engaged with spirituality and transpersonal psychology. The essays which critique modern psychology (including transpersonal psychology, and the framework of Carl Jung), in the light of the Perennial Philosophy are a revelation and make compelling reading. The book serves as a corrective to the excesses of modern psychology, and to this end Sotillos has done a commendable job. I for one will include the book in some of the graduate courses that I teach.”
—Suneet Varma, University of Delhi, co-editor of Foundations of Indian Psychology

“To its credit modern science by-and-large is becoming more cognizant of the essential connection between spirituality and psychological health and well-being and most of all its positive implications within the field of psychology. While there is ample data to document this in a plethora of academic journals and books, this new book Psychology and the Perennial Philosophy adds a novel contribution to the dialogue between psychology and spirituality, which captures many nuances that for the most part go unnoticed within these discussions, and last but not least, it provides a keen eye of discernment to understand this intricate relationship on a deeper level that is crucially needed. This work will be a valuable asset to students and long term mental health practitioners and professors alike who seek to better understand the relationship between psychology and spirituality.”
—Harold G. Koenig, Duke University, Director of the Center for Spirituality, Theology and Health, co-author of The Handbook of Religion and Health

What can philosophers today learn from the psychosomatic practice of Zen Buddhism? How does Zen challenge the methodology of our cerebral practice of philosophy?  In order to address these questions, this essay examines one of the major transitions that have occurred in modern Japanese philosophy, namely the translation of Zen Buddhist ideas into a philosophical idiom. When Zen ideas are discussed in an academic context, we need to be attentive to the fact that they have been displaced from the psychosomatic practices—the embodied-spiritual disciplines—in which they were originally embedded. Fortunately, there have been a few philosophers who have commuted between the psychosomatic practice of Zen and the intellectual discipline of philosophy, most notably the main figures of the first three generations of the Kyoto School: Nishida Kitarō (1870–1945), Nishitani Keiji (1900–90), and Ueda Shizuteru (1926–2019). The central sections of this essay examine how they challenge not just the ideas but also the disembodied methodology of Western philosophy by drawing on their psychosomatic practice of Zen. The final sections then critically compare and contrast Zen’s psychosomatic practice of with Richard Shusterman’s “somaesthetics” and with Pierre Hadot’s retrieval of the ancient Greek and Roman conception of philosophy as a “way of life,” a way that was not only more soteriologically oriented but also more holistically practiced than is modern academic philosophy. The essay concludes by addressing the prospects, for those living in contemporary Western or Westernizing countries, of incorporating psychosomatic disciplines such as those of Zen into the practice of philosophy as a truly holistic pursuit of wisdom and liberating way of life.

Citation information:
Bret W. Davis, “Commuting Between Zen and Philosophy: In the Footsteps of Kyoto School Philosophers and Psychosomatic Practitioners,” in Transitions: Crossing Boundaries in Japanese Philosophy, edited by Francesa Greco, Leon Krings, and Yukiko Kuwayama (Nagoya: Chisokudō Publications, 2021), pp. 71–111.

Data mining of Indus Script Corpora reveal the purpose of ceramic (stoneware) bangles (22), seals, fillets as dharma saṁjñā, 'badges of responsibility'.They are Corporate badges, with deciphered Indus Script inscriptions. Socio-cultural framework of a workshop (smithy-forge as a temple) for a cluster of Vedic villages unravels organization of artisanal-seafaring merchant society as a Corporation with ancient guilds.

The reference to an archaeological settlement of Sarasvati civilization is based on the finds of fire-altars in many sites (80% or over 2000 sites out of 2600 sites of the Indus valley civilization are on the banks of Vedic River Sarasvati), exemplified by the octagonal brick found in Binjor fire-altar (close to Anupgarh and Ganweriwala). At Anupgarh, the river forks into two channels: one flowing southwards towards Jaisalmer and another westwards towards Ganweriwala.


Binjor Indus Script seal PLUS fire-altar with octagonal brick (a signature tune of Vedic culture). See: http://bharatkalyan97.blogspot.in/2015/12/binjor-seal-with-indus-script.html 
Binjor seal with Indus Script deciphered. Binjor attests Vedic River Sarasvati as a Himalayan navigable channel en route to Persian Gulf
Locus of Binjor, near Anupgarh on Vedic River Sarasvati

There are clear intimations of precursors to corporate life in ancient Bharatam with the social organization of the samajam governed by the weltanchauung of dharma. By unambiguous allocation of socio-cultural responsibilities governing the economic activity and businesses (production and marketing) of Bharatam Janam in clusters of villages, dharma was enshrined as the inviolate principle of all cosmic phenomena manifested in material aspects of living.

There are clear indications that cororate form (sreni) was used for the business of people. One one ceramic (stoneware) bangle (m1639) such a sreni is clearly identified headed by a sreshthin, guild-master. Thus, millennia before the Roman proto-corporations, Bharatam Janam, 'metalcaster folk' had evolved a system of socio-cultural organization of commonwealths (janapadas) for conducting businesses. Assets of the sreni were deposited into the treasury of the commonwealth and were distinct from the assets of the individual members of the sreni, many of whom were artisans and seafaring merchants.
Location of Balakot, a site of Saraswvati civilization where a ceramic (stoneware) bangle with inscription was found. (Balakot 06)
See: http://www.penn.museum/sites/expedition/shell-working-at-ancient-balakot-pakistan/ Shell working at Ancient Balakot, Pakistan (Expedition, UPenn., Vol. 19, Issue 2, January, 1977)
  Balakot 06 Ceramic (stoneware) bangle with inscription

Intimations of such janapadas are seen in the way distinct badges (as corporate badges) evolved for specific functionaries. Roots of the corporate form detailed in Kautilya's Arthas'astra are to be found in the corporate identities indicated by distinct structural elements in Indus Script corpora such as ceramic (stoneware) bangles, fillets, seals -- all with inscriptions -- as Dharma saṁjñā Corporate badges. For an Economic History of Corporate form in Ancient India, see a paper by Vikramaditya S. Khanna (2005): http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=796464

It is possible to read the sã̄gāḍā°ḍī 'lathe, portable furnace' hieroglyph-multiplex as rebus: sanghar 'fortification'; jangada 'consignments on approval' The pronunciation in Gujarati is jangaḍ relatable to jangāḍiyo ‘a military guard who accompanies treasure into the treasury’ (of the commonwealth or guild)(Gujarati). Such a dharma saṁjñā 'corporate badge' may be the gold fillet with 'lathe' hieroglyph.

Gold paṭa, 'fillet'. Punctuated design on both ends. Mohenjodaro.


Executive summary: Socio-cultural framework of Vedic village clusters of Bronze Age

The workshops evidenced by circular platforms are Corporations of the Bronze Age, with the emergence of guilds of artisans with specific functions and responsibilities to promote the Corporation as a commonwealth. It was a smiths' guild at work on circular platforms of Harappa using tablets as category 'tallies' for the final shipment of package with a seal impression. each functionary in the guild had a recognizable paṭa 'badge' (Corporate badge of dharma, of responsibility assigned in a socio-cultural organization of the samajam). A Bronze Age village of Bharatam Janam or a cluster of such villages was a janapada, a Corporation of artisan guilds.

Three paṭa 'badges' are shown on the stone statue of the so-called 'priest-king' who wears a fillet on his forehead and also on hi right shoulder. A third badge is signified on his uttariyam (shawl) which is embellished with the hieroglyphs of 'trefoils' signifying tri-dhAtu 'three mineral' strands of dhā̆vaḍ 'smelter', with assigned functional responsibility.of a Potr 'purifier'.

It is suggested that many such badges were worn by artisans of a Vedic village of the Bronze Age; such badges were ceramic (stoneware) bangles.
  An "eye bead" made of gold with steatite inlay, Harappa. Fired steatite beads appear to have been extremely important to the Indus people because they were incorporated into exquisite ornaments, such as this "eye bead" made of gold with steatite inlay found in 1995 at Harappa [Harappa Phase]. https://www.harappa.com/slide/gold-disc
The central ornament worn on the forehead of the famous "priest-king" sculpture from Mohenjo-daro appears to represent an eye bead, possibly made of gold with steatite inlay in the center. https://www.harappa.com/slide/priest-king-forehead

 
The weltanchauung, 'world perception' of artisans in a Vedic village was governed by 1. dharma, assigned responsibilities and 2. the metaphor of a kole.l 'smithy-forge' as a kole.l 'temple'.
Male head probably broken from a seated sculpture. Finely braided or wavy combed hair tied into a double bun on the back of the head and a plain fillet or headband with hanging ribbons falling down the back. The upper lip is shaved and a closely cropped and combed beard lines the pronounced lower jaw.
  Male head shows the typical arrangement of the hair in a double bun, held in place by a thin fillet (badge) tied on the forehead.

Functions assigned were recognized by distribution of ceramic (stoneware) bangles worn as paṭa, 'socio-cultural honour-badges'. Such a paṭa m. ʻ slab, tablet, metal plate ʼ,was distinct from the seals and tablets.

Such a paṭa was a gold fillet with the inscribed sã̄gāḍā°ḍī 'lathe, portable furnace' hieroglyph-multiplex .

Hieroglyph: सांगड [ sāṅgaḍa ]  That member of a turner's apparatus by which the piece to be turned is confined and steadied. सांगडीस धरणें To take into linkedness or close connection with, lit. fig.Rebus 1: Sangara [fr. saŋ+gṛ1 to sing, proclaim, cp. gāyati & gīta] 1. a promise, agreement J iv.105, 111, 473; v.25, 479; sangaraŋ karoti to make a compact Vin i.247; J (Pali) Rebus 2: śã̄gaḍa 'catamaran'. Such a सांगड [ sāṅgaḍa ] is alsoa hieroglyph-multiplex, f A body formed of two or more (fruits, animals, men) linked or joined together.

Such a paṭa were two anthropomorphs of copper/bronze with spread legs of a human body. The rebus reading of the hieroglyph-multiplex (hypertext) on the badges: 1. helmsman, merchantman, (metal) suercargo, engraver, merchant, worker in wood and iron; 2. helmsman, (metal) supercargo, iron worker

Spread legs on both anthropomorphs signify कर्णक 'spread legs' rebus: 'helmsman'

Sharply defined inscriptions on each of the 22 ceramic (stoneware) bangles indicate 21 sharply assigned responsibilities within the guild for metalwork, for e.g. 21 functional allocations of responsibilitie of artisans delineated in a Vedic village:
1. iron smelting, furnace work (m1659)
2. metal casting, engraving, documenting supercargo (m1647)
3. bronze (casting)(m1646)
4. gota (laterite) (m1641)
5. Seafaring merchant, magnetite ingot workshop (m1643)
6. Smithy, forge (m1641)
7. Moltencast copper, brass (m1640)
8. Alloy metal mint, weapons, implements workshop, guild master workshop (m1639)
9. Bronze ingots, implements, magnetite ingots (m1638)
10. Metalcasting workshop (cire perdue?)(m1637)
11. Metal implements, weapons, smithy, forge (m1636)
12. Blacksmith, seafaring merchant (m1634)
13. Helman for supercargo boat, iron furnace work, metals workshop (m1633)
14. Metal casting, alloy mixing workshop (m1632)
15. dhā̆vaḍ 'smelter', supercargo of implements (m1631)
16. Magnetite ingots, furnace work, supercargo engraver (m1630)
17. Iron furnace work, metal casting of tin, helmsman supercargo of metals, bharat ‘mixed alloys’  metalworker (m1629)
18. Minerals workshop guild (h2576)
19. Magnetite ingots, smelter (h1010)
20. dhā̆vaḍ 'smelter' tri-dhAtu, '‘three minerals (H98-3516/8667-01)
21. Seafaring merchant, supercargo engraver(Blkt-6)

Inhalt
Christoph Binkelmann: Enthusiasmus und Skepsis. Das europäische Pendel
Burkhard Nonnenmacher: Kants Postulatenlehre als Prüfstein für Heideggers »These der neuzeitlichen Ontologie«?
Günter Zöller : Ex aliquo nihil. Fichtes Anti-Kreationismus
Kai U. Gregor: Eine Kritik innerhalb der Grenzen der Vernunft. Wilhelm Weischedels Grundlegungsversuch einer Philosophischen Theologie im Zeitalter des Nihilismus und ein Gedanke Fichtes
Marco Rampazzo Bazzan: Die Staatslehre Fichtes unter dem Aspekt der
politischen Theologie nach Carl Schmitt
Cristiana Senigaglia: Die Spur der Andersheit: Fichte und Levinas
Detlev Pätzold Hegels Philosophie der Religion: Die Stellung der Religion zwischen Kunst und Philosophie
Arthur Kok: Absoluter Geist und Schöpfung. Jan Hollaks neothomistische Hegelkritik
Kazimir Drilo: Kritik des religiösen Bewusstseins. Falk Wagners theologische Interpretation von Hegels »Wissenschaft der Logik«
Jakub Kloc-Konkołowicz: »Der Mensch lebt in zwei Welten […]«. Religion und Staat in Hegels Ansicht und in der heutigen Debatte
Elena Ficara: Der ontologische Gottesbeweis bei Hegel und in der analytischen Philosophie 
Robert Marszałek: Die Gegenwart der Religionslehre des mittleren Schelling
Mildred Galland-Szymkowiak Philosophie und Religion bei K.W.F. Solger.
Ein Beitrag zur nachkantischen Frage nach dem Prinzip der Philosophie
Patrick Grüneberg: Der transzendentale Gott
Wibke Rogge: Emmanuel Lévinas: Über die Beziehung des Unendlichen zum Seienden als Gemeinschaft in der Trennung
Ansgar Lyssy : Darwin, Gott und Neurotheologie. Was können uns die Biowissenschaften über die Religion sagen?

Jürgen Habermas und Talal Asad zählen zu den bedeutendsten Protagonisten des Diskurses um die postsäkulare Gesellschaft. In der vorliegenden Arbeit unternehme ich eine vergleichende Lektüre zentraler Schriften beider Autoren. Dabei versuche ich, möglichst präzise zu beschreiben, wie Habermas und Asad einen neuen Blickwinkel auf die Verhältnisbestimmung von Religion und Gesellschaft in der Gegenwart freigeben und plausibilisieren.
Einen zentralen Stellenwert schreibe ich der Tatsache zu, dass hierfür von beiden der Begriff der ‚Übersetzung‘ herangezogen wird. Ziel der Untersuchung ist es folglich, erste systematisierende Vorstöße bezüglich des Begriffspaars ‚Religion übersetzen‘ zu leisten. Dabei gilt es ein Bündel an Forschungsfragen zu beantworten: Wie wird der Begriff der Übersetzung verstanden? In welcher Art und Weise kommt Religion im Werk der Autoren zur Sprache? Auf welche Aspekte der Religion soll sich die Übersetzungsleistung beziehen? Wer sind die Subjekte dieser Übersetzung? Und schließlich, welche Chancen und Probleme bringen die beiden Ansätze für eine politiktheoretische Perspektive auf religiös-gesellschaftliche Fragestellungen mit sich?

Many of the arguments for and against robust moral realism parallel arguments for and against theism. In this article, I consider one of the shared challenges: the explanatory challenge. The article begins with a presentation of Harman's formulation of the explanatory challenge as applied to moral realism and theism. I then examine two responses offered by robust moral realists to the explanatory challenge, one by Russ Shafer-Landau and another by David Enoch. Shafer-Landau argues that the moral realist can plausibly respond to the challenge in a way unavailable to theists. I argue that Shafer-Landau's response is implausible as it stands, and that once revised, it will apply to theism just as well. I then argue that Enoch's response, to the extent that it is plausible, can be used to defend theism as well.