Published in 2010 by I.B.Tauris & Co Ltd 6 Salem Road, London W2 4BU 175 Fith Avenue, New York NY 10010 www.ibtauris.com Copyright © Kostas Vlassopoulos, 2010 he right of Kostas Vlassopoulos to be identiied as the author of this work has been asserted by the author in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patent Act 1988. All rights reserved. Except for brief quotations in a review, this book, or any part thereof, may not be reproduced, stored in or introduced into a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior written permission of the publisher. ISBN (HB): 978 1 84511 844 0 ISBN (PB): 978 1 84511 845 7 A full CIP record for this book is available from the British Library A full CIP record is available from the Library of Congress Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: available Typeset in Garamond Pro by Ellipsis Books Limited, Glasgow Printed and bound in Great Britain by CPI Antony Rowe, Chippenham Contents INTRODUCTION: Ancients and Moderns What is politics? CHAPTER I: WHO SHOULD RULE? he reception and transformation of the ancient vocabulary CHAPTER II: THE EXERCISE OF POWER: LIBERTY Modern times CHAPTER III: POLITICS AS ACTIVITY: PARTICIPATION, DELIBERATION, CONFLICT he moderns CHAPTER IV: THE ENDS OF POLITICS: THE GOOD LIFE, A BETTER WORLD he moderns ix xvi xx 1 14 40 51 76 93 117 126 EPILOGUE 142 NOTES 146 INDEX 165 CHAPTER I Who should rule? he question of who should rule and the classiication of political systems according to who rules are by no means natural to political thought. Many political systems have existed without ever raising the issue. he ancient Romans practised politics and even wrote about them without ever asking the question, until they came to adopt, very sparingly, some terms and questions of Greek political philosophy.1 To all means and extents the question and the terminology associated with this question were a Greek invention. As a matter of fact, it also took a long time before the question arose in Greek political thought. Until the ith century BCE the important questions for Greek political thought were rather diferent.2 For the archaic Greeks the main question was whether a political community was wellordered or not; they thus distinguished between two diferent conditions, eunomia (good order) and dysnomia (bad order). he question of who exercised power within the community was irrelevant and there was no available terminology in order to distinguish between diferent regimes; what mattered was only whether the citizens thought that their community was governed well.3 he archaic period was also characterised by the emergence of individuals who came to monopolise power in their hands; the Greeks called these individuals tyrannoi, from which the modern word tyrant derives. his monopoly of power and oice in the hands of a single individual was strongly resisted by the rest of the traditional ruling classes, who believed that power should be shared between political equals. heir slogan was isonomia, the equal share of power. Isonomia could describe all forms 1 V politics: antiqVity and its legacy of political regimes in which power was not restricted to the hands of a single individual. hese communities could vary widely in their political forms. In some, power was concentrated in the hands of a few elected magistrates or a council; in others, the citizen assembly had wider powers, but only the propertied had the right to participate in the assembly, while the poor citizens were excluded; in others, inally, the poor had the right to participate in the assembly, but not the right to be elected to oice. here were no terms available to distinguish between these diferent regimes; the important thing was that, when contrasted to tyranny, they all appeared to be systems of isonomia.4 his way of thinking changed rapidly with the emergence of democracy in Athens during the ith century BCE.5 he exercise of power continued to be seen as a reward for those who most contributed to the community in words and deeds. But in the course of the ith century a new contender for the reward of power emerged. We have seen how military service in defence of the community was of paramount importance in justiication of claims to power. he new Athenian superpower was not, though, dependent so much on its infantry, traditionally consisting of the rich and the middle class, but based its power on the navy, manned by thousands of sailors who belonged to the lower classes. he claim that the lower classes deserved to rule, because they contributed most to the defence and power of the community, is irst presented to us by a ith-century author that scholars traditionally call the Old Oligarch. First I want to say this: there the poor and the people generally are right to have more than the highborn and wealthy for the reason that it is the people who man the ships and impart strength to the city; the steersmen, the boatswains, the sub-boatswains, the look-out oicers, and the shipwrights – these are the ones who impart strength to the city far more than the hoplites, the high-born, and the good men. his being the case, it seems right for everyone to have a share in the magistracies, both allotted and elective, for anyone to be able to speak his mind if he wants to.6 2 who should rule? But it was not just the fact that a novel claim to power could be substantiated. It was also the case that the functioning of the political system had changed in a very fundamental manner.7 he political and social elite had no power anymore to take decisions on its own. Instead, all important decisions in Athens were taken by the assembly, in which every citizen, no matter how poor, had the right to participate, speak and vote. Furthermore, while rich Athenians had to pay taxes or personally cover the expenses of a number of state functions, poor citizens paid no taxes and received the beneits of these services. To disgruntled members of the old political elite, this looked like a form of government in which power rested in the lower classes and was exercised to promote their class interest. hese disgruntled members of the elite soon came with a name for this novel regime: they called it demokratia, which meant that power (kratos) was in the hands of the people (demos). But who exactly were the people? Like in modern languages, the Greek word demos can be understood in two ways, one horizontal, the other vertical. In the horizontal way, the people are seen as encompassing the whole citizen body; in the vertical the people are seen as the lower classes and contrasted with the upper classes, the rich, the aristocracy or the rulers. he diference is clearer in the Latin language, which distinguishes between the populus (horizontal) and the plebs (vertical). hose who initially coined the term demokratia, used the term people in the sense of the lower classes; in their eyes it was nothing more than the rule of the poor over the rich. hus, the emergence of democracy led to the discovery that political systems could be classiied according to which individual or group was holding power. Furthermore, political systems could be divided between those that aimed at the common good, and those perverted versions which merely aimed at the good of the rulers. A regime was classiied as a monarchy, when there was a single ruler who governed according to the common good; but it was classiied as a tyranny, when the single ruler governed in his own interest. Equally, a regime was called an aristocracy, when rule was in the hands of the best citizens (aristoi), who governed with the common good in mind; but when the few (oligoi) governed in their own interest, it 3 V politics: antiqVity and its legacy was called an oligarchy. Interestingly, there was little agreement in terminology when it came to the government of the many. Democracy could be used to describe both the good and the perverted version. he good version could be also called politeia (polity), while the bad version could be called ochlokratia, mob rule. he ambiguity was the result of the fact that democracy could mean either the rule of the people as a whole or of the lower classes only.8 Let us concentrate on the concept of democracy for the time being. he view of democracy as the rule of the lower classes became a staple of Greek political thought and found its most emphatic expression in the work of the fourth-century BCE philosopher Aristotle: he argument therefore seems to make it clear that for few or many to have power is an accidental feature of oligarchies in the one case and democracies in the other, due to the fact that the rich are few and the poor are many everywhere, but that the real thing in which democracy and oligarchy difer from each other is poverty and wealth; and it necessarily follows that wherever the rulers owe their power to wealth, whether they be a minority or a majority, this is an oligarchy, and when the poor rule, it is a democracy.9 he spectre of class rule by the lower classes haunted many opponents of democracy and remained inluential until well into the twentieth century. here was also an equally critical view of democracy which, however, put things in a diferent light. In this conception democracy was not the equivalent of class rule, but was identiied with lack of rule, with anarchy. Its most memorable depiction was presented by Plato in his Republic: ‘Is it not the excess and greed of [liberty] and the neglect of all other things that revolutionises [democracy] too and prepares the way for the necessity of a tyranny?’ ‘How?’ he said. ‘Why, when a democratic city athirst for liberty gets bad cupbearers for its leaders and is intoxicated by drinking too deep of that unmixed wine, and then, if its 4 who should rule? so-called governors are not extremely mild and gentle with it and do not dispense the liberty unstintedly, it chastises them and accuses them of being accursed oligarchs . . . Is it not inevitable that in such a state the spirit of liberty should go to all lengths?’ ‘Of course’. ‘And this anarchical temper’, said I, ‘my friend, must penetrate into private homes and inally enter into the very animals . . . And do you note that the sum total of all these items when footed up is that they render the souls of the citizens so sensitive that they chafe at the slightest suggestion of servitude and will not endure it? For you are aware that they inally pay no heed even to the laws written or unwritten, so that forsooth they may have no master anywhere over them’.10 his critical image of democracy as equivalent to anarchy remained equally inluential in ancient and modern political thought. But even from the beginnings of Athenian democracy in the ith century BCE, we come across alternative deinitions that aim to defend democracy from its opponents. he earliest of them comes from the historian Herodotus, who described a debate among Persian grandees about what form of regime they should adopt ater the death of the legitimate monarch. Ater criticising the excesses of monarchy and the danger of putting all power in the hands of a single person, Otanes, one of the grandees, ofered the following account of his preferred regime: But the rule of the multitude has, in the irst place, the loveliest name of all, equality, and does, in the second place, none of the things that a monarch does. It determines oices by lot, and holds power accountable, and conducts all deliberating publicly. herefore I give my opinion that we make an end of monarchy and exalt the multitude, for all things are possible for the majority.11 Democracy was a polity in which all citizens were free and equal. herefore, nobody had a better claim to rule than anybody else. Yet, decisions 5 V politics: antiqVity and its legacy needed to be taken and these decisions needed to be put into practice. Democracy answered these needs by creating a political system in which all citizens had an equal chance to participate in deliberation and to rule. All important decisions were taken by the popular assembly, in which all adult male citizens had the right to participate and speak. he magistrates were merely executive oicials, who had no power to initiate policies or to take important decisions on their own. hey were selected by lot annually, among those citizens who wished to hold public oice. No citizen could be selected twice for the same oice; thus, rotation ensured that no citizen could become excessively powerful by continuous holding of oice. he only exceptions were those functions that required special talents, like the military and inancial oices. In these cases, the Athenians employed the system of election instead of the lot and permitted re-election to the same position without limit. But even these magistrates had no power to initiate policy and were strictly within the power of the assembly.12 It is oten said that the diference between ancient and modern democracies lies in the fact that the former were direct, while the latter are based on representation. While there is an important element of truth in this, it is also highly misleading.13 Many important political decisions and functions were undertaken by representative bodies in Athenian democracy. Let us briely look at two of them: the Council of the 500 and the popular courts. he Council of the 500 was a representative body: each of the 139 districts of Attica was represented in the council in proportion to its number of citizens. he Council prepared the agenda of the assembly: no issue could be discussed in the assembly if it had not already been discussed and put into the agenda by the Council. But councillors were selected by lot, like the other magistrates, and no citizen could serve as councillor more than twice in his life and even that non-consecutively. he popular courts had important political functions, as we shall explain in the next chapter. Every year 6,000 jurors were selected by lot from among all citizens who wished to serve as jurors in that particular year. Cases were heard by panels selected daily by lot from this pool of 6,000 jurors. Any decision of the assembly could be challenged in court, and the jury had the 6 who should rule? power to overturn it if found unconstitutional or inexpedient. he courts were an important means of revisiting the decisions of the assembly, and their decisions were inal, making some modern historians believe that they were the true sovereign body of Athenian democracy.14 hus, important political functions were undertaken not by the assembly in which every citizen could participate, but by special bodies which represented the Athenian citizens. But, in contrast to modern democracies, all these representative bodies were selected by lot and not by election. hus, the diference between ancient and modern democracies cannot be sought in representation; it rather lies in the speciic role that representation and election play in modern democracies, a point to which we shall return later. Classical Greece was characterised by an intense struggle between partisans of oligarchy and democracy. To avoid these constant ights, Greek thinkers from the late ith century onwards came up with a new idea: the mixed constitution. he idea was that one could avoid the excesses of every single form and satisfy both democrats and oligarchs by combining elements from the diferent constitutions into a single, mixed form. his was a very potent idea in ancient, and later in modern political thought.15 Plato and Aristotle, the earliest Greek thinkers to deal with the concept, tended to see the mixed constitution as a mixture of monarchical, aristocratic and democratic principles. hus, the mixed constitution should combine the democratic principle of the lot with the aristocratic principle of election; or it should combine the democratic principle of universal right to vote for all citizens with the aristocratic principle that only certain citizens should have the right to be elected into oice.16 But a new departure in political thought took place when Greek thinkers tried to accommodate within this scheme some polities that were considered highly successful and could be seen as ideal examples of the mixed constitution: initially Sparta, and later also Rome.17 Sparta and Rome could not it easily into the usual classiication of Greek political thought.18 In Sparta power was divided between the two kings, the senate (Gerousia), the popular assembly and the ephors. he two kings were mainly in charge 7 V politics: antiqVity and its legacy of the army; the senate, made up of the two kings plus 28 Spartan citizens over sixty elected for life, discussed all political afairs and brought proposals for decision to the popular assembly. he assembly, in which all citizens with full rights had the right to participate, could not discuss the proposals put in front of it, but only accept them or turn them down. Finally, an important role was played by the ive ephors elected annually from all the Spartan citizens, but without the right of re-election. he ephors were seen as a bridle on the power of the kings, and each month they swore an oath of allegiance to the kings, valid for as long as the kings kept their own oath of upholding the law.19 Rome had a similarly complex political structure.20 Power was divided between the two consuls, the senate, the assemblies and the tribunes. he two consuls were the annually-elected heads of the executive: chief among their duties was military leadership. Once the consuls and other high magistrates, like the quaestors, the praetors and the aediles, had inished their term in oice, they became members of the Senate; the Senate was the only deliberative body of the Roman state. However, the Senate did not have any power to create new laws (legislative power) or to implement decisions taken (executive power); its role was that of discussing policy and advising the magistrates. Although its decisions were not legally binding, few magistrates ever dared ignore them. Legislation was in the hands of a variety of diferent assemblies.21 he centuriate assembly (comitia centuriata), which was the one that elected the consuls and other magistrates, was divided into 193 centuries, with each century having a single vote. he citizens were distributed among the centuries in a very unequal way, with the result that the upper classes had a majority of the centuries, while a large proportion of the citizens who belonged to the poorest class formed only a single century. his gave the upper classes a strong control of the election of magistrates. But, from the third century onwards, almost all legislative work was not done by the centuriate assembly but was taken over by the tribal assembly (comitia tributa), in which no class had a particular advantage.22 Roman assemblies could not deliberate on the proposals put in front of them, but, like in Sparta, could only accept them or turn them down. Finally, 8 who should rule? there were the plebeian tribunes, magistrates elected from among the plebeians to protect their interests against the aristocratic patricians. he tribunes had the right to imprison the consuls if they acted against the interests of the plebeians and had a veto over the activities of the senate. When Greek and Roman thinkers tried to classify Sparta and Rome as mixed constitutions incorporating monarchical, aristocratic and democratic elements, they efected a crucial transformation of the categories of Greek political thought. Democracy, monarchy and aristocracy were originally categories that described polities as a whole; when they became mere elements of a mixed constitution, the road was open for a radical re-interpretation of these concepts. his was particularly the case with Polybius, a Greek statesman who wrote an important historical work to explain to his fellow Greeks the reasons behind Rome’s meteoric rise to world power.23 According to Polybius, the success of Sparta and Rome was due to their mixed constitution.24 he Spartan kings and the Roman consuls comprised the monarchical element. Monarchy, in his discussion of Sparta and Rome, did not refer any more to the rule of a single individual; efectively, it had become synonymous with executive power. he example of the Roman consuls, which were considered as the monarchic element of the constitution, speaks volumes in this respect. he discussion of executive power, as such, was a novelty in Greek political thought. Previous discussions, like those of Plato and Aristotle, had focused on participation and the legislative and judicial powers. Now monarchy could be used to think about the implications and problems of the executive power even within non-monarchical regimes. In the same way, the Gerousia and the Senate represented the aristocratic element; thus, aristocracy or oligarchy was no longer understood as a regime in which sufrage was restricted to only a segment of the citizen body; it was now identiied with a speciic institution. Both the Spartan Gerousia and the Roman Senate were elected bodies, whether directly or indirectly, and, theoretically, they comprised just the wisest and ablest citizens; but one could easily make the move, as we shall see, of extending this new image in order to view the senate as an organ comprising and expressing the noble and the rich. 9 V politics: antiqVity and its legacy But the most important redeinition concerned democracy. One answer to what was the democratic element in Sparta and Rome was on traditional lines: it was the popular assemblies which, at the end of the day, decided on all legislative issues. his answer would thus identify the democratic element with direct popular participation in decision making. It is a distinctive characteristic of both Sparta and Rome that, in contrast to most ancient aristocracies/oligarchies, all citizens had the right to participate in the legislative assembly. his would be of crucial importance for the future. However, some ancient authors, when discussing Sparta, thought that the democratic element lay rather in social practices.25 It was the equality of life of the Spartan citizens that was the democratic element of their constitution. It was not the mere legal equality that existed in a democracy like Athens. In Sparta there was a public system of education and all citizens had to undergo the same training and live under the same conditions. here were strict limits on the use of wealth, while citizens dined and spent most of their time together in common messes. But there was a third answer which would also prove of immense importance for the future. he democratic element could be seen as those magistrates or institutions which protected the interests of the people, the lower classes: the ephors and the tribunes.26 he ephors and the tribunes were elected without any limit of age or wealth and thus these oices were not restricted to an aristocratic elite; in fact, in the case of the tribunes the patricians were ineligible and only plebeians could be elected to the oice. Both of them were seen as protecting the popular interest against the kings and the consuls, and in the case of the tribunes against the patricians and the senate as well. hus, the attempt to locate the democratic element within the mixed constitutions of Sparta and Rome provided two more ancient conceptions of democracy: that of democracy as equality of social conditions and that of democracy as the protection of the popular interests. his redeinition of the key concepts of Greek political vocabulary was destined to have a long aterlife. Plato’s and Aristotle’s version of the mixed constitution aimed to unite democratic, aristocratic and monarchical principles in a novel and 10 who should rule? unitary whole. In particular, they focused on how to redeine the citizen body in such a way that it would avoid the extremes of either democracy or oligarchy. he novelty of Polybius’s conception was that the issue of political participation played little role in it; instead the focus was on speciic institutions representing the diferent elements.27 here is one more essential thing to notice about the Greek classiication of constitutions and their vocabulary of political rule. Because we still use that vocabulary nowadays, we tend to consider it as natural and oten do not appreciate its peculiarities. One of the most intriguing of these is that it was not merely a typological description. he Greeks did not stop at merely classifying diferent political forms; from the very irst appearance of the diferent constitutions in the Persian Constitutional Debate presented in Herodotus, they were presented as dynamic and mutable. hey possessed their own inherent contradictions and had their own motors of change; their contradictions and principles meant that each constitution was prone to collapse and change into one of the others. According to the Persian king Dareius, who is presented as a supporter of monarchy, both oligarchy and democracy are inherently contradictory and their contradictions ultimately transform them into monarchies. he vying for authority and prestige among the political leaders in an oligarchy leads to conlict and faction, from which inevitably a successful individual emerges, who creates a monarchy. In a democracy, the people need leaders to stop corruption; these demagogues gain prestige and ultimately subvert the constitution into monarchy.28 his was a very elementary understanding of the mutability and contradictions of the constitutions. Later thinkers, notably Plato, Aristotle and Polybius, presented very elaborate schemes of how constitutions were subverted, what were their inherent contradictions and the process and order by which one constitution was followed by another.29 Plato was the irst political thinker to present a detailed description of constitutional change, from his ideal state to timocracy, oligarchy, democracy and inally tyranny.30 Plato was primarily interested in the supreme values that diferent 11 V politics: antiqVity and its legacy constitutions espoused and the process by which a form of rule was undermined and substituted by a diferent one. Aristotle disputed Plato’s claim that there was a set pattern through which one constitution changed into another; instead, he presented a very detailed and complex discussion of the diferent ways in which constitutions could be transformed and of the variety of reasons for which they were undermined. But it was Polybius who presented what later became the most inluential pattern of political change. According to him, the circle of constitutional change started from monarchy, which through the excesses of later kings was turned into a tyranny; once the tyrants were toppled, the regime would change into an aristocracy of the best citizens, which in its turn, when its rulers became corrupt and degenerate, would turn into an oligarchy governed by the rich; the overthrow of the oligarchy would be followed by democracy, which, due to the turbulence of the masses and the anarchy brought by the demagogues, would inally swing in full circle back to monarchy.31 Surprisingly, it was not Athens or Sparta but Rome that provided the ideal testing ground for the dynamic and temporal character of the Greek vocabulary. In contrast to the Greek cities, Rome was the only ancient community which could be seen as having passed through the whole circle of constitutional change. A plausible account could be written to show how Rome had started as a monarchy under Romulus, had degenerated into tyranny under Tarquinius Superbus, the last king, and was transformed into an aristocracy with the abolition of monarchy and the creation of the consuls; the creation of the tribunes, the abolition of patrician privileges and the transfer of legislative power into the comitia tributa could be portrayed either as the achievement of the mixed constitution, or as the emergence of democracy; this was followed by the anarchy of the irst century and Rome swung the full circle with the monarchy of Caesar and Augustus.32 his pattern of change would create endless discussions among later thinkers, who gave diferent assessments of the process, endeavoured to discern the motor of political change and reached divergent conclusions. As I said above, the distinction between diferent forms of political rule was a Greek pastime that never occupied the Romans too much. he 12 who should rule? Romans spent little time trying to diferentiate between the diferent elements of their constitution or thinking more abstractly of who should rule.33 What little discussion of the Roman polity from this perspective is preserved comes mainly from Greek observers of Rome.34 Nevertheless, the Romans possessed a political vocabulary, which would also play an important role in modern political thought. he most important term of Roman political vocabulary for our inquiry was the respublica. Respublica, from which of course our modern word republic derives, means the public concerns, the common issues.35 he early modern English translation of the term as Commonwealth gives a good impression of its semantic value. Respublica could be used to describe all political forms which pursued the common good; it could thus encompass all three good constitutions of the Greek vocabulary: Respublica is the property of the people [res populi]. . . When the supreme authority is vested in one man, we call him a king, and the government of that respublica is a monarchy. When it is vested in a select group, that respublica is said to be ruled by the power of an aristocracy [optimatium]. he respublica in which everything depends on the people is called a democracy [civitas popularis].36 While this was the meaning of respublica for the vast majority of Roman authors, in a few cases it could be used in a more restricted sense. When power in Rome was concentrated in the hands of the emperors, some Romans thought that this was the end of the respublica, which was now substituted by personal rule in the interest of the ruler and not for the common good. he Roman historian Tacitus, for example, oten implicitly argued that the republic was extinct ater the creation of the Principate by Augustus, and he even stated that no-one born ater the battle of Actium had ever seen the republic.37 his ambivalence of the term respublica would be of great importance for the future. It should be here noted that a similar semantic shit had taken place in the case of democracy as well. During the Hellenistic period, 13 V politics: antiqVity and its legacy the word democracy ceased to connote one of the six simple constitutions and became the generic term for every polity that was not a monarchy, or was independent from a king: thus, it could now cover both democracies and aristocracies/oligarchies.38 his new meaning did not extinguish completely older meanings of the term, which retained some of their hold in more theoretical accounts, while being rather redundant in common parlance. But the parallel shits of both republic and democracy to denote all polities which were not monarchies would prove important. To summarise, the Greeks invented a vocabulary to classify political systems according to who was the ruler; to this, the Romans added the concept of the respublica. hese diferent forms of rule were inherently unstable and normally ended up in degeneration; many ancient thinkers came to argue that only a mixed constitution, variously conceived, could incorporate the positive aspects of the simple forms of rule, while also solving their inherent contradictions. he vocabulary of rule was signiicantly modiied when it was used to identify monarchical, aristocratic and democratic elements within a mixed constitution. Finally, we should note the plurality of conceptualisations of democracy in ancient political thought: direct popular rule, rule of the poor, anarchy, equality of social conditions, representation of popular interests or a non-monarchical constitution. he reception and transformation of the ancient vocabulary The world that followed the collapse of the Roman Empire, the barbarian invasions and the loss of classical culture, was very different from classical antiquity. The world of the Middle Ages, fragmented in castles, principalities and kingdoms and dominated by feudal relations and obligations, offered little scope for classical politics. But, from the later Middle Ages, the political landscape changed significantly.39 The fragmented world of the Middle Ages was gradually replaced by two different entities: the largest part of Europe was now dominated by territorial kingdoms, like France, England and Portugal; while in some areas, particularly the Italian 14 Index Adams, John 30 Adoption xi–xiv, 1, 16–17, 20, 26, 59–60, 69, 94, 114, 126, 127–128, 137, 143 Ager publicus 136 Agis 122, 127 Agora 113 Agrarian laws 123–125, 127, 129, 135, 136–137, 139 America xii, 28–33, 34, 62–63, 103–105 Anarchy 4–5, 12, 14, 19, 23, 36, 48, 55, 59, 104 Ancients xvi–xviii, 64–67, 102, 104–105 and passim Apathy 112–113 Appius Claudius xiii Arendt, Hannah 113 Aretê xx, 77–78 Aristagoras 79 Aristides 91 Aristocracy xiv, xviii, 3, 7, 9, 10, 12, 13, 14, 16, 18, 19, 20, 22, 23–24, 26–27, 30, 33–34, 59, 64, 77, 79, 88, 100–101, 103, 107, 110, 129 Aristotle xii, xiv, 7, 12, 15, 22, 45, 56, 62, 72, 86–89, 94, 99, 114, 117–118, 126, 130, 138, 140–141 Army, standing 62 Athens ix, xv, xix, xxi, 2–3, 5–7, 10, 12, 19, 21, 25, 26, 30, 35–37, 43–47, 49, 50, 53, 56–57, 68, 73–74, 77–83, 84–85, 98, 104, 107, 109–111, 113, 114–115, 116, 119, 142 Augustine 145 Augustus 12, 13, 61–62 Auxilium 49 Aventine Secession xiii Babeuf, G. 136–137 Berlin, Isiah 42 Blair, Tony 116 Brutus 91, 108 Bush, George W. 116 Caesar 12, 52, 62 Camillus 108 Canon xvi–xvii, 94, 97, 110 Castoriadis, C. 113 Cato 61, 63, 91 Censors 29 Cicero 56, 62, 63, 90–91, 94, 96, 125–126, 127, 130 Cincinnatus 108 Cleomenes 123, 127 Comitia centuriata 8 Comitia tributa 8, 12 Commerce 25, 63, 66, 101, 132, 133 Communitarianism xii, 114 Conflict xxi, 80–81, 82–84, 87–89, 103–105 Constant, B. 40–41, 70 165 V politics: antiqVity and its legacy Constitutional change 11–12, 19, 38–39 Contrast xiv–xv Corcyra 83, 98 Corruption xiv, 11–12, 27, 46, 51, 61, 69, 71, 92, 93, 95, 103, 105, 107, 109, 119, 121, 122, 126, 131, 133, 135 Cromwell, Oliver 22–24, 128 Cursus honorum 90 French Revolution x–xi, xii, 21, 33–34, 69–70, 107–109, 136, 138–139 Deliberation 78–79, 81–82, 84–85, 90, 99–101, 106–107, 110–111, 115–116 Democracy xi, 3–4, 10–11, 13–14, 18–19, 22, 25, 28–39, 44–48, 56–57, 64, 73, 77, 80, 88, 102, 104, 107, 108, 110–111, 142 Demophilus 30 Demosthenes 44, 108, 110, 111 Dominium 58 Dysnomia 1 Habermas, Jürgen 115 Harrington, James 22–3, 62, 99–101, 128–129 Hebrews xvii Hérault des Séchelles, Marie-Jean x Herodotus 5, 11, 50, 79 Hobbes, Thomas xiv, xix, 56–59, 67, 97–99 Homer xx–xxi, 80, 117 Homoioi 120 Hume, David 65, 67 Hypereides 44 Germany ix Gerousia 7, 101 Gordon, Thomas 61 Gracchi 27, 123, 124–125, 127, 136 Graphê paranomôn 82, 116 Green, T. H. 140 Grote, George 36, 73–74, 111 Egyptians xvii Election 2, 6–7, 8, 29, 31, 32–33, 36–37, 88, 103–104 Empire xi, 49–51, 52–54, 63–64, 66 England 15, 20–24, 35, 54, 98, 131 Ephors 7–8, 10, 29, 54–55 Equality 1, 5–6, 10, 14, 22–23, 25, 30, 33–34,45, 47,49, 59, 67–69, 72, 74, 88, 105, 113, 120, 122–124, 133, 135, 136–137, 141 Eunomia 1 Idéologues 139 Isonomia 1 Ius 58 Jacobins 35, 40, 108, 138–139 Fascism xiii Federalist Papers xii, 30–33, 103–105, 109 Fénelon, François xii, 129 Ferguson, Adam 65, 102–103, 132–133 Finley, Moses I. 80, 114 Florence 15, 52, 94, 96 France 15, 54, 55, 59–62 Freedom 40–42, 45, 47–8, 53, 56–57, 64, 65–67, 71, 72, 73–74, 75 Law 44, 58, 64, 81–82, 88–89 Lawcourts 6–7 Lawgiver x, 76, 89, 119, 120–121, 127, 128, 129, 132, 135, 137, 138, 139 Liberalism xii, xv, 46, 63, 70, 72–73, 139–141 Libertas 48–51 Livy xii, xvii, 16, 48–49, 62, 91, 99, 101, 103, 110 Locke, John 59, 62, 67 Logos 86 Lot 2, 5–6, 7, 36, 82 Lycurgus 24, 76, 89, 107, 108, 119–124, 127, 128, 135 166 INDEX Mably xii, 69, 108, 135–136 Machiavelli, Niccolò xii, xiii, 16–19, 52–54, 94–96, 127 Mandeville, Bernard 131 Marius 62 Market 66, 113, 131–132, 133, 139 Marx, Karl x–xi, 39, 137–138 Matteotti, Giacomo xiii Michels, Robert 114 Mill, John Stuart 73–74, 110–111 Minos x Mirror of Princes 93 Mitford, William 35 Mixed constitution 7–11, 16, 17–18, 24, 25, 30, 32, 36, 89, 102 Models ix–x, xiii, xix, 16, 25, 26, 28, 29, 34, 36, 37, 55, 58, 62, 63, 68, 69, 84, 91, 94, 101, 103, 105–107, 108, 109–110, 113, 115, 118–125, 127, 129, 135, 137, 139, 143 Moderns xvi, xviii–xx, 64–67, 105–106, 139 Monarchy xi, 3, 9, 22, 25–26 Montesquieu 24–26, 34, 63–64, 70, 101–102, 109 More, Thomas 127–128, 135 Moyle, Walter 23, 35 Mussolini, Benito xiii Napoleon x Narratives xiv, xviii, 12, 23, 25–26, 61–62, 127, 139 Nazism 112 Nedham, Marchamont 21–22, 59–60 Nelson, Eric xvii, 141 Neville, Henry 23 Niebuhr, Barthold Georg 136 Numa 127 Nussbaum, Martha 141 Ober, Josiah 114–115 Oikos 113 Old Oligarch 2 Oligarchy xi, 4, 7, 9, 11, 12, 16, 20, 115 Otanes 5 Paine, Thomas 132, 151 n.82 Participation xx, 9–10, 11, 17, 19, 28–29, 32–33, 41, 45, 47, 68, 70, 73, 77, 81, 87, 112–115 Party xv, 104–105 Pelopidas 91 Pericles 77, 78, 84 Phocion 91 Physiocracy 135 Plato xii, xiv, 4, 7, 11–12, 47–48, 62, 75, 84–86, 108, 111, 112, 115–116, 120–122, 126, 127–128, 134, 140 Plebeians 20, 23, 49, 53–54, 95 Plutarch xiii, xvii, 62, 91, 101, 103, 110, 123–124, 127, 128, 135 Polis xx, 86–87, 130, 140 Politics xx–xxii, 84–86, 111 Polybius 9, 11–12, 16–17, 38, 52, 89, 95, 102, 142 Popper, Karl 112 Poverty 4, 78, 124–125, 135–136, 139 Proletarians 35 Property 58, 121–122, 126, 127–128, 136 Provocatio 49 Publius xii, 108 Rabaut de Saint-Étienne, J. P. 108 Rancière, Jacques 113 Rawls, John 140 Reform 112, 121, 123, 124, 127, 129, 137–138 Relevance xv, xviii, xix, 97, 105, 143 Religion 47, 54, 96, 106, 130, 144–145 Representation 6–7, 27, 29, 32–33, 68, 69–70 Republic xi, 13–14, 20, 24–26, 31 Rights 46–47, 57–59, 71–72, 130, 133, 136–137 Robespierre, M. x, 108 Rome xiv, 8–10, 12–14, 17–19, 20, 21, 23, 28, 30, 48–51, 52, 61–64, 69, 89–92, 95–96, 99–100, 103, 105, 108, 109, 110, 123–125, 127, 132, 136, 137, 142 Rosanvallon, Pierre 131 167 politics: antiqVity and its legacy Rousseau, Jean-Jacques xiii, 26–28, 67– 69, 75, 105–107, 108, 133–135, 145 Saige, Guillaume-Joseph. 69 Saint-Just, Louis de x, 138 Sallust 50–51 Salutati, Coluccio 52 Senate 8, 9, 10, 18, 19, 22, 30, 59, 92, 93, 99, 123 Seneca 92 Service 76, 89–92 Slavery 42–43, 48, 65–66, 71–72, 133 Smith, Algernon 65, 131–132 Socialism xii, xiii, xiv, 34–35, 136–137, 140 Socrates 47, 104, 120 Solon xxi, 21, 43, 108, 127 Sovereignty xiv, 7, 26–28, 36–37, 56–57, 69, 98–99 Sparta 7, 9–10, 16, 22, 23–24, 25, 52–53, 68–69, 76–77, 100–101, 102, 105, 108–109, 119–124, 129, 132, 134–137 Stalinism 112 Stasis 80–81, 83 Sulla 52 Symbols xii-xiii Tacitus xii, xvii, 13, 51, 61, 92, 97 Tarquinius Superbus 12 Thelwall, John 35 Thucydides ix, 77, 83–84, 97–98, 110 Terror 40, 70, 109 Timai xx Tocqueville, A. de 34 Totalitarianism 112 Transformation xiv, 9, 17–18, 24–25, 26–27, 31–32, 37, 57–58, 59–60, 70, 77, 99–101, 102, 114, 127–128, 135, 137, 138 Trenchard, John 61 Tribunes 8–9, 10, 12, 18, 27, 29, 49, 53–55, 61, 96, 103, 137–138 Tyranny xi, 1–2, 3, 4, 11–12, 16, 20, 22, 24, 30, 36, 43, 44, 50, 53, 54, 60, 63, 69, 73, 81, 92, 104, 107 Utopia 127–128, 131, 134–135 Venice 15, 16, 17, 25, 94 Vigilance 62 Virtue xx, 77–78, 81, 82–83, 87, 89–90, 91, 92, 94–96, 99, 101–102, 103, 105–106, 108–109, 114, 119–122, 124, 125, 130, 131, 135, 141 Welfare state xii, 140 Whigs 60–62, 70 Williams, Bernard 71–72 Xenophon 119 168