Sinking Pisa: The Decline of a Commercial Empire in the Thirteenth Century

Matthew E Parker

At the beginning of the thirteenth century the commercial commune of Pisa was one of the two most powerful maritime forces in the Mediterranean, alongside Venice and ahead of Genoa. By the end of the century, however, the city had declined to a position of solely regional political and economic importance. This dissertation delves into the reasons behind Pisa’s decline during the very period when Italy’s three most famous commercial economies of Venice, Genoa, and Florence were experiencing their greatest growth. This study primarily utilizes traditional historiographic approaches for examining Pisa during the long thirteenth century, but also incorporates the interdisciplinary use of statistical and social network analyses to uncover facets of the socio-economic landscape during the final decades of the century. The strength of the present work lies in the chronological breadth of its study, encompassing just over a century of Pisan history. Unlike previous scholarship which has focused more narrowly on a few decades, a broader period of study permits the uncovering of communal behavioral trends and patterns in decision making. The causes of thirteenth-century decline can generally be divided into four categories: imperial allegiance at all costs, ignoring structural changes in the global economy, unquenchable Sardinian aspirations, and the consequences of the traumatic naval defeat at Meloria in 1284. Since at least 1081 Pisa had traded its allegiance for imperial commercial concessions, often to the consternation of the city’s mostly papally-aligned neighbors. During the thirteenth century, as imperial power in Italy waned and factional conflict intensified, Pisa adherence to the imperial strategy repeatedly brought them into military conflict with the rest of Tuscany, ultimately isolating Pisa politically on the mainland. Pisa had built its economic-political prominence primarily through the spice trade with the East and the success of its leather industries at home. Political events and changing consumer preferences conspired to move the primary trade routes northward and westward while market demand for spices was eclipsed by demand for woolen textiles; while Pisa was slow to respond to these changes, the city’s chief competitors adapted quickly and reaped the bulk of the benefits, largely excluding Pisa from later entry. In Sardinia, what had begun as a twelfth-century argument with Genoa over episcopal supremacy evolved into a land grab by Pisa’s most powerful families. As these families wielded significant political power, their personal ambitions bent communal policies to their own interests, repeatedly bringing the commune into violent competition with Genoa. One such encounter was the Battle of Meloria in 1284 which resulted in the death or capture of over 10,000 Pisan men, possibly 25% of the city’s population. This demographic tragedy, combined with the counterproductive policies of a series of strongmen and oligarchies, sent the city spiraling into a protracted economic depression. This depression, discovered for the first time by the statistical and social network analyses of the present study, crippled the already declining economic and political importance of the city, permanently removing any hope of the municipality achieving anything beyond regional importance.

SINKING PISA: THE DECLINE OF A COMMERCIAL EMPIRE IN THE THIRTEENTH CENTURY Matthew E. Parker, B.A., M.A. A Dissertation Presented to the Graduate Faculty of Saint Louis University in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy 2019 © Copyright by Matthew Evan Parker ALL RIGHTS RESERVED 2019 i COMMITTEE IN CHARGE OF CANDIDACY: Professor Thomas F. Madden, Chairperson and Advisor Associate Professor Enrica Salvatori, Università di Pisa Professor Damian J. Smith ii Acknowledgements My view of this dissertation is akin to how a parent views a child: it is dear to my heart, it consumed years of my life, and raising it from an idea took a village. During the many years and miles travelled spent researching and writing, I met and consulted with numerous individuals who helped mold the work into its present form. Any attempt to name them all would surely fall short as I am merely human. Nevertheless, there are several people who are deserving of special mention, without which this project never would have reached fruition. I think it only fitting to put Marina Rustow at the top of what will surely prove to be a long list. I had the distinct pleasure of taking one of her classes during my undergraduate years at Emory University. After earning my baccalaureate degree, I spent several aimless and unsatisfying years outside of academia before deciding to change my life’s trajectory. It was her enthusiasm and guidance that ultimately inspired me to return to academia, one of the best decisions I have ever made. My dissertation committee merits great praise, for without them the present work would be a rather clunky affair. Many thanks to my advisor, Thomas Madden, whose encouragement and insights have been instrumental not only in the composition of this dissertation, but throughout the entirety of my graduate career. Damian Smith has also been a stalwart supporter throughout my time at Saint Louis University, constantly pushing me to achieve more. I could not possibly offer sufficient thanks to Enrica Salvatori. For many years she has selflessly devoted her time and attention from across an ocean. Her advice, references, and personal guidance on my first archival research trip have been invaluable. I owe my sincerest appreciation to the faculty, the staff, and especially the graduate student community at Saint Louis University for their support, collegiality, and close friendship; iii without them I am sure that I would not have survived graduate school. To Amy, Ben, Bobby, Bryan, Dan, Ian, John, Katie, Kevin, Meg, Nicole, Phil(s), Richard, Sammy, Ted, and the dozens more with whom I studied over the years: thank you for being such good friends. I also wish to thank Kyle Lincoln for many reasons, both academic and personal. For their technical expertise, I wish to thank several other individuals. James Kirtland is also deserving of my thanks, not only for his assistance with database manipulation, but also for his decades of friendship. John McEwan provided some key insights into database creation and management, helping to problem solve issues despite his busy schedule. Tore Opsahl’s knowledge of R and social network analysis saved me from the brink of panic when I thought my data was broken. The research that went into this work would not have been possible without the generous financial support of the History Department and the Center for Medieval and Renaissance Studies at Saint Louis University, the Economic History Association, The History Project (Harvard University & University of Cambridge), the Medieval Academy of America and the Committee on Centers and Regional Associations. These organizations and institutions funded my archival research. Accordingly, I also wish to thank the staff of the Archivio di Stato di Pisa and the Archivio di Stato di Firenze for their friendly assistance to a foreigner whose initial grasp of the language was tenuous at best. Last but certainly not least, I owe an incomparable debt to my lovely wife, Jennifer. Her boundless patience, love, and support have sustained me throughout the many years it took to complete this work. You have my undying love and gratitude. iv Table of Contents List of Tables ............................................................................................................................... viii List of Figures ................................................................................................................................ ix Introduction ..................................................................................................................................... 1 Methods & Sources ..................................................................................................................... 8 Chapter 1 - Betting on the Empire (1198-1250s).......................................................................... 13 Commerce, Genoa, and the Guelf League ................................................................................ 15 Commerce & Genoa ............................................................................................................. 15 Guelfs and Ghibellines .......................................................................................................... 21 Demographics ....................................................................................................................... 25 Changes in Government, Changes in Foreign Policy ............................................................... 28 Betting on the Empire ............................................................................................................... 36 Visconti-communal ambitions in Sardinia................................................................................ 43 The Pebble that Started a Landslide.......................................................................................... 50 Chapter 2 – Setting the Stage: Advances and Setbacks (c.1254-1280) ........................................ 54 Changes in Government, Changes in Industry ......................................................................... 55 The Anziani ........................................................................................................................... 55 Unified Purpose .................................................................................................................... 61 Corporatization and the Woolens Industry ........................................................................... 64 Old Lands and New Seas: Currency, Genoa, and Sardinia....................................................... 74 Gold and Silver ..................................................................................................................... 74 Genoese Tribulations ............................................................................................................ 78 The Black Sea ....................................................................................................................... 81 Pisa, Tuscany, and Charles of Anjou (1260s-1270s) ............................................................ 88 Partisanship, Peace, and Prosperity in the 1270s? .................................................................... 95 Partisanship ........................................................................................................................... 95 Peace and Prosperity? ........................................................................................................... 99 Chapter 3 – War with Genoa and the Battle of Meloria ............................................................. 109 The Last Years before Meloria ............................................................................................... 109 The Sicilian Vespers ........................................................................................................... 109 v Judge Sinucello of Cinarca and the Beginning of the War ................................................. 114 1284: The Point of No Return ................................................................................................. 117 Early 1284 ........................................................................................................................... 117 The Battle of Meloria .......................................................................................................... 119 Immediate Aftermath of the Battle of Meloria ................................................................... 123 The Remainder of a Difficult Decade ..................................................................................... 124 The Continuing War and The Signoria of Ugolino della Gherardesca .............................. 124 The New Brevi del Comune e Popolo (1287) ..................................................................... 132 The Downfall of the della Gherardesca and Visconti Clans ............................................... 138 The Extent of the Damage Done during the 1280s ................................................................. 144 Chapter 4 – Trying to Stay Afloat at the Close of the Thirteenth Century ................................. 147 External Politics ...................................................................................................................... 147 Guido da Montefeltro & the Land War............................................................................... 147 The Peace of Fucecchio (July 1293) ................................................................................... 152 Genoa at War and the Treaties of 1299 .............................................................................. 154 Sardinia ................................................................................................................................... 158 The Fight against the della Gherardesca & Visconti .......................................................... 158 Pope Boniface VIII and James II of Aragon ....................................................................... 162 Internal Politics and the Anziani Oligarchy ............................................................................ 166 The Anziani Oligarchy ........................................................................................................ 166 Commerce and the Economy .................................................................................................. 171 The Fall of Acre (1291) and Levantine Changes ................................................................ 171 Monetary Matters ................................................................................................................ 174 Trade and Taxation ............................................................................................................. 177 Sink or Swim: Striving for the Latter, Achieving the Former ................................................ 179 Chapter 5 – Meloria’s Lasting Economic Effects ....................................................................... 183 Social Network Analysis......................................................................................................... 186 1-mode Network Analysis .................................................................................................. 192 2-mode Network Analysis .................................................................................................. 194 Quantitative Analysis .............................................................................................................. 200 Families ............................................................................................................................... 202 Witnesses & Documents ..................................................................................................... 204 Wills .................................................................................................................................... 205 vi Rental Agreements .............................................................................................................. 209 Agistments .......................................................................................................................... 210 Investments ......................................................................................................................... 211 Sales .................................................................................................................................... 218 Loans ................................................................................................................................... 221 Debt Repayments ................................................................................................................ 223 Sufficient Evidence of Economic Recession? ........................................................................ 225 Chapter 6 – Making Sense of the Thirteenth Century ................................................................ 232 The Four Pillars of Pisan Decline ........................................................................................... 232 Imperial Allegiance at All Costs ......................................................................................... 232 Sardinian Aspirations .......................................................................................................... 237 Ignoring Structural Changes in the Global Economy ......................................................... 243 Meloria and Its Consequences ............................................................................................ 248 Stubborn Persistence into the Fourteenth Century.................................................................. 252 Final Thoughts ........................................................................................................................ 258 Appendix – Getting Started in Social Network Analysis ........................................................... 261 Bibliography ............................................................................................................................... 264 Vita Auctoris ............................................................................................................................... 281 vii List of Tables Table 5.1 – 1-mode (undirected) cohesion measures by year ................................................... 1900 Table 5.2 – 1-mode (undirected) cohesion measures by period ................................................. 191 Table 5.3 – 2-mode cohesion measures by year ......................................................................... 194 Table 5.4 – Document type distribution ..................................................................................... 205 Table 5.5 – Wills ......................................................................................................................... 208 Table 5.6 – Sales ......................................................................................................................... 219 Table 5.7 – Loans ........................................................................................................................ 221 Table 5.8 – Information from the cassati of credit-issuing documents....................................... 224 Table 5.9 – Information from the cassati of loans (without accomandigie) ............................... 225 viii List of Figures Figure 3.1 – Map of the Battle of Meloria……………………………………………………...120 Figure 5.1 – 1-mode Pisan social network, 1272-1301………………………………………...187 Figure 5.2 – 1-mode Pisan social network in 1272……………………………………………..188 Figure 5.3 – 1-mode Pisan social network in 1301……………………………………………..189 Figure 5.4 – 2-mode Pisan social network before Meloria……………………………………..195 Figure 5.5 – 2-mode Pisan social network after Meloria……………………………………….196 Figure 5.6 – 2-mode Pisan social network in 1272……………………………………………..198 Figure 5.7 – 2-mode Pisan social network in 1301……………………………………………..199 ix Introduction During the eleventh century, the city of Pisa led numerous naval coalitions aimed at ridding the western Mediterranean Sea of Muslim pirates.1 The continuation of this effort in the Levantine crusades brought the commune to the apogee of its economic and political power.2 Despite this ascendant trajectory, Pisan fortunes rapidly declined during the thirteenth century. By 1324 the city scarcely exerted influence beyond Tuscany. On its surface, Pisa’s sudden fall appears perplexing given the sustained economic growth experienced by Genoa, Venice, and Florence during the thirteenth century. Historians have offered various explanations for the city’s decline, but none satisfactorily account for the numerous variables at play. However, combining traditional historiographical techniques with new data-analytic methods permits us to gaze deeper into the underlying issues that brought about the city’s ruin. The eleventh-century rise of Pisa was largely a product of a pro-active defensive strategy to combat the depredations of Muslim pirates upon the city and the shipping activities of its merchants. Pisans took it upon themselves to become the protectors of the Christian coastal communities with which the city’s merchants traded along the western coast of Italy. This protection took the form of repeated raiding expeditions against Muslim pirate bases across the western Mediterranean. These raids brought great wealth to the commune, weakened commercial competition at sea, and elevated the city’s prestige internationally. In the twelfth century, as the crusading movement swept eastward, Pisans adopted a new strategy dependent upon establishing expatriate communities and securing permanent commercial privileges in major ports. With the 1 Enrica Salvatori, "Lo spazio economico di Pisa: dall' XI alla metà del XII," Bullettino dell'Istituto Storico Italiano per il Medio Evo 115 (2013): 126. 2 Matthew E. Parker, "Pisan Migration Patterns along Twelfth Century Eastern Mediterranean Trade Routes," in Papacy, Crusade, and Christian-Muslim Relations, ed. Jessalynn Bird (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2018), 97-116. 1 establishment of the Latin Levant came preferential access to the spice and silk trade connecting Europe to the Far East. It was participation in this trade which brought Pisa to the height of its power and influence by 1200. The city would not enjoy this position long, as it began to deteriorate as the thirteenth century progressed. Most scholars agree that the Pisan naval defeat to the Genoese at the Battle of Meloria on 6 August 1284 was an important element in the story of Pisa’s decline. Gioacchino Volpe, the most influential historian of Pisa at the turn of the twentieth century, claimed that the loss at Meloria interrupted the city’s seafaring tradition as the rise of the bourgeoisie had already enfeebled the nobility which now bore the brunt of the naval disaster, though it was the loss of Sardinia in 1324 that definitively ended it.3 Giuseppe Rossi-Sabatini modified Volpe’s thesis several decades later, asserting that Pisa had peaked around 1200 and spent the rest of the century defending its position, with Meloria marking the end, not the beginning, of the city’s decline.4 Emilio Cristiani was the first to substantially counter Volpe’s theses in his landmark work, Nobiltà e popolo nel commune di Pisa. He disproved the former Marxist interpretation of Pisan history and, agreeing with Rossi-Sabatini’s estimation that decline was already several decades in the making, argued that the closure of Tuscan markets due to constant factional warfare would have been just as damaging to Pisa’s economy as the loss of overseas territory (from Acre to Cagliari).5 A decade later, Marco Tangheroni took the novel stance that Meloria was not as detrimental to Pisa as once believed. He conceded that the defeat was harmful, 3 Gioacchino Volpe, "Pisa, Firenze, Impero al principio del Trecento e gli inizi della Signoria civile in Pisa," Studi Storici 11 (1902): 200-201, 314. 4 Giuseppe Rossi-Sabatini, L'espansione di Pisa nel Mediterraneo fino alla Meloria (1284) (Florence: Sansoni, 1935), 111. 5 Emilio Cristiani, Nobiltà e popolo nel comune di Pisa dalle origini del podestariato alla signoria dei Donoratico (Naples: Istituto italiano per gli studi storici in Napoli, 1962), 22, 60, 107, 137-160, 305-307, 320. 2 causing qualitative rather than a quantitative contraction in maritime trade, but that it was really the loss of Sardinia in 1324 that destroyed the communal economy by initiating a two-decade recession.6 The seven-hundredth anniversary of the Battle of Meloria spurred many scholars to revisit the episode and reassess its implications. Michel Balard used notarial registers from Famagusta, Cyprus to show that while Meloria did provoke the Pisan commune to reduce political intervention with the East, expatriate Pisan communities in those locales continued to conduct trade, only now divorced from interaction with the metropole.7 John Day similarly looked at Pisan involvement in the East, but concluded that the reduction in commercial treaty negotiation on the part of the commune could not be blamed for the city’s decline since Genoa exhibited an even greater reduction in government-backed treaty negotiation.8 However, Day’s proposition fails to account for Genoese communal establishment and defense of Genoese colonies in the East, something which Pisa never did. Maria Luisa Ceccarelli Lemut later added that Meloria was a sign, not a cause, of the Pisan crisis caused by the lesser dynamism and international initiative of the commune, exposing the sluggishness with which the city responded to changing realities.9 Paolo Malanima took a wider view of Pisan decline, building a more systemic view of the situation. He argued that geography had encouraged Pisa to become a seafaring mercantile city, 6 Marco Tangheroni, Politica, commercio, agricoltura a Pisa nel Trecento, 2nd ed. (Pisa: Edizioni Plus, 2003), 77, 80-82. 7 Michel Balard, "Génois et Pisans en Orient (fin du XIIIe - début du XIVe siècle)," in Genova, Pisa e il Mediterraneo tra Due e Trecento: per il VII centenario della Battaglia della Meloria, Genova, 24-27 Ottobre 1984, Atti della Società ligure di storia patria, nuova serie 24.2 (Genoa: Società Ligure di Storia Patria, 1984), 208. 8 John Day, The Medieval Market Economy (Oxford: B. Blackwell, 1987), 168. 9 Maria Luisa Ceccarelli Lemut, "Pisa nel Mediterraneo durante il XIII secolo," Bollettino Storico Pisano 75 (2006): 18. 3 while simultaneously leading Florence to be more industrial and focus on regional trade.10 Though this circumstance initially brought great prosperity to Pisa, it limited the extent to which it could grow. Furthermore, he argued, because industrial communities are more resilient against market oscillations and their wealth is not concentrated in a few key individuals, the state of nearly constant warfare in thirteenth-century Tuscany was much more damaging to Pisa than to Florence (or the other industrial Guelf cities). In the end, he posited that Genoa and Florence prospered because they enjoyed considerably more advantages than Pisa (many ultimately determined by geography) and, consequently, Meloria was a non-issue because Pisa had already lost the commercial struggle against Genoa before it happened.11 The broadening of scope by Malanima was soon followed by Geo Pistarino, who argued for a multiplicity of causes for Pisa’s fall. He attributed the decline to the local ascendancy of Florence, the incredibly advantageous position of Genoa, the Aragonese capture of Sardinia, the shifting of trade routes to the Black Sea and Atlantic Ocean, as well as the shift of focus among the Pisan communal magnates from the sea to the land.12 Michael Mitterauer and John Morrissey incorporated and expanded upon Pistarino’s list, adding internal power struggles and rising social tensions, even though they claimed that Meloria did not significantly damage the economy.13 Though scholarship has trended toward a more encompassing description of the detrimental forces acting upon Pisa in the decades surrounding the turn of the fourteenth century, 10 Paolo Malanima, "La formazione di una regione economica: la Toscana nei secoli XIII-XV," Società e storia 20, no. 1983 (1983): 241, 251. 11 "Pisa and the Trade Routes to the Near East in the Late Middle Ages," Journal of European Economic History 16 (1987): 356. 12 Geo Pistarino, "Politica ed economia del Mediterraneo nell'età della Meloria," Atti della Società Ligure di Storia Patria 98, no. 2 (1984): 44. 13 Michael Mitterauer and John Morrissey, Pisa nel medioevo: potenza sul mare e motore di cultura (Rome: Viella, 2015), 197-198. 4 most studies have been merely descriptive, failing to venture into the underlying origins of the causes of decline. Even when deeper examination does occur, as in the case of Malanima or Ceccarelli Lemut, the focus is narrow, excluding other contributing factors. Political isolation, for example, was economically damaging. But what caused the political isolation? At the close of the thirteenth century, Genoa and Florence enjoyed numerous economic and political advantages. But why was Pisa unable to share in those advantages? Pisa suffered from a lack of dynamism, slower to respond to shifting economic realities than most cities, but why? Although the present study is concerned with what caused Pisa’s decline, it is equally concerned with the “why” behind those causes. As Meloria is often cited as a cause, or at least of contributor, of Pisan decline, significant attention is paid to the event and its aftermath, including for the first time a data-intensive study of the defeat’s socio-economic impact, gleaned from notarial records. The first chapter of this study looks to the first half of the thirteenth century for early causes of Pisan decline. The numerous contributing factors fall generally into four categories that persist throughout the remainder of the century to varying extents. First, long-standing Pisan allegiance to the imperial standard brought commercial privileges in Sicily at the price of political isolation in Tuscany. Though not initially detrimental, the continuation of this trend turned Pisa into a lightning rod for anti-imperial factional violence and later left Pisa militarily stranded when the imperial throne was vacant. Second, the territorial ambitions for Sardinia of the high nobility manifested in the manipulation of the lower classes to sway communal policy to increasingly focus on the island. Third, this trend ultimately backfired as the commune experienced deep and continuous political instability as various factions vied for control. Ultimately, the lower classes overthrew the old regime but continued to fight Genoa for insular control. Lastly, the above issues all contributed to escalated tensions with Genoa and the Guelf 5 cities of Tuscany. Consequently, Pisa was usually at war with at least one foe, damaging access to markets on land and across the sea while the Mediterranean commercial landscape began a fundamental transformation. Chapter two focuses on Pisa during the thirty years past mid-century, continuing the examination of the previous chapter’s themes. The imperial affinity cost the commune privileged access to Sicily and rallied the city’s neighbors against her upon the arrival of Charles of Anjou, severely damaging the Pisan contado. Economic changes in the Mediterranean Basin brought about a northward shift in maritime trade routes from the Syrian coast to the Black Sea, where Genoa and soon Venice were heavily invested but Pisa was not. A similar shift occurred in the West as the woolens industry superseded the spice trade in importance, belatedly causing a profound restructuring of the communal government after the corporatization movement enabled the popolo to replace the old consular aristocracy. The several years surrounding the Battle of Meloria (i.e. the 1280s) form the focus of the third chapter. The first half of the chapter details the events leading up to the battle and the battle itself, including the immediate aftermath following the catastrophe. The remainder of the chapter examines the years of Ugolino della Gherardesca’s semi-tyrannical lordship of the city (12841288). Ugolino’s consolidation of power created the precedent for later attempts to concentrate political power within the hands of a few individuals. The constitutional changes enacted by Ugolino weakened the representative authority of the city magistrates while also highlighting the path through which later potentates could appropriate political control of the city. The divergence of Ugolino’s (and Nino Visconti’s) interests from those of the populace finally resulted in the overthrow and imprisonment of the lord. The rebellion exiled several powerful families bound to the Visconti and della Gherardesca clans, leading them to join forces with Genoa and the Guelf 6 League who were prosecuting a successful campaign which destroyed the vitally important Porto Pisano and the Pisan contado. Chapter four returns to a quadripartite categorization for factors of Pisan decline during the final decade of the thirteenth century, though the categories differ from the first chapter. External politics played a major role in Pisa’s waning health. First, though Pisan podestà Guido da Montefeltro was successful militarily, the treaties with the Guelf League and with Genoa contained harsh terms for Pisa. Second, the rebellion of 1288 brought the commune into direct conflict with the della Gherardesca and Visconti clans for control over Sardinia. As soon as this struggle was decided in Pisa’s favor Pope Boniface VIII granted the entire island to James II of Aragon, setting the stage for the eventual conquest of the island in 1324. Third, following the removal of Guido da Montefeltro, the Anziani ruling council began consolidating power, gradually insulating themselves from potential political rivals and once again separating the direction of the commune from the interests of the populace. Lastly, a variety of economic factors coalesced to weaken Pisa’s position, especially the fall of Acre and the rise to regional supremacy of the gold florin and the silver gros tournois. The fifth chapter departs from a chronological and narrative approach to conduct quantitative and social network analyses on notarial registers from the decades surrounding Meloria. This focused study reveals some of the deeper socio-economic ramifications of the traumatic defeat and the communal decisions taken in subsequent years. In short, the data shows that Pisans had grown quite risk averse following Meloria, causing a contraction in the money supply and a credit draught. These factors, exacerbated by social network fragmentation, forced the city into a prolonged economic depression. This chapter is followed by a final one which 7 provides a synthesis of the study’s conclusions and illustrates how the trends which contributed to Pisa’s fall continued well into the fourteenth century. Methods & Sources To address the problem of Pisan decline, I have endeavored to approach the issue through a variety of methods. When dealing with how Pisa fared over more than a century I have attempted to take a somewhat traditional historiographic approach to the extant narrative and archival sources. It would be impossible to recount them all here, but I typically drew from the works of Pisan, Genoese, Florentine, and Lucchese chroniclers, supplemented by the occasional papal letter or chancery document when the papacy or treaties were involved. The latest or most highly regarded edited editions were given preference. When a source was not available in print, reference was made to archival collections. However, narrative and chancery sources are documents filled with bias, composed with specific intentions in mind. To provide a more objective view of Pisa over time, this study regularly examines Pisan material culture. Whether it be the architectural legacy that persists to the present day or the numismatic evidence unearthed in archaeological surveys, physical objects are capable of confirming or refuting contemporary claims about Pisa’s political position and economic vitality. Additionally, geographical surveys offer an important window into the history of earthworks created and maintained (or not) by the city. By employing such a variety of approaches and sources over such a lengthy period, this study provides a more wholistic picture of Pisa’s decline. When compared to its rivals, the survival rate for documents from the thirteenth century is particularly poor for Pisa. However, the existence of notarial registers from the decades surrounding the battle of Meloria permit a novel approach to this study’s central problem. In 8 recent years, social network analysis (SNA) has become more popular as a tool for historians for its ability to reveal the underlying structures within a society. By looking at this structure and how it changed over time, as I have done in the fifth chapter of this work, one can reinterpret contemporary events to uncover the deeper effects upon a given society. By combining this technique with quantitative analysis of the economic data present in the notarial registers, I have uncovered a previously unknown economic depression resultant from the loss at Meloria. The specific application of these methods will be dealt with in more detail in chapter 5 and in appendix A. The analysis contained in the fifth chapter of the present study relies almost entirely upon the extant registers of two brothers and business partners, Ugolino and Bartolomeo di Iacopo di Carraia Gonnelle.14 These brothers inherited the notarial business of their father, Iacopo, and operated in the Kinzica neighborhood of Pisa on the southern side of the Arno. Kinzica was a relatively new neighborhood, having grown into being during the twelfth century population boom, and was dominated by merchants, warehouses, and the various newer industries.15 The notarial registers from the years 1272, 1283, 1284, and 1301 (and then typically the months April-September) provided the data for analysis. Although the registers of a few other notaries during this period exist, as do registers from Ugolino and Bartolomeo for some months and years beyond what was studied, these were excluded with the intention of eliminating biases and improving the comparability between the years. Though I took a whole network approach to my study, notarial registers are egocentric by nature in that they only reveal the economic activities of those who came to Ugolino or 14 ASPi, Ospedale di Santa Chiara, no. 2067, 2070, 2071; M. Luisa Sirolla, "Un registro di imbreviature del notaio ser Ugolino di Carraia Gonnelle 1272-1274 (Archivio di Stato di Pisa, Fondo Ospedali di S. Chiara, reg. no. 2067)" (Ph.D. dissertation, Università degli Studi di Pisa, 1976). 15 Cristiani, 164. 9 Bartolomeo for document drafting. Thus, introducing the registers of other notaries to my data set would likely skew any results unless those notaries happened to have registers survive in number and chronological distribution comparable to those of the aforementioned brothers. As it stands, the brothers were the only Pisan notaries to have sizeable registers survive from before, during, and after the Battle of Meloria. Additionally, though the brother’s registers contain documents from outside the stated months and years in question, approximately April-September was the only period which consistently appears in all the years examined. Some years contained documents from late autumn or winter, others did not. However, these months coincide with the medieval sailing and agricultural seasons which enjoyed the highest degree of economic activity.16 Despite these efforts to eliminate biases, there are nevertheless numerous variables that may potentially confound any attempt to produce a true picture of Pisan society. In particular, the representativeness of the sources presents a difficult problem. Because the work of only two notaries is under study here, sampling bias is a valid concern. The geographic location of their notary shop, who the brothers knew personally, whether the brothers specialized in only certain types of documents or customers, whether they kept multiple registers simultaneously for different document categories, the number of notaries concurrently operating in Pisa and their geographic distribution throughout it, etc. all confound my ability to say with certainty that my dataset perfectly represents all of Pisan society. But this is the nature of all historical research; a scholar must work with the sources at their disposal. Fortunately, some of these fears can be immediately assuaged. There is no indication that medieval notaries kept more than one running 16 Abraham L. Udovitch, "Time, the Sea and Society: Duration of Commercial Voyages on the Southern Shores of the Mediterranean during the High Middle Ages," in La navigazione mediterranea nell'alto Medioevo, Settimane di studio del Centro italiano di studi sull'alto Medioevo 25 (Spoleto: Centro italiano di studi sull'alto Medioevo, 1978), 513-514, 530-532. 10 register at a time, nor that the brothers specialized in only a select few types of documents.17 The fact that the brothers lived and worked in Kinzica, the economic center of the city, supports the notion that their records are representative of the wider community as most Pisan notaries would be operating in the same district and most business would take place there. Though one can never be absolutely sure, based on these criteria it seems reasonable to assert that the data are significantly representative of Pisan society. Scholars must overcome numerous challenges when approaching thirteenth century documents, but one of the most daunting is surely the irregularity of naming practices. Name spelling inconsistencies have frustrated many scholars, though fortunately in this case having the study confined to the works of two brothers has drastically reduced (but not eliminated) the variability apparent within the documents. Efforts have been made to normalize the spelling of the more common names when possible, including some of the most frequent nicknames (e.g. “Giovanni” from “Vanni”). Another issue was determining when documents referred to already known individuals versus distinct ones. When fully descriptive appellations or overt connections were not available, I required the alignment of multiple variables to confirm a connection (filiation, profession, parish, location of origin, etc.). There were undoubtedly many instances where the available information was insufficient to permit me to connect mentions of the same person, but I have tried as best I can. Consequently, the analysis has pushed the network described in chapter five further towards fragmentation than would have actually been the case, but this phantom fragmentation should apply equally to all periods here under study. A further problem was associating people with noble or popolo houses. When these ties were not explicitly mentioned, I utilized family relationship information provided by the documents themselves to 17 The breadth of document types suggests that they provided notarial services for all occasions as needed. 11 connect some individuals to known houses. As for the determination of what makes a house a member of the nobility or of the popolo, I have tried to rely upon the work of previous scholars when possible.18 Any family names that were not clearly identified with the nobility were combined with the known popolo families. However, any attempt to solidly assign a family to either camp is tenuous at best, as Emilio Cristiani has made clear that in the thirteenth century the boundary between such distinctions was a fluid one.19 In all cases, I have tried to adhere to modern Italian spellings for Italian persons and Anglicized spellings for all other individuals throughout the present study. —— · —— The precipitous decline of Pisan economic and political vitality in the thirteenth century has been a troubling and contentious topic for historians, stubbornly refusing to yield satisfying answers. The work of previous scholars has gone a long way towards providing insights into the decline, but none have grasped the entirety of the situation. It is my hope that by standing on the shoulders of those who have come before me and approaching the sources within a matrix of traditional and innovative methods, this study can reveal the defects and trends that led to the fall of one of the West’s first capitalist states. 18 Cristiani; Laura Ticciati, L'ordine dei mercante a Pisa nei secoli XII-XIII (Pisa: ETS, 1992); Enrica Salvatori, La popolazione pisana nel Duecento: il patto di alleanza di Pisa con Siena, Pistoia e Poggibonsi del 1228 (Pisa: GISEM : Edizioni ETS, 1994); Alma Poloni, Trasformazioni della società e mutamenti delle forme politiche in un Comune italiano: il Popolo a Pisa (1220-1330) (Pisa: ETS, 2006). 19 Cristiani, 74. 12 Chapter 1 - Betting on the Empire (1198-1250s) At the beginning of the thirteenth century Pisa had reached the zenith of its historical power, both commercially and politically, rivaling Venice and surpassing Genoa.1 The commune enjoyed favorable trading privileges in Constantinople, Alexandria, Acre, and other secondary Christian ports in the Levant and even maintained sizeable permanent communities within these cities. Pisans were also the dominant Christian traders in the eastern Maghreb (specifically in the coastal regions of modern Algeria and Tunisia), and continued to expand their involvement there over the course of the thirteenth century. Closer to home, Pisans had long maintained commercial privileges in the Mediterranean crossroads of Sicily and had mostly defended their dominance of Corsica and Sardinia against the ambitions of the Genoese.2 For most of the twelfth century Pisa was touted as the principal city of Tuscany due to its commercial and military might, though neighboring Florence was industrializing and grew rapidly in the later portion of the century. And yet, little more than a century later, Pisa was a regional power at best, incapable of maritime control even within the Tyrrhenian Sea and politically isolated in Tuscany as Florence continued to dominate the region and encroach upon Pisa’s contado. Another century on, Florence conquered Pisa outright in 1406. Why did Pisan importance decline so rapidly while Genoa, Venice, and Florence continued to grow and prosper for centuries to come? How could two centuries of consistent political and commercial ascendancy be mirrored so perfectly by two centuries of diminution? 1 On the twelfth century ascendency of Pisa, see Parker, 97-116; William Heywood, A History of Pisa: Eleventh and Twelfth Centuries (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1921). On the secondary position of Genoa, see Malanima, "Pisa and the Trade Routes to the Near East in the Late Middle Ages." 2 The intermittent Pisan-Genoese struggles for these islands date back to the eleventh century. Pisa’s dominant position began a slow process of erosion with the 1195 Genoese seizure of the strategically located Corsican port of Bonifacio. This seizure essentially ended what later came to be called, almost mythically, the pax pisana. 13 The answers to these questions, predictably, are multifaceted and often consist of a combination of incorrect decisions and poor luck. Earlier scholars have looked at the catastrophic defeat at Meloria in 1284 as the main culprit for Pisan decline;3 while others view the event as symptomatic of deeper problems.4 This study contends that the root causes of Pisa’s decline are found in four general categories in the first half of the thirteenth century. First, Pisa had long maintained a close connection with the German emperors in order to improve access to Sicilian ports and this policy extended throughout the thirteenth century. This policy increasingly isolated Pisa within Tuscany and drew the ire of the papacy. Second, although the commune of Pisa had fought for influence over Sardinia since at least 1015,5 the Sardinian ambitions of the Pisan Visconti family would permanently change the role of the commune vis-à-vis the island from that of protector and chief commercial partner to that of overlord, which in turn necessitated a shifting of political priorities within the communal government. Third, and closely related, the first half of the thirteenth century witnessed substantial communal government experimentation and reorganization which resulted in alterations to Pisan foreign policies and a gradual redistribution of power to a broader spectrum of citizens. Finally, for most of the thirteenth century Pisa was engaged in warfare against Genoa, the Guelf League (led by Florence), or both. Though Pisans generally prevailed over the Genoese during the first half of the century, the prolonged conflict jeopardized commerce in the numerous ports frequented by the merchants of both communes and further calcified the deep-rooted civic animosity each city held for the other. Similarly, the staunchly Ghibelline stance of Pisa against 3 Adolf Schaube, Das Konsulat des Meeres in Pisa: ein Beitrag zur Geschichte des Seewesens, der Handelsgilden und des Handelsrechts im Mittelalter (Leipzig: Duncker & Humblot, 1888), 18-19; Volpe, 314. 4 One of the earliest scholars to take this stance was Giuseppe Rossi-Sabatini. Rossi-Sabatini, 111. 5 Bernardo Maragone, "Gli Annales Pisani," ed. Michele Lupo Gentile, Rerum Italicarum Scriptores, 2nd ser., 6.2 (Bologna: Nicola Zanichelli, 1936), 4. 14 an increasingly Guelf Tuscany not only politically isolated the commune, depriving the city of potential local military allies, but also repeatedly robbed Pisan merchants of unimpeded access to regional markets and industries, often encouraging inland cities to seek alternative ports. All of this took place amid a fundamental restructuring of the Mediterranean commercial landscape. Commerce, Genoa, and the Guelf League COMMERCE & GENOA Pisa had reached the apogee of its commercial vitality by the turn of the thirteenth century, and the commune’s good fortune soon diminished as the century progressed. Over the course of the twelfth century, Pisa had expanded its commercial empire by exploiting the ports of the Eastern Mediterranean, primarily Constantinople, Acre, and Alexandria, as well as Tunis in the West. Despite difficulties, Pisan trade in these Eastern markets remained vibrant in 1200.6 The fall of Constantinople to the Fourth Crusade gave Venetian merchants a considerable advantage in Byzantine markets, and it would not be until 1 April 1207 that we find evidence of Latin Emperor Henry I (r. 1205-16) recognizing Pisan privileges.7 However, damage to the Pisan quarter during the crusade was extensive, limiting its reconstruction and consequently reducing the colony’s ecclesiastical revenues, which Catherine Otten-Froux has interpreted as a reduced Pisan presence in the city.8 Otten-Froux’s conclusions appear to be correct as we have evidence 6 Parker, 114-116. Giuseppe Müller, ed. Documenti sulle relazioni delle citta Toscane coll'Oriente cristiano e coi turchi fino all'anno MDXXXI (Florence: M. Cellini, 1879), 86-87 doc. 55. For more on the Fourth Crusade, see also Donald E. Queller and Thomas F. Madden, The Fourth Crusade: The Conquest of Constantinople (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1997); Thomas F. Madden, Enrico Dandolo & the Rise of Venice (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University, 2003). 8 Catherine Otten-Froux, "Les Pisans en Orient, de la première croisade à 1406" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Paris I, 1982), 149-157; "Identities and Allegiances: The Perspective of Genoa and Pisa," in Identities and allegiances in the eastern Mediterranean after 1204, ed. Guillaume Saint-Guillain and Judith Herrin (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2011), 256-257. 7 15 of Venetian and Genoese merchants expanding their presence in the Black Sea at this time while such evidence for Pisan traders is comparatively limited.9 This should perhaps not be surprising as the Fourth Crusade gave Venice political and commercial advantages within the Byzantine Empire with which the Serenissima’s rivals could not hope to compete. By at least 1231, Genoa allied herself with the Greek emperor in Nicaea in hopes of counterbalancing Venetian dominance of the Aegean and access to the Black Sea. Although the alliance between Emperor Frederick II and the Greek Emperor of Nicaea, John III Dukas Vatatzes (r. 1222-54), gave Pisan merchants de jure good relations with the Nicaeans, there is little evidence that they exploited the commercial potential of this arrangement to any degree, instead focusing on southerly ports.10 Pisan merchants had long dominated African ports from Egypt to Tunis, raising larger colonies and obtaining more privileges than other European commercial cities. The Fifth Crusade, however, dramatically altered this state of affairs. The capture of Damietta in 1218 initiated a few years of freer trade for Italian merchants, but the catastrophic defeat of the crusaders in 1221 resulted in the lengthy expulsion of all Europeans. Only in February 1229, when Frederick II and the Ayyubid Sultan al-Malik al-Kāmil signed the Treaty of Jaffa, did Pisans regain access to Egypt which would remain nominally in place until the end of the century, though the evidence suggests that trade with Egypt progressively diminished over the course of the thirteenth century.11 At the other end of the African littoral, Pisans had dominated 9 For the limited Pisan evidence, see Patrick Gautier-Dalché, Carte marine et portulan au XIIe siècle: le Liber de existencia riveriarum et forma maris nostri Mediterranei (Pise, circa 1200) (Paris: École française de Rome, 1995), 138-141; David Jacoby, "Pisan Presence and Trade in Later Byzantium," in Koinotaton Doron: Das späte Byzanz zwischen Machtlosigkeit und kultureller Blüte (1204–1461), ed. Albrecht Berger, et al. (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2016), 53. 10 Erasmo Merendino, "Federico II e Giovanni III Vatatzes," in Byzantino-Sicula II: Miscellanea di scritti in memoria di Giuseppe Rossi Taibbi (Palermo: 1975). 11 Müller, 97-98 doc. 66; Rossi-Sabatini, 18; Karl-Heinz Allmendinger, "Die Beziehungen Zwischen der Kommune Pisa und Ägypten im Hohen Mittelalter. Eine Rechts- und Wirtschaftshistorische Untersuchung," Vierteljahrschrift für Sozial- und Wirtschaftsgeschichte 54 (1967): 76-78; Robert-Henri Bautier, "Les relations économiques des occidentaux avec les pays d'Orient, au Moyen Age: points de vue et documents," in Sociétés et compagnies de 16 trade with Maghrebi ports since the late eleventh century. Late in the twelfth century we find the first commercial treaty here, between the Almohad caliph Abū Yūsuf Ya‘qūb al-Manṣūr (r. 1184-99) and Pisa, renewed in 1210 by an-Nāṣir (r. 1199-1213).12 Pisan control of the region would remain unquestioned throughout the thirteenth century, and it seems that the commune gradually increased the intensity of this trade during the early decades, though the dearth of documentation makes it difficult to confidently quantify it in relation to other destinations. Certainly by at least 1234 the Pisan presence in North Africa had greatly increased, resulting in a treaty with the Hafsid Emir, Abu Zakariya Yahya (r. 1229-49), whereby Pisa was granted a fondaco in all the principal cities of the region: Tunis, Bougie, Bona, Gabes, Sfax, Mahdia, and Tripoli.13 It seems reasonable to assume that the expulsions from Byzantine and Ayyubid territories encouraged a certain percentage of Pisan traders to move their business to these western ports, especially as this was precisely the period in which Pisan interests in Sardinia—an important stop on the way to Tunis—were enlarging. Sicily has long been the crossroads of the Mediterranean, and consequently its markets have always been of vital importance. Perhaps the biggest advantage of Pisa’s steadfast loyalty to the Hohenstaufen emperors was the guarantee of commercial privileges in Sicilian ports. In practice these privileges might not have been as extensive as initially promised, but they usually gave Pisans an advantage over the Genoese, who alternately allied with and opposed the German emperors. commerce en Orient et dans l'Océan Indien: Actes du huitième Colloque International d'Histoire Maritime (Beyrouth, 5-10 sept. 1966), ed. Michel Mollat (Paris: SEVPEN, 1970), 272; Ceccarelli Lemut, 12. 12 Michele Amari, ed. I diplomi arabi del R. Archivio Fiorentino (Florence: Felice Le Monnier, 1863), 17-22 doc. 5; Ottavio Banti, "I trattati tra Pisa e Tunisi dal XII al XIV secolo: Lineamenti di storia dei rapporti di Pisa con il Maghreb," in L'Italia ed i paesi Mediterranei: vie di communicazione e scambi commerciali e culturali al tempo delle Repubbliche Marianare: atti del Convegno Internazionale di Studi, Pisa, 6-7 Giugno 1987 (Pisa: Nistri-Lischi & Pacini, 1988), 57. 13 Amari, 292-294 doc. 28; Banti, 57-60. 17 Despite amenable relations with Catalonia stretching back to at least the Balearic Crusade of 1113-1115,14 there is little evidence that Pisan merchants maintained any appreciable presence in Iberian ports. This was likely due to an 1167 treaty (and others in the following decades) between Genoa and Alfonso II of Aragon (r. 1164-96) whereby Pisans were excluded from Tortosa and Nice.15 Although the Genoese-Pisan peace of 1188 permitted Pisans back into Catalan ports, there is little evidence for their presence until a century later. Even in the thirteenth century Pisans are found in the Balearic Islands only following King James I (r. 121376) of Aragon’s 1229 reconquest of the islands.16 Instead, Genoa had come to dominate trade along the entire Spanish coastline and even into Morocco. In terms of naval and commercial expansion, Genoa lagged behind Pisa throughout the eleventh and twelfth centuries. Consequently, Genoese merchants were often forced to develop secondary markets (Spain, Provence, Morocco, Tyre, Corsica, Nicaea, etc.) as Venetians and Pisans dominated the primary markets (Constantinople, Acre, Egypt, Tunis, Sardinia, etc.). The Genoese also traded in the principal markets, yet in the twelfth century they had to seek alternative markets to compete commercially against the other communes that enjoyed a longer history of maritime activity.17 Genoa prevailed over Pisa in a heated war for commercial control of the French Midi in 1162-1170, further encouraging Pisa to focus its attention on southern 14 Matthew E. Parker, "Pisa, Catalonia, and Muslim Pirates: Intercultural Exchanges in the Balearic Crusade of 1113–1115," Viator 45, no. 2 (2014): 77-100. 15 Ercole Riccoti, ed. Liber iurium reipublicae genuensis, 2 vols., Historiae Patriae Monumenta 7, 9 (Turin: Ex officina regia, 1854-7), 1: col. 227-228; Cesare Imperiale di Sant' Angelo, ed. Codice diplomatico della repubblica di Genova, 3 vols., Fonti per la storia d'Italia 77, 79 & 89 (Rome: Tipografia del Senato, 1936), 2: doc. 25; María Teresa Ferrer i Mallol, "Els italians a terres catalanes (segles XII-XV)," Anuario de estudios medievales 10 (1980): 448. 16 The earliest commercial privileges are from 8 August 1233. Enrica Salvatori, Boni amici et vicini: le relazioni tra Pisa e le città della Francia meridionale dall'XI alla fine del XIII secolo (Pisa: ETS, 2002), 249-51 doc. 26; David Abulafia, A Mediterranean Emporium: The Catalan Kingdom of Majorca (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 112-113, 162, 170-172. 17 Malanima, "Pisa and the Trade Routes to the Near East in the Late Middle Ages," 342. 18 ports. This was a watershed moment, for this gave Genoa “privileged access to the rapidly expanding hinterlands of France and Flanders” at a critical transitional period in consumer preferences.18 By a simple twist of fate the ports that were less desirable in the twelfth century were among the most lucrative of the thirteenth century due to the rise of the woolens trade, giving Genoa an enormous economic advantage over Pisa. Not long after the war, it seems that the largest of the coastal Provençal cities became proactively commercial in their own right, attempting to compete on the Mediterranean stage against the Italian traders upon whom they had previously depended.19 This development hinged predominantly upon the twelfth-century growth of the Champagne fairs as an important commercial destination and the growing importance of Marseilles as the principal port of departure for French crusaders to the Levant. Enrica Salvatori’s in-depth study of PisanProvençal relations during this period reveals a consistent pattern of French towns signing contemporaneous treaties with both Pisa and Genoa, granting commercial privileges and refusing to aid the other’s enemies in war. Marseilles in particular enjoyed a lengthy and close relationship with Pisa, though there is surprisingly little evidence of Pisans actually trading in Marseilles. Salvatori suggests that these pacts developed from the long-standing practice of Pisans negotiating commercial treaties on behalf of all Tuscan merchants who desired to sail under her banner.20 Pisan commerce was principally a transit trade,21 so the decision to seek commercial privileges in ports where Pisan traders would not conduct business of their own was intended to entice other Tuscan merchants to book passage on Pisan ships. 18 Ibid. Salvatori, Boni amici et vicini: le relazioni tra Pisa e le città della Francia meridionale dall'XI alla fine del XIII secolo, 93. 20 Ibid., 153-154. 21 Cristiani, 22. 19 19 The transit trade upon which Pisa’s maritime empire was built mostly involved moving spices, silks, food stuffs and raw materials westward and northward while sending money, crusaders, and Tuscan merchants in the opposite direction. The system worked quite well, enabling Pisa to become one of the most powerful Mediterranean forces by the end of the twelfth century, but it was vulnerable to changing consumer demand, the shifting of trade routes, and the vicissitudes of regional political dynamics, all of which characterize the early thirteenth century. Though the Champagne fairs had been steadily increasing in size and commercial reputation throughout the twelfth century, it was the rise of the woolens trade in the later decades that solidified the importance of routes that connected Flanders to the Mediterranean. Already by the turn of the thirteenth century, numerous northern Italian towns (especially Florence) were ramping up their own woolens industries. At this point Flanders still out-produced Italy in woolens, and merchants found healthy demand for these textiles in Spain, the Levant, and Italy.22 Pisa had traditionally been a manufacturer of iron and leather goods, perhaps explaining why the commune’s Arte della Lana did not break from the Order of the Merchants until the 1260s. Already late to the cloth trade, Pisa had to content itself with producing cheaper woolens of inferior quality, since Florence had unquestioned supremacy in the production of fine woolens and Lucca had been the principal Tuscan producer of silks since the twelfth century. The rise of woolens resulted in two very important changes for the future of Pisan commercial vitality. First, the products of this new industry were quickly coming to dominate markets across the Mediterranean and hundreds of kilometers into the European interior. As demand increased for textiles, so did the prices they fetched, putting pressure on traders to 22 Henri Laurent, Un grand commerce d'exportation au moyen age. La draperie des Pays-Bas en France et dans les pays mediterraneens (XIIe-XVe siècle) (Paris: Librarie E. Droz, 1935), 73-79; Bautier, 141. 20 prioritize textiles over spices or other goods in their cargoes.23 Instead of spices, European traders gravitated increasingly towards importing the raw materials for textile production from Eastern ports. Second, the growing importance of textiles also necessitated alterations in the predominant trade routes. The easiest route to the Champagne fairs and Flanders was through the Rhône valley, thus the commercial rise of the French Midi cities in the late twelfth century can be directly tied to their role as gatekeepers to the French interior.24 In addition to France, Iberian markets also became increasingly important as both consumers of finished textiles and suppliers of raw wool. Genoa had the good fortune to have already developed Iberian markets, and its proximal location to Provence facilitated its textile trade. During the same period, high demand resulted in the development of new transalpine routes connecting the Piedmont to Champagne and Germany, expanding the markets to which Genoa and Venice could cater; due to geography, Pisa had no access to these overland routes.25 In general, Pisan traders were slow to respond to this commercial shift, reluctantly altering the composition of their cargoes and almost never venturing into the French interior, and so the commune’s place within the sphere of Mediterranean commerce was eclipsed by Genoa, Venice, and soon Florence. GUELFS AND GHIBELLINES On its own, the perpetual military struggles against Genoa would not have been overly burdensome for Pisa, but the commune’s firmly Ghibelline stance also brought it into conflict with its Tuscan neighbors and the papacy on a number of occasions. Other less mercantile 23 A sack of Flemish cloths quickly became worth 3-5 sacks of spices. 298-302; Malanima, "Pisa and the Trade Routes to the Near East in the Late Middle Ages," 351. 24 Salvatori, Boni amici et vicini: le relazioni tra Pisa e le città della Francia meridionale dall'XI alla fine del XIII secolo, 94. 25 Eliyahu Ashtor, "Il retroscena economico dell'urto genovese-pisano alla fine del Duecento," in Genova, Pisa e il Mediterraneo tra Due e Trecento: per il VII centenario della Battaglia della Meloria, Genova, 24-27 Ottobre 1984, Atti della Società ligure di storia patria, nuova serie 24.2 (Genoa: Società Ligure di Storia Patria, 1984), 62-64. 21 Tuscan communities were not as amenable to imperial hegemony, partially because they reaped few rewards from the imperial court. Consequently, the repeated descents into Italy of the German rulers worked to divide Italian cities into mutually inimical alliances, which gradually developed into the Guelf and Ghibelline struggle that characterized the thirteenth century. Pisa understandably fell within the Ghibelline camp while the longstanding enemies of Pisa, Lucca and Florence, became Guelf. Also, because Pisa was the most powerful Tuscan city in the Ghibelline camp, the city served as the locus for the execution of the imperial agenda and therefore also the target of Guelf attempts to stop it. In the twelfth century, Pisa fought with Lucca and Volterra over territorial matters as the communes expanded the bounds of their contadi further and further from their city walls. Florence also occasionally clashed with Pisa, but not to the extent it would in succeeding centuries. Almost all of these conflicts involved the various cities engaging individually. Following Frederick II’s coronation, the nature of the conflicts fundamentally changed. Beginning in 1220 Pisa faced coalitions of enemies, usually led by Florence or Lucca, and often combined with a Genoese alliance. Pisa, for its part, often benefitted from imperial assistance and, in progressively decreasing frequency, alliances with Siena, Poggibonsi, and Pistoia. Volpe justifiably asserted that the clash between Florence and Pisa was inevitable as both cities expanded their spheres of influence and Florence’s quickly maturing woolens industry heavily depended on the Arno for access to the sea.26 The dispute between Pisa and the Guelf cities became an unending struggle throughout the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, significantly damaging Pisa in multiple respects.27 26 Gioacchino Volpe, Studi sulle istituzioni comunali a Pisa : città e contado, consoli e podestà, sec. XII-XIII (Pisa: Tip. Succ. Fratelli Nistri, 1902), 355. 27 For the clashes from the first half of the thirteenth century, see Salvatore Bongi, "Cronichetta lucchese," Atti dell'Accademia lucchese di scienze, lettere ed arti 26 (1893): 231-233, 247-248, 250-253; "Fragmenta Historiae 22 The financial and demographic burden of waging war on multiple fronts—on land and at sea—decade after decade must have been significant. Pisa’s contado was simultaneously an economic asset and a military liability, leaving the city vulnerable to land-based attacks; the mountainous Ligurian interior precluded any such worries for Genoa. As Ghibelline allies disappeared over the decades, Pisa had to bear a growing percentage of the military costs of fighting against the Guelf League. Although not a hard and fast rule, the imperial leanings of Pisa also repeatedly brought the city into direct opposition with the papacy. Relations with the papacy had already been rocky under Pope Honorius III when the Visconti ambitions for Sardinia repeatedly defied papal wishes, as we shall see. After the Guelf League solidified, Honorius placed Pisa under interdict in 1223 for refusing to accept the Lucchese terms for peace which a papal legate had negotiated.28 This was but the first of many papal censures in the thirteenth century. In addition to the military expense and the alienation of the papacy, the factional strife in an increasingly Guelf Tuscany served to isolate Pisa in other regards. Constant warfare between Pisa and the other major cities of the region hampered commercial flows along the Arno. Tuscan merchants had grown accustomed to enjoying the privileges Pisans had secured in foreign ports, but Pisa was not the only Mediterranean power with a merchant fleet. In point of fact, the long- Pisanae," ed. Lodovico Antonio Muratori, Rerum Italicarum Scriptores, 1st ser., 24 (Milan: Societatis Palatinae, 1738), col. 644; Lorenzo Aulo Cecina and Flaminio Dal Borgo, Notizie istoriche della città di Volterra: alle quali si aggiunge la serie de' podestà, e capitani del popolo di essa (Pisa: Gio. Paolo Giovannelli, 1758), 23-24; Giovanni Villani, Nuova Cronica (Parma: Fondazione Pietro Bembo, 2007), 7:3; Cecilia Iannella, Cronica di Pisa: dal ms. Roncioni 338 dell'Archivio di Stato di Pisa, Fonti per la storia d'Italia medievale. Antiquitates 22 (Rome: Istituto Palazzo Borromini, 2005), 33, 37-39; Anton-Filippo Adami, ed. Cronica di Paolino Pieri Fiorentino delle cose d'Italia dall'anno 1080 fino all'anno 1305 (Rome: Giovanni Zempel, 1755), 17, 26-27; "Chronicon aliud breve Pisanum incerti ab anno MCI usque ad annum MCCLXVIII," ed. Michele Lupo Gentile, Rerum Italicarum Scriptores, 2nd ser., 6.2 (Bologna: Nicola Zanichelli, 1936), 108; Emilio Cristiani, "Gli avvenimenti pisani del periodo ugoliniano in una cronaca inedita," Bollettino Storico Pisano 26-7 (1957-8): 52; Luigi Tomaso Belgrano and Cesare Imperiale di Sant' Angelo, eds., Annali genovesi di Caffaro e de' suoi continuatori (secoli XII-XIII), 5 vols., Fonti per la toria d'Italia 11-14bis (Genoa: Tip. del R. Istituto sordo-muti, 1890-1929). 28 Pietro Pressutti, ed. Regesta Honorii papae III, iussu et munificentia Leonis XIII pontificis maximi ex vaticanis archetypis aliisque fontibus, 2 vols. (Rome: ex typographia Vaticana, 1888-1895), no. 4335. 23 standing animosity which had developed between Lucca and Pisa in the twelfth century resulted in Lucchese silk merchants preferring Genoese traders to transport their wares and supply raw materials.29 As documentation survival rates improve later in the century, the same story unfolds for other Guelf cities; Florentine textiles typically relied on overland transport to reach southern Italian markets or utilized Venetian ships to reach more distant shores.30 By its nature, warfare is disruptive of trade and the prolonged aspect and intensity of the conflict must have meant that the losses of potential profit for Pisan merchants and shipowners were staggering. Though warfare certainly also weighed on the finances of non-Pisan merchants, the Guelf League bound most of them together whereas no such local network existed for Pisa (except Siena, Arezzo, Pistoia and Poggibonsi at various times). Pisa had failed to form ties with the nascent manufacturing centers of Tuscany, a consequence of its isolation, and as commercial trends centered increasingly on industrialization this left Pisa without preferential access to the new Mediterranean economy. The Pisan economy still grew throughout the majority of the thirteenth century, as David Herlihy has shown, but its growth was far outpaced by that of its commercial rivals.31 The factional disputes deprived Pisa of a large portion of the transit trade upon which its economy was built while Genoa acquired many of Pisa’s former clients to accelerate its own unimpeded growth. This situation only worsened after Frederick II’s death in 1250 revivified the ambitions and resolve of the Guelf League, initiating a period of renewed 29 Malanima, "Pisa and the Trade Routes to the Near East in the Late Middle Ages," 354. Robert Davidsohn, Forschungen zur älteren Geschichte von Florenz, 4 vols. (Berlin: Ernst Siegfried Mittler und Sohn Bottega d'Erasmo, 1896-1908), 3: nn.135, 435, 549, 944, 948; Michel Balard, La Romanie génoise: XIIe-début du XVe siécle, 2 vols. (Rome: École française de Rome, 1978), 2:780, 836; Malanima, "Pisa and the Trade Routes to the Near East in the Late Middle Ages," 355; William R. Day, Jr., "Population Growth and Productivity: Ruralurban Migration and the Expansion of the Manufacturing Sector in Thirteenth Century Florence," in Labour and Labour Markets between Town and Countryside (Middle Ages-19th Century), ed. B. Blondé, E. Vanhaute, and Michèle Galand (Turnhout, Belgium: Brepols, 2001), 100-101. 31 David Herlihy, Pisa in the Early Renaissance: A Study of Urban Growth (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1958), p. IX and ch. 10. 30 24 conflict, though this time Pisa lacked a strong imperial ally while the Genoese more consistently joined forces with the Guelf coalition. DEMOGRAPHICS Another indicator of Pisan decline in the early thirteenth century comes from scholarship on demographics and the city’s archaeological legacy. Precise figures on the medieval population of Pisa are elusive, and various scholars have produced wildly different estimates for thirteenth-century Pisa ranging from 25,000 to 50,000.32 Consolidating the work of several scholars, William Day, Jr., convincingly contends that Pisan population growth plateaued around 1230 and remained relatively flat throughout the remainder of the century.33 Marco Tangheroni argues that the new popolo immigrated to Pisa at the beginning of the thirteenth century from the contado and that there was no such comparable influx in the latter half of the century to further disrupt the balance of power.34 Emilio Cristiani, despite supporting one of the larger population estimates, comments that the strongest evidence against dramatic late-century population growth was the fact that the 1155 city walls were never expanded (Florence expanded their walls in the 1170s and again in the 1280s).35 Studies by Fabio Redi and Gabriella Garzella indicate that the urban topography of the city underwent little alteration after the end of the twelfth century— there was no flurry of construction that one would expect with population growth.36 Florence, by 32 Emilio Cristiani believed that by the century’s end there were around 50,000 inhabitants while William Day contends that the actual figure was probably little over half that, having not grown appreciably since 1228 when Enrica Salvatori calculated a population of around 25,000. Cristiani, Nobiltà e popolo nel comune di Pisa dalle origini del podestariato alla signoria dei Donoratico, 166-173; Salvatori, La popolazione pisana nel Duecento: il patto di alleanza di Pisa con Siena, Pistoia e Poggibonsi del 1228, 109-123; Day, 91-92. 33 See especially Day’s footnotes. 91-92. 34 Marco Tangheroni, "Famiglie nobili e ceto dirigente a Pisa nel XIII secolo," in I ceti dirigenti dell'età comunale nei secoli XII e XIII (Pisa: Pacini, 1982), 335. 35 Cristiani, Nobiltà e popolo nel comune di Pisa dalle origini del podestariato alla signoria dei Donoratico, 162164. 36 Gabriella Garzella, Pisa com'era: topografia e insediamento: dall'impianto tardoantico alla città murata del secolo XII (Naples: GISEM Liguori, 1990), 242-243; Fabio Redi, Pisa com'era: archeologia, urbanistica e strutture materiali (secoli V-XIV) (Naples: GISEM Liguori, 1991), 140. 25 contrast, experienced a nearly tenfold increase in its urban population between the mid-twelfth century and the early fourteenth century, and likely already doubled the population of Pisa by 1250.37 The demographic stagnation of Pisa indicates economic weakening. The thirteenth century was a period of intensive urbanization and population growth for almost all northern Italian cities, which makes the Pisan situation all the more alarming. The tapering off of demographic growth at precisely the moment when Pisa’s troubles with the Guelf League escalated is highly suggestive of a connection between the two. Although Pisa was undoubtedly still an economic powerhouse at this point, its numerous military engagements on land and at sea surely strained the ability of the commune to replace the numerous adult males it lost annually. The commercial cost of political isolation would have reduced the appeal for potential immigrants seeking economic prospects. Florence, on the other hand, was leading the growing coalition of Guelf cities and was also rapidly expanding its woolens industry, creating numerous jobs perfectly suited for ambitious able-bodied adults from the Tuscan countryside (perhaps even those who lived near Pisa). The causes behind Florence’s attractiveness also held true to a lesser extent for many other Tuscan cities which continued to grow and expand. The intermittent excommunicate status of Pisa also would have deterred the more pious among the potential immigrants. In essence, Pisan demographic growth halted because the city’s policies made it an urbs non grata for a large portion of the mobile rural population. One final event that would come to fundamentally alter the structure of global commerce was the 1245 diplomatic mission sent by Pope Innocent IV to Güyük Khan (r. 1246-48), grandson of Genghis Khan, in hopes of pacifying the Mongol threat in preparation for a new call 37 Villani, vol. 1, bk. 6, ch. 8; Day, 82, 95-96. 26 to crusade.38 Güyük’s response was not warm, demanding the submission of the pope and all European monarchs in person, but at the very least it opened the door for future diplomacy.39 Following the ca.1250 Mamluk overthrow of the Ayyubid Sultanate, the neighboring Mongol Ilkhanate decided they no longer wished to supply the sultanate with slaves from the more northerly Khanate of the Golden Horde.40 Although the Golden Horde at this point had not fully embraced international trade, they had enjoyed the profits from supplying Egypt with slaves. Following the elimination of the overland route, the Golden Horde sought alternative avenues to continue commerce with Cairo. A few years later, the War of St. Sabas in the Crusader States witnessed the expulsion of the Genoese from Acre, the most important Crusader port.41 Many of these traders moved their business into the open arms of the Black Sea to take control of the Mongol slave trade.42 The 1261 alliance with Emperor Michael VIII Palaeologus of Nicaea (r. 1159-82) resulted in the restoration of Greek rule in Constantinople, along with the replacement of Venetian merchants with Genoese ones as the preferred vendors of the empire, ensuring Genoese commercial predominance within the Black Sea.43 For the rest of the Middle Ages, Eastern Mediterranean commerce would increasingly center on the Black Sea, leaving Egyptian and Syrian ports to diminish over several short decades. 38 Georg Heinrich Pertz and Karl Rodenberg, eds., Epistolae saeculi XIII e regestis pontificum Romanorum selectae, Monumenta Germaniae Historica, Epistolae 3 (Berlin: Weidmannos, 1883-1894), 2:72-75 doc. 102 & 105 39 Vatican Secret Archives, Vatican City, Inv. no. A. A., Arm. I-XVIII; Christopher Dawson, The Mongol Mission: Narratives and Letters of the Franciscan Missionaries in Mongolia and China in the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Centuries (London: Sheed & Ward, 1955), 75-76. 40 Ashtor, 73-74; Virgil Ciocîltan, The Mongols and the Black Sea Trade in the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Centuries, trans. Samuel P. Willcocks (Leiden: Brill, 2012), 61-95. 41 Pistarino, 27-28; Charles D. Stanton, Medieval Maritime Warfare (Barnsley, UK: Pen and Sword, 2015), 129. 42 On the late thirteenth-century spike in Genoese commerce with Egypt, see Steven Epstein, Genoa & the Genoese, 958-1528 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1996), 142. 43 Belgrano and Imperiale di Sant' Angelo, 6:79; Camillo Manfroni, "Le relazioni fra Genova, l'impero bizantino e i Turchi," Atti della Società ligure di storia patria 28 (1896): 791-809; "Chronicon aliud breve Pisanum incerti ab anno MCI usque ad annum MCCLXVIII," 108. 27 Changes in Government, Changes in Foreign Policy Pisa’s imperial and Sardinian relations during the first half of the thirteenth century greatly impacted, and were impacted by, considerable political experimentation and corporative movements within the city. Though it seems to have been an unintentional consequence of these shifts rather than a deliberate political program, these decades of change also altered the commercial maritime focus of the commune, weakening its ability to effectively respond to external changes in the political-economic landscape of the Mediterranean basin. The Pisan communal government was dominated by the old consular class at the end of the twelfth century, but the progressive organization of various sections of the population over successive decades significantly transformed the distribution of power. What began with merchant-artisan guilds forming to protect commercial interests and regulate marketplaces gradually led to the empowerment of the lower classes (the popolo) to the point where the popolo successfully overthrew the municipal government in 1254, forever changing the political dynamics within the city. The internal political history of Pisa during the thirteenth century was, to put it mildly, complicated. The complexity of the sequence of events and the difficulty of their interpretation in the face of a notable dearth of reliable sources has resulted in no shortage of differing scholarly opinions. Gioacchino Volpe’s 1902 work argued that the political turmoil was the result of conflicts between the upper and lower nobility; however, in 1962 Emilio Cristiani revised Volpe’s thesis, focusing on a conflict between the nobility and the emergent popolo, a theory which remains mostly intact today.44 However, Cristiani did concede that Volpe was Ottavio Banti succinctly summarized the historiography of the matter, stating that Volpe’s work stemmed from Gaetano Salvemini’s 1899 theory that homines novi from the contado fought with the nobility for control of Florence. Volpe was in turn supplanted by Cristiani, whose theory has been only partially revised by Marco Tangheroni. Cristiani’s work is not without its critics, the most recent of which is Alma Poloni. In chronological 44 28 correct in asserting that the concept of “nobility” in Pisa was fluid throughout the period, and powerful men frequently were associated with the nobility, popolo, or both.45 The first known appearance of a podestà in Pisa occurred in 1196-99, with the podestariate of Count Tedicio della Gherardesca, initiating nearly forty years of government structure experimentation. The city would variously alternate between having a podestà and having no podestà, between having a consular college and having communal rectors—even between having a government and having no government at all!46 The scarcity of Pisan sources during these decades makes it quite difficult to assert with any degree of confidence what the root causes for this turmoil were or how the earliest podestàs were chosen. However, several concurrent trends emerge from this period, possibly as causes, as consequences, or as both. Pisa was exceedingly indecisive about whether it wished to have a podestà in addition to the traditional consular college, and this indecision extended further into the question of what type(s) of colleges it wished to have govern the municipality. It seems that the commune struggled to choose between having a podestà, a consular college, a council of communal rectors, or some combination of these, suggesting a fair amount of ongoing internal political discord.47 During this same period the della Gherardesca and Visconti families appear to have begun their competition for influence over communal affairs. We also see the development order of publication, here are the relevant sources: Gaetano Salvemini, Magnati e popolani in Firenze dal 1280 al 1295 (Florence: C. Carnesecchi e figli, 1899); Volpe, Studi sulle istituzioni comunali a Pisa : città e contado, consoli e podestà, sec. XII-XIII; "Pisa, Firenze, Impero al principio del Trecento e gli inizi della Signoria civile in Pisa."; Cristiani, Nobiltà e popolo nel comune di Pisa dalle origini del podestariato alla signoria dei Donoratico; Ottavio Banti, "La societá pisana del Due e Trecento," Bollettino Storico Pisano 33-35 (1964-1966); Tangheroni, Politica, commercio, agricoltura a Pisa nel Trecento; Poloni. 45 Volpe, Studi sulle istituzioni comunali a Pisa : città e contado, consoli e podestà, sec. XII-XIII, 269; Cristiani, Nobiltà e popolo nel comune di Pisa dalle origini del podestariato alla signoria dei Donoratico, 31. 46 On a handful of occasions, the commune failed to elect new officers upon the expiration of the outgoing officials’ terms of office. More on this below. 47 Laura Ticciati, "Mare, Mercanti, Lana: gli 'Ordines' a Pisa nel Duecento e l'evoluzione degli ordinamenti comunali," in Legislazione e prassi istituzionale a Pisa (secoli XI - XIII): una tradizione normativa esemplare, ed. Gabriella Rossetti (Naples: Liguori, 2001), 278. 29 of corporate bodies such as merchant orders and confraternities at just the same time that the communal government alternates between differing corporate structures. Lastly, in the midst of all this uncertainty one can find the origins of the Pisan popolo. As Pisan commerce expanded over the course of the twelfth century, the city markets grew as well, eventually requiring the formation of regulatory bodies to handle disputes and control weights and measures. From this need were born the first merchant orders, the Ordine del Mare (Order of the Sea) and the Ordine dei Mercanti (Order of the Merchants)—essentially merchants who stuck to the sea and those who operated storefronts, respectively.48 At first they held no political power beyond purely local influence over court cases and market access; but most of the communal consular families were also among the leadership of the Order of the Sea and, when political turmoil left Pisa without an official government in 1200-1201 (shortly after the end of its first podestariate), it was the consuls of the sea who stepped in to handle a dispute with the Almohad sultan of Tunis.49 This first political act by the Order of the Sea gave it a degree of legitimacy and, as Laura Trevisan has shown, served as a precedent for the multiple times over the succeeding decades when the consuls of the sea witnessed other treaties with foreign powers (even occasionally joined by consuls of the merchants, though only in a regional context).50 As early as 1215, during Ubaldo I Visconti’s first podestariate, the Order of the Sea 48 My parenthetical distinction between the two is a very rough one, as Laura Ticciati has shown there were numerous instances of land merchants at sea and vice versa. L'ordine dei mercante a Pisa nei secoli XII-XIII, 51-55. The best recent scholarship on the origins of the Tre Ordini are as follows: ibid.; "Mare, Mercanti, Lana: gli 'Ordines' a Pisa nel Duecento e l'evoluzione degli ordinamenti comunali."; Rossella Trevisan, "L'ordine del mare a Pisa dalle origini alla metà del XIII secolo: tesi di laurea" (Ph.D. dissertation, Università degli Studi di Pisa, 1987); Lorenzo Isoppo, "L'ordine del mare nello svolgimento sociale e costituzionale del comune pisano secoli XIII e XIV" (Ph.D. dissertation, Università di Pisa, 1988); Rossella Trevisan, "Per la storia dell'Ordo Maris di Pisa intorno alla metà del Duecento: il Registro 'Comune A 46'," in Pisa e la Toscana occidentale nel Medioevo, 1: a Cinzio Violante nei suoi 70 anni (Pisa: GISEM-ETS, 1991); Pierluigi Castagneto, L'arte della lana a Pisa nel duecento e nei primi decenni del trecento: commercio, industria e istituzioni (Pisa: ETS, 1996). 49 Amari, 119-122 doc. 33, 226-229 doc. 45; Travis Bruce, "Commercial conflict resolution across the religious divide in the thirteenth-century Mediterranean," Mediterranean Historical Review 30, no. 1 (2015). 50 Ticciati, L'ordine dei mercante a Pisa nei secoli XII-XIII, 172-174. 30 gained autonomy and real political power, a change that was most likely linked to Ubaldo’s Sardinian policy which began in 1216.51 The Order of the Merchants also gained autonomy and its members were on the city council by at least 1223.52 Beyond slightly earlier political representation, it seems that the Order of the Sea generally held more power than the Order of the Merchants. This should not be very surprising as Rossella Trevisan has shown that the Order of the Sea was a blend of the old consular class and the so-called homines novi (men distinguished by their wealth and/or military command),53 many of whom had recently immigrated to the city from within the expanding borders of the Pisan contado. Ticciati’s work reveals that the Order of the Merchants, dominated by spice and cloth merchants, enjoyed no such prestigious leadership.54 This widening of political participation beyond just the old consular families was a watershed moment, though perhaps it went unnoticed as such at the time, for it opened the door to future expansions of government participation to other demographics. This was not inherently a good or bad thing, but it did mean that a greater diversity of interests and ambitions were introduced into Pisan politics. Once the homines novi and other wealthy and influential families gained a modicum of political involvement as consuls of the sea, it was not long before they sought participation in the higher echelons of the communal government. Enrica Salvatori’s analysis of the 1228 military alliance between Pisa, Siena, Pistoia, and Poggibonsi shows a society in transition ten years before any semblance of political stability was 51 Trevisan, "L'ordine del mare a Pisa dalle origini alla metà del XIII secolo: tesi di laurea," 212-213; Ticciati, L'ordine dei mercante a Pisa nei secoli XII-XIII, 174. 52 ASPi, Miscellanea Manoscritti (Navarretti) 1/1, 84, f.5r (1223 June 23); Ticciati, L'ordine dei mercante a Pisa nei secoli XII-XIII, 174-175. 53 Mauro Ronzani, "Pisa nell'età di Federico II," in Politica e cultura nell'Italia di Federico II, ed. Sergio Gensini (Pisa: Pacini, 1986), 147-148; Trevisan, "L'ordine del mare a Pisa dalle origini alla metà del XIII secolo: tesi di laurea," 289-291. 54 Ticciati, L'ordine dei mercante a Pisa nei secoli XII-XIII, 172. 31 reached.55 The witness lists of the 1228 document prominently show the members of the Orders of the Sea and Merchants and an increased presence of artisans (leather, metal, textiles, etc.) compared to a 1209 treaty with Marseilles, suggesting that the corporatization of Pisan society was advancing and that these bodies were gaining a stronger political voice.56 Also evident in the 1228 document was a nearly complete shift from the twelfth-century method of neighborhood organization around city gates to one tied simultaneously to the numerous city parishes and the division of the city into quarters.57 Pierluigi Castagneto has demonstrated that the shift in administrative organization closely mirrored the development of the popolo and was expressed in the various government experiments. The first appearance of Pisan parish captains in a treaty occurred in 1207 and only two years later the popolo first appears in the aforementioned 1209 treaty with Marseilles.58 Following another year when Pisa lacked a government (1212) there is mention of four rectors of the Pisan citizenry and clear indications of neighborhood-based representation in treaties, suggesting an empowerment of the lower classes in response to the political unrest.59 Pisa was undergoing numerous structural reorganizations during these decades: corporative movements, administrative reorganization, empowerment of artisans and merchants, the appearance and rise of homines novi. It is little wonder that the city experienced dramatic 55 Salvatori, La popolazione pisana nel Duecento: il patto di alleanza di Pisa con Siena, Pistoia e Poggibonsi del 1228, 77. For a critical edition of the treaty, see Appendix 1, pp.181-239 of Salvatori’s book. 56 Although there is no evidence that the four Arti Minore (blacksmiths, cobblers, furriers, and leather workers) officially existed this early, the presence of these artisans in this document surely presaged the codification of these groups prior to 1235. Ibid., 84-89. For the treaty with Marseilles, see Boni amici et vicini: le relazioni tra Pisa e le città della Francia meridionale dall'XI alla fine del XIII secolo, 249-251 doc. 26. 57 La popolazione pisana nel Duecento: il patto di alleanza di Pisa con Siena, Pistoia e Poggibonsi del 1228, 91104. 58 Cecina and Dal Borgo, p. 23-24, 1 March 1207. 59 Müller, 88-90 doc. 57; Pierluigi Castagneto, "Il primo Popolo a Pisa e gli 'octo rectores communitatis' (12091237)," in Legislazione e prassi istituzionale a Pisa (secoli XI-XIII): Una tradizione normativa esemplare, ed. Gabriella Rossetti (Naples: GISEM - Liguori, 2001), 251-253. 32 swings in political organization as the commune struggled to reform its identity in the face of its quickly evolving society. As so often is the case in history, great changes bring great opportunity and the Visconti and della Gherardesca families were among the first to seize the moment in Pisa. The struggle between these families profoundly affected the trajectory of communal government and society. Ubaldo I Visconti regularly adopted the approach of broadening political participation in exchange for support of his policies. He had first done this in 1215 with the Order of the Sea, and he did this again in his 1223 struggle against the della Gherardesca when he “made the popolo in Pisa.”60 Throughout all three of his podestariates Ubaldo Visconti inserted himself as an arbiter between the nobility and the lower classes, consistently elevating his own power by giving franchise to corporate groups that had yearned for improved agency at the expense of the old consular class.61 After Ubaldo’s departure from Pisan politics in 1229, the city’s nobility and popolo fell into discord, each likely fearing the other would attempt to tip the balance of power, and in 1231 Siena came in to arbitrate the situation for the sake of a military alliance.62 Siena concluded that the popolo, the merchant Orders, and the city parishes and quarters should thenceforth have guaranteed participation in the communal government, solidifying the new topographical administrative reorganization, mostly to the benefit of the popolo as the consular nobility typically resided in the oldest quarter of the city.63 Throughout the 1220s, regional clashes against the Guelf League increased following the coronation of Frederick II and, within Pisa itself, violence erupted more frequently as the city became increasingly divided with competing factional loyalties (Guelf/Ghibelline, noble/popolo, 60 …Vesconti fenno populo in Pisa. Cristiani, "Gli avvenimenti pisani del periodo ugoliniano in una cronaca inedita," 50. 61 Castagneto, "Il primo Popolo a Pisa e gli 'octo rectores communitatis' (1209-1237)," 256-258. 62 Archivio di Stato di Siena ASSi, ed. Libri dell'entrata e dell'uscita della Repubblica di Siena detti del camarlingo e dei quattro provveditori della Biccherna, 22 vols. (Siena: Lazzeri, 1914-1969), 4:178, 185. 63 Ronzani, 161-170; Castagneto, "Il primo Popolo a Pisa e gli 'octo rectores communitatis' (1209-1237)," 259-260. 33 pro-/anti-Visconti). The increased bellicosity of the Pisan experience facilitated the rise of the società d’armi (societies of arms), and not surprisingly they, too, sought and received political representation in 1235.64 Although a semblance of peace between the Visconti and della Gherardesca parties was attained in 1237, the popolo had mostly switched to the della Gherardesca/communal side as Ubaldo II Visconti’s ambitions diverged from those of the commune.65 Even with the Visconti now divorced from the more popular or corporate elements of society, grand structural changes had begun. The Order of the Sea appropriated control of some functions of international policy (anything involving the sea or commerce) while the corporatization of Pisan society continued as more Arti arose to gain political influence, sharing municipal power with ever more groups.66 Eventually a breaking point was reached. The continued regional violence culminated in Pisa’s resounding defeat at the hands of the Florentines and other Guelfs at the Battle of Pontedera in 1254; immediately thereafter, the meagre Pisan sources speak of a new popolo regime in the city headed by a council of Anziani del popolo, ostensibly due to popular dissatisfaction with how the nobility had steered the commune according to their factional desires.67 However, it would be wrong to say that the entirety of the old guard had been removed from power. As already mentioned, many of the leaders of the Order of the Sea came from the old consular class (the nobility) or from the homines novi. For decades, these same families also provided captains or consuls for parishes, armed societies, Arti, or other corporate bodies 64 Ticciati, L'ordine dei mercante a Pisa nei secoli XII-XIII, 177. Cristiani, Nobiltà e popolo nel comune di Pisa dalle origini del podestariato alla signoria dei Donoratico, 493506 doc.1-2; Castagneto, "Il primo Popolo a Pisa e gli 'octo rectores communitatis' (1209-1237)," 262. 66 Ticciati, "Mare, Mercanti, Lana: gli 'Ordines' a Pisa nel Duecento e l'evoluzione degli ordinamenti comunali," 278-281; Castagneto, "Il primo Popolo a Pisa e gli 'octo rectores communitatis' (1209-1237)," 262-265. 67 "Fragmenta Historiae Pisanae," 1.24: col. 645; Lidia Orlandini, "Cronaca pisana di autore anonimo: contenuta nel cod. 54 dell'Archivio di Stato di Lucca: trascrizione dalla c. 35 alla c. 74 con introduzione" (Ph.D. dissertation, Università degli Studi di Pisa, 1967), 120; Ronzani, 188-190; Ticciati, L'ordine dei mercante a Pisa nei secoli XIIXIII, 179-180. 65 34 including the popolo itself. When the Anziani became the highest echelon of communal power, by law one third of the representatives came from the Arti of Pisa with the remaining two-thirds of their members typically coming from the two Orders and with each quarter of the city supplying representatives.68 An examination of diplomatics immediately before and after the popolo uprising reveals that the communal government, or at least the portion involved with foreign policy, continued to be dominated by the nobility (even many of the same families appear to have remained in power, though popolo families appear slightly more frequently after 1254), suggesting a surprising degree of continuity despite a complete restructuring of the communal government.69 To paraphrase Marco Tangheroni, the important change was not one of which families were ruling, but rather how power was distributed.70 The influence of the urban patriciate (old consular class and homines novi) was still dominate, but it had become more diluted by the growing influence of the artisan organizations and the Order of Merchants (whose members were not typically from the early thirteenth-century patrician families). Indeed, Ticciati has postulated that since the composition of the consulate of the Merchants did not change the nature of its membership at this time (while the consulate of the Sea did change somewhat) it is possible that the landed merchants participated in the popolo rebellion to strengthen their position in respect to the shipowners and sea merchants.71 Consequently, communal policies and commercial concentrations would reflect this gradual migration of the locus of power. 68 Cristiani, Nobiltà e popolo nel comune di Pisa dalle origini del podestariato alla signoria dei Donoratico, 189190, 196-199; Ticciati, L'ordine dei mercante a Pisa nei secoli XII-XIII, 180-182; Castagneto, L'arte della lana a Pisa nel duecento e nei primi decenni del trecento: commercio, industria e istituzioni, 62-64; Ticciati, "Mare, Mercanti, Lana: gli 'Ordines' a Pisa nel Duecento e l'evoluzione degli ordinamenti comunali," 281. 69 Cristiani, Nobiltà e popolo nel comune di Pisa dalle origini del podestariato alla signoria dei Donoratico, 58-60. 70 Tangheroni, "Famiglie nobili e ceto dirigente a Pisa nel XIII secolo," 340. 71 Ticciati, L'ordine dei mercante a Pisa nei secoli XII-XIII, 180-182. 35 Betting on the Empire By the thirteenth century Pisa already had a long tradition of amicable relations with German emperors, particularly in their capacity as kings of Italy. Though in the thirteenth century the Pisan custom of making imperial alliances was primarily informed by the desire for commercial privileges in the Kingdom of Sicily, due to the importance of those markets to Pisan merchants, Pisano-imperial relations predate German control of the Regno by over a century. Municipal relations with the empire date to at least 1081, when Henry IV (r. 1056-1105) granted privileges to various cities which offered him aid following his abandoned first siege of Rome and subsequent retreat to Tuscany.72 Although previous emperors had bestowed imperial protection upon various religious leaders or institutions in Pisa, this was the first instance of the city of Pisa receiving commercial privileges from an emperor along with legal recognition of Pisan maritime customs. This would forever define the relationship between Pisa and the Empire: Pisan support of imperial objectives in exchange for greater legal and commercial concessions. Over the course of the twelfth century, Pisa grew closer to the emperors, gaining commercial privileges and political autonomy incrementally in exchange for naval or military support in their efforts to quell the rebellious communes of Tuscany.73 Although in reality the commune had operated under relative autonomy since the eleventh century, the official sanctioning of these customs solidified the legitimacy of the Pisan communal government. When 72 Dietrich von Gladiss and Alfred Gawlik, eds., Heinrici IV Diplomata, 3 vols., Monumenta Germaniae Historica, Diplomata 6 (Hannover: Impensis Bibliopolii Hahniani, 1941-1978), 2:442-443; Silvia Orvietani Busch, Medieval Mediterranean Ports: The Catalan and Tuscan Coasts, 1100-1235 (Leiden: Brill, 2001), 165-166. 73 A document dated 6 April 1162, from Frederick I Barbarossa, references privileges granted by Lothar III and Conrad III. Emperor Henry VI also confirmed Pisa’s privileges in May 1192. Ludwig Weiland, ed. Constitutiones et acta publica imperatorum et regum, 11 vols., Monumenta Germaniae Historica, Leges 4 (Hannover: Hahn, 18931992), 1:282; Flaminio Dal Borgo, Raccolta di scelti diplomi pisani (Pisa: Giuseppe Pasqua, 1765), 24-28. 36 imperial ambitions began to center on seizing the Kingdom of Sicily from the Normans, Pisa was an enthusiastic supporter, having repeatedly attacked Norman ports in the past.74 The favor which the emperors showed to Pisa soon became a point of contention among neighboring communes, beginning more than a century of mounting political isolation for Pisa within Tuscany.75 Lucca fought almost incessantly with Pisa in the twelfth century and hostilities with Florence were increasing as well; the divisive nature of the imperial presence created the political pressure necessary for Pisa’s enemies to form an ostensibly anti-imperial alliance. Since the emperor himself was only intermittently in the region, this alliance more often became pugnacious towards Pisa as the defender of the imperial majesty. This situation would later come to define the Guelf-Ghibelline struggles of the thirteenth century. As regional tensions rose, Pisa depended increasingly on having a strong imperial ally to counterbalance threats from its hostile neighbors. The precariousness of the situation became apparent when Henry VI (r. 1190-97) died unexpectedly in 1197. At the behest of Pope Celestine III (1191-98) the majority of Tuscany banded together in opposition of imperial hegemony to form the Tuscan League (or League of San Genesio). Pisa abstained from joining the league, resulting in Celestine placing the city under interdict.76 Pisa was a Ghibelline city, though this classification obfuscates the actual situation. Pisans, as a whole, did not appear to hold any deep-rooted love for the empire or hatred for the papacy; as a city of merchants, Pisa merely supported whichever side held the potential to increase communal profits. In this sense, Pisan Ghibellinism was merely the political preference 74 Heywood, 121, 220-227. Volpe, Studi sulle istituzioni comunali a Pisa : città e contado, consoli e podestà, sec. XII-XIII, 293-294; Heywood, 227. 76 Robert Davidsohn, Storia di Firenze, 5 vols. (Florence: Sansoni, 1956), 913, 916, 919; Volpe, Studi sulle istituzioni comunali a Pisa : città e contado, consoli e podestà, sec. XII-XIII, 320; Heywood, 228. 75 37 of having a strong (and hopefully non-meddlesome) military overlord that granted commercial privileges, as opposed to the Tuscan Guelf preference for complete political autonomy, save for the pope in certain regards. Despite the etymologies of the terms Ghibelline and Guelf, Pisan Ghibellinism had no concern for which royal household controlled the empire. The clearest evidence of this comes from the 1209 and 1210 privileges that Otto IV of Brunswick (emperor 1209-15), a Welf (the house from whence the term “Guelf” originated), bestowed on Pisa.77 The commune had previously supported the Hohenstaufen dynasty, and soon would again, but commercial opportunity dictated the course of Pisan political sentiment regardless of which royal family was involved. Otto encouraged Pisans to prepare for his descent into Italy and conquest of Sicily in exchange for imperial aid in the capture or destruction of the southern Corsican town of Bonifacio, the port from which the Genoese had recently been disrupting Pisan commerce in the Tyrrhenian. When news reached Pisa in 1211 that German affairs would prevent Otto’s campaign, the commune quickly scrambled to secure a peace with Genoa.78 The following year, Frederick II (emperor 1220-50) stayed in Genoa for several months and Pisa lacked a communal government entirely.79 Whether the political disarray within Pisa was caused by the loss of the imperial project for Sicily and Corsica cannot be known, but these factors surely informed Pisan enthusiasm for a new peace treaty with Genoa in 1212, signed by Pisa’s Consuls of the Sea since the city “lacked podestà and [communal] consuls” at the time.80 Piracy on both sides continued until the Peace of Lerici in 1217.81 Otto IV confirmed Pisa’s privileges, control of the Pisan contado, and even promised to grant the island of Corsica to Pisa in exchange for naval support. Giovanni Lami, Sanctae Ecclesiae Florentinae monumenta, 3 vols. (Florence: Deipara, 1758); Weiland, 2:44-47. 78 Belgrano and Imperiale di Sant' Angelo, 2:124. 79 Ibid., 2:122-124; Riccoti, 1: col. 564-565; Epstein, 105. 80 … carebant consulum et potestatum … Belgrano and Imperiale di Sant' Angelo, 2:124. Unfortunately, this single brief mention is all that is known of the Pisan political landscape in 1212. 81 Ibid., 2:142-144; Davidsohn, Storia di Firenze; Stanton, 126. 77 38 Perhaps due to previous ties with Otto IV or because of the pre-existing alliance between Frederick II and Genoa, Pisa was rather late in seeking favor from the Staufen heir, only gaining privileges in Sicily on 13 April 1219.82 At Frederick’s imperial coronation in Rome the following year, Pisa received confirmation of Henry VI’s privileges, the confirmation of jurisdiction over contado lands contested with Lucca and Volterra, and commercial rights in the Regno.83 Although this was sufficient to anger two of Pisa’s neighbors, an anecdote from the coronation feast explains the inflammation of hostilities between Pisa and Florence. Giovanni Villani recorded that a Roman cardinal offered a lapdog to the Florentine ambassador as a gift. Later in the evening, the cardinal absentmindedly made a gift of the same lapdog to the Pisan ambassador. The Florentine left the feast first, taking the dog with him, and when the Pisan was ready to leave he could not find the dog. After searching around, the Pisan found the dog in the Florentine’s possession and a quarrel ensued, causing great offense on both sides, which eventually escalated into outright war between the communes.84 Although the tale sounds rather apocryphal, it does serve to highlight the level to which tensions had risen in Tuscany in that it seemed reasonable to contemporaries that a dispute over a dog was all that was needed to rekindle full-fledged war. Gioacchino Volpe posited that conflict would have been inevitable as both Pisa and Florence were extending their contadi, bringing their landed interests ever closer to overlapping.85 Regardless of the precise circumstances, the coronation of Frederick II initiated decades of factional warfare between the Guelf and Ghibelline cities of Italy. At the same time, 82 Eduard A. Winkelmann, ed. Acta imperii inedita saeculi XIII et XIV: Urkunden und Briefe zur Geschichte des Kaiserreichs und des Königreichs Sizilien, 2 vols. (Innsbruck: Wagner, 1880-5), 1:137; Ceccarelli Lemut, 9. 83 Jean Louis Alphonse Huillard-Bréholles, Historia diplomatica Friderici secundi: sive constitutiones, privilegia, mandata, instrumenta quae supersunt istius Imperatoris et filiorum ejus. Accedunt epistolae Paparum et documenta varia, 12 vols. (Paris: Henricus Plon, 1852), 2.1:19. 84 Villani, vol. 1, book 7, sec. 2. 85 Volpe, Studi sulle istituzioni comunali a Pisa : città e contado, consoli e podestà, sec. XII-XIII, 354-355. 39 Frederick II’s expulsion of the Genoese from Sicily at the Diet of Capua that December intensified enmity between the two maritime communes.86 The relationship between Pisa and Frederick II brought both increased prosperity and danger in the last two decades of the Staufen’s reign. Despite Frederick’s excommunication by Pope Gregory IX (1227-41) in 1227 on the eve of his crusade, the emperor successfully negotiated for Christian “control” of Jerusalem and peaceful relations with the Ayyubid Sultan al-Malik al-Kāmil (r. 1218-38) in 1229, though many contemporary Christians were appalled by the diplomatic solution. Pisa benefitted from his diplomacy by way of readmission to Egyptian ports (having been expelled after the disastrous Fifth Crusade) and confirmation of their Syrian privileges.87 Similarly, Frederick’s alliance with the Nicaean Emperor John III Dukas Vatatzes (r. 1222-55) permitted Pisan reentry to that portion of Anatolia (which Genoa had previously dominated exclusively).88 Meanwhile, disagreements between Genoa and Frederick had been escalating since 1220. In 1232 Genoa defied imperial demands to remove their Milanese podestà, at which point Frederick confiscated all Genoese goods within imperial lands.89 This incident ensured a firmly Guelf trajectory for Genoa, facilitating future alliances with Pisa’s Tuscan enemies. Frederick returned to Italy in 1237 to subdue the rebellious cities of Lombardy and Tuscany, stoking the flames of intercity violence once again. In response to further imperial demands, on 30 November 1238 Genoa allied with Venice and the Lombard League at the behest 86 Belgrano and Imperiale di Sant' Angelo, 2:168. Müller, 95-98 doc. 64-66; Rossi-Sabatini, 18; Allmendinger, 76-78; Ceccarelli Lemut, 11-12. 88 Merendino. 89 James Powell found that this act essentially eradicated all Genoese trade with the Regno from 1232-1240. James M. Powell, "Genoese Policy and the Kingdom of Sicily, 1220-1240," Mediaeval Studies 28 (1966): 353; Epstein, 121. 87 40 of Pope Gregory IX.90 That same year, Frederick II arranged for his son, Enzo, to marry Adelasia of Torres, Sardinia, naming him King of Sardinia, though he recognized the island as a protectorate of Pisa which had been granted by Frederick I Barbarossa (r. 1155-90).91 Perceiving this as infringing upon papal powers, Gregory IX once again proceeded to excommunicate Frederick II, who had been in good standing with the church since the 1230 Treaty of Ceprano. Gregory soon called for a church council to be held in 1241 with the purpose of deposing Frederick, for which the pope hired the Genoese to transport hundreds of northern prelates to Ostia. When Frederick learned of the plan, he ordered Pisa to prepare a fleet to capture the churchmen. Seeing a metaphorical storm on the horizon, Pisa sent ambassadors cautioning the Genoese to desist so that the two communes would not be forced to break the truce between them.92 Genoa ignored this warning and the two fleets met at the Battle of Giglio (3 May 1241); Pisa sank or captured over two thirds of the Genoese fleet, killing 2,000 men and taking 4,000 prisoners, one hundred of which were church prelates loyal to Gregory IX.93 In response, Gregory “excommunicated the commune of Pisa;” the city remained in poor standing until 1257.94 Though Pisa benefitted in the short term from putting Genoa on the defensive for the 90 Riccoti, 1: cols. 980-982; Epstein, 123; John H. Pryor, "The Maritime Republics," in The New Cambridge Medieval History, Volume V c.1198-c.1300, ed. David Abulafia (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 443; Stanton, 127. 91 David Abulafia, Frederick II: a Medieval Emperor (London: Allen Lane, 1988), 311-312; Pryor, 433-434; Marco Tangheroni, "Sardinia and Corsica from the mid-twelfth to the early fourteenth century," in New cambridge medieval history: volume 5, c.1198-c.1300, ed. David Abulafia (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 450; Stanton, 127. 92 Belgrano and Imperiale di Sant' Angelo, 3:104-105. 93 Ibid., 3:105-107, 111-113; Janet Shirley, ed. Crusader Syria in the Thirteenth Century: the Rothelin Continuation of the History of William of Tyre with Part of the Eracles or Acre Text (Aldershot, UK: Ashgate, 1999), ch. 37 & 60; Stanton, 127-128; Paul Crawford, ed. The "Templar of Tyre": Part III of the "Deeds of the Cypriots" (Aldershot, UK: Ashgate, 2012), 16 ch. 239; Salimbene di Adam, The Chronicle of Salimbene de Adam, Medieval and Renaissance Texts and Studies 40 (Binghamton, NY: University Center at Binghamton, 1986), 312. 94 … escomenia le comun de Pize … Unfortunately, the precise legal nature of the papal censure (interdict vs. excommunication) is unknown, as is the issuer of the ban itself (Gregory IX or Celestine IV). Gaston Raynaud, ed. Les Gestes des Chiprois: Recueil de chroniques français écrites en orient aux XIIIe & XIVe siècles, Publications de la Société de l'Orient latin: Série historique 5 (Geneva: Jules-Guillaume Fick, 1887), 142 sec. 240; Crawford, 16 sec. 240; Salimbene di Adam, Chronicle, 312. 41 remainder of Frederick’s reign, it remains dubious whether it was worth the cost of so greatly offending the papacy and deepening the factional rift within Italy. This affront against the Holy See may have indirectly contributed to the election of the Genoese-born Sinibaldo Fieschi as Pope Innocent IV (1243-54) in 1243. The unforeseen malarial death of Conrad IV (r. 1250-54) on 21 May 1254, much like Henry VI’s untimely demise in 1197, left chaos in its wake. Once again Pisa was bereft of a strong imperial ally. The death of Frederick II in 1250 had already significantly weakened the Ghibelline position in Tuscany, resulted in numerous popular uprisings in cities across Northern Italy, stirred internal discord within Pisa concerning control of Sardinia, and jeopardized the Pisan commercial position in ports spanning the Mediterranean (these topics will be addressed in more detail in the following chapter).95 Perhaps even more importantly, the end of the Hohenstaufen dynasty left Pisa politically isolated, surrounded by powerful enemies, having spent the past century building its foreign policy on the presence of a strong imperial power.96 Pisa would spend the remainder of the century without such an ally, though the commune would repeatedly search for one. To this end the commune later approached both Manfred of Sicily and Conradin, though neither were in a position to help. Pisa was powerless to stand against the immediately revived Genoese-Lucchese-Florentine alliance which handed heavy terms of peace to Pisa in August 1254.97 Perhaps an indication of how desperate Pisa had become following Conrad’s death, in 1256 the commune sent an embassy to Alfonso X of Castile (r. 1252-84) 95 Herlihy, 56; Ronzani, 188-189; Salvatori, Boni amici et vicini: le relazioni tra Pisa e le città della Francia meridionale dall'XI alla fine del XIII secolo, 160; Ceccarelli Lemut, 13. 96 Ceccarelli Lemut, "Pisa nel Mediterraneo," 13-14. 97 Salvatori, Boni amici et vicini: le relazioni tra Pisa e le città della Francia meridionale dall'XI alla fine del XIII secolo. 42 entreating him to claim the imperial title.98 Marseilles, embroiled in their own struggle against Charles of Anjou, had joined with this Pisan embassy. Alfonso was amenable to the plan, even granting Pisans extensive privileges throughout the empire and within his Iberian holdings, but political vicissitudes at home and in Italy prevented the project from moving forward. Visconti-communal ambitions in Sardinia The relationship between the cities of Pisa and Genoa and the islands of Sardinia and Corsica extends back to at least the beginning of the eleventh century when the Italians sent a joint fleet to Sardinia to expel the Andalusi pirate Mujahid in 1015 and 1016.99 This event also marks the earliest instance of Pisan-Genoese rivalry, as the Pisan chronicler Bernardo Maragone reported a Genoese attempt to seize Sardinia for their own upon Mujahid’s expulsion, but the Pisans were able to oust the Genoese instead. The islands were important sources of grain, timber, wool, hides, metals, and salt for both communes and commercial competition in this context led to war in 1066.100 The struggle over these islands would define the relationship between the two communes for almost three centuries. Institutional domination over the islands began in the religious realm in the 1070s when Pope Gregory VII attempted to Latinize the insular churches with the aid of a Pisan bishop.101 This relationship was further solidified in 1092 when Pope Urban II elevated Pisa to archiepiscopal status and granted it authority over the Corsican church.102 Genoa repeatedly objected to Pisan spiritual hegemony over Corsica and the stance of the papacy on the matter 98 "Pisa in the Middle Ages: the Dream and the Reality of an Empire," in Empires and States in European Perspective, ed. S.G. Ellis (Pisa: Università di Pisa, 2002), 21-22; Boni amici et vicini: le relazioni tra Pisa e le città della Francia meridionale dall'XI alla fine del XIII secolo, 160-164, 254-275 doc. 28-34. 99 Maragone, 4. 100 Ibid., 6. 101 Philipp Jaffé and S. Loewenfeld, Regesta pontificum Romanorum ab condita ecclesia ad annum post Christum natum MCXCVIII (Leipzig: Veit, 1888), nos. 5048, 5093 (16 Sep. 1077; 30 Nov. 1078). 102 Ibid., no. 5464 (21 Apr. 1092). 43 vacillated throughout the first half of the twelfth century, with Innocent II in 1133 finally declaring that the communal bishops would each control three dioceses in Corsica and each commune would receive half of the island in fief.103 Control over the souls of Sardinians and Corsicans was not enough for communal ambitions, however, as the vast natural resources of the islands and their strategic location for securing maritime trade routes became increasingly important for the merchants which controlled the communal governments. By the second half of the twelfth century the two communes were almost perpetually at war.104 Pisa initially claimed Corsica, a period known as the pax pisana, but Genoa gained the upper hand by the end of the century, thanks in large part to their capture of the southern port of Bonifacio in 1195.105 Pisans had previously used Bonifacio as a pirate base, but its capture gave control of the important Strait of Bonifacio to Genoa, enabling Genoese influence to propagate in the Sardinian Judgeship of Torres. The plentiful natural resources of the southern island, in contrast to mountainous Corsica, made Sardinia the more important battleground.106 Sardinia was divided into four kingdoms known as judgeships and the communes at first sought to extend their influence through diplomatic treaties.107 This policy soon gave way in the mid-twelfth century to the communes supporting different contenders in various dynastic struggles on the island.108 The most dramatic 103 Ibid., nos. 7613, 7614 (19-20 Mar. 1133); Julius von Pflugk-Harttung, ed. Acta Pontificium Romanorum inedita: Urkunden der Päpste 748-1198, 3 vols. (Graz: Akademische Druck- u. Verlagsanstalt, 1958), 2:273; Belgrano and Imperiale di Sant' Angelo, 1:23, 26; Imperiale di Sant' Angelo, 1: doc. 64, 65, 75-80; Heywood, 79-80; Tangheroni, "Sardinia and Corsica from the mid-twelfth to the early fourteenth century," 451; Stanton, 119-121. 104 For a succinct but good treatment, see Heywood, ch. 6, 8, & 14. 105 Rossi-Sabatini, 35-36; Tangheroni, "Sardinia and Corsica from the mid-twelfth to the early fourteenth century," 449-451. 106 Enrico Besta’s monograph on the medieval history of Sardinia remains the single best source for information regarding the island. Enrico Besta, La Sardegna medioevale, 2 vols. (Palermo: A. Reber, 1908). 107 Ibid., ch. 6-7. 108 Belgrano and Imperiale di Sant' Angelo, 1:179-187, 190-192, 209-210, 254-255; Maragone, 35-39, 46-47, 58-59; Besta, ch. 8-10; Tangheroni, "Sardinia and Corsica from the mid-twelfth to the early fourteenth century," 447-449; Stanton, 123-125. 44 affair in this regard began in 1187 when the Marquis Guglielmo di Massa (located on the mainland) acquired the Judgeship of Cagliari through marriage. Guglielmo then subjugated Arborea and conquered Torres with Pisan support. At this point, Archbishop Ubaldo of Pisa excommunicated the former Judge of Torres, Constantino, and made his successor, Comita III, and Guglielmo di Massa both swear allegiance to Pisa, bringing three quarters of the island closer to Pisa politically.109 The actions of the marquis of Massa in many ways paved the way for ambitious Pisan nobles who wished to expand their territorial holdings and political power. The Visconti family was the first to follow this path, though the della Gherardesca clan was not far behind them. The Visconti family of Pisa, as their name suggests, originated as viscounts for the Holy Roman Emperor. Though the Visconti last exercised jurisdictional power in 1116 and had lost their tax rights in 1153 (following an unsuccessful and bloody rebellion), the family remained an influential force in communal politics.110 After a lengthy absence, the Visconti returned to politics at the beginning of the thirteenth century, holding consulships and occasionally the office of podestà. During this period of tight political control of Pisa, they acquired the northeastern Judgeship of Gallura by a marriage (and supported by Pisan troops) between Lamberto Visconti and Elena of Gallura around 1207.111 Pope Innocent III’s nephew was a rival suitor for Elena’s hand, indicating that the Visconti were strong enough in Pisa politically, and that Sardinian control was beneficial enough to the commune, to guide the city in a somewhat anti-papal move 109 Besta, 1:154-155, 159-168; Tangheroni, "Sardinia and Corsica from the mid-twelfth to the early fourteenth century," 449. 110 ASPi, Carte Bonaini, n.16, a. 1153 October 28; Pier Silverio Leicht, "Visconte e Comune a Pisa," in Scritti vari di storia del diritto italiano (Milan: A. Giuffrè, 1943), 1:481-486; Cinzio Violante, Economia, società, istituzioni a Pisa nel Medioevo: saggi e ricerche (Bari: Dedalo Libri, 1980), 103. 111 There is some disagreement about the dating of the Visconti appearance in Gallura concerning a possible military entry in 1202 mentioned by Gioacchino Volpe, but the 1207 marriage is when Visconti control of the judgeship became indisputable. Volpe, Studi sulle istituzioni comunali a Pisa : città e contado, consoli e podestà, sec. XII-XIII, 328; Besta, 1:174-175. 45 even though relations with Innocent had already been rocky for almost a decade. 112 Innocent even excommunicated Lamberto Visconti over the incident, but Lamberto quickly travelled to Rome to submit himself to the pontiff.113 This mission was unsuccessful and only in May 1208, with a mission headed by former podestà Tedicio della Gherardesca, did Pisa return to papal favor.114 However, the intervention resulted in a year of anti-Visconti communal sentiment and presaged the further development of the Gherardesca-Visconti power struggle that would span most of the thirteenth century. At least for the time being relations between Pisa and papacy remained friendly, especially as Innocent III prepared for the Fifth Crusade.115 The next three decades were ones of extensive political experimentation and vacillation between different trajectories for Pisa. However, when Visconti family members served as the podestà or held seats on top government councils, Sardinia was always a priority for the Pisan government. For instance, the agreement with Otto IV concerning Bonifacio coincided with the podestariate of Gottifredo Visconti in 1210. Although the commune had recently taken an antiVisconti position, it is likely that news of Otto’s impending descent into Italy encouraged the city to side with the family of erstwhile imperial officials in the hopes of securing better privileges from the new emperor. When it became clear that Otto would not arrive, Gottifredo was not reelected.116 In 1215 Ubaldo I Visconti, the brother of Lamberto, began his fifteen-year domination of Pisan politics, serving as podestà for ten of them. Throughout this period Ubaldo maintained a 112 Tangheroni, "Famiglie nobili e ceto dirigente a Pisa nel XIII secolo," 341; "Sardinia and Corsica from the midtwelfth to the early fourteenth century," 449. 113 Pasquale Tola, ed. Codex diplomaticus Sardiniae, 2 vols., Historiae Patriae Monumenta 10, 12 (Turin: Regio tipographeo, 1861-2), 1:309-310 doc. 9; Ronzani, 129. 114 Tola, 1:312 doc. 13; Ronzani, 130-131. 115 Matthew E. Parker, "Papa et pecunia: Innocent III’s Combination of Reform and Fiscal Policy to Finance Crusades," Mediterranean Historical Review 32, no. 1 (2017): 15. 116 Ronzani, 131-132. 46 singular focus on expanding Visconti, and to some extent Pisan, control over Sardinia. In the decades following Guglielmo di Massa’s acquisition of Cagliari, the new judge grew steadily alienated from Pisa, and even began to side with Genoa.117 Pisa was mostly unable to counter this, but Ubaldo took action when Guglielmo died in 1214. Through a series of military assaults, Lamberto and Ubaldo strong-armed the heiress Benedetta into giving away control of strategic lands in Cagliari. 118 On a hill on the southern coast, the Visconti founded the fortified town of Castel di Castro, a port which grew rapidly with Pisan ex-pats and quickly became the locus of Pisan trade in Sardinia, being a perfectly situated crossroads for Western Mediterranean traffic in general.119 Pope Honorius III (1216-27) was incensed at the brashness of the Visconti-Pisan venture, seeing it as contrary to papal prerogatives for insular control. In 1217 Honorius told the Pisans to recall their forces from Sardinia at once, backing up his demand with punitive measures: he removed the primacy of the Pisan archiepiscopal see over Sardinia, refused to confirm the election of the new Pisan archbishop Vitale, and threatened the commune with excommunication.120 That same year, Honorius gave religious primacy over Bonifacio to the Genoese—during a consistory at the Lateran which resulted in a peace between the communes— 117 Besta, 168-177; Maria Luisa Ceccarelli Lemut, "Pisan Consular Families in the Communal Age: the Anfossi and the Ebriaci (or Verchionesi or da Parlascio) in the Eleventh to Thirteenth Centuries," in The "Other Tuscany": Essays in the History of Lucca, Pisa and Siena during the Thirteenth, Fourteenth and Fifteenth Centuries (Kalamazoo, MI: Medieval Institute Publications, Western Michigan University, 1994), 133. 118 Tola, 1:329-331 doc. 35; Besta, 182-186. 119 "Cronichetta Pisana," in Crestomazia italiana dei primi secoli: con prospetto delle flessioni grammaticali e glossario, ed. Ernesto Monaci (Castello, IT: S. Lapi, 1889), 357; "Chronicon aliud breve Pisanum incerti ab anno MCI usque ad annum MCCLXVIII," 108; Tangheroni, "Sardinia and Corsica from the mid-twelfth to the early fourteenth century," 450; Castagneto, "Il primo Popolo a Pisa e gli 'octo rectores communitatis' (1209-1237)," 255; Ceccarelli Lemut, "Pisa nel Mediterraneo durante il XIII secolo," 8. 120 Tola, 1:331 doc. 36; Dionigi Scano, ed. Codice diplomatico delle relazioni fra la Santa Sede e la Sardegna, 2 vols. (Cagliari: Arti Grafiche B.C.T., 1940-1941), 1:39-40 doc. 57-59; Ronzani, 137-139. 47 strengthening their hold on the island.121 Visconti and Pisan interests once again diverged due to the ire of the papacy, and Ubaldo’s first podestariate ended in 1218. The next year, Lamberto married Benedetta of Cagliari to legitimize Ubaldo’s previous acquisitions (soon nullified); in 1219 Lamberto’s son, also named Ubaldo (II), married the heiress Adelasia of Torres following a successful joint Visconti-Arborea invasion of Torres.122 By the 1220s the Visconti had acquired direct control over Gallura, varying degrees of control in Torres and Cagliari, and great influence in Arborea, all of which elevated the family’s prestige within Pisa, enabling Ubaldo I to once again be elected podestà in 1223 and 1226 due to his clout with the ruling consular class. The growing commercial importance of Castel di Castro and the ability of the Visconti to exploit the island to grant considerable commercial and territorial concessions to their allies greatly empowered the family within the Pisan commune.123 Nevertheless, papal disdain for Visconti ambitions led Gregory IX in 1228 to issue a demand to the commune: expel Ubaldo I Visconti.124 In early 1229, Ubaldo apparently sailed to Sardinia of his own accord, freely abandoning his podestarial post. Many decades would pass before another Pisan native occupied the office of podestà. A series of deaths in Sardinia in the early 1230s led to dynastic disputes. The elder Ubaldo Visconti died in 1231 and bequeathed his Cagliaritan lands to the commune of Pisa; the next year the rulers of Torres and Cagliari (Mariano and Benedetta, respectively) both perished, opening the door for multiple contests.125 Guelfo della Gherardesca and the Genoese contended 121 Tola, 1:332-333 doc. 68; Tangheroni, "Sardinia and Corsica from the mid-twelfth to the early fourteenth century," 451. 122 Besta, 186-188. 123 Castagneto, "Il primo Popolo a Pisa e gli 'octo rectores communitatis' (1209-1237)," 255. 124 Lucien Auvray, ed. Les registres de Grégoire IX: Recueil des bulles de ce pape, 4 vols., Bibliothèque des Écoles françaises d'Athènes et de Rome, 2nd ser., 9 (Paris: Albert Fontemoing, 1896-1955), col. 132-134 no. 220 (9 Oct. 1228); Ronzani, 155. 125 Besta, 194-195; Castagneto, "Il primo Popolo a Pisa e gli 'octo rectores communitatis' (1209-1237)," 261; Ceccarelli Lemut, "Pisa nel Mediterraneo durante il XIII secolo," 8. 48 with Ubaldo II Visconti for control in Torres; the whole affair caused factional violence to break out, both within the judgeship and in Pisa, which eventually resulted in the judgeship ceasing to operate as a political entity following Adelasia’s death in 1259.126 Meanwhile, Ubaldo II Visconti struggled to gain support for reclaiming the patrimony of Ubaldo I, a difficult task made more challenging by Ubaldo II’s inability to mimic his uncle’s knack for bending communal support to his will.127 Consequently, the alienation of Pisan communal sentiment from the Visconti family enabled the della Gherardesca family to ascend to a position of political primacy within the city.128 Ubaldo II’s untimely death in 1238 finally ended this stage of the GherardescaVisconti struggle. In an inspired political move, the Genoese Doria family in 1238 sought to end Visconti control over Torres by having Frederick II marry off his son Enzo (later annulled, ca. 1245) to Ubaldo II’s widow, Adelasia of Torres, naming him King of Torres and Gallura, and later of all Sardinia. During Enzo’s lengthy captivity in Bologna, Ugolino della Gherardesca would claim Enzo’s inheritance for himself, having arranged a marriage between Enzo’s daughter, Elena, and his eldest son, Guelfo. We know little else of relevance that happened in Sardinia during the 1240s due to sparse documentation, except for two events. In 1250 Pope Innocent IV invested the Pisan da Capraia family with the Judgeship of Arborea, solidifying Pisan control of the majority of the island (Genoa still held significant influence along the coast of Torres due to their control of Bonifacio, Corsica).129 Also, at some point in the 1250s, Ugolino della Gherardesca founded the town of 126 Tangheroni, "Sardinia and Corsica from the mid-twelfth to the early fourteenth century," 450. Ronzani, 166. 128 Castagneto, "Il primo Popolo a Pisa e gli 'octo rectores communitatis' (1209-1237)," 261. 129 Pertz and Rodenberg, 1:544, 2:8; Besta, 1:214-215. 127 49 Villa di Chiesa (modern Iglesias) in southwestern Cagliari to help exploit the area’s newfound and rich silver deposits.130 Though the Pisan position in Sardinia had strengthened considerably over the course of the first half of the thirteenth century, it certainly came at a cost. The ambitions of Pisan nobles brought the commune into frequent conflict with the papacy. As the Sardinian project became more lucrative and tied more closely with communal politics, factional divisions gravitated around the leading families, the Visconti and della Gherardesca.131 In the struggle for insular dominance, Pisan nobles began devoting ever more resources (ships, men, time) to the effort in hopes of gaining land or commercial advantages from the two leading families.132 Consequently, these resources could not be used simultaneously for other purposes or destinations, and so the world view of Pisan society began to narrow its focus upon the nearby island. The Pebble that Started a Landslide By the end of the twelfth century, Pisan fortunes were at their peak. Pisa had already been imperial supporters, of both Roman Empires, for quite some time. They had already regained considerable privileges from Byzantine Emperor Isaac II Angelus (r. 1185-95; 1203-04), having strong-armed him with years of piracy, when he was deposed by his brother Alexius III (r. 11951203) in 1195.133 Following the overthrow, Pisans pressed Alexius III for better privileges, which they gained.134 Shortly after the coup in Constantinople, the Hohenstaufen Emperor Henry 130 Tangheroni, "Sardinia and Corsica from the mid-twelfth to the early fourteenth century," 455. Cristiani, Nobiltà e popolo nel comune di Pisa dalle origini del podestariato alla signoria dei Donoratico, 53. 132 For instance, Volpe mentions how in the mid-1230s the Visconti were indebted to the da Capraia family for their assistance in Sardinia. Volpe, Studi sulle istituzioni comunali a Pisa : città e contado, consoli e podestà, sec. XIIXIII, 398. At least for the da Capraia family, investing in Sardinia soon payed off with their aforementioned acquisition of the Judgeship of Arborea in 1250. 133 For the documents involving Pisa, see Müller, 40-58 doc. 34, and 66-67 doc. 41. 134 Immanuel Bekker, ed. Nicetae Choniatae Historia (Bonn: E. Weber, 1835), 713; Müller, 71-79 doc. 44 & 46-48; Parker, "Pisan Migration Patterns along Twelfth Century Eastern Mediterranean Trade Routes," 114-116. 131 50 VI unexpectedly perished, leaving Pisa without a strong imperial ally near home at the moment when the proto-Guelf League (League of San Genesio) was formed to counter the imperial agenda. It is impossible to know whether they acted with the intention of pandering to a potential western contender for the throne (Frederick I’s youngest son, Phillip of Swabia) or whether they endeavored to create an Eastern emperor indebted to the commune, but in 1201 the Pisan nobles Count Ranieri de Segalari della Gherardesca and Ildebrando dei Famigliati carried Prince Alexius (son of Isaac II, brother-in-law to Phillip of Swabia, and the future Emperor Alexius IV Angelus [r. 1203-04]) away from his loose captivity in Constantinople and helped deliver him to his German relatives.135 The idea that Pisa thought of itself as a maker of emperors is not without merit. The commune repeatedly and increasingly relied upon imperial backing to secure trade privileges and counter the commune’s rivals in battle. Furthermore, Pisa had provided vital support to Frederick I and Henry VI to solidify their positions in Italy. Not long after, they enthusiastically embraced Otto IV as he struggled to extend his control over the peninsula, and in 1256 Pisa even sent an embassy to Alfonso X of Castile offering him the imperial throne. This pattern of behavior suggests that the commune somewhat over estimated its geopolitical power early in the thirteenth century and failed to alter this self-misperception as it became increasingly divorced from reality over the ensuing decades. Needless to say, as soon as it became known that Pisans had helped Prince Alexius escape they fell out of favor with Alexius III, who promptly began favoring the Genoese and relying on them for maritime services instead.136 Alexius IV did soon find his way 135 Bekker, 710-712; Müller, 93-94 doc. 62; Wilhelm Heyd, Histoire du commerce du Levant au moyen-âge, 2 vols. (Leipzig: Otto Harrassowitz, 1885), 1:265; Charles M. Brand, Byzantium Confronts the West, 1180-1204 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1968), 215-216, 275-276; Ceccarelli Lemut, "Pisa nel Mediterraneo durante il XIII secolo," 4. 136 For most of the twelfth century, the Byzantine Empire no longer maintained a large navy of its own, instead contracting out these duties to the Italian communes. Brand, 4-5, 215-216. 51 to the imperial throne, albeit briefly, though it was with Crusader and Venetian support, not Pisan.137 This would have been bad enough for Pisan merchants in the region, but soon the Fourth Crusade toppled the Byzantine Empire entirely, initially giving Venice control of the Aegean and Constantinopolitan markets (though Genoa soon stepped in to contest the Venetian position in the Aegean).138 The Pisan plan, whatever it may have been, had gone awry in the most spectacular fashion. Not only had Pisa lost access to a major commercial hub (for three years at most), but Constantinople’s market was now dominated by one of their principal rivals in the Levant and any favor they had hoped to gain with Philip of Swabia was rendered useless as he would never enter Italy. This misstep, though quite dramatic, is emblematic of the Pisan imperial strategy for this period: despite the theoretical benefits of such an alliance, the costs often ended up weighing more heavily on the final balance sheet. Alienating their regional neighbors and rivals while also running afoul of the papacy resulted in constant violent encounters and enormous economic losses, both real and potential, in men, money, and material. The double-edged sword of ambition was not restricted to communal actions, as the most powerful noble families in Pisa exploited the political instability of the commune to pursue territorial designs on Sardinia. This stoked the embers of the longstanding feud with Genoa over insular control, giving the commune yet another front on which it had to fight, further taxing the city’s resources. The Commercial Revolution, which had profited Pisa so greatly in the eleventh and twelfth centuries, also brought with it increased urbanization and population growth as immigration from the contado accelerated. The demographic shift resulted in political turmoil as 137 Some Italian Pisans did aid the Venetians in the conquest of Constantinople; however, simultaneously, many Pisans resident in Constantinople were known to have defended the city (or at least their quarter within it). 138 For the fascinating history of the Fourth Crusade and what it meant for Venice, see Queller and Madden; Madden. 52 the municipality struggled to respond to the differing interests of its citizens. While this left the government susceptible to exploitation by powerful families, the instability also enabled individuals outside of the traditional ruling class to seek franchise and progressively extend their political influence. Although the old consular families retained significant power, that power now had to be shared with groups from different backgrounds and with differing goals; the commune no longer had the singularity of vision which had driven its ascendancy over the previous two centuries. The changing winds of Mediterranean commerce were not gauged correctly by Pisa in this period. Pisa partially abandoned the French and Spanish markets at precisely the time when they were becoming more lucrative, thanks to the ascendancy of the woolens trade and the Champagne Fairs, enabling the commune’s most bitter rival, Genoa, to reap the lion’s share of the profits. Perhaps this was because the newly empowered middling classes of Pisa were mostly spice merchants or storefront owners, preoccupied with controlling the home market instead of distant ones; or perhaps Pisan merchants were content with the lucrative trade networks already in place and saw no need to venture elsewhere. Either way, the failure of Pisan merchants to respond to changing market demand and the movement of the major trade routes ultimately put Pisa at an enormous economic disadvantage, especially once the Black Sea opened its arms to European traders in 1261. Commercial success is not a zero-sum game, but commercial supremacy is. Although Pisan communal income continued to increase, these numerous setbacks prevented the city’s fortunes from growing at anywhere near the rates seen in Florence, Genoa, and Venice, leaving Pisa teetering on the brink of falling into secondary status on the Mediterranean stage by mid-century. 53 Chapter 2 – Setting the Stage: Advances and Setbacks (c.1254-1280) The first half of the thirteenth century witnessed Pisa plagued by frequent warfare and internal political turmoil, culminating in the 1254 overthrow of the communal government by the popolo. Following this dramatic event, however, the first several decades of the second half of the thirteenth century were relatively more fortunate for Pisan politics, commerce, and the geopolitical situation. The overhaul of the communal government and foreign policy increased internal stability and reduced factional violence within Pisa. The majority of the city’s martial endeavors, locally and abroad, were generally successful, at least until Charles of Anjou (Charles I of Sicily, r. 1266-85) entered the Tuscan theater in 1267. Despite the introduction of the gold florin in 1252, Pisan silver coinage continued to enjoy widespread use throughout Tuscany and did not depreciate considerably. Nevertheless, this period was not without its hurdles for Pisa, several of which ultimately contributed to the city’s decline. As often as not, what initially appeared advantageous to Pisa also held dire long-term consequences. Though the political restructuring brought immediate peace, the distribution of communal power was broadened to empower groups with interests somewhat at odds with those of the previous ruling aristocracy. The commune focused its efforts on control of Sardinia and war with its longtime rival, Genoa. This approach did successfully remove Genoa from the important markets of Sardinia and Acre, but Florence was also neglected long enough to further consolidate its leadership over the Guelfs of Tuscany. Additionally, the expulsion of Genoese merchants from two major markets gave the Ligurian city the impetus it needed to seek out alternative entrepôts in which to conduct business, encouraging the shift of global trade routes northward through the Black Sea. Furthermore, the firmer communal adoption of a Sardinian agenda initially benefitted the magnates who had engineered it, but, over 54 the ensuing decades, competition between magnates for control of the island created factional strife at home and, eventually, war against the commune itself for control of Sardinian (and Tuscan) lands. Lastly, though Pisa’s unshakable allegiance to the notion of a strong emperor over Italy had been profitable in the past, the commune’s policy of imperial support after the death of Frederick II rarely proved beneficial. The introduction of Charles of Anjou into Italian politics in 1266 resulted in considerable commercial and military losses for Pisa. This particular hurdle could perhaps have been avoided had Pisa sworn allegiance to Charles after Manfred of Sicily’s (r. 1258-66) death, or if the city had at least abstained from endorsing the young Conradin’s (r. 1258-68, mostly in absentia) ill-fated attempt to regain his grandfather’s empire. This chapter begins with the impact of the popolo uprising and its effect on the internal state of Pisan politics and commerce in the mid-1250s before then looking outward into the Mediterranean regarding the Pisan-Genoese struggle and the evolving nature of Genoa’s position in the Mediterranean economy at the beginning of the 1260s. The vicissitudes of the Tuscan military theater of the 1260s offers a good prelude to an examination of the Pisan economy and social network in the early 1270s. The remainder of the chapter will set the stage for the following one on the Battle of Meloria, discussing the renewal of factional strife and noble struggles for Sardinian land in the 1270s. Changes in Government, Changes in Industry THE ANZIANI As the previous chapter described, Pisa experienced a major political restructuring in 1254 following the military defeat to the Florentines and Guelfs at Pontedera. The popolo (“people”) revolted against the ruling class and installed a council of Anziani (“elders”) at the 55 head of the communal government. The Anziani were to have an equal number of representatives from each quarter of the city, with one third of the seats reserved for representatives from the various official Arti (artisan guilds); the remaining two thirds of the council typically came from the two merchant Orders (sea and landed merchants). Whereas during the first half of the century the communal government had been dominated by the podestà and the consular college/rectors of the city, all coming from either the feudal nobility or elite sea merchant families, after 1254 the center of power rested in the hands of the Anziani, which only permitted at most two thirds of its seats to come from the merchant Orders, and only one of these Orders (the Order of the Sea) was dominated by the old consular class. As the 1250s progressed, the bureaucracy of the popolo regime expanded from nine magistrate councils to eighteen as components of the commune’s Greater Council (Consiglio Maggiore), fourteen of which were dominated by the popolo party (which included some opportunistic nobles).1 This redistribution of power profoundly changed the trajectory of the commune; and yet, the old ruling families maintained a surprising degree of power. The political upset had resulted not just from dissatisfaction with the ongoing internal and external factional strife and the military loss to Florence, though these were major contributing factors, but also from the demographic and economic changes which Pisa had undergone in recent decades. The families that controlled the Pisan government in the twelfth and early thirteenth centuries were all either long-established urban elites deeply involved in shipping and maritime commerce or nobility which held productive lands in the contado. As the city prospered, so did the fortunes of many other urban elites, the homines novi, who in turn managed 1 These government councils included the Anziani, the Consuls of the Sea, the Captains of the Arti, and more. Castagneto, L'arte della lana a Pisa nel duecento e nei primi decenni del trecento: commercio, industria e istituzioni, 60; "Comune, popolo e arti a Pisa al tempo degli ultimi Svevi," in Strutture del potere ed élites economiche nelle città europee dei secoli XII-XVI, ed. Giovanna Petti Balbi (Naples: GISEM - Liguori, 1996), 97. 56 to force their way into communal politics at the beginning of the thirteenth century. Prosperity brought opportunity, opportunity brought immigration. As the wealth and population of the city, and indeed of all Tuscany, increased, so did the demand for skilled labor; more people meant more demand for clothing, shoes, tools, notaries, etc. Inhabitants of the ever-growing Pisan contado immigrated to Pisa in droves in the early thirteenth century, many assuming a variety of lower-level socio-political positions. The offspring of the first generation of contado migrants, having grown up in the city proper and participated in lower levels of government, were precisely the men who sought a stronger political voice in the 1250s as influential members of the popolo.2 The diversity of the popolo and the Anziani was not in itself a new thing; over the preceding years the progressive corporatization of Pisan society had included a gradual expansion of political power beyond the consular class and homines novi. By 1247 the General Council of Pisa was composed not only of the senators, military captains, and consuls of the two merchant Orders, but also had been joined by consuls of the Four Arts (Quattro Arti, which had recently been established as political entities) and the consuls and captains of the ports of Sardinia; also, the number of boni et sapientes viri from each city district had been increased from 25 to 100.3 What was new was how power was distributed. Whereas before the podestà and the consular college were the height of power, now the Anziani controlled all. The Anziani 2 Emilio Cristiani and Pierluigi Castagneto showed that most Anziani families had already been involved in politics for quite some time, contrary to Volpe’s claim that the Anziani provided a “breath of fresh air.” Marco Tangheroni’s argument and evidence regarding a two-generational development of popolo families disproves a previous assertion by David Herlihy that the majority of the popolo families migrated during the second half of the thirteenth century. Volpe, "Pisa, Firenze, Impero al principio del Trecento e gli inizi della Signoria civile in Pisa," 298; Herlihy, 40-41; Cristiani, Nobiltà e popolo nel comune di Pisa dalle origini del podestariato alla signoria dei Donoratico, 189; Tangheroni, "Famiglie nobili e ceto dirigente a Pisa nel XIII secolo," 335; Castagneto, "Comune, popolo e arti a Pisa al tempo degli ultimi Svevi," 83; L'arte della lana a Pisa nel duecento e nei primi decenni del trecento: commercio, industria e istituzioni, 58. 3 Ronzani, 187-188. 57 determined the membership of all other government councils and no council was permitted to meet without their consent.4 The podestà and the new position of captain of the popolo appear to have had very little power over the Anziani, restricted primarily to administrative and limited executive functions.5 So, though the nobility maintained some official representation at the top of the municipal government by virtue of their dominance of one of the two Orders (the Order of the Sea), the overall proportion of noble governmental control had declined in the wake of the franchise of the popolo. Before discussing the nobility further, it would be prudent to clarify that, in the Pisan context, the term “noble” is a bit of a misnomer. Although there were a few families which could be classically defined as “nobility” (e.g. the Visconti and della Gherardesca counts both fit the classical mold of rural territorial lords who had taken up residence in Pisa), in practice the term applied to a much broader variety of citizen. The conception of “noble” or “magnate” was fluid and went far beyond the landed, heritable aristocracy to include urban nobles and the wealthiest and most influential of the ship-owning merchants who made up the twelfth-century consular class.6 The fluidity of the concept is perhaps best exemplified by the high degree of inconsistency by which individuals were identified as nobiles, domini, magnati, etc., over time and even within the same documents. For the purposes of the present study, variations on the terms “nobility,” “magnates,” and “aristocracy” will be used interchangeably to refer to those families at the highest socio-political echelon of Pisan society and which enjoyed a tradition of political leadership in the early thirteenth century. Furthermore, in terms of the anti-magnate 4 Cristiani, Nobiltà e popolo nel comune di Pisa dalle origini del podestariato alla signoria dei Donoratico, 219. Ibid., 224. 6 Volpe, Studi sulle istituzioni comunali a Pisa : città e contado, consoli e podestà, sec. XII-XIII, 269; Cristiani, Nobiltà e popolo nel comune di Pisa dalle origini del podestariato alla signoria dei Donoratico, 31-37, 67-74, 90; Banti, "La societá pisana del Due e Trecento," 711; Tangheroni, "Famiglie nobili e ceto dirigente a Pisa nel XIII secolo," 330, 337-338, 340-341, 343. 5 58 popolo legislation, it is unclear how actively it was enforced and who would have been targeted as there was never any codified definition of “magnate;” instead, all anti-magnate legislation had a distinctly factional character, and whether one belonged to the nobility or popolo, to the Guelfs or Ghibellines, often depended on the prevailing political climate and which side was best aligned to each family’s interests.7 The legislation was not some sort of Marxist class struggle; it was, as Nicola Rubinstein has shown, to affirm the authority of the government against the private justice of the nobility (which had wrought so much discord in the early decades of the century), aimed at giving greater stability to the state authority.8 Though the Anziani, and by extension the popolo, now held the most power in the communal government, the old aristocracy was by no means powerless. In Pisa, as in Venice and Genoa, sea traffic was traditionally the domain of the noble families, explaining why the nobility dominated the Order of the Sea and not the Order of [Land] Merchants.9 Castagneto disagrees with Cristiani about the prevalence of members of the two Orders among the Anziani in its earliest years as it would be some time before their presence was legally mandated, but the communal policies of the mid-1250s appear to validate Cristiani’s assertion that the Orders (and therefore to a certain extent the nobility) held sway in the council from the beginning. 10 Additionally, since at least 1212 the Order of the Sea had been the body tasked with negotiating treaties with foreign powers, precisely because the Order was composed of the most prestigious Pisan citizens, and this continued without interruption after the popolo uprising.11 7 Cristiani, Nobiltà e popolo nel comune di Pisa dalle origini del podestariato alla signoria dei Donoratico, 73, 78. Nicola Rubinstein, La lotta contro i magnati a Firenze: II.: Le origini della legge sul "sodamento" (Florence: L.S. Olschki, 1939); Cristiani, Nobiltà e popolo nel comune di Pisa dalle origini del podestariato alla signoria dei Donoratico, 82. 9 Nobiltà e popolo nel comune di Pisa dalle origini del podestariato alla signoria dei Donoratico, 124. 10 Castagneto, "Comune, popolo e arti a Pisa al tempo degli ultimi Svevi," 95. 11 Cristiani, Nobiltà e popolo nel comune di Pisa dalle origini del podestariato alla signoria dei Donoratico, 60; Trevisan, "Per la storia dell'Ordo Maris di Pisa intorno alla metà del Duecento: il Registro 'Comune A 46'," 331. For 8 59 Though their presence on the Anziani council may have been somewhat limited, nobles could be found with increasing frequency on the ever more numerous lower councils within Pisan government.12 An important case in point is the continued control of communal finances by the Senate, a council composed exclusively of the old aristocracy.13 At some point before the fourteenth century the Senate, the Credenza, and the Savi gained great importance as advisory councils to the Anziani to the extent that the Anziani were required to consult these councils prior to enacting any decisions. These councils “constituted the very instrument by which the nobility succeeded in gaining direct participation in political life, while formally safeguarding their exclusion from the other organs of the popolo government.”14 In short, though the popolo uprising empowered numerous bourgeoisie families, the old aristocracy maintained a fair amount of influence and power. Trevor Dean may have put it best in his discussion of thirteenth-century Italian political trends: Leadership [of the councils] was not so much an attempt to take control of an organization that challenged aristocratic interests, as an attempt to mobilize the popolo against one or other faction. One aristocratic faction would look to the popular classes for the support with which to claim direction of the commune from its rivals … In this sense, the organization of the popolo by guild and neighborhood was not a collective reaction against the clan and the faction, but corresponded to aristocratic domination of their residential districts and to magnate membership and leadership of guilds. Both were merely vehicles for aristocratic power.15 Though Dean was speaking broadly, his conclusion applies to Pisa in the thirteenth century; Ubaldo I Visconti had mobilized the popolo deftly in the early thirteenth century, and various the 1212 treaty with Genoa, which contains the earliest mention of Pisa’s Ordine del Mare, see Tola, vol. 1, 322323. 12 Poloni, 79. 13 Herlihy, 57. 14 “… costituivano proprio lo strumento mediante il quale i nobili erano riusciti ad ottenere una partecipazione diretta alla vita politica, pur salvaguardando formalmente la loro esclusione dagli altri organi del governo del Popolo.” Cristiani, Nobiltà e popolo nel comune di Pisa dalle origini del podestariato alla signoria dei Donoratico, 104. 15 Trevor Dean, "The Rise of the Signori," in The New Cambridge Medieval History. Volume V: c.1198-c.1300, ed. David Abulafia (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 463. 60 members of the Visconti and della Gherardesca families would do so again in the following decades. UNIFIED PURPOSE Aside from empowering a larger portion of the Pisan citizenry, the popolo uprising appears to have had two principal purposes: the cessation of warfare against neighboring communes and the internal stabilization of the city. Tuscany’s regional warfare was a direct product of the intensification of the Guelf-Ghibelline struggles following Frederick II’s death. When Pisa lost the Battle of Pontedera in 1254, it had been the only powerful Ghibelline force still in the fight as the other members of the Ghibelline League had been defeated earlier that year.16 Consequently, the majority in Pisa (i.e. the popolo) saw peace with Florence as the only viable course of action, especially since violence was also ongoing against Genoa at sea; the commune could not maintain a war on multiple fronts without allies. Immediately after the July defeat at Pontedera, Federico Visconti entered Pisa as the commune’s new archbishop; he immediately pushed a somewhat Guelf-friendly agenda by encouraging peace with Florence and reconciliation with the papacy (Pisa still endured the ban of excommunication from 1241), perhaps even being a principal instigator in the popolo uprising.17 The motivations and leanings of Federico Visconti are not difficult to fathom; born of the high nobility, his family had significant lands in Sardinia (and as archbishop he had primacy over the island’s churches), but his direct appointment by Pope Innocent IV tied him closely to the papacy which made it 16 Pistoia was defeated on 1 February 1254. Conrad IV died on 21 May 1254. Siena was defeated in May/June 1254. Castagneto, "Comune, popolo e arti a Pisa al tempo degli ultimi Svevi," 79. 17 Emilio Cristiani and G. Roncioni, "Due lettere inedite di Federico Visconti arcivescovo di Pisa datate da Anagni il 17 Luglio 1255," Bollettino Storico Pisano 33-35 (1964-6); Ronzani, 191; Castagneto, "Comune, popolo e arti a Pisa al tempo degli ultimi Svevi," 80. 61 difficult to support anti-Guelf policies.18 Some scholars have interpreted Pisa’s popolo government as having significant Guelf leanings, which is true insofar as peace was maintained for over two years with Florence and reconciliation with the papacy followed shortly in 1257.19 Nevertheless, the commune of Pisa continued to seek imperial favor, evidenced by the 1256 embassy to Alfonso X of Castile (r. 1252-84) in support of his pursuit of the imperial title as well as the alliance with Manfred of Sicily not long after.20 Whatever the root causes, a modicum of peace with the Guelf League was achieved in 1254 and maintained for at least two years—quite a lengthy peace in thirteenth-century Tuscan experience. The struggle between the Visconti, the della Gherardesca, and their adherents for greater control over Sardinia was the principal cause of violence within the commune. Ironically, though the competition of the aristocracy played a leading role in the events that led to the popolo uprising, the popolo’s solution to the problem exemplified how much power the nobility retained even after the coup. Pisa was beset by two powerful enemies, Florence and Genoa, which threatened the city’s hinterland and trade, respectively. The popolo regime made peace with Florence so that it could focus all its attention on Genoa and, by extension, secure its hold on 18 Alexander Murray, Conscience and Authority in the Medieval Church (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 113-127. On the papal appointment of Federico Visconti as archbishop, see ASPi, Diplomatico, 440; Mauro Ronzani, "La Chiesa cittadina Pisana tra Due e Trecento," Atti della Società Ligure di Storia Patria 98, no. 2 (1984): 288-289 note 9. 19 Castagneto, "Comune, popolo e arti a Pisa al tempo degli ultimi Svevi," 85. The reconciliation with Pope Alexander IV entailed the construction of the Ospedale Nuovo in Pisa as penance for the commune’s sins. This hospital quickly came to surpass all of the others in Pisa in terms of importance and soon gained a degree of administrative control over them all. "Chronicon aliud breve Pisanum incerti ab anno MCI usque ad annum MCCLXVIII," 108; Dal Borgo, 70-71 no. 19; Francesco Bonaini, ed. Statuti inediti della città di Pisa dal XII al XIV secolo, 3 vols. (Florence: Gio. Pietro Vieusseux, 1854-1857), vol. 1, 649-650; Alessio Patetta, Gli ospedali di Pisa: sanità e assistenza nei secoli XI-XV (Pisa: ETS, 2001), 162-188. 20 For the embassy to Alfonso X, see Salvatori, Boni amici et vicini: le relazioni tra Pisa e le città della Francia meridionale dall'XI alla fine del XIII secolo, Appendix, doc. 28-31 & 33-34, pp.254-275. The alliance with Manfred of Sicily is difficult to date. Giovanni Villani reports that Pisa broke the peace with Florence in 1256 at the behest of “re Manfredi.” Villani’s dating or explanation is suspect for two reasons: Manfred was not crowned in Palermo until 10 August 1258 and Pisan support of one of Frederick II’s sons would be unlikely to facilitate a contemporaneous reconciliation with the papacy. At the latest, Pisa is reported to have shared the field with Manfred’s troops at the Battle of Monteperti in 1260. "Fragmenta Historiae Pisanae," c. 645; Adami, 31; "Chronicon aliud breve Pisanum incerti ab anno MCI usque ad annum MCCLXVIII," 110; Villani, vol. 1, bk. 7, sec. LXII, pp.355-358. 62 Sardinia. This policy directly benefitted the aristocracy who had territorial aspirations on the island as once again noble and communal interests coincided.21 By 31 December 1255 Guglielmo di Capraia (de facto judge of Arborea, 1241-1264) was confirmed as a Pisan citizen. The communal leadership informed him that if he wished to retain his Pisan properties and rights he had to swear loyalty to the commune and provide military support for any future campaigns in Sardinia. The last stipulation was included because Pisa had become suspicious of the intentions of the nearby Judge of Cagliari, Chiano di Massa, who had been courting the Genoese.22 Pisan efforts were focused on reasserting the loyalty of the judges of Arborea and Cagliari, certainly also to the benefit of the Visconti and della Gherardesca families which controlled Gallura and large portions of Sassari. The ownership of large tracts of productive land was precisely what enabled the upper nobility to retain some of their influence amidst the political upheaval.23 In this case, the power of land-holdings went beyond merely the ability to collect more rents and offer fiefs, the demographic and industrial24 explosion of Tuscany—and indeed, all of northern and central Italy—created enormous demand for resources, both in raw materials for industry and in food stuffs. The Maremma holdings of the della Gherardesca family were Pisa’s breadbasket (and beyond Florence’s reach), providing the family 21 Castagneto, "Comune, popolo e arti a Pisa al tempo degli ultimi Svevi," 88. Tommaso Vallauri, ed. Chartarum, II, Historiae patriae monumenta 6 (Turin: Ex officina regia, 1853), doc. MDCCCCXXIX, col. 1547-1548; Besta, 216-217; Alberto Boscolo, I conti di Capraia, Pisa e la Sardegna (Sassari: Edizioni Gallizzi, 1966), 64; Castagneto, "Comune, popolo e arti a Pisa al tempo degli ultimi Svevi," 88. 23 The popolo certainly wished for peace with Florence. Though certain members of the nobility were not pleased with this policy, the territorial holdings of the Gherardesca and Visconti families were never under serious threat from the Guelf League. These families were more focused on Sardinian opportunities, and a Tuscan peace would enable more municipal resources to be funneled toward their territorial ambitions. 24 It should go without saying that “industrialization” in the medieval sense was altogether different from that of the eighteenth century. All industries were still essentially home industries, or at best took place in dedicated workshops, but what changed was the relocation of these homes from the countryside into the cities. The concentration of similar artisans in a confined area enabled specialization and economies of scale to take effect. Herlihy, 136. 22 63 with unshakeable political influence in Pisa.25 Control of grain supplies was profoundly important in Tuscany, political regimes rose and fell on the vicissitudes of harvests.26 The land holdings in Sardinia were even more important; not only did the nobility have greater autonomy here, but the lands produced many essential commodities (e.g. grain, wool, salt, cheese, silver), served as a crucial crossroads connecting Pisan merchants with Sicily and the Maghreb, and were an important market for finished goods from Pisa. The control of lands so vital to Pisa enabled the great houses to repeatedly exert influence upon the commune, as the Visconti and della Gherardesca had done earlier in the century and perhaps as Federico Visconti had encouraged around 1254.27 After all, if the della Gherardesca and Visconti lands in Sardinia and the Maremma rebelled against Pisa, that would deprive the city of its most important grain sources and trade centers. But it would be wrong to say that this policy was solely a machination of the nobility, for the commercial landscape had recently changed considerably and Sardinia held special importance for the expanding industries and artisans of Pisa as well. The widespread interests of a diversity of Pisans was precisely what made unified communal action in Sardinia possible.28 CORPORATIZATION AND THE WOOLENS INDUSTRY The previous chapter described the corporatization of Pisan society in the first half of the thirteenth century, which took the form of confraternities, artisan guilds, and merchant orders. 25 Maria Luisa Ceccarelli Lemut, "Nobiltà territoriale e comune: i conti Della Gherardesca e la città di Pisa (secoli XI-XIII)," in Progetti e dinamiche nella società comunale italiana, ed. Renato Bordone and Giuseppe Sergi (Naples: GISEM - Liguori, 1995), 77. 26 George Dameron, "Feeding the Medieval Italian City-State: Grain, War, and Political Legitimacy in Tuscany, c. 1150–c. 1350," Speculum 92, no. 4 (2017): 976-1019. 27 Tangheroni, "Famiglie nobili e ceto dirigente a Pisa nel XIII secolo," 342. 28 Ibid. 64 The Order of the Sea (Ordine del Mare)29 and the Order of Land Merchants (Ordine dei Mercanti di Terra)30 were well established in some form by the beginning of the century, due to the highly mercantile nature of Pisa. The various artisan professions (and their guilds as they organized) were subordinated to the Order of Merchants by virtue of the Order’s duty to control local markets.31 Due to the acceleration of urbanization and demographic growth in Tuscany, demand for finished goods soared, spurring a rapid industrialization movement across northcentral Italy in the early thirteenth century. Accordingly, as the number of artisans of various specialties grew in Pisa, they began organizing and demanding political participation. As early as 1247 we have evidence of the consuls of the Quattro Arti (the artisan guilds for leather, fur, shoes, and blacksmiths) appearing on the Consiglio Maggiore of Pisa,32 suggesting that these were the biggest industries in Pisa at the time—which lines up well with Pisa’s longstanding reputation as a producer of high quality leather goods and ironworks—and that they were already organizing at least several years earlier. Conspicuously absent from the Quattro Arti were cloth producers, at precisely the time when woolen textile production was becoming the principal industry of Italy, from Lombardy to Tuscany. This was because the cloth trade, and industries associated with it, fell under the purview of the Order of Merchants—likely because prior to the rise of woolens, textiles were primarily imported from other locales and not produced en masse within Pisa. 29 On the Order of the Sea, see Trevisan, "L'ordine del mare a Pisa dalle origini alla metà del XIII secolo: tesi di laurea."; Isoppo; Trevisan, "Per la storia dell'Ordo Maris di Pisa intorno alla metà del Duecento: il Registro 'Comune A 46'," esp. 327-329. 30 On the Order of Merchants, see Ticciati, L'ordine dei mercante a Pisa nei secoli XII-XIII; "Mare, Mercanti, Lana: gli 'Ordines' a Pisa nel Duecento e l'evoluzione degli ordinamenti comunali," esp. 268-277. 31 L'ordine dei mercante a Pisa nei secoli XII-XIII, 156. 32 The Quattro Arti do not appear in a similar document from 1233, so they must have gained access to the Consiglio Maggiore sometime 1233-1247. The industries which constitute the Quattro Arti are first documented in 1254. Dal Borgo, 276 no. 36; Riccoti, 1: col. 1194, no. 856; Ticciati, L'ordine dei mercante a Pisa nei secoli XIIXIII, 177; Castagneto, L'arte della lana a Pisa nel duecento e nei primi decenni del trecento: commercio, industria e istituzioni, 68-71. 65 The fortunes of the great Italian maritime cities had been built upon the importation of silks and spices33 (broadly defined) from the East in the eleventh and twelfth centuries, with European traders generally running a trade deficit with their eastern counterparts.34 These imported goods made their way to markets throughout Europe. The Agricultural Revolution and the Medieval Warm Period had initiated a long period of demographic growth and urbanization throughout Europe, creating more demand for goods and foods while the money made from surpluses and trade enabled more people to spend on luxury items, however small.35 These developments were necessary for the creation of the Champagne Fairs which in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries became the most important commercial hub in all of northern Europe, where everything from agricultural goods to raw materials to eastern spices were exchanged. It was here that the fine quality of Northern European (primarily English and Flemish) wools and cloths were exchanged with itinerant Italian and Provençal merchants.36 The market began shifting as consumer preferences for woolens intensified. The woolens industry in turn became more profitable in general due to rapidly growing demand, and thus the industry become more appealing as an economic activity. Woolens manufacturing spread in Italy first to Lombardy in the early twelfth century, with production consumed regionally and throughout the rest of Italy.37 By the end of the twelfth century the woolens industry of Florence was mature enough to create The medieval conception of “spices” went far beyond the modern notion of food flavorings to include medicines and, of particular relevance to the topic at hand, dyestuffs and fixatives such as alum. 34 In other words, Italians were importing more goods than they were exporting and were making up the difference by sending incredible quantities of silver and gold eastward. Malanima, "Pisa and the Trade Routes to the Near East in the Late Middle Ages," 337. 35 Robert Sabatino Lopez, The Commercial Revolution of the Middle Ages, 950-1350 (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1971); Andrew M. Watson, "The Arab Agricultural Revolution and Its Diffusion, 700-1100," The Journal of Economic History 34, no. 1 (1974); Hubert H. Lamb, Climate, History and the Modern World (London: Methuen, 1982). 36 Edwin S. Hunt and James M. Murray, A History of Business in Medieval Europe, 1200-1550 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 25-29; Richard A. Goldthwaite, The Economy of Renaissance Florence (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2009), 9. 37 Malanima, "Pisa and the Trade Routes to the Near East in the Late Middle Ages," 352. 33 66 its own guild, coincident with the initiation of the city’s rapid demographic growth as many rural individuals flocked to the city.38 Italy was well-placed to develop their own textile industries, even if initially the focus was on low-quality products to meet local needs, as it sat at the midpoint in the commercial network between the wool and cloth from Northern Europe and the dyestuffs and fixatives from the East.39 Pisa, by contrast, lagged considerably behind the rest of Italy in developing a woolens industry of its own, and here several factors were likely at play. First, geography impaired Pisa’s access to wool and cloth from Northern Europe. Though the commune’s commercial network received dyestuffs and alum from the East, Lombardy was much better positioned to engage with Frankish and Flemish marketplaces, fueling the expansion of transalpine trade routes. Throughout the twelfth century, Pisa and Genoa fought for dominance of Provençal markets, with Genoa eventually gaining the upper hand. Even as some Provençal cities became commercial powers in their own rights in the early thirteenth century, Pisa did not invest in the region nearly as much as Genoa, thus foregoing the principal point of contact between Champagne and the Mediterranean markets. Second, in the latter half of the twelfth century the Pisan leather industry grew dramatically as the city experienced its most intensive period of demographic growth40—in medieval Italy, urban growth generally accompanied the development of a textile industry.41 Herlihy suggested that the rise of leather in Pisa may be directly tied to the commune’s contemporaneous heavy investment in Sardinia and the Maghreb, the nearest reliable sources of furs and pelts.42 In the Middle Ages clothing was made from plant fibers (linen, 38 Day, 82-83, 94-95; Goldthwaite, 43. Goldthwaite, 268-270. 40 Herlihy, 136. 41 Ibid., 157; Alma Poloni, "Qualche considerazione sull'industria laniera pisana nel Due e Trecento," in Studi di storia e archeologia in onore di Maria Luisa Ceccarelli Lemut, ed. Monica Baldassarri and Simone M. Collavini (Pisa: Pacini, 2014), 197. 42 Herlihy, 168. 39 67 cotton, etc.), animal hair (wool), animal skins (leather, furs), or a combination of these.43 Third, Pisa had become a prosperous city without the aid of a woolens industry, so it is likely that there was less incentive to embrace the new trend. This factor seems more probable considering the evidence that Genoa, too, despite being better positioned to source woolens (and woolens technology) from Champagne and Lombardy, also lagged behind the curve in developing its own textile industry.44 Fourth, the longstanding and increasing political isolation of Pisa in Tuscany also would have disincentivized the pursuit of a Pisan textile industry. As mentioned earlier, in the late twelfth and thirteenth centuries the majority of Italian textile production was for peninsular consumption, not for overseas or transalpine exportation.45 Political animosities made it more difficult for Pisan producers to distribute their cloths in Guelf markets; meanwhile many Guelf cities tried to utilize Genoese and Venetian shipping or overland transport for sourcing materials and distributing their products, excluding Pisan merchants from much of the profits of the woolens trade.46 At least as late as 1228 Pisans had not seriously invested in the woolens industry and trade as evidenced by the nearly complete absence of wool workers from the treaty with Siena, Pistoia, and Poggibonsi.47 The Pisan failure to develop a woolens industry by the early thirteenth century brought with it significant consequences. Most significant in this context was the 43 Ibid., 134. Poloni, "Qualche considerazione sull'industria laniera pisana nel Due e Trecento," 197. 45 Malanima, "Pisa and the Trade Routes to the Near East in the Late Middle Ages," 354-355. 46 Ibid. 47 Though Salvatori here claims that the witness list suffers from sampling bias, I would contend that it is still very instructive of the economic-political landscape of Pisa in 1228. The absence of wool workers suggests that Pisa’s nascent woolens industry was not yet mature enough, or simply too small, to convey political influence to its constituents (reference how the Merchant Orders and the Quattro Arti had gained political power). The other most likely alternative, and this is not the place to delve into such a discussion, was that the woolens industry was mature but that their political leanings were diametrically opposed to the Ghibelline program espoused in the 1228 treaty. Later in this chapter I provide evidence for a connection between the popolo regime, the Order of Merchants, and the woolens industry, but I think that 1228 is too early to support any notions of a woolens-popolo-Guelf faction in Pisa. Salvatori, La popolazione pisana nel Duecento: il patto di alleanza di Pisa con Siena, Pistoia e Poggibonsi del 1228, 141, 181-239. 44 68 sweeping, pan-European-Mediterranean shift in consumer textile preferences, not only for finer woolens from the North, but for woolens in general. Though wool clothing had always been common alongside leathers, linens, cottons, and furs, the scale of industrialization of the woolens industry at this time brought down the price of these garments everywhere, making woolens the preferred everyday clothing choice for all households. Consequently, Pisa shared weakly in the new trade flows originating with the expansion of European woolens manufacturing,48 resulting in a massive opportunity cost to Pisan merchants and investors.49 The leather and furs industries declined in the mid-thirteenth century,50 likely as a direct result of the rising popularity of woolens. As the leather industry faded so did the immigrational allure of Pisa; the cities which had invested early in building a woolens industry exerted the greatest attraction to potential immigrants (i.e. Florence).51 Salvatori demonstrated that the demographic expansion of Pisa ceased in the first half of the thirteenth century,52 coincident with the decline of leather. The stagnation of Pisan population growth in the early thirteenth century was atypical, as most Mediterranean communities enjoyed steady growth throughout the century.53 Eliyahu Ashtor has shown that the demographic growth of the thirteenth century resulted in outward migratory pressure for commercial cities (Genoa, Venice, Barcelona, etc.) 48 Malanima, "Pisa and the Trade Routes to the Near East in the Late Middle Ages," 355. For a modern (2017) corollary, consider the opportunity cost of having not purchased any Bitcoins in 2010 when they were valued at $0.01 (USD) only to see the value rise to $19,000 (USD) in late 2017. You could have purchased Bitcoins at any point in the interim, but your profit would still pale in comparison to that of the people who invested early. Such was the disparity between the woolens industries of Pisa (late adopter) and Florence (early adopter). 50 Herlihy, 149. 51 Day, 82-110, esp. 82-85 and 94-95. 52 It seems that the medieval maximum of Pisa’s population would have been around 30,000 inhabitants. This figure appears to have remained relatively constant between 1228 and 1284. Compare this figure with thirteenth-century Florence’s 120,000 or so inhabitants. Salvatori, La popolazione pisana nel Duecento: il patto di alleanza di Pisa con Siena, Pistoia e Poggibonsi del 1228, 109-123; Day, 82, 92. 53 Ashtor, 54. 49 69 towards the Levant, the Aegean, and the Black Sea.54 Without population growth to fuel emigratory pressure out of Pisa, Pisan commercial networks could not expand into new regions like the Black Sea (as Genoa and Venice were able to do), nor could they respond to the shifting of major trade routes as any foreign agents they had were already settled. Furthermore, without a continuous supply of new Pisan merchant emigrants heading to the East, there was a generational decline in commercial ties to those markets as the early thirteenth-century Pisan ex-patriots aged into Nature’s retirement. Whereas in the twelfth century there were hundreds of Pisans living in Eastern ports, by the beginning of the fourteenth century there were only “a handful of isolated individuals.”55 Thus the resistance to developing a woolens industry put Pisa at a considerable disadvantage in comparison to her flourishing Genoese and Florentine rivals. It took strong economic forces for Pisans finally to develop a woolens industry in the mid-thirteenth century. Over the course of the thirteenth century the balance of trade with the East was flipped. As Eastern markets expanded and Europe industrialized, demand everywhere for the growing multiplicity of European goods expanded, woolens chief among them. The spice trade (generally raw materials flowing westward) was eclipsed by the textiles trade (finished goods flowing eastward), for the first time resulting in precious metals flowing into Europe instead of out.56 Not only was the volume of the spice trade superseded by textiles, so was the value; at one point a sack of Flemish cloths was worth three to five sacks of spices.57 The enormity of the potential profits from engaging in the woolens industry eventually reached a tipping point and, perhaps in the 1230s or 1240s Pisa’s nascent woolens industry began to 54 Ibid., 54-57. Interestingly, Ashtor claims that twelfth century emigration was typically seasonal in nature or for several-year stints, while thirteenth century emigration was permanent. However, Pisan emigration in the twelfth century was characteristically more permanent in nature. Parker, "Pisan Migration Patterns along Twelfth Century Eastern Mediterranean Trade Routes," 104. 55 Malanima, "Pisa and the Trade Routes to the Near East in the Late Middle Ages," 349. 56 Ibid., 339. 57 Bautier, 298-302; Malanima, "Pisa and the Trade Routes to the Near East in the Late Middle Ages," 351. 70 develop dramatically. Herlihy’s claim that the woolens industry only entered Pisa in the 1250s seems implausible given the power attained by the Arte della Lana in 1266/7.58 Although the woolens industry did grow rapidly, it would need more than a decade to go from nothing to one of the three most powerful political blocs in the commune. Nonetheless, the change was dramatic; the woolens industry went from having virtually no political presence in 1228 to having its own guild (the Arte della Lana) legally codified as one of the great Three Orders (Tre Ordini) of the city in 1266/7 alongside the Order of the Merchants (from which this Arte sprang) and the Order of the Sea.59 Laura Ticciati suggested that, since the membership of the Order of Merchants’ consulate went unchanged while that of the Order of the Sea did undergo some alterations, the Order of Merchants may have participated in the popolo uprising of 1254.60 Yet this connection extends well beyond what Ticciati proposed. The rapid mid-century industrialization of Pisa brought about a profound shift in the communal economy and demographics, eventually necessitating a political restructuring to accommodate the new situation. The old regime was controlled by the consular class of nobles and sea merchants, many of whom were part of the Order of the Sea. By contrast, the Order of Merchants was exclusively burghers who regulated and oversaw the artisan guilds of the city. The composition of Anziani clearly indicates the heavy influence of the Arti in the popolo uprising. As the body which controlled the Arti, the Order of Merchants did not participate with the popolo, they were the popolo. 58 Herlihy, 136. Frederick C. Dietz, "Industry in Pisa in the Early Fourteenth Century," The Quarterly Journal of Economics 28, no. 2 (1914): 346; Castagneto, L'arte della lana a Pisa nel duecento e nei primi decenni del trecento: commercio, industria e istituzioni, 71-74. 60 Ticciati, L'ordine dei mercante a Pisa nei secoli XII-XIII, 180-181. 59 71 As previously mentioned, in the decades prior to 1254 Pisa witnessed the progressive corporatization of various sectors of the economy (Order of the Sea, Order of Merchants, and finally the Quattro Arti before 1247), with each sector gaining political influence as their economic importance to the commune passed a certain point—shipping was essential earliest, then the local markets themselves, followed by the industries which produced the most popular goods for those markets (fur, shoes, leather, iron). The demographic growth of the early thirteenth century increased the number of citizens who participated in the various industries of Pisa. As leather and furs were becoming overshadowed by fabrics in the marketplace, thereby reducing demand for those goods and so also reducing the viability of jobs in those industries, the offspring of the first generation of migrants would likely have sought alternative industries for employment—namely textiles. The commercial potency of woolens gave this second generation additional leverage when seeking political participation. Ticciati has shown that the various Arti of the city, though legally autonomous, were essentially subordinate to the Order of Merchants as the Order controlled the marketplaces, were in charge of enforcing the market rules of the Arti, and were responsible for emending the statutes (Brevi) of the Arti.61 Prior to 1266/7 the Arte della Lana did not exist, all of the textile industry was instead regulated by the Order of Merchants. Indeed, even the splitting off of the Arte della Lana from the Order of Merchants appears to have been amicable as many families had members in both organizations; by making the Arte della Lana a separate and politically equal entity, this demographic had in essence doubled their political power, further ensuring the communal pursuit of policies amenable to their interests.62 This expansion of political power was also mirrored by 61 Ibid., 156-157. "Mare, Mercanti, Lana: gli 'Ordines' a Pisa nel Duecento e l'evoluzione degli ordinamenti comunali," 282. Whether the families involved were closely related or not matters little since the nature of the industries in which 62 72 the contemporaneous creation of the Sette Arti (the Quattro Arti were enlarged by the addition of notaries, vintners, and butchers, all professions which were essential to the functioning of the marketplaces), further burgeoning the presence of the popolo within government councils.63 From its inception, the Anziani were progressively dominated by the oligarchic families at the head of the Order of Merchants.64 It is therefore likely that the Order of Merchants (including all of the Arti subordinate to it) was instrumental in the 1254 uprising as a means to expand its political influence on the communal government. Though the Order of Merchants and the subordinate industries had important interests in importing raw materials for production from afar (e.g. alum and other dyestuffs), the principal markets for consumption in most cases were more local (i.e. Tuscany and Sardinia). The importance of local and Sardinian markets emphasized a policy of relative peace with Pisa’s Tuscan neighbors, as well as a renewed communal interest in securing access to Sardinia which was both a consumer of Pisan products and a supplier of wool.65 This happened to nicely align with the ambitions of the great noble families of Pisa at the time, as formerly exiled families were permitted to return to the city and communal resources were redirected towards expelling the Genoese from southern Sardinia. The growth of the wool industry in Pisa had brought about a revolution in the 1250s and even began thereafter altering the directions of Pisan commerce. In 1273 we find the earliest mention of Pisans at the Champagne fairs and later in the thirteenth century Catalonia and France are the two areas to which Pisan trade was growing the most rapidly. Meanwhile, the African and Levantine trade dominated by the old merchant aristocracy they operated (the textiles trade and associated manufacturing industries) were closely tied and had similar economic interests. 63 Castagneto, L'arte della lana a Pisa nel duecento e nei primi decenni del trecento: commercio, industria e istituzioni, 72. 64 Ticciati, L'ordine dei mercante a Pisa nei secoli XII-XIII, 196. 65 On the economic importance of Sardinia in this context, see Poloni, "Qualche considerazione sull'industria laniera pisana nel Due e Trecento," 198. 73 appears to have entered a period of decline.66 The Anziani progressively absorbed the powers of the Order of the Sea during the 1250s-1280s, further reducing the political influence of the old aristocracy relative to that of the popolo.67 The political shift of commercial focus away from the Eastern Mediterranean set up the commune for those holdings and trade networks to deteriorate from neglect over the following decades beyond the point of repair. Old Lands and New Seas: Currency, Genoa, and Sardinia GOLD AND SILVER By the beginning of the thirteenth century, European businessmen had been relying on small silver pennies (denarii) for monetary transactions for centuries. However, the Commercial Revolution had greatly increased the demand for coinage in everyday transactions. As mints struggled to keep up with that demand, they sought solutions by decreasing the size and fineness of the coins. Unfortunately, this debasement made them useless for large commercial transactions.68 The enormity of the transactions Venice was undertaking at the end of the twelfth century—and especially soon thereafter in preparation for the Fourth Crusade—and the devaluations of Byzantine currency led the Serenissima to an innovation around 1193/4: the issuing of a large silver coin (grosso) of high purity.69 The practice soon spread throughout Northern and Central Italy, arriving in Pisa by the 1220s.70 The grossi of Tuscany were all 66 Herlihy, 170. Isoppo, 363ff; Ticciati, L'ordine dei mercante a Pisa nei secoli XII-XIII, 182-183. 68 Philip Grierson, The Coins of Medieval Europe (London: Seaby, 1991), 105. 69 Louise Buenger Robbert, "Reorganization of the Venetian Coinage by Doge Enrico Dandolo," Speculum 49, no. 1 (1974): 51-55; Alan M. Stahl, "The Grosso of Enrico Dandolo," Revue belge de numismatique et de sigillographie 145 (1999): 261-268; "The Coinage of Venice in the Age of Enrico Dandolo," in Medieval and Renaissance Venice, ed. Ellen E. Kittell and Thomas F. Madden (Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press, 1999), 124-125; Madden, 110111; William R. Day, jr., Michael Matzke, and Andrea Saccocci, Medieval European Coinage. Volume 12: Northern Italy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016), 637-640. 70 Grierson, 108. 67 74 virtually identical in form and value for many years, suggesting the existence of a (now lost) monetary convention between the Tuscan communities.71 Pisa was even the contracted supplier of coinage for Florence from 1171 until ca.1230 when Florence began minting its own grosso,72 likely as a move towards monetary independence from Pisa,73 especially since Pisan currency was the most widely used across Tuscany throughout the thirteenth century.74 David Herlihy posited that the regional success of Pisan currency around the turn of the thirteenth century stemmed from the fact that Pisa was able to strike more coins than her neighbors at precisely the time when more coins were needed.75 Accordingly, the 1230s were precisely when the Florentine economy began booming, drawing in greater quantities of silver, enabling the city to mint its own currency to keep up with pecuniary demand. Nevertheless, the grosso soon fell prey to the same problems that plagued the smaller penny; supply could not keep up with demand as European silver mines were becoming exhausted in the early thirteenth century.76 A solution was found in gold in 1252 when Genoa and Florence minted large, high-purity gold coins. The supply of raw gold was generally increasing in Europe in the thirteenth century; a reversal in the balance of payments meant that 71 David Herlihy, "Pisan Coinage and the Monetary Development of Tuscany, 1150-1250," Museum Notes (American Numismatic Society) 6 (1954): 161. 72 Florence began minting its own grosso before 1237. Robert Sabatino Lopez, "Back to Gold, 1252," The Economic History Review 9, no. 2 (1956): 238. 73 Though Venice appears to have innovated the grosso in 1193/4 in response to the debasement of Byzantine coinage, there were no similar circumstances in Tuscany. Surviving Tuscan grossi from the 1220s and 1230s show a remarkable uniformity of weight and fineness (1.80 grams / 87-88% silver). Therefore, Florence’s decision to begin minting its own grosso—even though the 1171 agreement gave Florence a 50% share of the Pisan mint’s profits— seems more likely to have been a matter of prestige (and perhaps a need to keep up with increased monetary demand) than based on an unfounded concern for the reliability of Pisan currency. On the weight and fineness of early thirteenth-century Tuscan grossi, see Alan M. Stahl, "The Orte Hoard of Tuscan grossi," in XII Internationaler Numismatischer Kongress, Berlin, 1997: Akten-proceedings-actes, ed. Bernd Kluge and Bernhard Weisser (Berlin: Staatliche Museen zu Berlin, 2000), 2:1085-1090; Monica Baldassarri, Zecca e monete del Comune di Pisa: dalle origini agli inizi della seconda repubblica (Pisa: Felici, 2010), 110-111. 74 On the prevalence of Pisan coinage, see Herlihy, "Pisan Coinage and the Monetary Development of Tuscany, 1150-1250," 147, 158, 161. 75 Ibid., 161. 76 Lopez, "Back to Gold, 1252."; Grierson. 75 African gold began pouring into Italy (particularly through Genoa which was better positioned than Pisa in Morocco), while by mid-century Germanic metallurgic improvements quadrupled gold production in Silesia and Hungary (which were connected to Florence through Venice).77 The ability to mint gold coins has traditionally been seen as an indicator of high economic vitality for Genoa and Florence; and indeed, Florence was booming and Genoa had just enjoyed enormous investment by King Louis IX of France (r. 1226-70) for his crusade to Egypt, further cementing ties between Genoa and northern Europe while its woolens industry was expanding.78 Pisa, on the other hand, never minted in gold, although that does not mean it lacked the means to do so. While Pisa did not have connections with Hungarian gold mines, the commune did enjoy preferential relations with the Maghreb and could have sourced gold ore from West African caravans almost as easily as Genoa. An important difference between Pisa and the rival mints of Genoa and Florence was that Pisa had access to a new source of silver. In the 1250s Ugolino della Gherardesca founded the city of Villa di Chiesa (modern Iglesias) in southwest Sardinia to exploit the rich silver resources of the area.79 Pisan currency already dominated Tuscany and, with a new supply of silver from mines owned and operated by Pisan citizens, the commune could continue to produce silver coins at a sufficient rate and possibly at even lower cost than before. Therefore, Pisa had little incentive to switch its coinage to a different metal. Pisa had even issued a new silver coin in ca.1254, the aquilino grosso, likely in an effort to compete with the increasingly popular florin.80 Despite the local-market dominance of Pisan It should be noted that Lopez and Ashtor use the term “Sudan” in the historical sense to refer to the sub-Saharan region of West Africa, not the area below Egypt occupied by the modern nation of Sudan. Lopez, "Back to Gold, 1252," 233-234; Ashtor, 57-59. On the improvement of metallurgic technology, see Balint Homan, "La Circolazione delle monete d'oro in Ungheria dal X al XIV secolo e la crisi europea dell'oro nel secolo XIV," Rivista italiana di numismatica 35 (1922): 127, 131. 78 Lopez, "Back to Gold, 1252," 230; Epstein, 128. 79 Tangheroni, "Sardinia and Corsica from the mid-twelfth to the early fourteenth century," 455. 80 Lucia Travaini, ed. Le zecche italiane fino all'Unità, 2 vols. (Rome: Libreria dello Stato, Istituto poligrafico, e Zecca dello Stato, 2011), 1028. 77 76 currency, it did falter a bit in value as the gold florin quickly gained popularity in usage for larger transactions, especially internationally, due to guarantees of its weight and fineness (3.5 grams and 24 carats, respectively).81 Though the depreciation of the silver grosso relative to the gold florin was not initially severe (18% from 1252-1268; but then worse at 50% from 12681279),82 it was nevertheless persistent for two reasons: increased demand for gold coins drove up their value relative to silver coins; and, the smaller silver coins suffered from a progressive deterioration of their fineness and overproduction.83 Though not initially a cause for concern, the gradual decline in value of Pisan coinage eventually damaged the city as its monetary hegemony over Tuscany eroded. Despite Genoa’s strength, apparent from its ability to mint a gold coin in 1252, the 1250s were not halcyon years for La Superba. The events during the second half of that decade resulted in an economic depression, slowing the production of gold coins, and in turn assuring that the gold genoin would never rival the popularity of the gold florin.84 However, the adversity the Genoese faced in these few years ultimately led the Ligurian commune to new policies which brought the city to the historical height of its power and, in so doing, put Pisa at a considerable competitive disadvantage. 81 Goldthwaite, 48, 52. These figures come from Carlo Cipolla’s 1948 work (see citation in following footnote), but he cautions that the scarcity of documentation means that the starting and ending years for the date ranges are not exact and he can only state whether significant changes did or did not occur within the stated spans of years. Unfortunately, year by year data does not exist. 83 Interestingly, Carlo Cipolla pointed out that these trends were more pronounced in manufacturing centers (e.g. Lucca and Florence) than in commercial centers (e.g. Pisa and Genoa). Carlo M. Cipolla, Studi di storia della moneta: I. I movimenti dei cambi in Italia dal secolo XIII al XV (Pavia: Università di Pavia, 1948), 55-57, 79; Bruno Casini, "Il corso dei cambi tra il fiorino e la moneta di piccioli a Pisa dal 1252 al 1500," in Studi sugli strumenti di scambio a Pisa nel medioevo (Pisa: Pacini, 1979), 134-137. 84 Lopez, "Back to Gold, 1252," 236. 82 77 GENOESE TRIBULATIONS The years 1256-1257 were fateful ones for Genoa. In a bold move, on 20 April 1256 Judge Chiano di Massa of Cagliari signed a treaty with Genoa promising to give the Pisanowned city of Cagliari (Castel di Castro) to Genoa upon its capture.85 This city was Pisa’s principal port in Sardinia and was increasingly a major hub for shipping beyond the Tyrrhenian. Without hesitation the popolo government allied with the great families of Pisa which held significant Sardinian interests (Visconti, della Gherardesca, da Capraia) to reconquer Cagliari. The Pisan forces killed the traitorous Chiano di Massa in December 1256 and a month or so later expelled the Genoese from southern Sardinia.86 Despite the purported rift between the nobility and middling to lower classes of Pisa which had caused the popolo uprising of 1254, less than three years later we have the clearest evidence of nobility and popolo working together for mutual benefit. In this case, however, the nobles involved profited considerably. Once the judgeship of Cagliari was completely conquered, Pisa decided to divide the lands between the parties involved: the Visconti received the third of Cagliari (judgeship, not city) in the north/east adjoining their holdings in Gallura, giving the family control of the entire eastern seaboard of the island; the da Capraia family, as de facto judges of Arborea, received the middle third of Cagliari which bordered their own judgeship; the southwestern third of Cagliari was split evenly between the two della Gherardesca brothers, Ugolino and Gherardo, where Ugolino would dramatically ramp up production from the region’s silver mines; and, the city of Castel di Castro (modern Cagliari) itself remained under the direct governance of the commune of Pisa.87 At first, despite 85 Besta, 1:216-225; Belgrano and Imperiale di Sant' Angelo, 4:21-23, 28-29. "Chronicon aliud breve Pisanum incerti ab anno MCI usque ad annum MCCLXVIII," 109; Riccoti, 1: col. 1240, 1243-1245, 1257-1260. 87 Cristiani, "Gli avvenimenti pisani del periodo ugoliniano in una cronaca inedita," 55; Ranieri Sardo, Cronaca di Pisa di Ranieri Sardo, Fonti per la storia d'Italia 99 (Rome: Istituto Storico Italiano, 1963), 41; "Cronica di Pisa," ed. Lodovico Antonio Muratori, Rerum Italicarum Scriptores, 1st ser., 15 (Milan: Societatis Palatinae, 1729), col. 977; 86 78 the enormous costs, this seemed to be a great victory for Pisa—the Genoese had been expelled from Sardinia, Pisa gained direct control over its most important commercial colony, and the great noble families were all appeased with their territorial gains88—but in only two years a dynastic dispute arose in northern Sardinia upon the death of Adelasia of Torres, with all three Pisan families aspiring to acquire her lands.89 At the same time that the Genoese were trying to conquer Cagliari, trouble was brewing for them in the Levant as they and Venice became embroiled in a territorial dispute which became the War of St. Sabas.90 Initially, the Pisans were on the side of Genoa but, according to the Annales Ianuenses, the events in Cagliari caused the Pisans to join forces with the Venetians.91 In short order the Genoese were expelled from Acre, save for a handful who barricaded themselves inside a tower for a year,92 and forced to concentrate their Levantine commerce in the secondary port of Tyre. Pisa acquired many of the Genoese properties in Acre, a fact which would become a sticking point years later in the treaty negotiations following the Battle of Meloria. In 1256 Pisa also signed an anti-Genoese pact with Marseilles, further "Chronicon aliud breve Pisanum incerti ab anno MCI usque ad annum MCCLXVIII," 109-110; Besta, 223-224; Alberto Boscolo, Sardegna, Pisa e Genova nel medioevo, Collana storica di fonti e studi 24 (Genoa: Università di Genova, 1978), 53-69; Sandro Petrucci, Re in Sardegna, a Pisa cittadini: ricerche sui domini Sardinee pisani (Bologna: Cappelli, 1988), chap. 2. 88 Castagneto, "Comune, popolo e arti a Pisa al tempo degli ultimi Svevi," 91. 89 Ceccarelli Lemut, "Nobiltà territoriale e comune: i conti Della Gherardesca e la città di Pisa (secoli XI-XIII)," 8283. 90 Epstein, 146; Stanton, 160-162. 91 Belgrano and Imperiale di Sant' Angelo, 4:32; "Chronicon aliud breve Pisanum incerti ab anno MCI usque ad annum MCCLXVIII," 109. The Pisan-Venetian treaties can be found in Archivio di Stato di Venezia, Pacta, 4, cc.94-95; ASPi, Carte Bonaini, n.6 (Pisa 1258 Agosto 17). 92 John Dotson, "Venice, Genoa and Control of the Seas in the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Centuries," in War at Sea in the Middle Ages and the Renaissance, ed. John B. Hattendorf and Richard W. Unger (Boydell Press, 2003), 120121; F. C. Hodgson, Venice in the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Centuries: A Sketch of Venetian History from the Conquest of Constaninople to the Accession of Michele Steno, A.D. 1204-1400 (London: George Allen & Sons, 1910), 122-125. 79 damaging Genoese commerce; this was short-lived, however, as Charles of Anjou soon put down rebellious Marseilles (for the first time) in 1257.93 Despite having prospered so recently from Louis IX’s crusade investments of 1250, the numerous shocks to the Genoese commercial network, from Marseilles to Sardinia to Acre, sent the Ligurian city’s economy into a depression for the remainder of the decade. Genoa had lost its primary Eastern port and access to southern Sardinia while its Rhône route to Champagne was thrown into jeopardy, not to mention the incredible losses of men and ships. Genoa had just invested heavily in developing its woolens industry and now several key points in the supply chain were gone. It seemed as if Genoa was on the brink of being forced into a permanently secondary status in Mediterranean commerce if no solution could be found. The desire for revenge drove the Ligurian city to pursue an unlikely ally which, by pure luck and numerous coincidences, brought Genoa back from the precipice and propelled the commune to the height of its power. In 1260, Genoese ambassadors approached the Greek Emperor of Nicaea, Michael VIII Palaeologus, to form a pact aimed at restoring Michael to the Constantinopolitan throne and expelling the Venetians.94 Thus, on 28 April 1261 the Treaty of Nymphaeum was signed, whereby Genoa promised to aid Michael VIII’s efforts in exchange for enormous commercial privileges should Constantinople be recovered.95 Ironically, a Greek general captured Constantinople almost by accident three months later without any Genoese assistance; the Latin Empire had been considerably weakened by the recent Mongol threat.96 Coincidentally, friendly 93 Salvatori, Boni amici et vicini: le relazioni tra Pisa e le città della Francia meridionale dall'XI alla fine del XIII secolo, 164, 268-274. 94 Pistarino, 28; Epstein, 150. 95 "Chronicon aliud breve Pisanum incerti ab anno MCI usque ad annum MCCLXVIII," 108; Belgrano and Imperiale di Sant' Angelo, 4:79. For the text of the treaty itself, see Manfroni, 791-809. 96 Epstein, 150; Pistarino, 27. 80 relations between the Greeks and Pisans at the time prevented their exclusion from Constantinople in 1261.97 The generous terms of the Genoese-Palaeologus treaty were upheld; these incentives, combined with the ouster from Acre, provided sufficient pressure for Genoese merchants to refocus their Eastern affairs on trade with Constantinople and, by extension, assume control over access to the Black Sea—soon to become the most valuable asset Genoa would ever possess.98 THE BLACK SEA The Black Sea, though occasionally visited by Italian merchants prior to the Fourth Crusade, was largely untouched by western commerce, instead dominated by Byzantine traders servicing the coastline on the eastern side of the Bosporus.99 To be fair, the economic potential of the Black Sea, with the exception of Trebizond, did not yet exist; the regions bordering the Black Sea had little to offer commercially beyond commodities like furs and timber and slaves, and no major trade routes ran through the areas to bring in more exotic goods from the East or to provide the demand for finished goods from the West. Even after the Fourth Crusade, the Latin rulers and traders of Constantinople did not develop the region. When the Mongol army under Genghis Khan began conquering the region in the 1220s, the uncertainty of the political situation made developing trade even less attractive to enterprising merchants. At the time, Venice was too preoccupied consolidating its Aegean holdings to fret over another sea with unproven economic potential.100 By the 1250s, the Mongol Empire had established peaceful rule of its 97 Balard, "Génois et Pisans en Orient (fin du XIIIe - début du XIVe siècle)," 184. Evgeny Khvalkov, The Colonies of Genoa in the Black Sea Region: Evolution and Transformation (New York: Routledge, 2018), 62-63. 99 Michel Balard, "Byzance et les régions septentrionales de la mer Noire (XIII e-XV e siècles)," Revue historique 288, no. 1 (1992): 19-23; Khvalkov, 60. 100 Khvalkov, 60-61. 98 81 domain before dividing into four large blocks controlled by Genghis Khan’s descendants: the Golden Horde controlled the northern littoral of the Black Sea, stretching eastward across modern Russia into western China; the Ilkhanate controlled Persia, stretching eastward to modern India, sharing borders with the Golden Horde, the tiny enclave of Trebizond, the Seljuk Turks in Anatolia, and the Mamluk Sultanate to the southwest; the Chagatai Khanate straddled the silk road to the east, bordering both the Ilkhanate and the Golden Horde; and, the Khanate of the Great Khan occupied most of modern China, Mongolia, Korea, and parts of Siberia. Although political stability did encourage some increased commerce in the Black Sea, the Ilkhanate controlled the major crossroads of Baghdad and Tabriz.101 To the south, in Egypt, the Ayyubid Sultanate had long depended on the steady inflow of slaves to fill their Mamluk (slave) armies. These slaves typically came from Central Asia or the Caucasus (areas that fell under control of the Golden Horde), arriving via land routes through Mesopotamia or eastern Anatolia (areas that fell under the control of the Ilkhanate).102 The double threat of the Mongol invasion and Louis IX’s failed crusade in the late 1240s weakened the Ayyubid Sultanate to the point where its Mamluk armies were able to overthrow the government and establish their own empire in 1249.103 The Mamluks were able to stop the Mongol advance and soon focused on further reducing the remnants of the Crusader States. Despite their newfound freedom and power, the Mamluks continued to rely on the importation of slaves to fill their armies and government posts. As both traditional trade routes for the importation of slaves were controlled by the Ilkhanate, Hulagu Khan’s (r. 1256-65) attack on the 101 Baghdad was the traditional crossroads, but Hulagu invaded Persia in 1256 and burnt the city to the ground. He did the same to Mosul in 1262. This made the more northern Tabriz the new center of Persian economic and political life. Hulagu’s path of destruction threw the region’s industries and agriculture into disarray. Pistarino, 26. 102 Andrew S. Ehrenkreutz, "Strategic Implications of the Slave Trade between Genoa and Mamluk Egypt in the Second Half of the Thirteenth Century," in The Islamic Middle East, 700-1900: Studies in Economic and Social History, ed. Abraham L. Udovitch (Princeton: Darwin Press, 1981), 336. 103 Pistarino, 26. 82 Mamluk Sultanate in 1260 created a serious problem for the fledgling state. Hulagu’s bellicosity also created trouble for the Golden Horde in 1261 when access to Tabriz was eliminated, cutting off the Horde from the East-West Silk Road and the North-South slave trade routes.104 During this decade (ca.1249-1261), the Genoese developed an Aegean strategy, establishing a commercial presence along the eastern shores of the Sea.105 The double injuries of expulsion from Cagliari and Acre in 1257 made desperate the financial futures of numerous Genoese traders. A potential solution was found in Michael VIII Palaeologus of Nicaea. Though betting on the successful conquest of Constantinople was a long shot (its defenses had only been breached once in the previous 900 years), a commercial treaty with Nicaea at least provided a friendly port in the Sea of Marmara. This enabled access to the same trade routes that went to Constantinople as well as access to the Black Sea and, therefore, to the Christian commercial center of Trebizond (which traded directly with Tabriz, the new crossroads of the Spice Road). When Michael Palaeologus reclaimed the Constantinopolitan throne, Genoa suddenly gained near-monopolistic control of Black Sea and Byzantine maritime commerce.106 Thus, in 1261 Genoa found itself square in the middle of one of the most fortuitous coincidences of circumstance in the history of commerce: the Golden Horde needed a way to export slaves and enjoyed direct access to China, the Mamluk Sultanate needed a way to import slaves and controlled access to the Nile and Red Sea trade routes, Genoa had just become the (almost) exclusive provider of maritime shipping for the Byzantine Empire and the Black Sea, and Genoa already had commercial relations and colonies in ports along the entire path between 104 Ciocîltan, 148-150. David Jacoby, "Western Commercial and Colonial Expansion in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Black Sea in the Late Middle Ages," in Rapporti mediterranei, pratiche documentarie, presenze veneziane: le reti economiche e culturali (XIV-XVI secolo), ed. Gherardo Ortalli and Alessio Sopracasa (Venice: Istituto Veneto di Scienze, Lettere ed Arti, 2017), 32. 106 You will recall that the treaty between Genoa and Michael VIII stipulated that Pisa would retain its commercial privileges. 105 83 the domains of the Golden Horde and the Mamluk Sultanate. Though Michael VIII did not reenter Constantinople until 25 July 1261, Mamluk-Horde negotiations were already advanced enough for a commercial treaty to be written that year (renewed in 1281).107 Since neither the Golden Horde nor the Mamluk Sultanate possessed any maritime capability, it seems likely that the Genoese were intended to fulfill this role. Though no thirteenth-century treaties between the Genoese and the Golden Horde are extant, the involvement of a Genoese representative in an anti-Ilkhanate coalition in 1263—composed of Khan Berke (Golden Horde, r. 1257-66), Emperor Michael VIII Palaeologus (Byzantine Empire), Sultan Baybars (Mamluk Sultanate, r. 1260-77), and ex-Sultan ʿIzz ad-Dīn Kaykāwus bin Kaykhusraw (Seljuk Sultanate of Rum, r. 1246-57)—is suggestive.108 The importance of the slave trade between the Black Sea and Egypt allowed Genoa to quickly dominate this new North-South trade route, and for a long time enjoy unparalleled commercial privileges in Egypt due to state dependence on their trade.109 The anti-Ilkhanate coalition of the Golden Horde, the Seljuks, the Mamluks, and Genoa affected much more than the creation of a new North-South trade route, it profoundly altered the existing, more important, East-West trade routes. Since Hulagu’s destruction of Baghdad and Mosul, the major caravans had to go through the more northern Tabriz (in the northwestern tip of modern Iran, between the southern shores of the Black and Caspian Seas). This shift had already reduced the amount of goods travelling to Crusader ports (Acre, Tyre, etc.), and gradually increased the amount of traffic through Laiazzo, in Cilician Armenia (modern Yumurtalık, 107 Gheorghe I. Brătianu, Recherches sur le commerce génois dans la Mer Noire au XIIIe siècle (Paris: Paul Geuthner, 1929), 206-08; Marius Canard, "Le Traité de 1281 entre Michel Paléologue et le sultan Qala'ûn: Qalqasandi, Subh al-Asâ, XIV, 72 sqq.," Byzantion 10, no. 2 (1935): 669. 108 Ciocîltan, 153. The mention of Genoese involvement comes from Ibn ʻAbd al-Ẓāhir’s Kitāb al-Rawḍah alBahīyah, printed in Muḥyī al-Dīn Ibn ʻAbd al-Ẓāhir, "Kitāb al-Rawḍah al-Bahīyah," in Sbornik materialov, otnosiashchikhsia k istorii zolotoi ordy, ed. Vladimir Gustavovich Tiezengauzen (Saint Petersburg: Izd. na izhdivenie grafa S.G. Stroganova, 1884-1941), 1:49-51. 109 Ehrenkreutz, 342; Ashtor, 74. 84 Turkey), and through Trebizond on the southeastern shore of the Black Sea.110 Once the coalition was formed, the Ilkhanate no longer had viable access to the Mediterranean. The Golden Horde, on the other hand, opened its hinterland to enterprising European traders such as Niccolò Polo (father of the famed Marco Polo, though a Venetian) who travelled to Beijing along the new northern route that bypassed Tabriz by going north of the Caspian Sea. Though perhaps anecdotal as evidence, both Marco Polo and his father only took northern routes to and from China.111 Niccolò headed east through the Golden Horde’s capital of Sarai and returned via Laiazzo, only arriving at Acre afterwards by sea; Marco disembarked at Laiazzo to travel east and returned via Trebizond and the Black Sea, reinforcing the notion that even between 1272 and 1295 the major caravan roads had appreciably shifted northwards.112 The commercial advantages of the route through the Black Sea were enormous. Perhaps most importantly, the state of warfare between the various states that composed the southern route—the Ilkhanate was at war with all of its western neighbors while the Christian states were at war with their Muslim neighbors—increased the risk of lost caravans and therefore the price of goods travelling along that path.113 Also, because Golden Horde territory directly bordered the Khanate of the Great Khan (modern China, et al.), the cost of goods travelling along the northern route was much lower than those flowing along southern routes which accrued customs duties as they passed through at least three borders to get from Beijing to the western seas. Furthermore, Genoa and soon Venice took a different approach to the Black Sea than they had in 110 Laiazzo would grow in importance for all three major Italian communes throughout the remainder of the century, especially after the fall of Acre in 1291. Rustichello da Pisa, The Travels of Marco Polo the Venetian, trans. William Marsden, Everyman's Library 306 (London: J.M. Dent & Sons, 1918), 30-32; Balard, "Génois et Pisans en Orient (fin du XIIIe - début du XIVe siècle)," 193. 111 At the very least, the incredible fourteenth century popularity of Marco Polo’s travels ensured that the route he took would maintain its strength for a long time to come. 112 Rustichello da Pisa, Travels, 11, 17, 30-32, 35. 113 On the effect of the anti-Ilkhanate alliance on the northward shift of trade routes, see Ciocîltan, 89-90. 85 Mediterranean ports. Rather than solely establish communities within existing major towns and cities, the Italians established true colonies all along the Black Sea coastline, both to protect their trade from attackers and to avoid having to pay the typical port duties on merchandise. Genoa wasted no time after 1261, founding the colony of Caffa in the Crimea by at least 1266.114 The rapid demographic and commercial expansion of Genoa in the previous decades enabled the commune to relieve its overpopulation stresses by sending citizens (both of Genoa and its subject Ligurian towns) to the Black Sea to establish fortified trading centers and populate the ports of already existing cities.115 The Crimea was a perfect home for Genoese expatriots, as the topography quite closely resembles that of Liguria: mountainous coastline protecting the flat, fertile interior of the steppe.116 In 1269 Genoa permitted Venetians and Pisans greater access to Constantinople and the Black Sea, though they were not officially permitted to travel further than the port of Tana in the Sea of Azov (just northeast of the Crimean peninsula).117 Venice seized on the opportunity, especially after the fall of Acre in 1291, but there was no comparable influx of Pisan merchants. This was possibly a result of the apparent evaporation of official initiative on the part of the commune, leaving Pisan merchants to their own devices.118 If anything, Pisans appear to have doubled down on their trade with the Maghreb, attempting to win monopolistic concessions from the Hafsids in a 1264 treaty.119 Whereas Genoa and Venice both enjoyed strong demographic growth throughout the thirteenth century, Pisa’s growth had already slowed or stopped before 1269; the commune did not possess 114 Brătianu, 219; Ehrenkreutz, 342. Ashtor, 55; Malanima, "Pisa and the Trade Routes to the Near East in the Late Middle Ages," 347. 116 Khvalkov, 56-57. 117 Şerban Papacostea, "'Quod non iretur ad Tanam': Un aspect fondamental de la politique génoise dans la Mer Noire au XIVe siècle," Revue des études sud-est européennes 17, no. 2 (1979): 202-203; Ciocîltan, 154. 118 Ceccarelli Lemut, "Pisa nel Mediterraneo durante il XIII secolo," 15. 119 Amari, ser. 2, doc. 29, pp. 295-302; Banti, "I trattati tra Pisa e Tunisi dal XII al XIV secolo: Lineamenti di storia dei rapporti di Pisa con il Maghreb," 59-61; Ceccarelli Lemut, "Pisa nel Mediterraneo durante il XIII secolo," 16. 115 86 the necessary additional local human resources to establish new colonies unless it removed individuals from their current foreign locations. Pisa simply lacked the required combination of motivation and resources to exploit this new commercial region. This is not to say that Pisans were completely absent from the Black Sea; there is scattered evidence of Pisans in Kiev, Soldaia, and Tabriz during this period, and at some point after 1253 they even founded another Porto Pisano just west of Tana.120 Caffa quickly became the economic and social center for Black Sea commerce by virtue of Genoese dominance of it and Constantinople, and Pisans thus often had to deal with Genoese (or Venetian) middlemen to engage with the Black Sea trade, putting them at a competitive disadvantage. Once Cilician Armenia became a vassal state to the Mamluks in 1285 and the Crusader States fell in 1291, there were no more Levantine ports enjoying unfettered Christian control, causing trade in the region to deteriorate drastically. 121 Though Pisan merchants did develop colonies in Armenian and Cypriot ports in the thirteenth century, the majority of their Levantine focus had been in Acre and Alexandria—though even the latter was not a reliable market following Louis IX’s failed crusade—as evidenced by an extant Pisan portolan from 1278.122 Pisa had neglected to develop a significant Black Sea presence in the thirteenth century, and so were largely excluded from access to the new trade route that boasted the best prices. Genoa, 120 There is some disagreement as to whether this Porto Pisano was founded in the first or second half of the thirteenth century, but it ultimately is of little consequence to this study as it soon lost most of its importance to Caffa and Tana. Balard, "Génois et Pisans en Orient (fin du XIIIe - début du XIVe siècle)," 185; Malanima, "Pisa and the Trade Routes to the Near East in the Late Middle Ages," 348; Ciocîltan, 155; Khvalkov, 114. Regarding the presence of Pisans in the Black Sea, see Jacoby, "Pisan Presence and Trade in Later Byzantium." 121 Ciocîltan, 151-152. 122 The Pisan portolan, one of the earliest extant navigation manuals, makes numerous mentions of Acre and especially Alexandria, but hardly mentions Constantinople or the Black Sea at all. It should be noted that this attention may be an artifact of the author’s personal experience rather than being representative of Pisan commerce as a whole. Balard, "Génois et Pisans en Orient (fin du XIIIe - début du XIVe siècle)," 188. For an analysis and edition of the portolan text, see Gautier-Dalché; David Jacoby, "The Pisan Commercial Manual of 1278 in the Mediterranean Context," in Quel mar che la terra inghirlanda: in ricordo di Marco Tangheroni, ed. Franco Cardini and Maria Luisa Ceccarelli Lemut (Pisa: Pacini, 2007). 87 meanwhile, profited many times over from their gambit: Genoa dominated the north-south trade axis connecting the Golden Horde to Mamluk Egypt, they gained a leading role in the newly relocated artery connecting China to Europe, Benedetto Zaccaria acquired the lucrative alum mines of Phocaea in 1275,123 and Genoa developed and controlled regional shipping around the Black Sea which was itself growing in terms of commerce and population. The opening of the Black Sea as another market for the export of Italian woolens also further strengthened the entire supply chain of this industry. While things had looked bleak for Genoese merchants in 1258, only a few years later the Black Sea fueled the maturation of the commune as a maritime power on the world stage and directly financed much of the city’s future ambitious activities (e.g. being the first to establish a sea route to Flanders in 1277,124 and constructing an enormous fleet against Pisa in 1284). Genoa had successfully shifted the focus of its economy in terms of what, where and how they would trade (woolens; the new northern route;125 highly organized colonization of the Black Sea, as well as the creation of the Credenza in 1282 to regulate Genoese maritime activity126)—Pisa failed to some degree on all three counts. PISA, TUSCANY, AND CHARLES OF ANJOU (1260S-1270S) Despite Pisa’s overtures to Alfonso X of Castile and the purportedly Guelfic policy of peace with Florence in the mid-1250s, Pisa leapt to Manfred of Sicily’s side in 1258 when he assumed the kingship of Sicily, thus reigniting Guelf-Ghibelline tensions in Tuscany.127 This The acquisition of Phocaea’s (western coast of Asia Minor) rich alum mines was an enormous windfall for the maturing Genoese woolens industry, which depended upon alum as a fixative for textile dyes. Benedetto Zaccaria would later admiral Genoa’s fleet at Meloria. George Pachymeres, Georgii Pachymeris de Michaele et Andronico Palaeologis libri tredecim, 2 vols. (Bonn: Impensis Ed. Weberi, 1835), 2:558; Robert Sabatino Lopez, Benedetto Zaccaria: ammiraglio e mercante nella Genova del Duecento (Genoa: Fratelli Frilli Editori, 2004; originally published 1933), 68-80; Pistarino, 38. 124 Malanima, "Pisa and the Trade Routes to the Near East in the Late Middle Ages," 352. 125 Ibid., 351. 126 Epstein, 158. 127 Stanton, 129. 123 88 move was obvious as Sicily still held importance for the Pisan economy. On 4 September 1260, the Guelf League was soundly defeated by the armies of Manfred, Siena, Pisa, and other Ghibellines at the Battle of Montaperti (near Siena), sending the League into disarray.128 For the next six years (1260-1266) Pisan forces were mostly victorious in their military endeavors in Tuscany.129 Surely the citizens of Pisa by this point were feeling quite positive about their situation: a much larger portion of the community had been politically empowered in 1254, the Genoese had been expelled from two major ports (Cagliari and Acre) in 1257, Pisa had a new, strong, and Sicilian pseudo-imperial ally, and the commune’s Guelf enemies had been handsomely defeated in 1260. Unfortunately, this situation was not to last, as Charles of Anjou ventured from Provence to Southern Italy in 1265. Manfred of Sicily’s presumption to declare himself King of Sicily in 1258, to no one’s surprise, angered the papacy, which had fought for decades to destroy Hohenstaufen control of the Italian peninsula. In July 1263 Pope Urban IV (1261-64) called on Count Charles of Anjou (brother to King Louis IX of France) to claim the Sicilian crown for himself.130 Charles was unable to depart immediately, as his control of Provence had been elusive since he acquired the county in 1246; the chief troublemakers were Marseilles, Arles, and Avignon.131 In 1262 Charles signed a treaty with Genoa to bring Marseilles to heel and by 1265 Charles succeeded in subduing the rebellious city.132 Forever after, Marseilles was loyal to the Angevin cause, much to 128 "Chronicon aliud breve Pisanum incerti ab anno MCI usque ad annum MCCLXVIII," 110; "Fragmenta Historiae Pisanae," col. 645; Adami, 31; Villani, bk. 7, sec. 28. 129 Just a few examples: "Chronicon aliud breve Pisanum incerti ab anno MCI usque ad annum MCCLXVIII," 108, 110-114; "Fragmenta Historiae Pisanae," col. 645; Cristiani, "Gli avvenimenti pisani del periodo ugoliniano in una cronaca inedita," 57-60; Adami, 31-34. 130 Steven Runciman, The Sicilian Vespers: A History of the Mediterranean World in the Later Thirteenth Century (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1958; repr., 2002), 78-80. 131 Ibid., 73. 132 Salvatori, Boni amici et vicini: le relazioni tra Pisa e le città della Francia meridionale dall'XI alla fine del XIII secolo, 164-165. 89 Pisa’s chagrin as relations with the city’s former ally and trading partner quickly deteriorated. With his Provençal affairs in order, Charles traveled south into the Regno to fight Manfred. On 26 February 1266 at the Battle of Benevento (near Naples) Manfred was defeated and killed, and with him died the last true hope of Tuscan Ghibellinism.133 Charles wasted no time conquering the rest of the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies over the ensuing months, aided considerably by the naval support of the Genoese and the financial backing of Florentine bankers.134 The Genoese had helped Charles handle Marseilles recently and Florence had a great interest in securing a steady supply of Sicilian grain.135 Upon Charles’ capture of Sicily, all Pisan merchants were expelled from the island as Hohenstaufen supporters and for refusing to pay reparations for military and piratical attacks.136 Having consolidated his possession of Southern Italy, Charles traveled to Tuscany in 1267, arriving in Florence that April. The Guelf League swiftly sided with Charles and began laying waste to Tuscan Ghibelline cities and their lands. He even proposed a Genoese alliance to destroy Pisa and, later that year, the combined Angevin, Guelf, and Genoese forces beset Porto Pisano, burning the surrounding contado, blockading the harbor, and even destroying several installations of the port itself before retreating.137 133 Runciman, 91. David Abulafia, "Southern Italy and the Florentine Economy, 1265-1370," The Economic History Review 34, no. 3 (1981): 379-380. 135 Goldthwaite, 136-138. 136 Sadly, the Angevin archives were destroyed by the German army during World War II, so most of the documentary record for Charles of Anjou in Italy is no longer extant. Riccardo Filangieri, ed. I registri della Cancelleria angioina, ricostruiti da Ricardo Filangieri con la collaborazione degli archivisti napoletani, 50 vols., Testi e documenti di storia napoletana 1-50 (Naples: L'Accademia Pontaniana, 1950-2010), 1:28-29, 56-57; Georges Yver, Le commerce et les marchands dans l'Italie méridionale au XIIIe et XIV siècle (Paris: Fontemoing, 1903), 228; Abulafia, "Southern Italy and the Florentine Economy, 1265-1370," 379. 137 Adami, 35; Belgrano and Imperiale di Sant' Angelo, 4:105-107; Cristiani, "Gli avvenimenti pisani del periodo ugoliniano in una cronaca inedita," 23, 63. 134 90 In desperation, the Pisans invited the last Hohenstaufen descendant, the child Conradin, to claim his inheritance. Conradin arrived in Pisa in 1268 and granted extensive concessions to the Pisans in Sardinia and Sicily in exchange for their allegiance and an enormous annual tribute of 17,000 ounces of gold (approximately 500,000 Pisan denarii).138 Had Conradin succeeded, this would have been a boon to Pisan ambitions in Sardinia, especially for the noble houses who had competed for control of Logudoro since 1260. However, Conradin was defeated on 23 August 1268 at Tagliacozzo (east of Rome), where both he and Gherardo della Gherardesca were executed.139 Adding insult to injury, Pope Clement IV (1265-68) excommunicated Pisa and deprived its archbishop of primacy over Sardinia.140 The next year the people of the Genoesecontrolled city of Torres (northern Sardinia) expelled all the Pisans from their town and proclaimed Philip of Anjou (Charles’ son) King of Sardinia—a slap in the face to Ugolino della Gherardesca (Gherardo’s brother) who had been trying for years to secure the inheritance of the region from the Hohenstaufen King of Sardinia, Enzo.141 The Pisan situation in Tuscany did not improve much over the following years as Charles of Anjou and the Guelf League continued to harry the Pisan contado and other Ghibelline allies. A brief reprieve from the Tuscan struggles came in 1270 with Louis IX’s crusade to Tunis. For the sake of the crusade, Pisa was reconciled with the papacy and agreed to terms of peace with Charles and the Guelf League, permitting Pisan merchants to return to the Regno.142 Though Pisa 138 Dal Borgo, no. 25, pp. 201-209. "Chronicon aliud breve Pisanum incerti ab anno MCI usque ad annum MCCLXVIII," 116; Cristiani, "Gli avvenimenti pisani del periodo ugoliniano in una cronaca inedita," 64-65. 140 Édouard Jordan, ed. Les registres de Clément IV (1265-1268): Recueil des bulles de ce pape, 3 vols., Bibliothèque des Écoles françaises d'Athènes et de Rome, 2nd ser., 11 (Paris: Thorin & fils., 1893-1946), 1: no. 701, pp. 265-266. 141 Besta, 237-238. 142 Dal Borgo, 241; Giuseppe Del Giudice, ed. Codice diplomatico del regno di Carlo I e II d'Angiò, ossia collezione di leggi, statuti, e privilegi...dal 1265 al 1309, 2 vols. (Naples: Stamperia della R. Università, 1863), 1:191, 2:104; "Chronicon aliud breve Pisanum incerti ab anno MCI usque ad annum MCCLXVIII," 108-109; Sergio Terlizzi, ed. 139 91 regained access to Sicilian markets, it came at an enormous cost. The fight against the GuelfAngevin alliance had permanently destroyed the Ghibelline cohort of Tuscany, left Pisa without any powerful allies, severely damaged the Pisan contado, further empowered Florence and Genoa regionally and internationally, and jeopardized Pisan legitimacy in Sardinia, not to mention the human and capital costs of war. Perhaps most dangerous of all, the peace agreement with Charles instigated a Guelf uprising in Pisa, shattering the rare communal unity which had lasted a full decade. Less than a month after the April 1270 peace treaty with Charles, the Visconti family incited a riot in the Borgo neighborhood of Pisa in an attempt to seize control of the commune. The coup was unsuccessful and the next day the Visconti and della Gherardesca families, along with the families that maintained loyalties to their respective factions, were expelled from the city.143 The documentation is extremely poor for this period, so it is unclear as to when the Visconti and della Gherardesca families were readmitted to the city, though we do know that Ugolino della Gherardesca was at least briefly in Pisa on 3 July 1272 to negotiate another peace treaty with representatives of the Angevin-Guelf alliance.144 Despite the paucity of information, the episode highlights several important aspects of life in Pisa at the time. First, in spite of over a decade without significant factional violence in Pisa, the rivalries between the great families of the city simmered right beneath the surface.145 Second, the resolution of the event—the expulsion of both factions—indicates the further Documenti delle relazioni tra Carlo I d'Angiò e la Toscana, Documenti di storia italiana (Florence: Olschki, 1950), 47, 65-66, 84, 106-115, 128-129. 143 Cristiani, "Gli avvenimenti pisani del periodo ugoliniano in una cronaca inedita," 28-29, 66-71; "Fragmenta Historiae Pisanae," col. 645; Guidone de Corvaria, "Historiae Pisanae Fragmenta," ed. Lodovico Antonio Muratori, Rerum Italicarum Scriptores, 1st ser., 24 (Milan: Ex Typographia Societatis Palatinae, 1738), col. 675. 144 Terlizzi, 240-241 no. 440; Cristiani, "Gli avvenimenti pisani del periodo ugoliniano in una cronaca inedita," 35; Ceccarelli Lemut, "Nobiltà territoriale e comune: i conti Della Gherardesca e la città di Pisa (secoli XI-XIII)," 85-86. 145 "Nobiltà territoriale e comune: i conti Della Gherardesca e la città di Pisa (secoli XI-XIII)," 85. 92 development of communal disillusionment with the highest nobility. The first indications of this came with the 1254 popolo uprising which, though it left the aristocracy with significant influence over communal affairs, diluted the power of the old ruling class. Over the course of the next few decades this trend continued. Third, the comital and vice-comital families of Pisa began to appropriate control of the commune, something that would progress in the mid-1280s and achieve with more success in the fourteenth century. As Cristiani pointed out, 1270 is slightly too early to discuss the potential Guelf leanings of the Pisan nobility,146 but it was an important date for the divergence of Visconti-Gherardesca interests from those of the commune, which in turn created the necessary circumstances for future Guelf policies pursued by both families. The aberrant nature of Louis IX’s second crusade, much like the Fourth Crusade, has generated numerous historiographical theories due to its unusual destination and the eerily convenient coincidences surrounding the major actors.147 Yet only a few details are relevant to our discussion. For centuries, Pisan merchants had dominated the trade with Maghrebi ports and in 1264 attempted to increase their involvement in the region.148 The Hafsid-Pisan relationship must have been quite close by 1270, for it was reported that Pisans were the only Europeans who remained in Tunis (though they fled Bougie) during Louis IX’s crusade, even receiving the protection of the sultan.149 Perhaps as an act of solidarity with their Pisan friends, the Hafsid 146 Cristiani disproved a claim by David Winter that the 1269-1270 peace treaties were evidence of the early beginnings of a pro-Guelf/pro-Angevin faction within Pisa. Cristiani, "Gli avvenimenti pisani del periodo ugoliniano in una cronaca inedita," 26-27; David Alexander Winter, "Die Politik Pisas während der Jahre 1268-1282" (Ph.D. dissertation, Halle-Wittenberg, 1906), 12-13. 147 The debate typically revolves around whether Charles of Anjou manipulated his brother into attacking Tunis or whether such a strategy would not have been in Charles’ favor. For the former, see Louis de Mas Latrie, ed. Traités de paix et de commerce et documents divers concernant les relations des chrétiens avec les Arabes de l'Afrique septentrionale au Moyen Age (New York: Burt Franklin, 1964). For the latter, see Robert Brunschvig, La Berbérie orientale sous les Hafsides, des origines à la fin du XVe siècle, 2 vols. (Paris: Adrien-Maisonneuve, 1947), 2:58. 148 Amari, ser. 2, doc. 29, pp. 295-302; Banti, "I trattati tra Pisa e Tunisi dal XII al XIV secolo: Lineamenti di storia dei rapporti di Pisa con il Maghreb," 59-61. 149 Mekkia Bensaci, "Pise et le Maghrib au Moyen-Age" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Paris X, 1979), 167, note 1-3; Ottavio Banti, "I rapporti tra Pisa e gli stati islamici dell’Africa settentrionale tra l’XI e il XIV secolo," in Le ceramiche medievali delle chiese di Pisa: contributo per una migliore comprensione delle loro caratteristiche e del 93 Sultan Muhammad I al-Mustansir (r. 1249-77) in 1266 refused to recognize Charles of Anjou’s legitimacy over Sicily, declined to pay the nominal annual tribute that had originated during Norman times, and even harbored some of Charles’ opponents (presumably not solely Pisan merchants).150 Additionally, while Louis IX was making his crusade preparations in 1269, Charles began treaty negotiations with the Mamluk Sultan Baybars to form a political and commercial alliance.151 Whether or not the crusade’s destination was a result of Charles’ machinations, when he took control of the crusade upon his brother’s death from dysentery he successfully negotiated with al-Mustansir for quite favorable commercial privileges as well as an enormous annual tribute in gold.152 This treaty formed the basis for the confirmation or extension of numerous privileges to other European commercial powers (e.g. France, Navarre, Venice, Genoa).153 Perhaps most important was the 1271 treaty between al-Mustansir and James I of Aragon, apparently at the initiative of the Hafsid court.154 The fact that the Hafsid ruler actively offered commercial concessions to the Aragonese indicates that al-Mustansir wished for an augmented Aragonese-Catalan presence in the region, ostensibly as a counterbalance to his hostile Angevin neighbor. Catalan mercenary companies had provided protection for the Hafsid sultan since at least 1258,155 but the pursuit of state-sponsored protection elevated the relationship to another loro significato quale documento di storia (Pisa: Pacini, 1983), 23, note 41; Ceccarelli Lemut, "Pisa nel Mediterraneo durante il XIII secolo," 16; Ronald A. Messier, "The Christian Community of Tunis at the Time of St. Louis' Crusade, A.D. 1270," in The Meeting of Two Worlds: Cultural Exchange between East and West during the Period of the Crusades, ed. Vladimir Goss and Christine Bernstein (Kalamazoo, MI: Medieval Institute Publications, 1986), 246-247. 150 Messier, “The Christian Community of Tunis,” 245. 151 Negotiations began in 1269, but the treaty was concluded in 1272. Charles E. Dufourcq, "Les Angevins dans le monde méditerranéen des alentours de 1260 aux alentours de 1340," in La società mediterranea all'epoca del Vespro, ed. Francesco Giunta and Pietro Corrao (Palermo: Accademia di Scienze Lettere e Arti, 1983), 175. 152 For the treaty, see Mas Latrie, 2:93-96. 153 Messier, 241, 247-248. 154 Mas Latrie, 1:140-141; Messier, 248. 155 Messier, 251. 94 level. A decade of increased Aragonese presence around the Gulf of Tunis may have facilitated the Aragonese capture of Sicily following the Sicilian Vespers, which in turn laid the ground work for the expansion of the Aragonese maritime empire to Sardinia in the fourteenth century. Of equal importance was the absence of a new treaty with Pisa. Despite the close friendship of the two states, it seems al-Mustansir did not consider the Pisan fleet strong enough to act as a counterbalance to Charles of Anjou, perhaps indicative of how Pisa was perceived across the Mediterranean at the time. Though the first several years of Charles of Anjou’s presence in Italy had been disastrous for Pisa, the decade ended with a small bit of good fortune coming from the unlikeliest of places: Genoa. In October 1270, civil unrest over control of Ventimiglia broke out in Genoa, resulting in the communal government switching its factional loyalties from Guelf to Ghibelline.156 This served to weaken the anti-Pisan coalition because Genoa and Charles of Anjou were no longer in accord. If nothing else, this distracted both sides from harassing Pisa while they battled each other in Liguria from 1273-1276,157 giving Pisa a reprieve to deal with the escalation of factional strife at home. Partisanship, Peace, and Prosperity in the 1270s? PARTISANSHIP As had been the case for most of the last century, the fight for control of Sardinia inflamed factional discord in Pisan society in the 1270s, only this time it spilled well beyond the confines of the city walls. Though the failed Pisan uprising of 1270 resulted in the expulsion of 156 Belgrano and Imperiale di Sant' Angelo, 4:138-141; Dufourcq, 170-171; Epstein, 156. Belgrano and Imperiale di Sant' Angelo, 4:147, 158-160, 171-174; Riccoti, 1: col. 1428; Epstein, 156-157; Stanton, 129. 157 95 the Visconti and della Gherardesca factions from the city, at some point during the next year or two they were readmitted to the commune. Just when it seemed that internal peace had returned to Pisa, the long-imprisoned King Enzo of Sardinia died in 1272, shortly after dictating a will on 16 March 1272 in which he declared his grandsons by his daughter Elena and son-in-law Guelfo della Gherardesca (the son of Ugolino della Gherardesca) the rightful inheritors of his lands in Logudoro/Torres.158 Ugolino, vicar for Enzo in Sardinia since the mid-1250s, had sought control of Logudoro since Adelasia of Torres’ death in 1259 and now had a new opportunity to continue the pursuit. Wasting no time, on 26 October 1272 Ugolino purchased the inheritance of his grandsons for 4,250 Bolognese lire.159 Distrustful of all Hohenstaufen adherents, no matter how many generations removed, Pope Gregory X (1271-78) threatened the city of Pisa with the loss of its episcopal status (already having lost archiepiscopal dignity in 1268) if it did not immediately desist from efforts to take Logudoro.160 The new situation put Ugolino della Gherardesca and the commune of Pisa at odds and, strangely, aligned Ugolino’s branch of the Gherardesca clan with Visconti ambitions. The commune agreed to forego all efforts to claim Sassari and Torres and was reconciled with Gregory X on 20 June 1273, even regaining archiepiscopal status.161 However, the abandonment of communal military support in Sardinia was insufficient to stop Giovanni Visconti and Ugolino della Gherardesca, who departed for Sardinia on 11 and 12 October 1273, respectively, in direct 158 Migliorotto Maccioni, ed. Difesa del dominio de Conti della Gherardesca sopra la Signoria di Donoratico, Bolgheri, Castagneto, etc. raccomandata alla protezione della real corona di Toscana, 2 vols. (Lucca: Gio. Riccomini, 1771), 2:67-71; Maria Luisa Ceccarelli Lemut, Medioevo pisano: chiesa, famiglie, territorio (Ospedaletto, Italy: Pacini, 2005), 266. 159 Dal Borgo, 14-16 no. 4; Tola, 1:391-392 no. 112. 160 There was also the competing claim over Sardinia by Philip of Anjou, Charles of Anjou’s son, who enjoyed a more amicable relationship with the papacy than Enzo. Jean Guiraud and E. Cadier, eds., Les registres de Grégoire X (1272-1276): Recueil des bulles de ce pape, 5 vols., Bibliothèque des Écoles françaises d'Athènes et de Rome, 2nd ser., 12 (Paris: Thorin & fils., 1892-1960), 1:76 no. 203. 161 Ibid., 1:109 no. 272; Guido Da Vallechia, Libri memoriales (La Spezia: Accademia lunigianese di scienze Giovanni Capellini, 1973), 32. 96 opposition to communal policy, suggesting the beginning of an alliance between the formerly bitter rivals.162 At this point it seems that Giovanni and Ugolino allied against the joint forces of the Pisan commune and Judge Mariano II de Bas of Arborea; Mariano controlled part of the southwestern portion of Logudoro and, around the time that Mariano was ultimately victorious over Giovanni Visconti in July 1274, both Ugolino and Giovanni returned to Tuscany.163 On 14 July 1274 Ugolino, having recently returned to Pisa, was imprisoned for refusing to relinquish his Sardinian possessions to communal control; the imprisonment was short-lived as he soon renounced his Sardinian lands.164 For the time being, Ugolino della Gherardesca wished to remain in the commune’s good graces, but the same was not true of Giovanni Visconti. After losing definitively to Mariano II, Giovanni Visconti returned to Tuscany, but instead of returning to Pisa he took refuge in the Maremma with the Angevin-allied, Guelf Aldobrandeschi counts of Santa Fiora. Attempts at arbitration with the commune failed and on 29 July 1274 the Visconti family was officially put on notice and 10,000 silver marks worth of assets were confiscated by Pisa.165 The Visconti family soon thereafter officially allied with the Guelf League, resulting in the exile of their allies from Pisa and the destruction or confiscation of their properties.166 Even Count Anselmo da Capraia left the city to ally with the Guelfs, though his recent conflicts with Mariano in Sardinia may have informed this decision.167 The Guelf League embraced the powerful Visconti family, and warfare against the Angevin-Guelf coalition 162 , 34; Ceccarelli Lemut, Medioevo pisano: chiesa, famiglie, territorio, 268. Almost nothing is known of Ugolino’s activities in 1273-1274, but Giovanni Visconti’s struggles in Sardinia are comparatively better known. Cristiani, "Gli avvenimenti pisani del periodo ugoliniano in una cronaca inedita," 3637, 75-77. 164 Ibid., 37, 82; Da Vallechia, 35. 165 Cristiani, "Gli avvenimenti pisani del periodo ugoliniano in una cronaca inedita," 75-81; Da Vallechia, 36. 166 Davidsohn, Forschungen zur älteren Geschichte von Florenz, 2:189-90 no. 1341; Cristiani, "Gli avvenimenti pisani del periodo ugoliniano in una cronaca inedita," 38, 81-83. 167 Corvaria, col. 683. 163 97 soon resumed.168 Though Giovanni Visconti died on 19 May 1275, his family maintained his political position.169 Ugolino della Gherardesca continued his nominal allegiance to Pisa until 8 June 1275 when, perhaps spying opportunity amid Pisa’s struggles, his family left the commune to join the Guelf alliance.170 The timing of Ugolino della Gherardesca’s exit so close to Giovanni Visconti’s death may not be mere coincidence, for Ugolino’s daughter was the wife of Giovanni Visconti and mother to his surviving children, Ugolino (“Nino”) and Guelfo; additionally, Ugolino della Gherardesca was a legal guardian of Giovanni’s heirs.171 With Giovanni out of the picture, perhaps Ugolino left Pisa in hopes of controlling his grandsons’ inheritances. The struggle for control of Sardinia—once a fight between separate Pisan families, now a fight between the commune itself and its leading families—had once again thrown the city into a desperate situation. Though communal control over Sardinia had been extended, it came at the cost of reviving the Guelf threat which had grown even more dangerous as many of the most powerful families in Pisa were actively fighting against the commune. One ought to remember that the della Gherardesca holdings in the Maremma were vital for the provisioning of grain to the city, especially during the years 1267-72 and 1275 when Charles of Anjou prohibited the export of Sicilian grain to Pisa172 and 1274-1276 when Tuscany experienced a general food 168 For descriptions of the warfare which lasted from autumn 1274 to autumn 1276, see "Fragmenta Historiae Pisanae," col. 645-646; col. 681-684; Davidsohn, Forschungen zur älteren Geschichte von Florenz, 2:197-198 nos. 1406, 1408, 1416; Bongi, 237; Pietro Silva, "Questioni e ricerche di cronistica pisana," in Archivio muratoriano studi e ricerche in servigio della nuova edizione dei Rerum Italicarum scriptores di L. A. Muratori (Castello, IT: S. Lapi, 1913), 42. 169 Da Vallechia, 38. 170 Corvaria, col. 684; Silva, 42; Cristiani, "Gli avvenimenti pisani del periodo ugoliniano in una cronaca inedita," 83. 171 Silva, 45; Maria Luisa Ceccarelli Lemut, "Il conte Ugolino della Gherardesca: un episodio della storia di Pisa alla fine del Duecento," in Momenti di storia medioevale pisana: discorsi per il giorno di S. Sisto, ed. Ottavio Banti and Cinzio Violante (Pisa: Pacini, 1991), 109-110. 172 David Abulafia, "Sul commercio del grano siciliano nel tardo Duecento," in La società mediterranea all'epoca del Vespro, ed. Francesco Giunta and Pietro Corrao (Palermo: Accademia di Scienze Lettere e Arti, 1983), 9-10; "A Tyrrhenian Triangle: Tuscany, Sicily, Tunis, 1276-1300," in Studi di storia economica toscana nel Medioevo e nel Rinascimento: in memoria di Federigo Melis, ed. Cinzio Violante (Ospedaletto, Italy: Pacini, 1987), 60; Jacoby, "The Pisan Commercial Manual of 1278 in the Mediterranean Context," 456-457. 98 shortage.173 The opposing force, even without Genoa, was too much for Pisa to overcome. Huge losses at the battles of Asciano (3 September 1275) and Fosso di Rinonico (9 June 1276) forced the commune to sue for peace.174 The terms of the treaty were rather one-sided, involving the restoration of numerous properties to Guelf cities and the readmission of all exiled Pisan Guelfs, along with the restoration of their goods and properties (even the Sardinian properties which Ugolino della Gherardesca had relinquished prior to his defection to the Guelf cause).175 The whole affair had further damaged the Pisan position in Tuscany, having suffered considerable losses again at the hands of the Guelf League, while also introducing a dangerously Guelffriendly component to the balance of Pisan politics and uniting the two most powerful families of Pisa. Though Cristiani illustrated that the Treaty of Rinonico did not issue in an era of Pisan Guelfism,176 the willingness of the leading families to ally with the Guelf League certainly calls into question whether later policies were truly accepted as being in the commune’s best interest or were merely self-serving for those in power. PEACE AND PROSPERITY? It may seem foolish to posit the question of whether there was peace and prosperity in Pisa, having just spent half a chapter describing warfare against the Angevin-Guelf-Genoese alliance and the comparatively superior economic performance of Genoa after mid-century, but discerning the status of the Pisan economy at this time is not an easy task. Many pieces of 173 This food shortage was particularly ill-timed for Pisa at it almost perfectly overlapped with the period of warfare against the Guelf League which entailed widespread destruction of the Pisan contado. It is unclear what the nature of the shortage was (natural or manmade), so perhaps it was the war itself that reduced the food supply so notably. Dameron, 988-989. 174 It was claimed that 4,000 Pisans were captured at Asciano. For brief accounts of the battles, see "Fragmenta Historiae Pisanae," col. 646; Bongi, 237; Silva, 42-43. 175 Peace talks began in the spring of 1276, but it was not until the defeat at Fosso di Rinonico that a treaty was finalized. Terlizzi, 390-397 no.729; Bongi, 237; Silva, 42-43; "Fragmenta Historiae Pisanae," col. 646. 176 Cristiani, "Gli avvenimenti pisani del periodo ugoliniano in una cronaca inedita," 41-44; Ceccarelli Lemut, Medioevo pisano: chiesa, famiglie, territorio, 271. 99 evidence argue in both directions, so it is important to address them all to provide context for the changes wrought by the events of the tumultuous 1280s. Although the alliances of the Visconti and della Gherardesca factions with the Guelf League were certainly damaging to Pisa, it must be remembered that this episode only lasted from mid-1274 until mid-1276; the decade was otherwise relatively peaceful compared to the rest of the century. Louis IX’s crusade prompted peace treaties with the Guelf cities, Genoa, and Charles of Anjou in 1270. The peace with the Guelf cities of Tuscany remained mostly in place except for the stated two-year war. Peace with Charles of Anjou, though by no means friendly, persisted throughout the decade. Even the peace with Genoa went uninterrupted, though probably more due to Genoese attention focused against the Angevin threat than any feelings of good will towards Pisa. In general, peace is a precondition for economic prosperity in a commercially oriented society, and here indeed there are multiple indications of such. Perhaps most notably, the Pisan woolens industry continued to thrive and expand throughout the period, evidenced in part by the increasing political power of the Arte della Lana, though production at this time was still primarily for localized consumption.177 In close relation to the continued ascent of the woolens industry was interaction with the fairs of Champagne for the provision of woolens and wool. Though Pisan merchants never achieved as substantial a presence in Champagne as their Tuscan neighbors, there are undeniable indications that in the 1270s Pisan merchants were becoming more interested in this burgeoning north-south trade route. After Charles of Anjou finally subdued Marseilles in 1265, Pisans sought other ports along the Midi with which they could 177 Herlihy, Pisa in the Early Renaissance: A Study of Urban Growth, 136, 151-161; Ticciati, L'ordine dei mercante a Pisa nei secoli XII-XIII, 184-186; Poloni, "Qualche considerazione sull'industria laniera pisana nel Due e Trecento," 189, 195-198. 100 trade, concluding treaties with Narbonne in 1275.178 Another example comes from the Pisan commercial manual of 1278 (one of the earliest surviving examples of this genre), in which Champagne features prominently, indicating the importance of the woolens trade and at least the shipping of other Tuscans towards the region, if not actual Pisan merchants.179 Pisan dominance of Maghrebi markets almost to the point of monopoly by this time also facilitated the woolens industry, as Pisan merchants were beginning to transport woolens to North Africa.180 Monopolistic status would have given Pisan merchants greater profits than when competitors still roamed the markets. Additionally, over the course of the late thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries, the Pisan families most involved in the Maghreb shifted from the nobility (Lanfranchi, Lanfreducci, Aiutamicristo, dal Bagno, Bocca, etc.) to popolo families (Alliata, Gambacorta, dell’Agnello, Buonconti, da Fauglia, dale Brache, etc.),181 mirroring the shifting demographics of the communal government. More enduring examples of Pisan prosperity are the monumental buildings of the Piazza dei Miracoli of Pisa, most of which were in some way augmented during the 1270s. Construction of the Baptistery began in 1153 and continued sporadically for the next two centuries.182 Construction had mostly stalled by the end of the twelfth century and had ceased completely by 178 Though Narbonne was not as well positioned as Marseilles for access to Champagne, it did have the advantage of being a good waypoint between the rest of the Midi and Catalonia. Salvatori, Boni amici et vicini: le relazioni tra Pisa e le città della Francia meridionale dall'XI alla fine del XIII secolo, 176, 289-293 no. 44-45, 295-301 no. 4749. 179 Jacoby, "The Pisan Commercial Manual of 1278 in the Mediterranean Context," 451, 455. For an edition of the entire manual, see Robert Sabatino Lopez and Gabriella Airaldi, "Il più antico manuale italiano di pratica della mercatura," in Miscellanea di studi storici, II, ed. Geo Pistarino (Genoa: Università di Genova, Istituto di Medievistica, 1983), 97-133. 180 An example comes from the will of Lupo di Gherardo Rosso in Bougie in 1278. Mékia Bensaci, "Familles et individualités pisanes en rélations avec le Maghrib," Les cahiers de Tunisie 28, no. 113/114 (1980): 60-65; Jacoby, "The Pisan Commercial Manual of 1278 in the Mediterranean Context," 456. 181 Banti, "I rapporti tra Pisa e gli stati islamici dell’Africa settentrionale tra l’XI e il XIV secolo," 23-24, esp. footnotes 40-41. 182 Piero Sanpaolesi, La Piazza dei Miracoli: il Duomo, il Battistero, il Campanile, il Camposanto di Pisa (Firenze: Del Turco, 1949), 37-44. 101 the 1230s due to lack of funding, leaving only the first level near completion.183 A baptismal font was added around 1246 and, thanks to Archbishop Federico Visconti, a pulpit was erected ca.1255-1260.184 The famed sculptor Giovanni Pisano added the statues to the exterior gables in 1277-1284 while the upper portion of the Baptistery underwent a gothic transformation during the same period. The iconic leaning Tower of Pisa similarly suffered from sporadic construction efforts that spanned 199 years from 1173 to 1372.185 Three floors had been built by 1178 when the campanile acquired a noticeable tilt; construction was then ceased for nearly a century. Work finally resumed under Giovanni di Simone in 1272, though here again this was cut short in 1284 after four more levels had been added. The walled burial grounds of the Camposanto (purportedly floored by several shiploads of soil from the Holy Land) also began construction around 1277 and likewise were abandoned in 1284, its chief architect, Giovanni di Simone, having perished at Meloria.186 Finally, the Ospedale Nuovo was undergoing continuous construction from 1258 until the early fourteenth century as part of the terms for reconciliation with Pope Alexander IV (1254-61), though this work benefitted from a papal fine of 10,000 lire per year for five years.187 The trend here is rather obvious. Pisa, flush with capital in the mid-twelfth century, began constructing monuments until the city’s fortune began to sour around the turn of the thirteenth century. The resumption of construction was not an idea worth entertaining during the highly volatile first half of the thirteenth century, and only after the start of the popolo regime and the 183 Eloise M. Angiola, "Nicola Pisano, Federigo Visconti, and the Classical Style in Pisa," The Art Bulletin 59, no. 1 (1977): 2. 184 Sanpaolesi, 41. 185 Ibid., 45-46. 186 Ibid., 47-55. 187 Elizabeth P. Rothrauff, "Charity in a Medieval Community: Politics, Piety and Poor-relief in Pisa, 1257-1312" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of California, Berkeley, 1994), 52-53, 62. For more on the Ospedale Nuovo, see Patetta, 162-188. 102 archiepiscopacy of Federico Visconti did the city begin to build again (the Ospedale Nuovo and a pulpit for the Baptistery). The period of peace afforded by the treaties for Louis IX’s second crusade enabled work on the Tower to resume, while the peace following the treaty of Fosso di Rinonico in 1276 permitted work on the Camposanto to begin and on the Baptistery to begin anew. Peace enabled increased spending on non-essential projects rather than on warfare or dealing with the ravages of it. The processes by which monumental projects were funded were mostly religious, usually budgeted for either by the cathedral canons and archbishop or through donations from private individuals (most commonly in their last testaments).188 Samuel Cohn’s work on late medieval wills highlighted that Pisan society was exceptional among Tuscan cities for how often dying Pisans made pious bequests, preceding the rest of Tuscany by decades in terms of this “mendicant spirituality.”189 Elizabeth Rothrauff greatly expanded upon the Pisan portion of Cohn’s work, illustrating that the process of the “laicization of Pisan institutional charity” began in the 1270s, whereby laypersons, especially women, took it upon themselves to make charitable donations for the public good rather than either depending on the Church to handle it or making bequests to specific individuals.190 This behavioral trend was a product of the precursors of civic Christianity and civic humanism, which had sprung from the late twelfth century elevation of the importance of charity over penitence and asceticism.191 In this spirit, “just three months after Alexander IV's hospital was founded, the pope, at the request of Fra Mansueto, requested archbishop Visconti to centralize the jurisdiction and 188 Rothrauff, 32-34. Samuel K. Cohn, The Cult of Remembrance and the Black Death: Six Renaissance Cities in Central Italy (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1992), 31-71, 76-77. 190 Rothrauff, ch. 3 & 4, esp. p.174. 191 Lester K. Little, "Pride Goes before Avarice: Social Change and the Vices in Latin Christendom," The American Historical Review 76, no. 1 (1971); Cohn, 32; Rothrauff, 157-159; Parker, "Papa et pecunia: Innocent III’s Combination of Reform and Fiscal Policy to Finance Crusades," 7. 189 103 patrimonies of almost all of the city's smaller, pre-existing hospitals in order that their funds and resources be liquidated into the new hospital, already in need of a financial boost.”192 Archbishop Federico began the effort enthusiastically, but due to resistance from the various parishes and hospitals the process only occurred gradually over the next two centuries. Nevertheless, Federico did succeed in obligating every hospital to pay an annual tribute to the Ospedale Nuovo. Federico saw the centralization of Pisan hospitals as a means to revitalize the Piazza del Duomo (a.k.a. Piazza dei Miracoli) and to centralize the city’s religious life. In this vein he personally sponsored the completion and decoration of the Baptistery and the creation of the Camposanto cemetery in 1277.193 The resumption of work on the Tower was also likely part of this campaign. Although the institutional centralization was not accomplished in his lifetime, Federico Visconti’s monumental efforts achieved his aim of supporting “the notion of a civic Church,” as evidenced by the change in the pattern of testamentary pious bequests.194 Yet despite these signs of prosperity, Pisa was not living up to its potential. Though the Pisan woolens industry was undeniably thriving in this period, the same could be said of the woolens industries of most Northern Italian cities. The important distinction here was that the expansion of the Florentine woolens industry far outpaced that of Pisa, in part evidenced by the explosive population growth the city enjoyed throughout the thirteenth century.195 Of note in this regard was that the progressive guelfizzazione of Tuscany (and indeed most of North and Central Italy) created preferable commercial advantages for Florentine merchant-bankers, especially since Florence was the de facto leader of the Tuscan Guelf League, which Ghibelline Pisans 192 ASPi, Diplomatico, Spedale Nuovo, 28 July 1258; Rothrauff, 55-56. Rothrauff, 225. 194 Ibid., 227. 195 On the Florentine woolens industry, see Hidetoshi Hoshino, L'arte della lana in Firenze nel basso medioevo: il commercio della lana e il mercato dei panni fiorentini nei secoli XIII-XV (Florence: Olschki, 1980). On Florentine demographics (and connection to industry), see Day, “Population Groth and Productivity,” 82-110. 193 104 could not enjoy.196 Latecomers to the woolens trade, Pisans began emphasizing Champagne and connections to it through ports along the French Midi slightly too late. The longtime ally of Marseilles had succumbed to Angevin control in 1265, breaking ties with Pisa, and Genoa already enjoyed a significantly larger presence in the remaining ports along the French and Iberian coasts (including Narbonne).197 Furthermore, this was precisely the time when the Italian woolens industry began shifting to the use of English wool.198 This change, along with the opening of a direct sea route to Flanders by the Genoese by 1277 and political changes in France, led to the diminution of the Champagne fairs, and with it the importance of the Rhône River and its surrounding ports.199 Genoese control of the rich alum mines of Phocaea also gave the commune an enormous competitive advantage in controlling the woolens trade with Northern Europe, carrying raw materials and finished goods in both directions. Pisa had long dominated trade in Maghrebi ports, even almost obtaining a monopoly in the 1260s. However, the intensive focus of Pisan commerce on the region tells only half the story. In light of the evidence, it is reasonable to suppose that Pisan interest in the Maghreb was intensifying precisely because their ability to compete in the Eastern Mediterranean was diminishing. Though Pisans did continue to trade in Constantinople after 1261 (even founding a short-lived Porto Pisano in the Sea of Azov), they could not compete with the privileged status of the Genoese in Constantinople, Genoese control of the eastern Aegean Sea, and Venetian territorial control of the western Aegean; there simply was not enough room for Pisans to 196 Day, 102. The italicized term is borrowed from Hoshino. Genoese treaties with Iberian rulers, particularly with Seville and Granada, greatly facilitated the city’s entry into Atlantic shipping around 1277. Salvatori, Boni amici et vicini: le relazioni tra Pisa e le città della Francia meridionale dall'XI alla fine del XIII secolo, 160-173; Pistarino, 38. 198 Alwyn A. Ruddock, Italian Merchants and Shipping in Southampton, 1270-1600 (Southampton: University College, 1951), 17, 20; Ashtor, 61. 199 Genoa was soon followed by Venice and Catalonia in establishing an Atlantic sea route, but there is no evidence that Pisa ever entered the Atlantic with any vigor. Goldthwaite, 9-10, 30. 197 105 maintain a foothold. Ottavio Banti posited that the increased focus on the Maghreb was due to the relatively greater political stability of the region as compared with the East,200 but I think that instead there was a growing disconnect between Eastern merchants of Pisan ancestry and the metropole. The Pisan portolan of 1278 does not even mention the Porto Pisano in the Sea of Azov and only rarely mentions Constantinople, indicating just how much trade with the Byzantines had fallen.201 Pisans in the Levant instead concentrated their efforts on Egypt, Acre, and Cilician Armenia,202 but this did not necessarily aid the home city very much. If one assumes that trends in Famagusta in the 1290s also held true for the 1270s in other Levantine ports, then Pisan merchants in the East were much less apt to send the fruits of their commerce back to Pisa, instead preferring to reinvest in the East.203 Since early in the twelfth century, Pisan merchants were more prone than their competitors to permanently settle in Eastern ports,204 so perhaps this behavior is a legacy of the progressive generational detachment from the mother city, with Eastern Pisan merchants focusing on regional transshipment rather than long distance trade with a city they would not reasonably consider as “home.” Whatever the case, trade with the Eastern Mediterranean was suffering and the Maghreb provided a ready outlet for this stress. Unfortunately, even this new haven was not free of worry; not only had Louis’ Crusade put a brief damper on Pisan trade with the region (and gave the local Pisan merchants quite a scare), but the Crusade resulted in a double hit to the Pisan position there. Charles of Anjou had negotiated favorable commercial privileges for his subjects and the Hafsid sultan had invited in Banti, "I rapporti tra Pisa e gli stati islamici dell’Africa settentrionale tra l’XI e il XIV secolo," 9-10. Balard, "Génois et Pisans en Orient (fin du XIIIe - début du XIVe siècle)," 185; Jacoby, "The Pisan Commercial Manual of 1278 in the Mediterranean Context," 464. 202 Balard, "Génois et Pisans en Orient (fin du XIIIe - début du XIVe siècle)," 188-189, 194. 203 In 1296-1310 only 0.43% of the investment capital of Pisan merchants in Famagusta was directed back to Pisa while 24.59% went to Cilician Armenia and 29.06% went to Venice (perhaps due to their better position in the Aegean and Black Seas). Compare this with Genoese merchants sending approximately 25% of their investment capital back to Genoa. Ibid., 205-206. 204 Parker, "Pisan Migration Patterns along Twelfth Century Eastern Mediterranean Trade Routes," 104. 200 201 106 the Catalans as a balance, both damaging the monopoly Pisans had taken decades to build. Adding insult to injury, the imminent Aragonese-Catalan acquisition of Sicily in 1282 put the important island in the hands of one of Pisa’s newest commercial competitors.205 Numismatics offers one final window into the health of the Pisan economy in this period. The introduction of gold coinage by Genoa and Florence in 1254 has already been mentioned as a sign of the vitality of those cities. What is important in the Pisan context is the value and velocity of Pisan coinage. The gold florin, and to a lesser extent the genoin, enjoyed almost immediate popularity upon its creation due to its excellent purity and weight, and over the course of the late thirteenth century was gradually adopted as the preferred currency of commerce in Tuscany and much of the Mediterranean—a title formerly held by the silver Pisan grosso.206 This process was already well advanced by the end of the 1270s, perhaps in part due to various problems the Pisan currency experienced. An examination of currency exchange rates over time reveals that the value of the florin (as calculated in small Pisan denari) rose from 28s.6d. in 1268 to 36s. in 1277, a 26% increase.207 Since the florin was valued precisely for the consistency of its weight and fineness, the change must be found on the Pisan side of the equation. First, the growing popularity of the florin created greater demand for the gold coins, increasing its worth as an object relative to other silver currencies that were falling in demand. Second, the relative prices of gold and silver bullion were in flux during this period as new sources of both were exploited and older mines were exhausted.208 In the late 1270s in particular the price of silver bullion was rising,209 making 205 Regarding Catalans, see Goldthwaite, 30. Ceccarelli Lemut, "Pisa nel Mediterraneo durante il XIII secolo," 16. 207 For a useful table of exchange rates, see Baldassarri, 458-459. 208 Casini, 137. 209 Baldassarri, 121. 206 107 it more difficult for mints to acquire the silver they needed, which in turn led some mints to depart from best practices. Third, the increase in the value of the new silver aquilino grosso of Pisa from 24d. in 1263, to 26d. in 1272, and then to 33d. in 1279 suggests that the quality of the coins produced may have been slightly reduced to accommodate the greater cost of silver bullion. Fortunately, thanks to Pisan access to Sardinian silver mines, the commune was better positioned to deal with fluctuations in bullion prices than other cities which minted in silver.210 Lastly, the harsh terms of the treaty of Fosso di Rinonico in 1276 contributed to the plight of Pisan currency by returning the Sardinian silver mines to Gherardesca ownership.211 In short, any changes to the value or desirability of the Pisan grosso would only have accelerated the rate of adoption of the gold florin. The beginning of the decline of the city’s coinage was rather indicative of the health of Pisan commerce as a whole, with the newer competitors pushing the communal currency out of the picture.212 When properly contextualized, one can see that, while the Pisan economy was doing better than in the preceding decades, its growth lagged far behind that of its chief competitors of Genoa and Florence, making it increasingly difficult for the commune to compete commercially and politically with its foes. 210 Ibid., 131. Pisa was forced to return all of the goods and properties confiscated from the exiled families, including the silver mines of Sardinia, in addition to handing over several important portions of its contado to its enemies. Terlizzi, 390397 no.729; Casini, 137. 212 Ceccarelli Lemut, "Pisa nel Mediterraneo durante il XIII secolo," 16. 211 108 Chapter 3 – War with Genoa and the Battle of Meloria At the beginning of 1282, the Western Mediterranean was reasonably peaceful by medieval standards. Following the temporary abandonment of the Reconquista in 1252 and the failure of Louis IX’s second crusade in 1270, the Iberian and North African coastline enjoyed a prolonged respite from warfare, though Peter III of Aragon (r. 1276-85) was preparing a fleet to attack Tunis despite amenable relations with the Hafsids.1 In southern France, the cities of the coast had been subjugated to Charles of Anjou by 1265. Despite the occasional tussle between individuals, Genoa and Pisa had remained at peace since the early 1270s and there were only occasional clashes with Pisa’s Guelf neighbors after 1276. In Naples, Charles planned a crusade to retake Constantinople, scheduled for 1282.2 The major islands of the Western Mediterranean, however, were not quite as placid, and disturbances there would ultimately rewrite the geopolitical map of the Mediterranean. The Last Years before Meloria THE SICILIAN VESPERS To solidify control over the Regno and neutralize Hohenstaufen loyalists, Charles of Anjou (r. 1266-85, of Sicily) had confiscated the properties and titles of the local aristocracy and redistributed them to his French subjects. After his rule was established, he moved the seat of power from Palermo to Naples and used the island of Sicily as merely a source of funding for his ambitions in the wider Mediterranean basin, heavily taxing local inhabitants. Sicilian anger 1 Bernat D'Esclot, "Cronica del Rey en Pere," in Chroniques étrangères relatives aux expéditions françaises pendant le XIIIe siècle, ed. Jean Alexandre C. Buchon (Paris: A. Pilon, 1875), 626-628, 630-631; Ramón Muntaner, Crónica d'en Ramon Muntaner (Barcelona: La Renaixensa, 1886), 103-11; Runciman, 221-222. 2 The new Pope Martin IV had requested that Charles attack Constantinople. To that end, Charles concluded a treaty with Venice in 1281. Dufourcq, 174. 109 boiled over on the evening of Easter Monday, around Vespers on 31 March 1282 near Palermo, when an altercation occurred between some French troops and a crowd of native Sicilians.3 The event quickly escalated; within several weeks thousands of French men and women had been massacred across Sicily and the governance of the island broke free of Angevin control forever. Several weeks later, after Pope Martin IV (1281-85) denied their request to become independent communes, Sicilians invited Peter III of Aragon to rule over them, owing to his Hohenstaufen marital ties (his wife, Constance, was the daughter of Manfred of Sicily). He landed in Trapani in August and marched unopposed to Palermo. As discussed in Chapter 2, Charles of Anjou had a rocky relationship with several of the Italian mercantile communes. Pisa had struggled against Angevin troops in the 1260s before reaching an uneasy peace that permitted its merchants to resume grain exportation in Sicily. Genoa spent most of the following decade in open conflict with Charles until a new peace was settled in 1276. Neither Genoa nor Pisa contributed appreciably to his attempts to retake Sicily, perhaps due to their tumultuous history with Charles. Despite the victory of the Guelf-allied Pisan exiles over Ghibelline Pisa, in the 1270s the city continued to secretly pursue anti-Angevin policies in hopes that a more powerful ally might arise. This included several embassies to Rudolf of Habsburg (r. 1273-91) in 1277 and 1278,4 as well as a June 1277 treaty with Peter III of Aragon,5 both of whom possessed claims to the Hohenstaufen lands. Rudolf, however, never entertained a real interest in Italy and circumstances surrounding Pisan relations with Peter soon changed. 3 For a lengthier exploration of this event, read Runciman. Winter, 68-69. 5 The treaty not only gave Pisan merchants commercial privileges in Aragonese lands, but also gave reciprocal rights to Catalan merchants in Sardinia and Pisa, indicating the growing importance of commerce to the Aragonese crown. Stefano Maria Cingolani, ed. Diplomatari de Pere el Gran 2. Relacions internacionals i política exterior (12601285), Diplomataris 68 (Barcelona: Fundació Noguera, 2015), 151-152 no. 39. 4 110 By the middle of 1281 Martin IV and Charles of Anjou were requesting the aid of the major Italian maritime communes for a crusade to retake Constantinople. Venice agreed to participate and Pisa also promised to provide some ships.6 Though by this point Pisa could not hope to become the most prominent commercial power in the city, having let its commerce with Constantinople deteriorate significantly since 1204 while both its rivals continuously ramped up operations in the Aegean, this was an opportunity to gain more privileges and perhaps better access to the booming trade with the Black Sea. Genoa politely refused to get involved, claiming they were too busy with other undisclosed endeavors. The Ligurian republic even went so far as to send a galley to Constantinople to warn Emperor Michael VIII Palaeologus (r. 1259-82) of the coming invasion.7 Michael VIII and Peter III separately appealed to Pisa to abstain from involvement in the campaign.8 No response survives, yet the Pisan presence alongside the Angevin fleet at the Battle of Nicotera in October 1282 makes their position plain.9 Nevertheless, this marked the end of Pisan involvement in the War of the Sicilian Vespers, as the attention of the commune soon was consumed by more pressing matters. So, somewhat bizarrely, on the eve of the Sicilian Vespers one sees Genoa in opposition to Angevin ambitions, and thus a natural ally of the Aragonese, while Pisa suddenly endorsed the Angevin strategy despite years of enmity. 6 G.L.F. Tafel and G.M. Thomas, eds., Urkunden zur älteren Handels- und Staatsgeschichte der Republik Venedig, mit besonderer Beziehung auf Byzanz und die Levante: Vom neunten bis zum Ausgang des fünfzehnten Jahrhunderts, 3 vols. (Vienna: Hof- und Staatsdruckerei, 1856-7), 3:287-297; Fritz Kern, ed. Acta imperii Angliae et Franciae ab a. 1267 ad a. 1313: Dokumente vornehmlich zur Geschichte der auswärtigen Beziehungen Deutschlands in ausländischen Archiven (Tübingen: Mohr, 1911), 15-16 nos. 25 and 27. 7 Belgrano and Imperiale di Sant' Angelo, 5:16-17; Lopez, Benedetto Zaccaria: ammiraglio e mercante nella Genova del Duecento, 105-108; Epstein, 158. 8 Kern, 16 no. 26, 17 no. 28; Runciman, 194 note 2. 9 Stefano Maria Cingolani, Historiografia, propaganda i comunicació al segle XIII: Bernat Desclot i les dues redaccions de la seva crònica, Memories de la Secció Històrico-Arqueològica 68 (Barcelona: Institut d'Estudis Catalans, 2006), 434-438. 111 Although the details of the uprising and the ensuing war are mostly inconsequential for the present study, it is worth noting that, with a few initial exceptions, the fleets of the major Italian maritime powers were not involved in the struggle. For the first time in centuries a major western Mediterranean naval conflict did not involve Venice, Pisa, or Genoa as key players. This is a good indication of just how much Catalan-Aragonese maritime power had developed since recapturing Majorca in 1229; likewise for the Angevins, though they were soundly defeated by the Aragonese. The transfer of Sicily to the Crown of Aragon hemmed in the Genoese and Pisans, reducing western access beyond the Ligurian and Tyrrhenian Seas without Aragonese favor. According to Francesco Giunta, this necessitated the elimination of one or the other in such a confined space.10 Genoa positioned itself to curry Aragonese favor while Pisans, at least at first on the Angevin side, were unable to win similarly advantageous terms in Sicily.11 The Byzantine emperor recognized the rising star of Aragon and allied with Peter III on the eve of the Vespers, even taking a role in inciting the insurrection. Aragon had truly become a central player on the Mediterranean stage, upsetting the balance of political-commercial power that had favored the Italian communes for centuries. Underlying this episode and its consequences was the importance of grain. Sicily had been important as a granary since ancient times, and its importance as a commercial crossroads arose partially due to this fact. While Sicily and the southern Italian peninsula were under the governance of one individual, and the seat of power remained on the island, it was clear to all commercial entities that friendly relations with Sicily were essential for access to the island’s 10 Francesco Giunta, "Federico III di Sicilia e le repubbliche marinare tirreniche," in Genova, Pisa e il Mediterraneo tra Due e Trecento: per il VII centenario della Battaglia della Meloria, Genova, 24-27 Ottobre 1984, Atti della Società Ligure di Storia Patria, nuova serie 24.2 (Genoa: Società Ligure di Storia Patria, 1984), 481. 11 Eliyahu Ashtor, "Il retroscena economico dell'urto genovese-pisano alla fine del Duecento," ibid., Atti della Società ligure di storia patria, nuova serie 24.2, 80. 112 markets. After Charles acquired the Regno he moved political operations to Naples, separating the commercial and political centers of the realm. Having grown into its majority in the midthirteenth century, Florence appears to have concentrated its diplomatic and commercial efforts on Naples and Apulia, rather than Sicily, at precisely the time that they became closely allied with Charles in Tuscany.12 Florence’s two principal economic interests in the Regno were exporting Florentine textiles to southern peninsular markets and importing grain. Thus, once the Regno was cleaved in two, Florence naturally remained at the side of its long-time Angevin ally.13 The plains of Apulia provided more than enough grain for Florence and the commune’s banking services achieved new importance for their Angevin client as he fought to reclaim Sicily. Pisa was a new friend to Charles of Anjou, but the differences between the Pisan and Florentine economies—Pisa focusing more on transshipment, Florence focusing more on banking and industry—prevented Pisa from benefitting appreciably from the friendship in the way Florence did. Meanwhile, the separation of Sicily from Neapolitan control opened the island’s grain markets to those who had formerly suffered Charles’ disfavor, namely the Catalans and Genoese.14 Genoa itself sourced most of its grain either from Sicily or the Black Sea region. Pisans soon realized the error they had made in betting on Charles and by 1283 they were again exporting grain from Sicily.15 In losing control of the markets and fields of Sicily, Charles lost the interest of most Mediterranean powers and with it aa significant portion of his political influence. This diversification of options for sourcing grain was ultimately harmful to Pisa’s 12 Abulafia, "Southern Italy and the Florentine Economy, 1265-1370," 386. Ricordano Malespini, Giacotto Malespini, and Vincenzio Follini, Storia fiorentina di Ricordano Malispini col seguito di Giacotto Malispini: dalla edificazione di Firenze sino all'anno 1286 (Florence: G. Ricci, 1816), 185. 14 Abulafia, "Sul commercio del grano siciliano nel tardo Duecento," 15. 15 Herlihy, Pisa in the Early Renaissance: A Study of Urban Growth, 85. 13 113 place in Tuscany. Pisan trade was primarily a transit trade and one of the things that had made Pisa so indispensable to other Tuscan cities was its diplomatic mediation power in foreign ports, the legal protections for its merchants, and the “flag of convenience” under which Tuscan merchants could operate.16 Now that Florence maintained favorable relations with the Kingdom of Naples and Genoese and Catalan traders had privileged access to Sicily, the commercial utility of affiliating with Pisa was much diminished, further harming the prestige of the commune among its neighbors. Chronicle evidence indicates that 1282 was the beginning of one of the worst grain crises to hit thirteenth-century Tuscany, lasting until 1286.17 While the dearth probably hit Pisa less severely, due to its control of the fertile lands of the Maremma and Sardinia, other Tuscan cities were not so lucky. Their desperate need for sustenance would have encouraged closer ties with whomever could supply grain. As 1282 wore on, it became increasingly clear that Florence and Genoa were better situated to fill Tuscan bellies with grain from aboard than was Pisa, again damaging the commercial and political influence of Pisa in the region. It is known that by the late 1260s Pisa was sourcing much of its grain from outside of Tuscany,18 perhaps the dearth of 1282 was severe enough for Pisa to gamble on taking Corsica away from Genoa. JUDGE SINUCELLO OF CINARCA AND THE BEGINNING OF THE WAR Sinucello della Rocca, the Corsican son of the lord of Cinarca, was nothing if not an ambitious opportunist and his struggle to extend his influence across Corsica ultimately led to the resumption of open warfare between Genoa and Pisa. As a youth, his father was killed by his 16 Salvatori, Boni amici et vicini: le relazioni tra Pisa e le città della Francia meridionale dall'XI alla fine del XIII secolo, 175-176. 17 Marchionne di Coppo Stefani, Cronaca fiorentina di Marchionne di Coppo Stefani, Rerum Italicarum Scriptores, 2nd ser., 30.1 (Città di Castello: S. Lapi, 1903), 58; Dameron, 1001. 18 Dameron, 997. 114 cousins, leading Sinucello to flee to Pisa in his adolescence. By the age of twenty-four (c. 1243) Sinucello was rewarded for his service in the army of Pisa by receiving the feudal lordship of Cinarca and the title “Judge of Cinarca.” He soon thereafter returned to Corsica on a Pisan galley, succeeded in retaking some lands, and proceeded to extend his territorial control in Corsica over the following decades, becoming the de facto ruler of southern Corsica. In December 1258 Sinucello made an alliance with the Genoese castellan of Bonifacio. This was not an intentionally anti-Pisan agreement, but rather one to help Sinucello increase his power against his inimical neighbors. Genoa began implementing initiatives that ran counter to Sinucello’s political interests in 1272 as the commune tried to extend its sphere of influence in southern Corsica. Despite a December 1278 renewal of the alliance between Sinucello and Genoa, in April 1282 Genoa concluded a treaty with Sinucello’s cousins (purportedly because Sinucello had violated the previous treaty by attacking Bonifacio19) that sought to displace Judge Cinarca.20 By late May 1282, Genoese forces landed in Bonifacio and proceeded to encroach upon Sinucello’s domain. Seeing no better alternatives, Sinucello sailed for Pisa where he played upon his former feudal ties to seek assistance from the Tuscan commune.21 The commune of Pisa welcomed Sinucello with open arms, seeing in his defection from Genoa an avenue to reassert communal control in Corsica. Despite Genoa obtaining political control of Corsica in the late twelfth century, the Corsican church and much of the island’s commerce remained linked to Pisa well into the fourteenth century;22 nonetheless, the 19 Belgrano and Imperiale di Sant' Angelo, 5:20-21. Riccoti, 2: cols. 42-47. 21 For most of the biographical information about Sinucello della Rocca referenced in this section, see Jean-André Cancellieri, "Sinucello della Rocca," in Dizionario biografico degli Italiani 37: della Fratta - della Volpaia (Roma: Istituto della Enciclopedia Italiana, 1989), 322-325. 22 Luigina Carratori, "Chiesa pisana e Corsica nel XIV secolo," in Acta de la table ronde de Biguglia: La féodalité corse et ses relations avec les cités maritimes, Cahiers Corsica 106-110 (Bastia: Fédération d’Associations et Groupements pour les Etudes Corses, 1984); Jean-André Cancellieri, "De la 'Corse pisane' à la 'Corse génoise': remarques sur la portée structurelle insulaire de la bataille de la Meloria (1284)," in Genova, Pisa e il Mediterraneo 20 115 opportunity for Pisa to injure its age-old rival was too appealing to ignore. Indeed, Genoa was not altogether surprised by the turn of events as Pisa had been attempting to undermine Genoese control of lands near the Strait of Bonifacio for years, evidenced by the return of Sassari to Pisan control sometime in 1280-1282.23 Although in August 1282 both Genoa and Pisa exchanged ambassadors in hopes of defusing the situation, Pisa was unwilling to abandon their new Corsican ally and so both sides prepared for war, ending the truce of 1270.24 Around the same time Tommaso Spinola arrived in Genoa and reported that he saw Pisans in Acre making light of the capture and death of the Genoese ally Guy II of Ibelin, lord of Jubail, following his capture by Prince Bohemond VII of Antioch (r. 1275-87).25 Incensed by both the Levantine and Corsican episodes, Spinola reportedly rose a cry of “war with Pisa!”26 The Genoese government immediately created a special council of sixteen citizens, the Credenza, tasked with financing and managing the war along with the two captains of the Genoese popolo.27 The creation of the Genoese Credenza enabled the commune to better marshal its resources for war, including the ability to build and dispatch enormous fleets.28 The remainder of 1282 passed almost without incident, save for a non-engagement outside of Porto Pisano, while both sides built up their war fleets.29 1283 also saw no major engagements, though throughout the year the various smaller squadrons and fleets of the two tra Due e Trecento: per il VII centenario della Battaglia della Meloria, Genova, 24-27 Ottobre 1984, Atti della Società Ligure di Storia Patria, nuova serie 24.2 (Genoa: Società Ligure di Storia Patria, 1984), 575-576. 23 Besta, 1:246. 24 Belgrano and Imperiale di Sant' Angelo, 5:20-24; Crawford, 87 cap. 441. 25 Crawford, 80 cap. 412-413. 26 Ibid., 87 cap. 441. 27 Belgrano and Imperiale di Sant' Angelo, 5:25; Epstein, 158; Stanton, 130. 28 Dotson, 123. 29 The chronicler recounts that Genoese ships briefly blocked the harbor of Porto Pisano before sailing home. In retaliation, several ships sailed to Genoa and fired silver-tipped arrows into the city before retreating. This is quite similar to the 1243 episode recounted by Salimbene de Adam, so it may be wrongly dated. Interestingly, the chronicler cites events in Acre, not Corsica, as the root cause of Genoa’s actions. For the 1282 account, see Silva, 43-44. For Salimbene di Adam’s account from 1243, see Salimbene di Adam, Chronicle, 544. 116 communes participated in raids and games of cat and mouse across the eastern Ligurian and northern Tyrrhenian Seas.30 John Dotson has noted Genoa’s February 1283 raid on Elba as particularly important, representative of an overall shift in naval tactics. For the first time, thanks in part to the recent introduction of the magnetic compass along with better sea charting, winter was no longer an off season for maritime combat.31 Though the introduction of winter combat did not seriously influence the outcome of the war, it was indicative of the increasing pace of technological advances. Dotson also credits the creation of the Credenza for enabling the relatively early Genoese adoption of the trireme vessel—the new, larger cousin to the common bireme—which ultimately may have given Genoa a significant advantage over the predominantly bireme Pisan fleet.32 1284: The Point of No Return EARLY 1284 By the beginning of 1284, both communes had amassed sizeable fleets, requiring a division of forces between several commanders for proper control.33 The Pisans Ugolino della Gherardesca and Andreotto Saraceno were made captains general of war at sea, while Bonifazio “Fazio” della Gherardesca (Count of Donoratico and nephew to Ugolino, from the rival Ghibelline branch of the Gherardesca family) was made captain of the war in Sardinia while the podestà of Pisa, Albertino Morosini (a Venetian), maintained the defense of the commune.34 For 30 For the details of the skirmishes of 1283, see "Fragmenta Historiae Pisanae," col. 647; Crawford, 88 cap.442; Belgrano and Imperiale di Sant' Angelo, 5:27, 30-38, 41, 45; Cristiani, "Gli avvenimenti pisani del periodo ugoliniano in una cronaca inedita," 90-92; Corvaria, 691; Da Vallechia, 46-49. 31 Dotson, 124. 32 Ibid., 123-124. 33 Most of my retelling of the events of 1284 must be attributed to Charles D. Stanton, who provided a wonderful account of the Battle of Meloria in his 2015 study: Stanton, 131-132. 34 "Fragmenta Historiae Pisanae," cols. 647-648; Belgrano and Imperiale di Sant' Angelo, 5:47. 117 the Genoese, Oberto Doria retained control of the home fleet while the famed Benedetto Zaccaria commanded a smaller force that patrolled the waters around Sardinia.35 In April 1284 a storm separated Fazio della Gherardesca from his fleet of 25 ships while en route to Cagliari. After the storm subsided, Fazio awoke to find his vessel surrounded by a Genoese merchant convoy escorted by Zaccaria. The rest of the Pisan convoy arrived on the scene just as battle ensued and, though both sides were equally matched, the Genoese handily won the engagement, allowing only half the Pisan ships to escape. Fazio and many of his men were then carried off to Genoa for a lengthy imprisonment.36 The Genoese capitalized on the victory by harrying Pisan shipping across the Tyrrhenian. Zaccaria had been roaming the Tuscan coast until July when he received orders to relieve the Genoese soldiers besieging Sassari, Sardinia. Shortly after hearing of Zaccaria’s departure, the Pisan podestà Morosini and Ugolino della Gherardesca set sail toward Genoa with a fleet of 72 galleys. Salimbene de Adam claimed that to man so many ships, all able-bodied Pisan men between the ages of twenty and sixty were drafted into naval service.37 An undertaking of such size was impossible to keep secret; upon hearing of the imminent Pisan attack, Oberto Doria recalled Zaccaria from Sardinia. Doria armed all available galleys around Genoa (perhaps 60 or so) and was able to form a defensive line against the Pisan fleet when it arrived on 31 July 1284. Zaccaria arrived the same day but, failing to seize the opportunity to attack the Pisan flank, he sailed his 30 galleys into the safety of the Genoese harbor. Doria next moved the combined fleet to the southeast, hoping to draw the Pisan forces into a trap against the Genoese harbor, but 35 For more on the fascinating and far-ranging life of Benedetto Zaccaria, see Lopez, Benedetto Zaccaria: ammiraglio e mercante nella Genova del Duecento. 36 "Fragmenta Historiae Pisanae," col. 648; Belgrano and Imperiale di Sant' Angelo, 5:48-49; Crawford, 88-89 cap. 444; Stanton, 131. 37 Salimbene di Adam, Chronicle, 542. 118 Morosini instead sailed his fleet westward to raid the Ligurian coast before heading home, having narrowly averted disaster. Doria and Zaccaria thus entered into pursuit of the Pisan fleet on 1 August 1284. After reaching Porto Maurizio, Doria learned that the Pisan fleet had turned southeast toward Corsica. When Doria reached Capo Corso on 5 August, he found that the Pisan fleet had stopped to re-water only a few hours earlier before continuing homeward. Doria hastened onward, arriving outside Porto Pisano in the late afternoon on 6 August 1284, before the enemy fleet was fully sheltered.38 THE BATTLE OF MELORIA The Battle of Meloria39 was recorded with widely varying degrees of detail and accuracy in numerous medieval chronicles, though the lengthiest contemporary descriptions can be found in Iacopo Doria’s portion of the Annales Ianuenses, the third part of the Deeds of the Cypriots, and the chronicle of Salimbene de Adam.40 As the Genoese approached Porto Pisano, Oberto Doria ordered his fleet of 70-odd galleys to unfurl their sails as they took position just north of the islet of Meloria while Benedetto Zaccaria’s fleet of perhaps 30 galleys remained behind them at a distance with their sails lowered, in hopes that Pisan lookouts from shore would miscalculate the size of the Genoese forces, helped by the afternoon sun sitting behind them on the horizon. 38 Belgrano and Imperiale di Sant' Angelo, 5:51-54; "Fragmenta Historiae Pisanae," col. 648; Camillo Manfroni, Storia della Marina Italiana, 2 vols. (Livorno: R. Accademia Navale, 1897-1902), 2:124-126; Stanton, 131-132. 39 Again, most of my retelling of the action owes a large debt to the work of Charles Stanton. Stanton, 132-135. 40 For the best accounts, see Belgrano and Imperiale di Sant' Angelo, 5:53-57; Crawford, 89-91 cap. 445-451; Salimbene di Adam, Chronicle, 541-543. For other, shorter or later medieval accounts, see Villani, 1: bk. 8, sec. 92, pp.550-552; Cristiani, "Gli avvenimenti pisani del periodo ugoliniano in una cronaca inedita," 93-94; Bongi, 237; "Chronicon aliud breve Pisanum incerti ab anno MCI usque ad annum MCCLXVIII," 7, 9-10; "Fragmenta Historiae Pisanae," col. 648; Silva, 44-45; Da Vallechia, 49; Iannella, 41; Corvaria, col. 691-692; Giovanni Monleone, ed. Iacopo da Varagine e la sua Cronaca di Genova dalle origini al MCCXCVII, 3 vols. (Rome: Tipografia del Senato, 1941), 396-97; Malespini, Malespini, and Follini, 197-198. 119 Figure 3.1 – Battle of Meloria. (Adapted from diagrams found in Stanton, Medieval Maritime Warfare, 134; and Mazzanti, Pasquinucci, and Salghetti Drioli, "Il sistema secche della Meloria," 11) The isle of Meloria itself sits atop an expanse of rocky shoals, and so provided a natural southern barrier to the maritime battlefield that day [figure 3.1].41 The sixth of August was a historically auspicious day for Pisans, being the feast day of Saint Sixtus, the city’s patron. Pisan forces repeatedly achieved great victories on that day, going 41 For an in-depth study of the geomorphology of the Meloria-Porto Pisano region, see Renzo Mazzanti, Marinella Pasquinucci, and Ursula Salghetti Drioli, "Il sistema secche della Meloria. Porto Pisano: Geomorfologia e biologia marina in relazione ai reperti archeologici," in 1284: L'anno della Meloria, ed. Renzo Mazzanti (Pisa: ETS, 1984), 7-54. 120 back to the 1087 al-Mahdia campaign and possibly even further to the defeat of Muslim corsairs at Reggio in 1005.42 The protection of the city’s patron saint had been proven at least once before, as the commune embarked upon the Balearic Crusade on 6 August 1113 and were ultimately successful in that endeavor. With this in mind, Marco Tangheroni argues, Alberto Morosini and Ugolino della Gherardesca entered into battle, in full knowledge of the greater Genoese numbers (the Genoese fleet outnumbered the Pisan fleet by perhaps 30 galleys), due to the propitious date upon which the battle fell; also perhaps because Pisans were tired of generally losing to the Genoese in small raids and wished to gamble all on a decisive engagement which, as it turned out, is precisely what the Battle of Meloria proved to be.43 In preparation for battle, Doria arranged his fleet in a convex bow with his own flagship at the front of the arc, flanked on either side by the ships of the merchant companies of Genoa. As Morosini’s fleet approached by oars, the engagement began with the typical volleys of projectiles, ranging from rods and bolts to hot oil and lye.44 One of the important differences between the Genoese and Pisan approaches to this battle appears to have been in their armor choices. The Pisans sweltered under the armor they wore in the heat of the Tuscan summer sun while the Genoese forewent the additional protection in favor of greater agility for boarding enemy vessels. Likewise, the Pisan ships were covered in defensive iron works, weighing them down and reducing their speed and maneuverability, whereas the Genoese vessels were not so encumbered.45 Italian sailors had long been valued in the crusades for their constructive 42 Maragone, 4-5. Marco Tangheroni, "Perché i Pisani combatterono alla Meloria?," in 1284: L'anno della Meloria, ed. Renzo Mazzanti (Pisa: ETS, 1984), 58, 64-65. 44 Belgrano and Imperiale di Sant' Angelo, 5:55; Stanton, 133. 45 Crawford, 90 cap. 448. 43 121 ingenuity and the Pisans flaunted this as well, attaching mechanical whirling blades and flails to the prows of their ships.46 At some point late in the battle, Zaccaria pulled his fleet around to the north to envelope the exhausted Pisan flank in a pincer move, allowing him to attack the stern of Morosini’s ship while Doria engaged the bow. The so-called Templar of Tyre recounts the battles’ conclusion: … Sir Benedetto Zaccaria had two of his galleys raise their masts, and he had a long, sturdy rope tied from the mast of one galley to that of the other. Then these two galleys … got under way well-lashed together. They went on either side of [Alberto Morosini’s] galley, where the red [Pisan] standard flew. The rope came across this flagstaff … and [the rope] broke off the standard’s flagstaff, and it fell … The Pisans were put to flight, and that day forty-eight galleys and their captain, Sir Alberto Morosini, who had been hit in the face, were taken prisoner …47 The contemporary accounts of the Pisan losses vary dramatically, but they are all clear that it was a devastating defeat for the Tuscan commune. The overall picture that emerges was that 25-30 galleys were captured while around seven were sunk in battle. The chronicles also report 1,000-5,000 Pisan lives were lost that day and approximately 10,000 men were taken prisoner.48 Given the broad scope of the recruiting effort to man the Pisan fleet, the upper-class obligation for military service, and the fact that shipowners typically came from the old ruling class, it should be no surprise that numerous wealthy and important men died or were taken prisoner that day. Among the prisoners was a certain Rustichello da Pisa, who during his lengthy captivity eventually met the Venetian merchant Marco Polo and recorded the tale of his travels. 46 Ibid. Ibid., 91 cap. 449. 48 Despite the tendency for medieval chroniclers to exaggerate numbers, the consistency with which the number of ships and prisoners were similarly tallied lends some credibility to these estimates. For a more detailed study of the losses and prisoners of the battle, see Maria Luisa Ceccarelli Lemut, "I Pisani prigionieri a Genova dopo la battaglia della Meloria: la tradizione cronistica e le fonti documentarie," in 1284: L'anno della Meloria, ed. Renzo Mazzanti (Pisa: ETS, 1984), 75-88. 47 122 Not present in the Genoese jails was Ugolino della Gherardesca who, upon seeing the standard on Morosini’s ship fall, made haste for the protection of Porto Pisano.49 IMMEDIATE AFTERMATH OF THE BATTLE OF MELORIA The commune of Pisa was cast into disarray, having lost perhaps as much as a quarter of its adult population50 to the sea or to Genoese prisons before also suffering a pestilence a few months later.51 It almost goes without saying that commerce in the city initially came to a near standstill with the fate of so much of the city’s population unknown.52 Save for the Ospedale Nuovo, monumental construction around the Piazza dei Miracoli halted completely and would not resume until the fourteenth century. After the battle, Salimbene reports that many Pisan women walked the 140+ kilometers to Genoa by foot to inquire about their captive husbands, fathers, sons, and brothers.53 In a shrewd if sinister move, Genoese podestà Oderto Doria refused to permit the ransoming of any of his Pisan captives. He was bent on the complete and utter destruction of the Ligurian republic’s age-old foe. To this end, Doria sent ambassadors all over Tuscany to bind allies to Genoa’s goal of Pisan obliteration. Over the span of a week in midOctober 1284 the Guelf League was resurrected and aligned with Doria’s plan.54 In their panic over hearing of the revived Guelf League, the commune of Pisa elected Ugolino della Gherardesca to serve as podestà for an unprecedented ten years (and 49 Manfroni, Storia della Marina Italiana, 2:130. Though there is some confidence about the numbers from the battle, I can only provide the vaguest of estimates about what proportion of the city’s population that represents. If we assume roughly 12,500 men were killed or captured in 1284 and that estimates that Pisa’s population at the time was in the range of 40,000 (give or take 10,000 people!), then the city lost between a third and a quarter of its population. However, it is safe to assume that a significant portion of the naval force was sourced from the Pisan contado and dependent towns (as Genoa is shown to have done), so the real percentage must have been quite a bit lower. Unfortunately, we have no information as to the urban-rural ratio of the men in the fleet. 51 Mention of the pestilence can be found in Salimbene di Adam, Chronicle, 543. 52 See chapter 5 for more detail. 53 Salimbene di Adam, Chronicle, 543. 54 The treaties were dated 13-20 October 1284. Riccoti, 2: col. 60-76 doc. 39-45; Silva, 45. 50 123 simultaneously as captain of the popolo)—the first time in over half a century the post was not filled by a foreigner.55 Prior to this, a podestà’s term of office generally did not exceed a year, unless he was re-elected, and the holding of both offices by the same individual was almost unprecedented as each was intended to check the power of the other. Both Alberto Morosini and Ugolino had received a wartime plenitude of power earlier in the year; with Morosini out of the picture, there was little to stop Ugolino from ruling Pisa as its lord. The Remainder of a Difficult Decade THE CONTINUING WAR AND THE SIGNORIA OF UGOLINO DELLA GHERARDESCA Unfortunately for Pisa, the loss at Meloria was not the end of the war. A lasting peace would only come fifteen years later in 1299, and only then were the Genoese prisons finally emptied of their Pisan tenants. This was not due to a lack of effort by Pisans to seek terms. Despairing of their situation in late 1284, Pisa sent the keys of the city to Pope Martin IV begging for papal protection despite the commune’s long history of Ghibellinism.56 Martin accepted the offer and, because Florentine bankers wished to continue their amicable relations with the papal curia, Florence soon ceased its support of the war. In February 1285 Florentine ambassadors even attempted unsuccessfully to negotiate a peace with Genoa on Pisa’s behalf.57 When it became apparent that ransom was not forthcoming, even the imprisoned Pisans made 55 The Fragmenta Historiae Pisanae gives the election date as the feast day of Saint Luke (18 October), 1284. His term of office was extended to 10 years around February or March 1285. "Fragmenta Historiae Pisanae," col. 648649; Belgrano and Imperiale di Sant' Angelo, 5:59; Silva, 45. The holding of two offices was not normal, but had occurred before under extreme circumstances in 1270, 1282, and early 1284. Mauro Ronzani, "Una nuova datazione per gli statuti di Ugolino e Nino 'podestà, capitani e rettori del Comune e del Popolo di Pisa'," Bollettino Storico Pisano 60 (1991): 275-276, esp. note 30. 56 Salimbene di Adam, Chronicle, 545. 57 Alessandro Gherardi, ed. Le consulte della Repubblica fiorentina: dall'anno MCCLXXX al MCCXCVIII, 2 vols. (Florence: G.C. Sansoni, 1896-1898), 1:158; Marco Tangheroni, "La situazione politica pisana alla fine del Duecento tra pressioni esterne e tensioni interne," Atti della Società ligure di storia patria 98, no. 2 (1984): 106-107. 124 impressive efforts to negotiate a peace, winning the approval of Roberto Spinola. Oberto Doria, displaying the extent of his hatred for Pisa, rejected the agreement and killed Guinizzello Sismondi (an influential Pisan) in cold blood.58 With the hope of peace dashed, Ugolino della Gherardesca and Pisa’s leaders looked to other avenues to protect the city. In early 1285 at least ten Pisan noble houses joined the Guelf party of Florence, either to bind the two cities closer together or just to save their personal fortunes.59 Ugolino had long enjoyed friendly relations with Florence and, in the summer of 1285, they became quite useful. In June or July Roberto Spinola and Benedetto Zaccaria set out with a fleet to destroy Porto Pisano while the Guelf League armies besieged Pisan fortifications by land. Ugolino convinced his Florentine contacts that the annihilation of Pisa was not in Florence’s best interests, as it was the city’s natural gateway to the sea. Florence then secretly informed the new Pope Honorius IV (1285-87) of the battle plans and papal envoys quickly carried out threats of excommunication against any who destroyed the papally-protected commune of Pisa (or its port). The papal warning and the Florentine withdrawal ultimately prevented the destruction of Pisa and Porto Pisano in 1285, though Zaccaria did manage to raze the port’s Lantern Tower.60 Though Emilio Cristiani argued that Pisan “Guelfism” only began in 1286, this episode indicates that the Pisan leadership was moving that way a year earlier; indeed, it was not so much a philosophical shift as it was a matter of alliances, for Florence and the papacy appeared to be the only powers open to the notion of protecting Pisa.61 58 Cristiani, "Gli avvenimenti pisani del periodo ugoliniano in una cronaca inedita," 94. "Fragmenta Historiae Pisanae," col. 649; Silva, 45. 60 For this entire episode, see "Fragmenta Historiae Pisanae," col. 649; Belgrano and Imperiale di Sant' Angelo, 5:62-66; Salimbene di Adam, Chronicle, 588. 61 For Cristiani’s argument, see Cristiani, Nobiltà e popolo nel comune di Pisa dalle origini del podestariato alla signoria dei Donoratico, 237-242. 59 125 Despite the Florentine departure from the anti-Pisan alliance, the military campaigns on land and the Genoese raids by sea continued to damage Pisa and gradually ate away at its contado.62 Pisan shipping, already injured by the loss of dozens of ships and thousands of men in 1284, suffered further blows in 1287 when Genoese fleets stole the harbor chain of Porto Pisano and sunk four ships in the harbor, and again more fatally on 11 September 1290 when the Genoese leveled the lighthouse on Meloria, razed the remaining towers and port installations of Porto Pisano, and sank numerous ships in the harbor to render it unusable.63 The Genoese took the harbor chains back to Liguria where they were displayed as trophies. They were not returned until 1860, after the Kingdom of Sardinia joined the Italian unification movement.64 Neither the port nor the mercantile fleet of Pisa were rebuilt in the thirteenth century.65 The reasons behind the Pisan failure to rebuild are numerous and interwoven. The most obvious culprit is Oberto Doria’s refusal to allow the ransoming of any Pisans. Marco Tangheroni astutely noted that the decision to hold a large portion of the Pisan population in prison instead of ransoming or killing them may have been intentional: forcing Pisan women of 62 There are numerous accounts of the events during these years. For Genoese activity, see Belgrano and Imperiale di Sant' Angelo, 5:61-67, 71-73, 77-79. 63 For the 6 July and 19 October 1287 events, see ibid., 5:77-79. For the 11 September 1290 attack, see "Fragmenta Historiae Pisanae," col. 658-659; Adami, 54; Belgrano and Imperiale di Sant' Angelo, 5:119-120; Silva, 47-48; Villani, 1: bk. 8, sec. 141, pp. 615-616; "Cronica Fiorentina compilata nel secolo XIII," in I primi due secoli della storia di Firenze, ed. Pasquale Villari (Florence: G.C. Sansoni, 1945), 569; Cristiani, "Gli avvenimenti pisani del periodo ugoliniano in una cronaca inedita," 99; Iannella, 979. 64 Today the chains hang on the wall of the Camposanto cemetery in Pisa, a fitting funerary monument to the death of Pisan maritime power. Benjamin Z. Kedar, "Prolegomena to a world history of harbour and river chains," in Shipping, trade and crusade in the medieval Mediterranean : studies in honour of John Pryor, ed. Ruthy Gertwagen and Elizabeth Jeffreys (Farnham, UK: Ashgate, 2012), 28. 65 The fleet saw some signs of new life only decades later. Only by 1297 were there any indications of communal efforts to rebuild the Porto Pisano infrastructure, though it is unclear how much of this work was actually undertaken and when (or if) it was completed. There were provisions to replace or shore up several towers, to install a new harbor chain, and to remove the ships which the Genoese had sunk. Most of this work was only documented from the fourteenth century. ASPi, Comune, Divisione A, no. 81, ff. 8v, 18r, 20r, 26r, 38v-39v; Francesca Riva, "Le provvisioni ordinarie degli anziani del Comune di Pisa del luglio-agosto 1297 (Archivio di Stato di Pisa, Comune divisione A, n. 81)" (Ph.D. dissertation, Università di Pisa, 1988-1989), 41, 99, 113-114, 152, 233-239; Bonaini, 3:368, 413, 416-417, 431-432; Maria Luisa Ceccarelli Lemut, "Assetto del territorio, insediamento ed economia nel Medioevo," in Tombolo: territorio della Basilica di San Piero a Grado, ed. Sergio Paglialunga (Pisa: Felici, 2001), 116. 126 child-bearing age to wait while their husbands remained in captivity.66 This state of affairs had numerous consequences. The city suffered from a prolonged gender imbalance in the adult population, making it difficult or impossible to fill military and maritime positions. It bears repeating that roughly 10,000 men were killed or captured at Meloria; the best estimates put late thirteenth-century Pisa’s population at around 30,000-40,000 individuals, approximately 13,000 of which would have been adult males (including the elderly).67 The population deficit could not be replenished naturally (even when combining biological methods with immigration) until long after the eventual release from captivity—birthrates would likely have remained relatively low for the fifteen years of captivity and even then it would be another fifteen or so years before these new Pisans entered the economy as adults. The finances of virtually all Pisan families were thrown into disarray as family businesses were thrust into the hands of those unaccustomed to or even incapable of handling them while simultaneously having to pay for the provisioning of their imprisoned family members.68 In some ways, Pisa would have been better off if all 10,000 captives had been massacred as it would have permitted the remarrying of widows and the transference of inheritances rather than forcing much of Pisan society to hang in a sort of limbo until the century’s end. 66 Tangheroni, Politica, commercio, agricoltura a Pisa nel Trecento, 78. Pisa’s population growth stagnated at the beginning of the century when we have good evidence of a population of 25,000 (in 1228), not growing appreciably again until modern times. Though a similar prisoner scenario had happened to Venetians in Constantinople in 1171-1183, Venice’s population at the time was at least twice that of Pisa and the republic lost perhaps half as many men (several thousand) so the demographic impact was much reduced by comparison. On Pisa’s thirteenth-century population, see Salvatori, La popolazione pisana nel Duecento: il patto di alleanza di Pisa con Siena, Pistoia e Poggibonsi del 1228, 109-123; Day, 92. On Venice’s late-twelfthcentury population, see Frederic Chapin Lane, Venice, a maritime republic (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973), 18. On the imprisonment of Venetians in 1171, see Warren T. Treadgold, A History of the Byzantine State and Society (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1997), 648. 68 Wives often took over the family finances, or sons if they remained free and of age, though numerous families were left with no living and able-bodied adults in Pisa. Business connections were inevitably lost and finances were often mismanaged due to inexperience. On the trustworthiness of the figure of 10,000 prisoners and on paying to feed the prisoners, see Ceccarelli Lemut, "I Pisani prigionieri a Genova dopo la battaglia della Meloria: la tradizione cronistica e le fonti documentarie," 78-79, 87. 67 127 In addition to the captivity problem were the additional costs of nearly continuous defensive warfare and the depredations of Genoese maritime raids. With half of the Pisan fleet resting on the floor of the Tyrrhenian Sea, many Pisan merchants had little choice but to utilize non-Pisan ships to continue their business.69 Indeed, they may have even preferred to avoid Pisan ships so that their cargoes would be less likely to suffer confiscation by the Genoese who roamed the seas. Whatever the reasons, the longer that this trend persisted the more this new business arrangement became the norm, solidifying disincentives for fleet reconstruction and providing a boon for the shipping industries of Pisa’s competitors (especially Catalonia and Venice). One should not assume that Pisans abandoned trade altogether, greatly hampered though it was. In fact, the city maintained quite lively commerce with North Africa and Sardinia, though whereas before these harbors were dominated by Pisan ships they were now opened to ships from across the Western Mediterranean, which in turn bolstered the commercial vitality of Pisa’s commercial rivals.70 However, despite the continuity of trade, Pisa had still lost a significant economic sector (shipping) which had been its lifeblood for centuries. This was a significant loss for the communal budget as shipping traditionally accounted for a considerable portion of the city’s income, especially as it struggled to pay for years of ongoing warfare. 69 Pisan merchants increasingly utilized foreign shipping after Meloria. Belgrano and Imperiale di Sant' Angelo, 5:71-73; Herlihy, Pisa in the Early Renaissance: A Study of Urban Growth, 171ff; Sandro Petrucci, "Tra Pisa e Maiorca: avvenimenti politici e rapporti commerciali nella prima metà del XIV secolo," in XIII Congrés d'Història de la Corona d'Aragó (Palma de Mallorca, 27 setembre-1 octubre 1987) (Palma de Mallorca: Institut d'Estudis Baleàrics, 1989), 1:139; Marco Tangheroni, Medioevo tirrenico: Sardegna, Toscana e Pisa (Pisa: Pacini, 1992), 207ff. 70 Venice, Genoa, and Catalonia benefitted the most from the removal of Pisan ships from the Mediterranean. Ciro Manca, "Nuove prospettive sulla storia economica della Sardegna pisana dalla fine del sec. XII all'inizio del XIV," Economia e storia 10 (1963): 197; Marco Tangheroni, Politica, commercio, agricoltura a Pisa nel Trecento (Pisa: Pacini, 1973), 79. 128 Federigo Melis tried to account for Pisa’s failure to rebuild its fleet and port by asserting that the city must have experienced a lack of available capital.71 Melis was concerned with the inability of Pisans to convert landed and industrial assets into liquid capital but, although he was correct on this point, the problem was likely more extensive owing to a persistent and prolonged economic recession (to be discussed more thoroughly in chapter 5). The preceding paragraphs list just some of the factors that contributed to the reduced capital flows and causes of the recession. All of this ultimately resulted in the inability of Pisans to focus on building, whether monuments in the Piazza dei Miracoli or ships and port infrastructure at Porto Pisano. All of Pisa’s attention and resources appear to have been dedicated to survival, leaving nothing for reexpansion. As conditions did not change appreciably for at least fifteen years, non-essential projects—such as the dredging of the Porto Pisano harbor or the maintenance of drainage canals throughout the contado—which had at first been temporarily postponed, gradually left the public consciousness, or even the ability to be addressed due to disrepair. The silting problem around Porto Pisano was compounded by the Genoese sinking ships in the harbor and, judging by geological surveys, the shoreline would have moved westward a full ten meters by 1300 without human intervention.72 Similarly in the contado, while the wealth of the twelfth century enabled land reclamation projects, the capital and manpower requirements to maintain the earthworks were lacking after Meloria and so the wetlands gradually took over the farmland once again,73 further reducing the productivity of the contado and the income of Pisa. 71 Federigo Melis, Note di storia della Banca pisana nel Trecento (Pisa: Società Storica Pisana, 1955), 221; Tangheroni, Politica, commercio, agricoltura a Pisa nel Trecento, 79. 72 The distance is a rough approximation from my own calculations based on the work of Giovanni Sarti, Monica Bini, and Serena Giacomelli, "The Growth and Decline of Pisa (Tuscany, Italy) up to the Middle Ages: Correlations with Landscape and Geology," Il Quaternario 23, no. 2 (2010): 311-322. 73 Ibid., 315-316. 129 Amid the crisis of the mid-1280s, Ugolino della Gherardesca was doing his best to consolidate power and ensure the security of the commune and, by extension, his own position. I mentioned before that his long friendship with Florence enabled him to persuade the city to withdraw from the anti-Pisan alliance. This was not done purely out of friendship or because of the “Guelfism” of which he was later accused; it came with a price, it happened because it was in the economic interests of Florence. In addition to convincing Florence of the utility of a functional port near the mouth of the Arno, the friendship of Florence was bought and paid for through the sale of numerous Pisan castles scattered across Tuscany.74 His opponents would later accuse him of being a Florentine wolf in Pisan sheep’s clothing, but he really had little other recourse. At the time, Pisa’s fleet had been decimated and the city was surrounded on all sides by advancing armies. Not only was Florence the city with which Ugolino had a pre-existing relationship but it was also by far the largest of the powers targeting Pisa. In 1284 Florence began construction of yet another series of city walls to enclose its population of approximately 120,000, making it one of Italy’s largest cities.75 After the demographic shock of Meloria, Pisa’s population was at best only one fifth that of its neighbor; if Pisa was to stand any hope of survival, it needed the friendship of the largest city in the region. In 1286 Ugolino absolved the exiled Pisan Guelf families which had been ravaging the contado (his Upezzinghi relatives chief among them), reinstated their properties, and had Nino Visconti associated with his rule first as captain of the popolo in 1286 and then as co-podestà and co-captain in early 1287 (though clearly as his subordinate in the hierarchy of power given that Nino had just aged out of his minority).76 These decisions have been claimed by many (medieval 74 Cristiani, Nobiltà e popolo nel comune di Pisa dalle origini del podestariato alla signoria dei Donoratico, 236. Day, 82. 76 The dating of Nino’s political offices is tricky to determine, but Mauro Ronzani has expertly deduced the chronology. "Fragmenta Historiae Pisanae," col. 649; Cristiani, "Gli avvenimenti pisani del periodo ugoliniano in 75 130 and modern) as evidence of Ugolino’s “Guelfism.” However, there are no indications that Ugolino cared strongly for either faction, Guelf or Ghibelline, and to label him as such is overly reductive of the situation and misconstrues his motivations. Ugolino was instead a pure pragmatist who negotiated with specific groups to improve his own situation. After he pardoned and repatriated the exiled Pisan Guelfs, the city remained inimical with all its Guelf neighbors save Florence. The move was not for the benefit of international politics but, as Cristiani proposed, for internal political stability. 77 The supremacy of Guelf power in the region was undeniable and Ugolino could not jeopardize his own position (and the protection of Florence) by the commune remaining in strong opposition to the region’s dominant faction; that condition was already causing harm to the contado and was a recipe for a government coup. Even some medieval chroniclers, both inside and outside of Pisa, recognized Ugolino’s Guelf-friendly behavior as nothing more than an obvious political exigency given the situation.78 By inviting the exiled families back into the city and sharing power with his nephew, Nino Visconti, Ugolino eliminated one major threat to the stability of his podestariate, permitting him to turn his attention to other dangers. Ugolino della Gherardesca, in much the same way as Ugolino Visconti had done a half century before, sought to secure his position by winning over the popolo. He did this in part by elevating numerous Arti, as one can see in the new Brevi del Comune e Popolo of 1287.79 una cronaca inedita," 94-95; Silva, 45-46; Cristiani, Nobiltà e popolo nel comune di Pisa dalle origini del podestariato alla signoria dei Donoratico, 239-241; Ronzani, "Una nuova datazione per gli statuti di Ugolino e Nino 'podestà, capitani e rettori del Comune e del Popolo di Pisa'," 277-278. 77 Cristiani, Nobiltà e popolo nel comune di Pisa dalle origini del podestariato alla signoria dei Donoratico, 240. 78 Belgrano and Imperiale di Sant' Angelo, 5:59; "Cronica di Pisa," col. 979; Tangheroni, "La situazione politica pisana alla fine del Duecento tra pressioni esterne e tensioni interne," 107-108. 79 Politica, commercio, agricoltura a Pisa nel Trecento, 60-61. 131 THE NEW BREVI DEL COMUNE E POPOLO (1287) Not long after Nino Visconti was elevated to co-podestà and co-captain of the popolo in the spring of 1287, he and his uncle Ugolino della Gherardesca embarked upon a revision of the Brevi del Comune e Popolo, the principal legal statutes of Pisa.80 Ugolino had revised the Breve del Comune during his solitary rule of the commune a year or two prior, but unfortunately the 1287 statutes are the only ones that have survived intact from the thirteenth century.81 However, the Brevi have always been patchwork documents that grew longer over the years as more laws and stipulations were added to meet particular circumstances. Diligent textual analysis by several modern scholars, particularly Lorenzo Isoppo, enabled a partitioning of the Brevi into three periods: pre-October 1284, Ugolino’s podestariate, and the shared podestariate of Ugolino and Nino.82 Prior to Ugolino’s rise to power, the Anziani dominated the communal government while the podestà and captain of the popolo were essentially enforcers of council decisions, keepers of the peace, and military commanders.83 Once Ugolino was given a plenitude of power in 1284/5, he made overt moves to secure and extend his authority over the commune. Ugolino substantially rewrote the powers of the podestà office, elevating the position to share equally with the Anziani the decision-making processes of the communal government, particularly in the On the dating of Nino Visconti’s rise to shared power and of the Brevi themselves, see Ronzani, "Una nuova datazione per gli statuti di Ugolino e Nino 'podestà, capitani e rettori del Comune e del Popolo di Pisa'." For a modern critical edition of the Brevi, see Antonella Ghignoli, I Brevi del comune e del popolo di Pisa: dell'anno 1287, Fonti per la storia d'Italia medievale. Antiquitates 11 (Rome: Istituto Palazzo Borromini, 1998). The older, but much more widely cited edition of the Brevi can be found in Bonaini, 1:55-640. 81 There does exist a short fragment of the Breve del Comune from 1275 in Bonaini, 1:43-54. 82 For the periodization, see Lorenzo Isoppo, "Le revisioni dei Brevi del Comune e del Popolo di Pisa effettuate durante le podesterie di Ugolino della Gherardesca e il comune governo di Nino Visconti e Ugolino della Gherardesca, potestates et capitanei, autunno 1284-autunno 1287," in Legislazione e prassi istituzionale a Pisa (secoli XI-XIII): Una tradizione normativa esemplare, ed. Gabriella Rossetti (Naples: GISEM - Liguori, 2001), 316. 83 Ibid., 316-319. For the traditional rights of the Anziani, see Ghignoli, 489-491 (BP 24), 531-532 (BP 76), 625-629 (BP 98). 80 132 case of municipal elections and management of public finances.84 He also gained powers newly exclusive to the podestà, such as the election of and control over the officers of Castel di Castro in Sardinia, the ability to interpret the law as he saw fit in order to mete out justice, and further powers over matters concerned with public order.85 The appropriation of control over the officers at Castel di Castro was a move obviously in line with the long history of della Gherardesca ambitions in Sardinia. The other changes quite clearly empowered Ugolino with the means to maintain his lordship of the commune; where before the podestà was the chief executive power in the city, now he also shared in the powers of legislation and interpretation of justice. When Nino Visconti left his minority in 1286, he became the head of the Visconti faction in Pisa. To mollify this faction and forestall any attempts at a coup, Ugolino allowed the election of Nino as captain of the popolo in July 1286 and then in spring 1287 Nino rose higher to share the offices of podestà and captain alongside Ugolino, with Ugolino the senior of the duumvirate.86 Although the historic Visconti-Gherardesca tensions remained just under the surface, the two rulers were able to extend their lordship and further disenfranchise the Anziani. Perhaps most notably, whereas before Ugolino had shared authority over all municipal elections with the Anziani, now Ugolino and Nino shared this power exclusively between themselves. The co-rulers now exercised control over the meeting and election of virtually every municipal 84 Isoppo, "Le revisioni dei Brevi del Comune e del Popolo di Pisa effettuate durante le podesterie di Ugolino della Gherardesca e il comune governo di Nino Visconti e Ugolino della Gherardesca, potestates et capitanei, autunno 1284-autunno 1287," 320. 85 Ghignoli, 74 (BC 1.39), 113 (BC 1.56), 327-328 (BC 3.30), 393 (BC 3.59); Isoppo, "Le revisioni dei Brevi del Comune e del Popolo di Pisa effettuate durante le podesterie di Ugolino della Gherardesca e il comune governo di Nino Visconti e Ugolino della Gherardesca, potestates et capitanei, autunno 1284-autunno 1287," 323. 86 Cristiani, "Gli avvenimenti pisani del periodo ugoliniano in una cronaca inedita," 94-95. For the dating of these events, see Mauro Ronzani, "Una nuova datazione per gli statuti di Ugolino e Nino 'podestà, capitani e rettori del Comune e del Popolo di Pisa'," Bollettino Storico Pisano 60 (1991): 277-80; Maria Luisa Ceccarelli Lemut, "Il conte Ugolino della Gherardesca: un episodio della storia di Pisa alla fine del Duecento," in La storia di Pisa nelle celebrazioni del “6 agosto” (1959-2008), ed. A. Zampieri (Pisa: 2008), 96. 133 council, even the Anziani itself.87 Additionally, Ugolino and Nino gave themselves exemption from following the provisions of the Brevi should they choose to do so. One wonders why the Anziani would allow this further deterioration of their political power, but perhaps it came down to the captain of the popolo (here, Nino) being nominally a representative of the very group which the Anziani represented, so exchanging one representative for another was not a far leap of logic in times of war. At the very least, the Anziani were able to stipulate that Ugolino and Nino could only act if both of them were in agreement, theoretically preventing either man’s ambitions coming before those of the commune.88 By 1287, though likely earlier during Ugolino’s tenure as sole podestà, other changes in communal political power dynamics were underway which further solidified the GherardescaVisconti position and diminished competition against them for control of the commune. An antinobility clause was added to the rules for membership in the popolo whereby anyone who had knights (miles) among their family members as far back as 1251 were barred from participating in the popolo (and therefore also barred from serving in political office on behalf of the popolo). There was an amnesty for those of knightly heritage who were already serving as part of the popolo (i.e. Nino Visconti), but in general this new regulation was intended to prevent any ambitious aristocrats from utilizing the power of the popolo to facilitate a contest against the lordship of Ugolino and Nino.89 Both men were apparently students of history and well aware of their family traditions of exploiting popular sentiment to achieve private goals. 87 Ghignoli, 473 (BP 5), 474 (BP 6), 498-499 (BP 36), 500 (BP 41), 503-504 (BP 48), 505 (BP 50), 510 (BP 52), 514 (BP 53), 517-518 (BP 60), 523 (BP 64), 529 (BP 72), 536 (BP 81), 549 (BP 93); Isoppo, "Le revisioni dei Brevi del Comune e del Popolo di Pisa effettuate durante le podesterie di Ugolino della Gherardesca e il comune governo di Nino Visconti e Ugolino della Gherardesca, potestates et capitanei, autunno 1284-autunno 1287," 325-326. 88 "Le revisioni dei Brevi del Comune e del Popolo di Pisa effettuate durante le podesterie di Ugolino della Gherardesca e il comune governo di Nino Visconti e Ugolino della Gherardesca, potestates et capitanei, autunno 1284-autunno 1287," 324, 334. 89 Ghignoli, 479-480 (BP 8); Cristiani, Nobiltà e popolo nel comune di Pisa dalle origini del podestariato alla signoria dei Donoratico, 91-93, 242. 134 The council of the Anziani was not the only institution under attack by Ugolino and Nino; the count and viscount also sought to humble the Tre Ordini and Sette Arti of the city.90 The Order of the Merchants especially had become influential in recent decades due to the growth of the woolens trade; so much so that perhaps, according to Laura Ticciati, the poorly documented uprising of 1281 resulted in the elevation of the Arte della Lana to the status of “order,” now equal and no longer subservient to the Order of the Merchants.91 The Anziani had already appropriated certain powers from the Order of the Sea (the Order traditionally dominated by aristocrats) and the strength of the bourgeois merchants was a palpable threat to the lordship of Ugolino and Nino. The duumvirate did nominally respect the old privileges of the Orders and Arti, but they sought to dilute their power and weaken them in other ways. First, the two lords elevated all of the artisan guilds, not just the Seven Arti, to share in the election of one third of the seats on the Anziani council.92 Though most of the artisan guilds of the city were subject to the Order of the Merchants or to the Arte della Lana, the broadening of the field from which Anziani members could come potentially introduced elements outside the control of the major merchant powers while weakening the political influence of the established guilds and the influence which the Orders had over the lesser guilds. In a more dramatic move, Ugolino and Nino demanded that all orders, guilds, and confraternities submit their own Brevi to the commune for editing and forbade the creation of 90 See in particular Nobiltà e popolo nel comune di Pisa dalle origini del podestariato alla signoria dei Donoratico, 191-196, 241-242; Castagneto, L'arte della lana a Pisa nel duecento e nei primi decenni del trecento: commercio, industria e istituzioni, 90-92. 91 Ghignoli, 550-551 (BP 96); Ticciati, L'ordine dei mercante a Pisa nei secoli XII-XIII, 159, 186. 92 Up until this time two thirds of the Anziani members came from the great merchant Orders (Sea and Merchants, though recently the Arte della Lana had been added to this category) while one third of the seats were reserved for the official artisan guilds of the city (the Sette Arti). For the new rule, see Ghignoli, 506-510 (BP 52). For discussion, see Cristiani, Nobiltà e popolo nel comune di Pisa dalle origini del podestariato alla signoria dei Donoratico, 193, 241-242. 135 new societies.93 This alteration had the effect of handing control of the minor Arti and societies that already existed as political entities over to the two lords by giving them the ability to alter the statutes (and therefore also the officer election process) that governed these entities. 94 Additionally, preventing the creation of new societies and guilds would have hampered the ability of the lower classes to further organize politically outside of the established hierarchy of political control.95 Ugolino, and possibly Nino, must have known that this was precisely how the Tre Ordini and Sette Arti had risen to power in the first place, and so the two lords sought to prevent such from occurring again. Furthermore, by virtue of controlling the statutes of the Arti and Orders, the lords held indirect authority over the actual industries and markets which these entities regulated.96 Finally, within the same statutes, Ugolino and Nino also permitted all artisans to practice their skills without being beholden to the Arti.97 This was a major blow to the political influence of the city guilds and orders whose strength relied on their monopolistic control over various economic sectors. The Orders and Arti were powerful due to their monolithic nature; the sudden introduction of market competition would have decreased profits and reduced their collective bargaining power which, in turn, would have reduced the influence of the upper bourgeoisie (and some aristocratic) families in control of these associations and industries, crippling their ability to mount a successful opposition to the Gherardesca-Visconti regime. The changes to the Brevi were intended to reduce the ability of the nobility and the popolo to challenge Ugolino and Nino’s authority. This meant that the communal government 93 Ghignoli, 258-259 (BC 1.157), 554-559 (BP 100-102); Cristiani, Nobiltà e popolo nel comune di Pisa dalle origini del podestariato alla signoria dei Donoratico, 191. 94 Castagneto, L'arte della lana a Pisa nel duecento e nei primi decenni del trecento: commercio, industria e istituzioni, 91-92. 95 Cristiani, Nobiltà e popolo, 241-242. 96 Ticciati, L'ordine dei mercante a Pisa nei secoli XII-XIII, 41. 97 Ghignoli, 259 (BC 1.157), 554-555 (BP 100). 136 went from being run by representatives of the largest economic sectors of the city (the Tre Ordini and Sette Arti) to being run by two individuals with mostly political and territorial (rather than economic) ambitions. Apart from the broadening of participation in the Anziani to all the Arti,98 there is no indication that any of these changes were reversed following Ugolino and Nino’s removal from power in June 1288. Consequently, the podestàs and captains of the popolo for the remainder of the century retained the enlarged constitutional command of the commune instead of it reverting entirely back to the Anziani (though no podestàs for the rest of the thirteenth century would attempt to turn their office into a lordship nearly to the extent that Ugolino della Gherardesca had). For all their faults, Ugolino and Nino’s reforms were not all blatantly self-serving; Ugolino recognized the dire financial condition of the commune and took steps to remedy the situation through tax reform and monetary policy. In the Breve del Comune, Ugolino undertook to reform the estimo (property census) process to take account of all the people in the city and contado that were either not yet accounted for or who had failed to pay the data (direct tax) or prestanze (forced loan) from previous years, creating a new office for assessors.99 The text of the statutes concerning the data expressly forbade any tax exemptions for the nobility.100 Moreover, the data was proportionally distributed among all of the parishes, and the dues of any absent persons (for instance, those imprisoned in Genoa) were distributed evenly among the family heads within each parish.101 This was a heavy tax burden, and it was dropped in the 1302 98 Cristiani noted that the professions of the members of the Anziani after 1288 appear to all be from the Tre Ordini and Sette Arti. Francesco Bonaini, ed. Breve vetus seu chronica antianorum civitatis Pisarum, Archivio Storico Italiano 6.2 (Florence: Gio. Pietro Vieusseux, 1845), 647-661; Cristiani, Nobiltà e popolo nel comune di Pisa dalle origini del podestariato alla signoria dei Donoratico, 196. 99 Ugolino and Nino reserved for themselves the right to select assessors of urban properties but left to the Anziani the selection of assessors for the contado. Ghignoli, 178-180 (BC 1.05); Herlihy, Pisa in the Early Renaissance: A Study of Urban Growth, 77-78; Violante, 111. 100 This likely would have brought a smile to the faces of the popolo. Ghignoli, 185-188 (BC 1.07); Violante, 115. 101 Ghignoli, 188-193 (BC 1.08). 137 revision of the Brevi.102 Despite the burden, it was necessary to prevent communal income from dropping significantly in the midst of an expensive war for communal survival.103 Additionally, Ugolino attempted to halt the recent communal trend of selling off the right to collect certain types of tax revenue (taxes on salt, sheep, etc.) to private individuals or companies, instead mandating that all tax revenue revert to the state.104 Finally, Ugolino must have been aware of the broader political and economic dangers from runaway depreciation of Pisan silver coinage in the face of the ascendant gold florin, for he stipulated that the small “black” money (monetam minutam nigram) of Pisa would no longer be minted so as to prevent further flooding of the market.105 Though small coins were in high demand for everyday needs, overproduction always causes depreciation due to decreased scarcity of the coinage. Most of these policies were not likely to be popular, but they were necessary measures for Pisa to fund its fight for survival against the numerous threats the city faced. THE DOWNFALL OF THE DELLA GHERARDESCA AND VISCONTI CLANS The end of the duumvirate, and ultimately of Ugolino della Gherardesca and Nino Visconti themselves, began in November 1287. At that time, two different factions from the town of Buti petitioned Ugolino and Nino separately for aid against the other. The two lords supported opposing sides and the affair ended violently with a series of reprisal murders. This quickly escalated when Nino Visconti returned home and attempted to convince Pisans to revolt against Ugolino, claiming that he was opposed to peace with Genoa. Though most of the city wished for peace and the return of their family members, no one rallied to Nino’s cause. Ugolino 102 Violante, 113. Perhaps around 25% of the city’s population was imprisoned in Genoa, making it difficult for those individuals to pay their taxes. The new provisions enabled the commune to make up this shortfall in communal income. 104 Ghignoli, 534-535 (BP 80); Herlihy, Pisa in the Early Renaissance: A Study of Urban Growth, 86-87. 105 Ghignoli, 261 (BC 1.160); Casini, 138. 103 138 and Nino were subsequently both forced out of office and into private life by the Tre Ordini and Sette Arti.106 Ticciati noted the exceptional mention of the merchant orders and artisan guilds having the agency in this instance instead of the Anziani, suggesting that, perhaps due to Ugolino’s changes to the Brevi, there was already a disconnect between these various oligarchies; perhaps seigniorial influence over Anziani elections resulted in a council composed of toothless puppets of the two lords instead of representing the various orders and guilds.107 Despite their familial competition, neither Ugolino nor Nino enjoyed their loss of power and so the two men came to terms, reaching a peace agreement in February 1288 before being reinstated as co-rulers in March 1288.108 Despite the purported hesitancy of Pisa’s rulers to reach a peace with Genoa, a treaty was nevertheless delivered to Pisa in April 1288. Several of the more influential Pisans imprisoned in Genoa had come to an agreement with their Genoese captors and delivered it to Pisa for ratification by the communal government. According to the Annales Ianuenses, Ugolino was reluctant to accept the treaty terms due to the threat posed to his Sardinian holdings, but he would not dare go against the wishes of the people on this matter.109 Ugolino should not be faulted too much for his hesitancy as the lengthy treaty terms were exceptionally harsh and dealt extensively with Sardinia. The most notable terms were: the cession to Genoa of Castel di Castro and all lands within a four-mile radius; cession of the port of Cagliari with all structures and villages in the area; cession of all coastal territory within a 106 "Fragmenta Historiae Pisanae," col. 649-650; Bernhard Schmeidler, ed. Tholomei Lucensis Annales, Monumenta Germaniae Historica, Scriptores rerum Germanicarum, n.s., 8 (Berlin: Weidmannsche buchhandlung, 1955), 213; Ceccarelli Lemut, "Il conte Ugolino della Gherardesca: un episodio della storia di Pisa alla fine del Duecento," 97. 107 Ticciati, L'ordine dei mercante a Pisa nei secoli XII-XIII, 187. 108 "Fragmenta Historiae Pisanae," col. 650-651; Belgrano and Imperiale di Sant' Angelo, 5:83; Cristiani, "Gli avvenimenti pisani del periodo ugoliniano in una cronaca inedita," 95. 109 "Fragmenta Historiae Pisanae," col. 651; "Gli avvenimenti pisani del periodo ugoliniano in una cronaca inedita," 95; Belgrano and Imperiale di Sant' Angelo, 5:82-83. 139 mile of the Gulf of Cagliari; cession of the Cagliari salt works, with all appertaining equipment and personnel; cession of a number of castles and places in Logudoro; cession and renunciation of all claims in Corsica with a promise to never interfere there again; forbidding of Pisan citizens to own property or have legal arrangements of any kind in Corsica; restitution of the Genoese quarter in Acre and the demolition of the Pisan tower built on that land; cession of the isle of Elba along with funds to support a Genoese garrison there; Pisa was to hand over 20,000 silver lire as collateral for damage done to Genoese ships and merchants; Pisa was also to hand over a 50,000 lire deposit in seven separate payments through seven intermediary cities; Pisa was to pay even more money upon the release of prisoners from Genoa; Pisa was banned from arming new ships; and, Pisans were prohibited from sailing beyond the Naples-Cagliari line to the south or beyond the Rhône delta to the west.110 The treaty terms were clearly designed to hobble Pisa and insure that the city would never again pose a threat to Genoa. Ottavio Banti noticed that the document was highly atypical of medieval peace treaties as it was essentially a dictate from Genoa that also included numerous compliance guarantees and other elements from commercial agreements.111 He believes that this was done not only to provide greater assurances that the terms would be followed, but also to give the treaty legal validity since it dealt with the transfer of real estate that theoretically belonged to the empire and papacy (a valid concern given the events of the next chapter). Although the two rulers of Pisa outwardly accepted the deal with Genoa, at least Ugolino made clandestine efforts to break the peace. He secretly instructed his son Guelfo, who governed 110 The treaty and the documents surrounding preliminary negotiations and ratification can be found in Riccoti, 2:127-164 nos. 56-60 and 62; Tola, 1:413-440 nos.125-128. 111 Ottavio Banti, "I trattati fra Genova e Pisa dopo la Meloria fino alla metà del secolo XIV," Atti della Società ligure di storia patria 98, no. 2 (1984): 352-360. 140 Castel di Castro at the time, to support corsair activity against the Genoese.112 By late May, Pisa was already behind in the payment of 50,000 lire to Genoa (possibly due to Ugolino’s influence over communal finances), even though Pisans assured the Genoese ambassador that they had every intention of abiding by the terms of the treaty. At this point it was becoming clear that communal sentiment diverged considerably from that of its rulers. Archbishop Ruggieri degli Ubaldini and Bacciameo Gualandi secretly approached the Genoese ambassador, saying that if Count Fazio della Gherardesca of Donoratico (from a rival branch of the della Gheraredsca clan, the descendants of Ugolino’s late brother, Gherardo) and several other influential Ghibellines were released from prison and returned to Pisa, they could easily effect a coup d’état and ensure the execution of the treaty terms.113 The ambassador returned to Genoa with the offer, which the Credenza and city captains refused, though they did permit the sending of letters from Fazio and others to encourage the revolt to proceed. When the ambassador arrived once again in Pisa, however, Archbishop Ruggieri had already succeeded in removing the two lords from power. Despite the lack of Genoese aid, both cities agreed to release approximately 200 prisoners as a show of good will between the new regime and the old foe. Archbishop Ruggieri led the popular revolt against Nino Visconti in late June 1288 with the aid of the principal Ghibelline families of Pisa (i.e. the della Gherardesca Counts of Donoratico, the Gualandi, Lanfranchi, da Caprona, Zacci, Ripafratta, and Sismondi families). Ruggieri exploited the long history of Gherardesca-Visconti rivalry by approaching Ugolino 112 Belgrano and Imperiale di Sant' Angelo, 5:83-84; Cristiani, Nobiltà e popolo nel comune di Pisa dalle origini del podestariato alla signoria dei Donoratico, 243; Ceccarelli Lemut, "Il conte Ugolino della Gherardesca: un episodio della storia di Pisa alla fine del Duecento," 97. 113 As an extra incentive, Ruggieri offered Genoa the right to choose Pisa’s podestà for ten years, the release of imprisoned Genoese citizens, the delivery to Genoa of Ugolino and Nino, and the handing over of Elba, Gorgona, and Porto Pisano’s towers. Belgrano and Imperiale di Sant' Angelo, 5:87; Cristiani, Nobiltà e popolo nel comune di Pisa dalle origini del podestariato alla signoria dei Donoratico, 244. 141 della Gherardesca to seek permission to oust Nino Visconti. Ugolino gave his consent and remained outside of Pisa during Nino’s expulsion from office and subsequent flight from the city. On 1 July 1288, trusting in Ruggieri’s word that it was once again safe to re-enter the city, Ugolino returned to Pisa only to find himself and his family members captured and imprisoned in the Gualandi tower.114 It seems Ruggieri had played on popular discontent over Ugolino’s reputation for hoarding grain; Tuscany had experienced a severe famine in 1286 and Ugolino controlled extensive grain-producing lands in the Maremma and Sardinia,. Whether or not he actually hoarded grain matters little since the people believed that he had done so.115 Archbishop Ruggieri stepped into the role of temporary podestà and captain for July and August 1288 before promoting his son as vicar for another two months; only in November 1288 did an election for a new podestà and captain take place (though by those loyal to Ruggieri).116 The foreigner Gualtieri da Brunforte was elected podestà while Ildebrandino di Ranieri Pannocchieschi d’Elci was chosen to captain the popolo.117 The lackluster military leadership of the two men in December resulted in the sending of a delegation to the Ghibelline hero Guido da Montefeltro—under papally-mandated house arrest in Asti at the time—to request his service as podestà and captain of the popolo of Pisa for a term of three years. Although it might seem that 114 The revolt is reported in numerous chronicles. "Fragmenta Historiae Pisanae," col. 651-653; Da Vallechia, 52; Belgrano and Imperiale di Sant' Angelo, 5:85, 87; Adami, 50; Silva, 46; Villani, 1: bk. 8, sec. 121, p. 587; Sardo, 4748; Iannella, 42. See also Ceccarelli Lemut, "Il conte Ugolino della Gherardesca: un episodio della storia di Pisa alla fine del Duecento," 97-99. 115 Emilio Cristiani has discussed this in some detail, locating several documents that suggest that Ugolino did in fact hoard grain and permit Pisans to die of hunger. Varanini cited David Herlihy’s work to show that grain prices peaked in Pisa during the very years that Ugolino ruled the city. Alfredo Schiaffini, Testi fiorentini del Dugento e dei primi del Trecento (Florence: G.C. Sansoni, 1954), 133; Herlihy, Pisa in the Early Renaissance: A Study of Urban Growth, 113, 198; Giorgio Varanini, L'acceso strale: saggi e ricerche sulla "Commedia" (Naples: Federico & Ardia, 1984), 87; Emilio Cristiani, "Le ipotesi sul significato delle 'taglie' imposte al conte Ugolino (1288)," in 1284: L'anno della Meloria, ed. Renzo Mazzanti (Pisa: ETS, 1984), 89-92. 116 "Fragmenta Historiae Pisanae," col. 654-655. 117 On Gualtieri’s podestariate, see ibid., col. 655-656; Bonaini, Statuti inediti della città di Pisa dal XII al XIV secolo, 3:748-749 no. 8; Cristiani, "Gli avvenimenti pisani del periodo ugoliniano in una cronaca inedita," 97. On Ildebrandino’s captaincy, see Bonaini, Breve vetus seu chronica antianorum civitatis Pisarum, 647. 142 Pisans had not learned their lesson about investing a single person with such broad powers, it must be remembered that the city was still in a dire position regarding its Guelf adversaries. Thus, the city felt it needed some degree of political continuity in order to address the threats. At the very least, the commune decided to shorten the term of office from the ten years it gave Ugolino to a mere three (though still longer than the traditional single year) in case something went wrong. Nino soon traveled to Calci in Tuscany, where he allied with Lucca and Florence against Pisa; their combined forces proceeded to ravage the Pisan contado all throughout the Valdarno nearly up to the gates of Pisa itself. At the same time, the Upezzinghi family had also fled Pisa and allied with the Guelf League to take possession of almost the entire Valdera.118 Two major portions of the Pisan contado were essentially lost to the city, depriving it of the important tax revenue and resources upon which Pisa depended. All the while, Ugolino della Gherardesca and his family members languished in their tower prison, on the brink of starvation for months. During the months of imprisonment, the commune repeatedly demanded exorbitant sums from Ugolino’s relatives to pay for their provisions. By the time the last request (for 5,000 lire) was made in early 1289 Ugolino’s kin could pay no more and so Ugolino, along with several of his sons and grandsons, starved to death on 18 March 1289.119 The tragic end of Ugolino was immortalized by the Florentine Dante Alighieri a few decades later in quite grisly detail within the Inferno portion of his Divine Comedy: in the ninth and lowest level of hell, in the frozen lake Cocytus reserved for souls guilty of treachery, Dante depicts Ugolino and Ruggieri encased in 118 "Fragmenta Historiae Pisanae," col. 653-654; Villani, 1: bk. 8, sec. 121-122, p. 587-589; Adami, 50-52; Bongi, 238; Cristiani, Nobiltà e popolo nel comune di Pisa dalle origini del podestariato alla signoria dei Donoratico, 249. 119 "Fragmenta Historiae Pisanae," col. 655; Belgrano and Imperiale di Sant' Angelo, 5:88; Cristiani, "Gli avvenimenti pisani del periodo ugoliniano in una cronaca inedita," 98; Villani, 1: bk. 8, sec. 128, p. 594; Bongi, 238; Schmeidler, 214-215; Salvatore Bongi, ed. Le croniche di Giovanni Sercambi, Lucchese, pubblicate sui manoscritti originali, 3 vols., Fonti per la storia d'Italia 19-21 (Torino: Bottega d'Erasmo, 1892), 44; Ceccarelli Lemut, "Il conte Ugolino della Gherardesca: un episodio della storia di Pisa alla fine del Duecento," 99. 143 ice up to their necks, the former eternally gnawing on the skull of the latter.120 As callous as this treatment appears (Pisa’s treatment, not Dante’s), a recent forensic study of the Gherardesca family remains uncovered indications of damage to Ugolino’s skull, suggesting the possibility of a mercifully swift final dispatch.121 When Nino and Ugolino were removed from power, they and their closest kin became enemies of the state. Those who survived beyond the first months of 1289 continued to fight against Pisa for their lands and inheritances well into the 1290s, though none of them were ultimately victorious. The Extent of the Damage Done during the 1280s Without question, the 1280s were one of the worst decades Pisans ever experienced, with numerous events and decisions negatively impacting the economic and political strength of the commune with respect to its competitors in the Mediterranean. The last-minute decision to commit resources to Charles of Anjou’s ambitions in 1281 against the wishes of Peter III of Aragon put Pisan merchants at a disadvantage the following year when Peter claimed control of Sicily—a market which was almost as vital to Pisa as Sardinia, especially for provisioning grain for Tuscany and any commercial ventures beyond the Tyrrhenian Sea. A Genoese alliance with Aragon gave Ligurian traders favorable conditions in Sicily while Pisa had no significant interests in Naples. Consequently, the Pisan “flag of convenience” for other Tuscan communities was suddenly not very convenient, reducing Pisan prestige and influence among its neighbors. 120 Dante, Divine Comedy, Inferno: 32.124-139, 33.1-90. Although starvation may not have been the final cause of death, the skeletons displayed clear indications of prolonged malnourishment. Francesco Mallegni, "Strani traumi sulle ossa di due dei cinque individui," in Il conte Ugolino Della Gherardesca tra antropologia e storia, ed. Francesco Mallegni and Maria Luisa Ceccarelli Lemut, Fenice 3 (Pisa: Édizioni Plus-Università di Pisa, 2003), 121-127. 121 144 By far the most damaging decision was that of resuming open warfare with Genoa over the long-lost island of Corsica after over a decade of peace. Pisa critically misjudged Genoese strength and wealth, which had grown appreciably since 1270 due to the booming Black Sea trade. Genoa simply had better financial resources for fleet construction and superior naval technology due to quicker adoption of recent innovations. The subsequent hubris of the Pisan commanders in sailing out to meet the superior numbers of the Genoese on 6 August 1284 hastened Pisa’s downfall as a Mediterranean power. Pisa lost half of its fleet along with perhaps a quarter of its population. If this wasn’t catastrophic enough, Oberto Doria’s decision to refuse the traditional right of ransom for his Pisan captives for fifteen years sent the commune spiraling into socio-economic disarray, ultimately resulting in a prolonged depression that prevented the commune from rebuilding its fleet and maintaining its principal port. As a further consequence, Pisan traders were forced to rely heavily on foreign shipping to transport their goods, bolstering the shipping industries of their competitors and opening the ports formerly dominated by Pisan merchants to others. In their panic following Meloria, the Anziani of Pisa willingly gave control of the commune to Ugolino della Gherardesca (and later also Nino Visconti), permitting him to establish a lordship over the city. Ugolino gave away many Pisan castles to the city’s Guelf attackers in an attempt to end the onslaught and became quite close to the city of Florence, Ghibelline Pisa’s enemy for most of the century. This openly conciliatory approach to the Guelf party did not sit easy with many Pisan citizens, creating political tensions within the city. The lordship of Ugolino pulled communal control out of the hands of the merchant elite and put it into the hands of a territorial lord. This resulted in constitutional changes, most of which were never undone. More importantly, this action divorced the communal government from the very 145 interests which had brought the city so much prosperity and power over the preceding centuries: maritime commerce. By further weakening the merchant and artisan corporations of the city, Ugolino and Nino damaged the strength of existing commercial structures and control over local markets. On top of all of this, the loss of the Valdera and Valdarno deprived the city of significant tax revenue and human and raw resources that were vital to the maintenance of the city and to sustaining any potential military endeavors. The overly harsh terms of the Genoese treaty of 1288, had they been implemented, would have permanently crippled Pisa. Even while the terms were not followed, they severely handicapped Pisa’s ability to maintain its position in the Tyrrhenian, in Sardinia, and especially beyond. Furthermore, by initially agreeing to the disadvantageous treaty, Pisa gave Genoa the legal and moral upper hand in future peace negotiations, ensuring that any future agreement would not be much more favorable to Pisa. Despite the obvious shortcomings of the treaty, Ugolino’s attempts to break the peace with Genoa by fostering piracy further destabilized the commune internally. In 1288, he finally reaped what he had sown with Archbishop Ruggieri’s revolt. However, the overthrow of Ugolino and Nino, though ostensibly to ensure peace with Genoa, reinvigorated conflict with the Guelf League and further jeopardized control of Cagliari along with Pisan access to the silver mines near Villa di Chiesa. In short, two seemingly minor decisions at the beginning of the decade, the Angevin alliance and the sheltering of Judge Sinucello of Cinarca, initiated a chain of events with calamitous consequences that continued to compound upon each other to bring low the once proud republic. 146 Chapter 4 – Trying to Stay Afloat at the Close of the Thirteenth Century Though the events of the 1280s had dealt a near-mortal wound to Pisa, it still showed signs of the indefatigable, pro-active military tenacity which had been a hallmark of the commune for centuries. Indeed, it was this attitude which had set Pisa down the road to Mediterranean commercial superiority in the first place, beginning with its first expedition against Muslim pirates in Calabria over three centuries earlier in 970.1 Pisa would surely need this obstinacy in the years ahead as the city continued to face a multiplicity of threats. The Florence-led Guelf League posed a serious danger to Pisa and its contado close to home. The ongoing war with Genoa threatened Pisan interests abroad and even within the Tyrrhenian Sea. Further afield, Pope Boniface VIII (1294-1303) and James II (of Sicily 1285-1295, of Aragon 1291-1327) threatened Pisa’s hold on Sardinia while the expansion of the Mamluk Sultanate endangered virtually all remaining Pisan commercial interests in the Levant. Though Pisa weathered the numerous storms without being completely dashed upon the rocks, the ship of the commune continued to take on water with each engagement, slowing economic progress and decreasing political maneuverability. External Politics GUIDO DA MONTEFELTRO & THE LAND WAR Following Archbishop Ruggieri’s revolt against the lordship of Ugolino della Gherardesca and Nino Visconti in the summer of 1288, Florence and Lucca seized upon the opportunity to make territorial gains while the Pisan government was in flux. The losses in the 1 Maragone, 4. 147 Valdera and Valdarno were compounded by the revolt of most of the remaining Pisan holdings in the Valdera; by October 1288 Guelf forces took Asciano, a mere six kilometers from Pisa.2 The leadership of Archbishop Ruggieri and his vicar, Bonaccorso Gubbetta da Ripafratta, was obviously insufficient to counter the Guelf threat. When Pisa continued to suffer defeats at Buti and Bientina in December 1288, despite having recently installed a foreign podestà and captain of the popolo, the city sent ambassadors to a Ghibelline military hero, Guido da Montefeltro, beseeching him to become the city’s new podestà, captain of the popolo, and captain of the war for a period of three years. Prior to 1289, Guido da Montefeltro had been one of the most successful military leaders of the Ghibelline effort in Central Italy. His actions for the Ghibelline cause had won him the respect of the Pisan ruling class but also the ire of Pope Honorius IV (1285-1287) who had sentenced him to house arrest in Asti.3 The Pisan offer, however, spoke to his political convictions (and to his purse with an annual salary of 10,000-12,000 gold florins). In disguise, he fled Asti for the Ligurian coast and set sail for Pisa, arriving in March 1289.4 Guido immediately set about shoring up the defenses along the Arno and training 3,000 crossbowmen for two months. Angered by such blatant disregard of Guido’s papally-mandated house arrest, Pope Nicolas IV (1288-1292) excommunicated Pisa, Guido da Montefeltro, and Guido’s cousin, Galasso.5 Had Guido proved to be militarily ineffective, perhaps Pisans would have listened to 2 "Fragmenta Historiae Pisanae," col. 654; Silva, 47; Villani, 1: bk. 8, sec. 122-123, pp. 589-590; Maria Luisa Ceccarelli Lemut, "I Montefeltro e il Comune di Pisa tra XIII e XIV secolo," in Lo Stato e "I valore": i Montefeltro e i Della Rovere: assensi e conflitti nell'Italia tra '400 e '600, ed. Patrizia Castelli and Salvatore Geruzzi (Pisa: Giardini, 2005), 8. 3 Silva, 47. 4 "Fragmenta Historiae Pisanae," col. 655; Cristiani, "Gli avvenimenti pisani," 98; Villani, 1: bk. 8, sec. 128, pp. 594-595; Gino Franceschini, I Montefeltro (Milan: dall'Oglio, 1970), 125. 5 First Archbishop Ruggieri was threatened with excommunication and ordered to appear in Rome. Then Guido and Galasso da Montefeltro (then podestà of Arezzo) were excommunicated. The citizens of Pisa were repeatedly warned to expel Guido, but their refusal to do so resulted in their excommunication as well. Ernest Langlois, ed. Les registres de Nicolas IV: Recueil des bulles de ce pape, 2 vols., Bibliothèque des Écoles françaises d'Athènes et de 148 Nicolas IV; instead, Guido was quite successful in regaining castles in the lower Valdera, along the Lucchese borderlands, and in the valuable Maremma.6 At some point early in his Pisan career, Guido da Montefeltro sent a letter to Genoa to negotiate for the release of their Pisan prisoners.7 The offer was declined, perhaps because Pisa was over a year delinquent in handing over control of Castel di Castro, per the terms of the 1288 peace treaty. Concerned, Genoese ambassadors came to Pisa in July 1289. Communal leaders assured the ambassadors that they intended to abide by the treaty’s terms; the veracity of this promise is supported by the commune’s payment two months prior of 9,000 lire for reparations concerning Corsica.8 However, the Genoese ambassadors were not persuaded and demanded that Guido da Montefeltro hand over one of his sons, along with castles on Elba and Gorgona and the towers of Porto Pisano, as collateral. These terms were too much for Pisa or Guido to accept, especially since he had just lost one of his sons a month before at the Battle of Campaldino.9 Guido refused the ambassadors’ demands and thus the maritime communes returned to war against each other.10 Realizing the danger posed by an infuriated Genoa, Guido followed the time-honored Pisan tradition of seeking a strong, regal ally. In the years since Pisa’s 1282 request to Rudolf I Habsburg (r. 1273-1291) to send troops to Italy went unfulfilled,11 it had become apparent that Rudolf’s attention would remain strictly transalpine in nature. It was also perhaps a moot point Rome, 2nd ser., 5 (Paris: Albert Fontemoing, 1886-1905), 395-396 no. 2172 (7 Apr. 1289), 410 no. 2262 (18 Nov. 1289), 892 no. 6705 (19 Apr. 1291), 895 no. 6725 (31 May 1291), 907-910 no. 6840 (20 Nov. 1291); Silva, 47. 6 "Fragmenta Historiae Pisanae," col. 655; Silva, “Questioni e ricerche,” 47; Ceccarelli Lemut, "I Montefeltro," 10. 7 Florence, Biblioteca Medicea Laurenziana, Plutei 76.74, ff. 170-171; Franceschini, 126, esp. note 12. 8 Belgrano and Imperiale di Sant' Angelo, 5:98-99. 9 On 11 June 1289 Florence handily defeated Arezzo, killing many notable Aretines, Bounconte da Montefeltro among them. Galasso da Montefeltro was then named podestà of Arezzo. Franceschini, 131-132. 10 Belgrano and Imperiale di Sant' Angelo, 5:111-113; Banti, "I trattati fra Genova e Pisa dopo la Meloria fino alla metà del secolo XIV," 360. 11 Silva, 43. 149 after the Crown of Aragon acquired Sicily in 1282. Charles of Anjou’s son, Charles II of Naples (r. 1289-1309) had only just been crowned a few weeks earlier and was in no position to offer any military assistance. The only remaining powerful ruler in the western Mediterranean was James II of Aragon (merely James I of Sicily at the time) and so it was to him that Guido da Montefeltro sent ambassadors on 15 August 1289. The embassy offered to James the title of Lord of Pisa and all Tuscany, if he would but send troops to claim it.12 Though negotiations between Pisa and James dragged on intermittently for two decades before being called off, they did serve to improve relations between the two parties. In 1291 Catalan ships were providing occasional aid to Pisan fortifications and ships throughout the Tyrrhenian, most notably foiling a joint Florentine-Genoese assault on Elba that April.13 Despite the sometime assistance of the Catalans and Venetians, Pisa’s resources were spread thin by the autumn of 1290 when Guelf forces took back many castles and harried the Pisan contado almost up to the gates of the city, hoping in vain to draw Guido out from behind Pisa’s fortifications. Denied their quarry, the Lucchese, Florentines, and Genoese descended upon Porto Pisano and Livorno on 11 September and razed to the ground all remaining fortifications and towers, including the lighthouse on Meloria.14 Adding insult to injury, the Genoese sank numerous ships in the mouth of the port before taking the harbor chain back to Genoa as a trophy. This, obviously, was a huge blow to Pisa economically; the city simply could not afford to rebuild the port infrastructure anytime in the near future and so turned to the 12 Heinrich Finke, ed. Acta Aragonensia: Quellen zur deutschen, italienischen, französischen, spanischen, zur Kirchen- und Kulturgeschichte aus der diplomatischen Korrespondenz Jaymes II (1291 - 1327), 3 vols. (Berlin: Dr. Walther Rothschild, 1908-1922), 3:5-6 no. 3; Tangheroni, Politica, commercio, agricoltura a Pisa nel Trecento, 121. 13 Belgrano and Imperiale di Sant' Angelo, 5:124-129; Franceschini, 134. 14 "Fragmenta Historiae Pisanae," col. 658-659; Cristiani, "Gli avvenimenti pisani del periodo ugoliniano in una cronaca inedita," 99; Silva, 47-48; Villani, 1: bk. 8, sec. 141, pp. 615-616; "Cronica Fiorentina compilata nel secolo XIII," 569; Adami, 54; Belgrano and Imperiale di Sant' Angelo, 5:119-120; Schmeidler, 320. 150 Maremma port of Piombino as the new, they hoped temporary, locus for their maritime activity.15 Despite this major loss, or perhaps newly inspired by it, Guido da Montefeltro began successfully retaking parts of the Valdera and Maremma in late 1290. In late December 1291 Pisan forces dealt a crushing blow to the Florentine army at Pontedera.16 In short order Guido struck again at Castel del Bosco and soon reclaimed most of the rebellious Pisan contado in the Valdera, Collina, and the Maremma. The fall of Acre a few months prior, and probably also the recent string of Guelf-Florentine losses, led Pope Nicolas IV to attempt to establish a peace between Pisa and Florence in early 1292, ostensibly to free Pisans to provide ships for a new crusade. Both cities appeared to be amenable to the notion, but Nicolas IV died on 2 April 1292 before any agreement could be reached; the papal throne remained vacant for the next two years, forestalling any possibility of papal arbitration in the near future.17 Although during his three-year term of office Guido had accomplished more than could ever have been hoped for, on 1 March 1292 Guido was not re-elected; instead, his cousin Galasso da Montefeltro was named podestà and captain.18 Guido was not expelled from the city, though; in fact, he remained in Pisa for another five months as the captain of the war. Yet, Galasso was not quite as successful militarily as his cousin, failing to retake Asciano or Avane and unable to prevent the further ravaging of the Valdarno.19 Unsurprisingly, when Galasso’s 15 Belgrano and Imperiale di Sant' Angelo, 5:134-136. Silva, 49; Villani, 1: bk. 8, sec. 148, pp. 622-623; "Cronica Fiorentina compilata nel secolo XIII," 569-570; Adami, 55. 17 Franceschini, 137. 18 "Fragmenta Historiae Pisanae," col. 661-662; Bonaini, Breve vetus seu chronica antianorum civitatis Pisarum, 651-652; Ceccarelli Lemut, "I Montefeltro e il Comune di Pisa tra XIII e XIV secolo," 11-12. 19 "Fragmenta Historiae Pisanae," col. 662-664; Villani, 1: bk. 8, sec. 154, p. 627; Adami, 56. 16 151 one-year term expired at the end of February 1293, Guido was reinstated in his former capacity for another three-year term.20 THE PEACE OF FUCECCHIO (JULY 1293) Fearing what Guido’s return might bring, Florence sent several priors to Fucecchio on 12 July 1293 to negotiate a peace treaty with Pisa; within only a single day the treaty was drawn up and ratified.21 Despite the strong position from which Pisa could negotiate, the treaty terms read almost as if Pisa had been defeated: the castle at Pontedera was to be destroyed, Florentine (and Lucchese) merchants gained free franchise in Pisa, many of the recently regained castles and lands of the Pisan contado were handed back to the members of the Guelf League, for the next four years either the Pisan podestà or captain of the popolo would be chosen by a Guelf city, the return of the exiled Pisan Guelf families (except the Upezzinghi family and the heirs of Ugolino della Gherardesca), and Guido da Montefeltro (and his relatives) was to vacate Pisan lands within a month.22 Emilio Cristiani suggested that the events of 1292-1293, particularly the brief ouster and then return of Guido, show that internal political tensions had arisen in Pisa.23 Maria Luisa Ceccarelli Lemut further postulated that it was the exorbitant cost of warfare combined with the prolonged interruption of land and sea trade which drove certain communal leaders to grasp for peace.24 Although both views likely factored into the situation, Cristiani’s assessment of the divisions among the Pisan ruling class fails to properly explain the circumstances. 20 "Fragmenta Historiae Pisanae," col. 664; Cristiani, "Gli avvenimenti pisani del periodo ugoliniano in una cronaca inedita," 100; Bonaini, Breve vetus seu chronica antianorum civitatis Pisarum, 651-652. 21 "Fragmenta Historiae Pisanae," col. 664; Villani, 2: bk. 9, sec. 2, pp. 12-13; Iannella, 982; Adami, 56; Silva, 49; Belgrano and Imperiale di Sant' Angelo, 5:171-172; Bongi, "Cronichetta lucchese," 239. 22 Dal Borgo, 279-285 no. 37. 23 Cristiani, Nobiltà e popolo, 252-254. 24 Ceccarelli Lemut, "I Montefeltro e il Comune di Pisa tra XIII e XIV secolo," 11. 152 When Guido took office in 1289 the commune was still at peace with Genoa and only faced landed Guelf opponents. The renewal of warfare with the Genoese a few months later— especially the Genoese destruction of Porto Pisano (with some Guelf assistance)—altered the circumstances in which the commune found itself. Guido was essentially a territorial lord from an inland town (Urbino) with no knowledge of naval tactics, likely part of the reason he went to James II for help. Though Guido was quite successful at combatting the Guelf League on land, Pisa enjoyed very few maritime successes during his podestariate. There were already indications of a desire for peace with the Guelfs in early 1292, but Nicolas IV died before any progress could be made. When Guido returned to power in 1293, it is likely that many Pisans no longer wished to continue the fight on land, instead wishing to prioritize the Genoese threat in hopes of bringing to a resolution the war that prevented the return of the captives from Meloria. Thus, in July 1293, Pisans were not torn between peace and warfare, but rather between war on land and war by sea. The motives of the Anziani in this instance mirrored those of the 1254 uprising which had first brought it into existence. Enraged by the apparent betrayal of many of the families who had brought him to power in the first place, Guido da Montefeltro accused several powerful individuals, especially the Gualandi and Gaetani families, of selling out the city with an expensive and overly submissive treaty.25 Guido then proceeded to enact severe measures of repression against those who favored the peace treaty. Nevertheless, Guido did abide by the terms, if belatedly, leaving Pisa only in October 1293, ostensibly having overstayed the preordained departure date to ensure the proper execution of the treaty. Though the treaty was initially drawn up between Florence and Pisa, it applied to the entirety of the Guelf League. With Tuscany pacified, Pisa could once again focus 25 "Fragmenta Historiae Pisanae," col. 664-665; Cristiani, Nobiltà e popolo nel comune di Pisa dalle origini del podestariato alla signoria dei Donoratico, 255-258. 153 all her attention on the Genoese threat and resume regional commerce, even though much of her recent gains in the contado were forfeit. GENOA AT WAR AND THE TREATIES OF 1299 Following the destruction of Porto Pisano in 1290, the war between Genoa and Pisa settled to a low simmer. Though it may be an artifact of the particularly sparse documentary record for the 1290s, there were no known major engagements between the two communes that decade. The war consisted primarily of minor ship seizures, occasional fracases over Elba, failed chases, and unsuccessful diplomatic maneuvering in Sicily, Tunis, Majorca, and Catalonia.26 For all their desire to focus on the fight against Genoa, Pisans apparently were unable to rebuild a fleet of sufficient size to warrant Genoa’s attention. Instead, Genoa was preoccupied by internal factional strife and war with Venice. Only a month after the destruction of Porto Pisano, Roberto Spinola and Corrado Doria stepped down as captains of the Genoese commune and popolo in late October 1290, perhaps partially due to public dissatisfaction over the expensive and prolonged state of warfare.27 Political conditions in the Ligurian city allowed for a resurgence of the nobility who, over the course of the next year, restructured the government to permit half of their Anziani council seats to be filled by noble families and for the commune to elect only foreign podestàs and captains. Several years later, in December 1295, struggles between the Ghibelline (Mascherati) and Guelf (Rampini) factions erupted into violent anarchy that continued for forty days. Finally, in February 1296 the Ghibelline faction prevailed and Corrado Spinola and Corrado Doria were 26 Most of the evidence we have of Pisan-Genoese encounters in this decade comes from the Annales Ianuenses, which itself ends at 1294. Belgrano and Imperiale di Sant' Angelo, 5:138-143, 145-147, 152-153, 156, 158, 161, 164-166, 169, 171-172, 174. 27 Ibid., 5:121; Epstein, 181. 154 named captains of the commune and popolo, despite the previous provision to only employ foreigners.28 In the intervening years between these governmental changes Genoa entered another war, this time with her other chief rival: Venice. When Acre fell to the Mamluks in 1291, European traders lost the last Latin Christian port in the Holy Land. Consequently, commercial operations were intensified in the nearest Christian kingdoms, namely Cilician Armenia and the island of Cyprus. Despite the existence of a truce between Genoa and Venice (renewed repeatedly since 1269), in 1294 Venice sent a fleet of a dozen or two war galleys along with its eastern convoy. The Venetians first attacked the Genoese base in Limassol, Cyprus. This opening salvo alerted the Genoese at Pera (a suburb of Constantinople), and Niccolò Spinola immediately mustered a fleet. The Genoese surprised the Venetians outside of Laiazzo, Armenia, and captured nearly every vessel.29 At this point the Genoese in the home city were incensed and devoted all of their resources to arming an anti-Venetian fleet, with little or no thought left for Pisa.30 Over the next several years, the two communes sent their fleets out on raiding expeditions, burning and pillaging each other’s bases of operations across the Mediterranean, Adriatic, Aegean, and Black Seas without the two fleets ever directly engaging one another.31 However, on 7 September 1298, the Genoese and Venetian fleets met at Curzola on the Dalmatian coast. The fighting was fierce, and the combatants were closely matched at around 85 galleys apiece, but the Genoese won the day due to a slight technological superiority and arrival late in the battle of a few 28 Monleone, 2:413; Luciana Cocito, ed. Anonimo genovese: Poesie (Rome: Ateneo, 1970), 383; Epstein, 182. Crawford, 132-135; Lane, 82-83; Stanton, 165-166. 30 Iacopo Varagine claimed that the Genoese Credenza made a fleet of 165 galleys crewed by around 40,000 men! Monleone, 2:106; Dotson, 125-127. 31 Monleone, 2:413-414; Crawford, 139-140; Manfroni, Storia della Marina Italiana, 2:207-208; Lane, 83; Stanton, 166-167. 29 155 additional galleys.32 The victory could almost be classified as Pyrrhic in nature due to the severity of the losses on both sides; nonetheless, Genoa took home perhaps 8,000 Venetian captives beyond the thousands that perished that day.33 Among the Venetian prisoners taken to Genoa was Marco Polo; during his captivity in Liguria he recounted his travels to Rustichello di Pisa, a Meloria prisoner and author, who published the tale of adventure upon his release.34 Though the losses for Venice were certainly numerically comparable to those of Pisa at Meloria, here the commune’s future was not placed in jeopardy for three principal reasons. First, Venice’s wealth and population by this point well out-stripped that of Pisa, so the losses suffered by St. Mark’s Republic comprised a comparatively smaller proportion of the commune’s total pool of resources. Second, and much more importantly, Venice had inflicted significant damage to their Genoese opponents, much more so than the Pisans accomplished at Meloria. The severity of the Genoese losses prevented admiral Lamba Doria from pushing further into the Adriatic or even establishing a naval blockade; instead, Doria burned the captured vessels and limped home with the remainder of his fleet.35 Third, the political unrest in Genoa of the preceding few years was rekindled by the costly victory, sapping the will to continue the war from the Genoese populace.36 Venice was not overly committed to continuing the fight either, and so both sides readily agreed to the peace brokered by Matteo Visconti of Milan (no relation to the Pisan Visconti) on 25 May 1299 which treated both parties as equals.37 The peace which came only eight months after Curzola resulted in the return of the Venetian captives by August 1299,38 32 Monleone, 2:109-111; Crawford, 140-142; Manfroni, Storia della Marina Italiana, 2:208-213; Cocito, 281-293; Dotson, 127; Stanton, 167-169. 33 Lane, 84; Epstein, 183; Stanton, 169. 34 Rustichello, Travels; Donald L. Hoffman, "Rusticiano da Pisa," in The New Arthurian Encyclopedia, ed. Norris J. Lacy (London: Garland Publishing, Inc., 1991), 392. 35 Dotson, 127; Stanton, 169. 36 Crawford, 142; Lane, 84; Stanton, 169. 37 Riccoti, 2: col. 344-352 no. 137; Dotson, 127-128. 38 Stanton, 169. 156 leaving the Venetian economy relatively intact while the prisoners from Meloria still languished in captivity. Although Pisans knew that the Genoese had been greatly hurt at Curzola, the treaty with Venice freed the Ligurian commune to focus entirely on Pisa if it so wished. There is no indication that Pisa had been able to rebuild an appreciable naval force during the years that Genoa was distracted by Venice, so it is reasonable to assume that the leaders of the Tuscan city realized that this was a war they could not win. Only two months after the Venetian treaty, Genoa signed a treaty of truce with Pisa on 31 July 1299.39 The terms of this new treaty were quite similar to those of the 1288 treaty, even calling on Pisans to honor all of the terms of the earlier arrangement. The several new conditions included a 160,000 lire penalty for piracy and having broken faith with the 1288 agreement, the transfer of 400 hostages and extension of Pisan trade restrictions until payment was made in full, and the understanding that the truce would stand for twenty-five years, after which it could be renewed.40 After 15 years of almost unbroken warfare between the two communes a lasting, if initially uneasy, peace was finally reached. Later that same year approximately 1,000 Pisans returned home from their lengthy captivity in Genoa, ostensibly all that remained in Genoa of the initial 9,000 captives from Meloria.41 39 The treaty itself mentions that it was the product of months of negotiations, though it is unclear if these negotiations were begun before or after negotiations started between Venice and Genoa. For the treaty itself, see Tola, 1:462-471 no. 141. For descriptions of the treaty by chroniclers, see Silva, 50-51; Iannella, 51-52; Crawford, 143; Villani, 2: bk. 9, sec. 30, pp. 48-49; Adami, 65. 40 For a careful comparison and analysis of the 1288 and 1299 treaties between Pisa and Genoa, see Banti, "I trattati fra Genova e Pisa dopo la Meloria fino alla metà del secolo XIV," 349-366, esp. 60-61. 41 Ceccarelli Lemut argues that 1,000 survivors out of an initial 9,000 is a suspiciously high mortality rate, even for a medieval prison. She believes the figure fails to account for escapees and the exchange of less important prisoners. Silva, 50-51; Sardo, 51; Iannella, 51-52; Ceccarelli Lemut, "I Pisani prigionieri a Genova dopo la battaglia della Meloria: la tradizione cronistica e le fonti documentarie," 78-79. 157 Sardinia THE FIGHT AGAINST THE DELLA GHERARDESCA & VISCONTI The previous chapter recounted how Archbishop Ruggieri harnessed popular dissatisfaction with the lordship of Ugolino della Gherardesca and Nino Visconti to successfully depose them, exiling the Visconti family and starving to death much of Ugolino’s branch of the Gherardesca clan. However, this was not the end of either family as both familial lines continued to impact Pisan interests throughout the 1290s and beyond. Nino Visconti had fled the city and remained in exile after 1288; he spent the next five years making alliances with the Guelf League cities, adding his considerable retinue to the allied forces, and even becoming the captain general of the Guelfs until the Peace of Fucecchio in 1293. Ugolino della Gherardesca’s surviving adult sons, Guelfo and Lotto, did their best to seek revenge from afar; Lotto was still imprisoned in Genoa for his service at Meloria while Guelfo wreaked havoc in Sardinia. When Ruggieri’s revolt occurred in 1288, Ugolino della Gherardesca’s eldest son, Guelfo, had already been in Cagliari for two years, governing the area at the commune’s behest. A year later, the Genoese complained of the delay in receiving the Cagliaritan lands promised in the 1288 treaty. Because the Pisans protested that they still fully intended to comply with the treaty’s terms, Enrico Besta suggested that perhaps Guelfo della Gherardesca had taken control of Cagliari as his own.42 This seems likely as Guelfo seized the fortress at Castel di Castro in July 1289, the same month that war resumed between Genoa and Pisa.43 The townsfolk soon rebelled and named their own city captain, forcing Guelfo to retreat to his rural stronghold of Acquafredda. That same year, Guelfo attacked the Cagliaritan holdings of his cousins Bonifazio 42 43 Besta, 1:256. Belgrano and Imperiale di Sant' Angelo, 5:89. 158 (“Fazio”) and Ranieri della Gherardesca, even capturing Gioiosaguardia.44 On 21 March 1290 he allied with the Guelf League, even sending some troops to Tuscany.45 He spent the next several years fighting Pisans wherever he could, gradually extending his territorial control over southwestern Sardinia.46 Lotto della Gherardesca, meanwhile, was negotiating with the Genoese for his freedom. On 28 May 1292 the two parties reached an agreement: Lotto, Guelfo, and Matteo (their underaged brother) were to become Genoese citizens and be given Ligurian properties in exchange for the Gherardesca lands in Sardinia and a promise to aid Genoa in the fight against Pisa.47 As further insurance, Lotto wedded the daughter of Oberto Spinola, Leona, and sailed for Sardinia in September.48 The brothers continued their campaign to conquer Sardinia lands, even minting coins in Villa di Chiesa proclaiming to be lords of a third part of Cagliari—they had a legal claim only to a sixth part of Cagliari.49 The July 1293 Peace of Fucecchio had immediate consequences for both the della Gherardesca and Visconti. The treaty mandated an amnesty for all the Pisan exiles except for the heirs of Ugolino and the Upezzinghi family.50 Though Nino Visconti was mentioned specifically as a recipient of amnesty, he did not immediately return to Pisa, instead retiring to Calci. Several months later, upon the departure of Guido da Montefeltro, Nino considered entering Pisa. Fazio and Ranieri were the sons of Gherardo della Gherardesca, who was Ugolino’s brother. Gherardo’s branch has typically been portrayed as the Ghibelline branch in contrast to Ugolino’s purported “Guelfism.” Cristiani, "Gli avvenimenti pisani del periodo ugoliniano in una cronaca inedita," 98. 45 Gherardi, 1:384-385, 399; 2:672-673; Ceccarelli Lemut, "I Montefeltro," 9. 46 Cristiani, "Gli avvenimenti pisani del periodo ugoliniano in una cronaca inedita," 99-103. 47 Tola, 440-447 no. 130, 131, 133; Riccoti, 2: col. 288-300 no. 113-116; Besta, 1:257-258; Ceccarelli Lemut, "Il conte Ugolino della Gherardesca: un episodio della storia di Pisa alla fine del Duecento," 100. 48 Belgrano and Imperiale di Sant' Angelo, 5:147; Cristiani, "Gli avvenimenti pisani del periodo ugoliniano in una cronaca inedita," 100-101; Schmeidler, 225; Michele Tamponi, Nino Visconti di Gallura: il dantesco Giudice Nin gentil tra Pisa e Sardegna, guelfi e ghibellini, faide cittadine e lotte isolane (Rome: Viella, 2010), 368-369. 49 Tamponi, 369. 50 Dal Borgo, 279-285. 44 159 However, public sentiment had once again turned against him, leaving him little choice but to remain in exile. Deprived of allies and options in Tuscany, Nino sailed for Gallura after allying with Genoa.51 Guelfo and Lotto, by contrast, had immediately lost their Tuscan allies upon the ratification of the peace treaty and now could only look to Genoa for support. Consequently, Pisa’s newly unfettered focus upon the war against Genoa played out in Sardinia as the commune attempted to extend its control over the island. The Genoese were likely the first to shift the balance in Sardinia, conquering Sassari and expelling Judge Mariano II de Bas (r. 1241-1297) of Arborea’s forces from Logudoro sometime in 1294.52 In response, Pisa made a new alliance with Mariano II and by 28 June 1294 had sent troops to assist in protecting Arborea against the Genoese, the della Gherardesca brothers, and Nino Visconti.53 In exchange for Pisan aid, on 4 January 1295 Mariano II dictated his will, leaving Arborea to his son Giovanni and bequeathing his third of Cagliari to the commune of Pisa.54 Count Ranieri della Gherardesca of Donoratico captained the Pisan forces and, with Mariano II, besieged Guelfo della Gherardesca at Villa di Chiesa. Guelfo held out for quite some time, but when his food stores were exhausted he rode out for Acquafredda. Fate was against him that day; he was mortally wounded by a fall from his horse, resulting in his easy capture by Pisans. Lotto negotiated poorly for his brother’s ransom, only obtaining his release on the condition that the brothers concede all their Sardinian territories to the commune of Pisa and The details of Nino Visconti’s life after the Peace of Fucecchio are unclear. It seems that sometime late 12931295 he allied with Genoa (becoming a citizen in 1295) and sometime 1293-1294 he arrived in Gallura to take possession of his lands from his unfaithful vicar. Schmeidler, 227; Besta, 1:260; Tamponi, 340-342, 355-362. 52 Besta, 1:260-261; Boscolo, I conti di Capraia, Pisa e la Sardegna, 95; Tamponi, 377-378. 53 Francesco Artizzu, ed. Documenti inediti relativi ai rapporti economici tra la Sardegna e Pisa nel Medioevo, 2 vols. (Padua: CEDAM, 1961-2), 1:35-36 no. 26. 54 This third of Cagliari technically belonged to the da Capraia family, but Mariano II had long since appropriated it as his own. Enzo Cadoni et al., eds., Ioannis Francisci Farae opera, 3 vols. (Sassari: Gallizzi, 1992), 2:328; Bonaini, Statuti inediti della città di Pisa dal XII al XIV secolo, 2:225-227, 270-271; Francesco Loddo-Canepa, "Rettifica alla lettura di alcune iscrizioni medioevali della Raccolta Casini," Studi Sardi 12-13 (1954): 266-267; Boscolo, I conti di Capraia, Pisa e la Sardegna, 95. 51 160 depart the island forever. Guelfo died from his wounds in 1295 almost immediately after his release; Lotto died shortly after returning to Tuscany the same year.55 Meanwhile, Nino Visconti struggled for control of Gallura. While waging war in Tuscany at the head of the Guelf League, his insular lands had been grossly mismanaged by his vicar “Gomita.”56 His della Gherardesca in-laws, Guelfo and Lotto, had not respected his lands either, as they relinquished to Pisa several Cagliaritan Visconti properties in 1295. Realizing that Pisa was free to turn its attention to Gallura with the della Gherardesca heirs out of the way, Nino sought allies wherever he could. In early 1295 Nino sent ambassadors to several members of the Guelf League for aid in securing Gallura. Although Florence turned him away, Nino had more success with the Lucchese and San Gimignanese.57 Nino also negotiated with Genoa to become a citizen of the Ligurian republic, securing the release of several Meloria captives belonging to the families still loyal to him (the Duodi, dal Bagno, Gaetani, Casapieri, Upezzinghi, and others).58 Pisa then undercut Nino’s efforts to acquire strong allies on 29 August 1295 by making peace with the powerful Upezzinghi, one of the few families specifically excluded from the Peace of Fucecchio.59 55 Cristiani, "Gli avvenimenti pisani del periodo ugoliniano in una cronaca inedita," 101-103; Schmeidler, 226; Paolo Maninchedda, ed. Memoria de las cosas que han aconteçido en algunas partes del reino de Çerdeña (Cagliari: CUEC, 2000), 16-18; Besta, 1:259; Ceccarelli Lemut, "Il conte Ugolino della Gherardesca: un episodio della storia di Pisa alla fine del Duecento," 101. 56 Dante, Divine Comedy, Inferno: 22.81-90; Tamponi, 355-365. 57 Gherardi, 2:456; Tangheroni, "La situazione politica pisana alla fine del Duecento tra pressioni esterne e tensioni interne," 99; Vicente Salavert y Roca, "Giovanna di Gallura, il suo matrimonio e la politica sarda di Giacomo II d'Aragona," Archivio Storico Sardo 24 (1954): 103-104; Tamponi, 379-380. 58 Cristiani, "Gli avvenimenti pisani del periodo ugoliniano in una cronaca inedita," 103-104; Ceccarelli Lemut, "I Pisani prigionieri a Genova dopo la battaglia della Meloria: la tradizione cronistica e le fonti documentarie," 81. 59 The Upezzinghi were one of the strongest Pisan families, so the neutralization of that threat was a major blow to the Visconti effort. The terms of the peace treaty stipulated that the family had to pay taxes if they wished to enjoy political participation. ASPi, Diplomatico Upezzinghi, 29 August 1295; Cristiani, Nobiltà e popolo nel comune di Pisa dalle origini del podestariato alla signoria dei Donoratico, 261-262. 161 Despite Nino’s efforts, he met an untimely death in late 1296, leaving behind his young daughter, Giovanna, as his only heir.60 Pisa then confiscated all Visconti lands and repeatedly sent troops to Gallura over the following few years to consolidate communal control over the judgeship by 1299.61 Mariano II of Arborea passed away in 1297, leaving his third of Cagliari to communal control as well.62 Thus, by 1297 the Pisan commune directly controlled five-sixths of Cagliari (including the port of Castel di Castro and the silver mines around Villa di Chiesa), was in the process of securing all of Gallura, and had a close alliance with Arborea, leaving only Logudoro outside of its grasp. Ironically, this marked the apogee of Pisan control over Sardinia. Pisa had fought vigorously for well over a century to extend communal control over the island. Just when the city came the closest to effecting total control, a new threat appeared from the unlikeliest of places: Rome. The next thirty years saw Sardinia transition from Pisan domination to Aragonese rulership. POPE BONIFACE VIII AND JAMES II OF ARAGON When Benedetto Caetani ascended to the papal throne as Boniface VIII on Christmas eve 1294, he inherited a problem that had plagued his four predecessors ever since 1282: the War of the Sicilian Vespers. Pope Martin IV (1281-1285) had sponsored an unsuccessful crusade against Aragon in 1284, going so far as to name Philip III of France’s (1270-1285) son, Charles of Valois, as the new king of Aragon. Boniface realized that military strategy would not produce a solution beneficial to papal interests and so he pursued a diplomatic approach. In June 1295, at Boniface’s birthplace of Anagni near Rome, a treaty was signed ending the war. The terms of the 60 Salavert y Roca, 103-105; Tamponi, 413-418. Damiano Filia, La Sardegna cristiana: storia della Chiesa, 2 vols. (Sassari: Tip. U. Satta, 1909-1913), 2:126; Iannella, 52; Salavert y Roca, 106; Cristiani, Nobiltà e popolo nel comune di Pisa dalle origini del podestariato alla signoria dei Donoratico, 279; Boscolo, I conti di Capraia, Pisa e la Sardegna, 98. 62 I conti di Capraia, Pisa e la Sardegna, 96 note 134. 61 162 Treaty of Anagni called for James II of Aragon to return his Italian holdings to Charles II of Naples (r. 1285-1309; Sicily was given to the papacy which in turn handed it to Charles) in exchange for confirmation of the 1291 Treaty of Tarascon which lifted the ban of excommunication on James II and renounced Charles of Valois’ claim to the Aragonese crown.63 Although the parties involved upheld the treaty, the people of Sicily did not fancy the document. Several months later, the Sicilian nobility crowned James II’s brother (and former regent of Sicily) King Frederick III of Sicily (r. 1295-1337). Neither Boniface VIII nor Charles II were pleased by this turn of events, though as James II was not culpable they had little choice but to uphold the treaty. Despite James II’s militarily superior position in 1295, the terms of the treaty appear decidedly favorable to his enemies.64 To account for this, one must look to 4 April 1297, when Boniface VIII granted James II the kingdom of Sardinia and Corsica.65 The Crown of Aragon had desired the islands since at least 1283 when Peter III of Aragon (r. 1276-1285) had made overtures to Judge Mariano II de Bas of Arborea, and later to his son Giovanni de Bas in 1293 even while Mariano still ruled.66 Given the unbalanced nature of the 1295 treaty and the history of Aragonese desire for Sardinia, it seems reasonable to conclude that there was likely a separate agreement in 1295 (verbal, or written and now lost) by which Aragon would receive the islands 63 The Treaty of Anagni also included two marriages for security. James II of Aragon wedded Charles II’s daughter, Blanche, and Charles II’s son Robert married James II’s sister, Iolanda. The 1291 treaty had been with Alfonso III of Aragon who died a month after it was signed, rendering it void. For the Treaty of Anagni, see Georges Digard et al., eds., Les registres de Boniface VIII: Recueil des bulles de ce pape, 4 vols. (Paris: E. de Boccard, 1904-1937), 1: col. 60-62 no. 164. For a detailed study of the Treaty of Anagni, see Vicente Salavert y Roca, "El Tratado de Anagni y la expansión mediterránea de la Corona de Aragón," Estudios de edad media de la Corona de Aragón 5 (1952): 209-360. 64 The treaty also called for James II of Aragon to assist Charles II of Naples in recapturing Sicily and to relinquish the Balearic Islands to his uncle, James II of Majorca, who had sided with France during the Aragonese Crusade. 65 Digard et al., 1: col. 925-926 no. 2336, col. 929-935 no. 2344. 66 Vicente Salavert y Roca, Cerdeña y la expansión mediterránea de la Corona de Aragón, 1297-1314, 2 vols. (Madrid: C.S.I.C., 1956), 2:5-11 nos. 5-9 & 11-12; Dionigi Scano, Scritti inediti (Sassari: Gallizzi, 1962), 150; Boscolo, I conti di Capraia, Pisa e la Sardegna, 97. 163 as compensation for Sicily.67 Furthermore, a document written by a cleric at Anagni several days after the treaty was signed claims Boniface VIII and Charles II of Naples were obligated to aid James II’s conquest of Sardinia.68 Another papal document from 20 January 1296 discusses Sardinia as a possible domain for James II.69 Finally, a convention dated 18 December 1296 stated Boniface VIII had already “commanded [James II] to be ordained illustrious king of Sardinia and Corsica,” suggesting that this arrangement had been in the works for quite some time.70 However, it is unlikely that such an arrangement was common knowledge before the issuance of the 1297 decree. A year prior, on 15 February 1296, Pisa convinced Boniface VIII to lift the ban of excommunication issued by Nicholas IV for the reasonable price of 500 silver marks.71 On that same day, and not by coincidence, Boniface VIII accepted Pisa’s offer to become podestà of the commune for a term of three years, with an annual salary of 4,000 lire.72 At that moment, Pisa had recently defeated the della Gherardesca brothers and were in the midst of a fight for control of Gallura. Had the Anziani known that Boniface VIII was about to give away Pisa’s prized possession to the commune’s newest commercial rival they surely would not have offered Boniface the office of podestà. The fact that Pisa approached Boniface at all was 67 The annalist Zurita asserted that the treaty had secret clauses granting the islands to James II. Salavert y Roca, "El Tratado de Anagni y la expansión mediterránea de la Corona de Aragón," 49; "Giovanna di Gallura, il suo matrimonio e la politica sarda di Giacomo II d'Aragona," 95-96. 68 Item est sciendum quod rex Aragonum debet habere regimen Sardinie et rex Karolus et papa debent iubare ipsum ad habendum Sardanie regnum. Charles Victor Langlois, "Formulaires de lettres du XIIe, du XIIIe et du XIVe siècle," Notices et extraits des manuscrits de la Bibliothèque nationale 34, no. 1 (1891): 319 note 2; Salavert y Roca, Cerdeña y la expansión mediterránea de la Corona de Aragón, 1297-1314, 1:114-115. 69 Salavert y Roca, Cerdeña y la expansión, 1:115, 2:17-20 no. 19. 70 …Sardinie et Corsice rege illustri duximus ordinandum… Digard et al., 1: col. 849-854 no. 2188. 71 Ibid., 1: col. 583-584 no. 1563-1565. 72 Though 4,000 lire is certainly less than the 10,000 lire paid to Guido da Montefeltro, here Pisans were paying for peace instead of military genius. Boniface never intended to rule Pisa directly, a week later he appointed the count of Colle di Val d'Elsa (near San Gimignano) to serve in his stead. Ibid., 1: col. 582 no. 1562, col. 584 no. 1566. 164 likely due to the hiring of Guelf, pro-papal podestàs and captains as stipulated by the Peace of Fucecchio.73 Marco Tangheroni correctly suggests that the granting of Sardinia and Corsica to James II was indicative of the waning power of Pisa in the western Mediterranean.74 The Crown of Aragon conquered and defended Sicily for fifteen years without the involvement of any of the Italian maritime communes, demonstrating the strength of the Aragonese navy. Since Sicily was not in jeopardy, James had little reason to abandon it for the promise of another two islands that neither he nor Boniface controlled unless he felt confident that he could successfully press his claim. Though Genoa’s visibly growing vitality might have made the conquest of Corsica a dubious prospect—and, indeed, Aragon would never fully control it—the real prize was Sardinia with its rich natural resources and thriving ports. Pisa had famously suffered a crippling defeat in 1284 and now Catalan merchants filled the ports once dominated by the Tuscan commune (Tunis, Sicily, and even Castel di Castro). It was likely only by coincidence that the Pisan Anziani approached Boniface in 1296 offering the podestariate. Boniface’s acceptance of the office may have even accelerated the finalization of the agreement with James, since Boniface as podestà (in theory) could have restrained Pisan objections, further assuring James of a smooth transferal of power. James II had every indication that Pisa would not be up to the challenge of fending off the Aragonese navy, though in the end Pisans would hold their ground for almost thirty years. For a great study on the changing demographics of Pisa’s foreign-born leaders, see Maria Luisa Ceccarelli Lemut and Mauro Ronzani, "Il reclutamento dei podestà a Pisa dall'inizio del XIII secolo alla metà del XIV," in I podestà dell’Italia comunale: Parte I: Reclutamento e circolazione degli ufficiali forestieri (fine XII sec.-metà XIV sec.), ed. Jean-Claude Maire Vigueur, Nuovi Studi Storici 51 (Rome: Istituto storico italiano per il Medio Evo, 2000), 1:645657. 74 Tangheroni, "La situazione politica pisana alla fine del Duecento tra pressioni esterne e tensioni interne," 95. 73 165 Internal Politics and the Anziani Oligarchy THE ANZIANI OLIGARCHY Beginning in 1293, the commune of Pisa pursued two internal policies throughout the remainder of the century: the pacification of internal tensions and the empowerment of the Anziani oligarchy. These policies were essentially two aspects of a singular effort by the Anziani to bring greater stability to the communal government and, thus, solidify the political influence of the leading families. Pisa had experienced considerable political changes in the decade since Meloria, between the far-reaching constitutional changes wrought by the lordship of Ugolino della Gherardesca and Nino Visconti and the intensive regional warfare and factional strife during the Montefeltro years. Such uncertainty threatened the security of the Anziani oligarchy, and so they made great strides to protect their interests. The pacification movement was in part a response to war-weariness and the seemingly endless factional struggles within the city. The palpable desire for local calm persuaded the Anziani to quickly accept less than favorable terms at Fucecchio in 1293, despite the strength of the Pisan position. Though the city was willing to readmit most of the Pisan families who had rebelled against the commune, the harsh repression measures of Guido da Montefeltro during his final months in office made the citizenry think twice about welcoming the Visconti family back into the city.75 Besides depriving the Visconti of allies, the amnesty given to the powerful Upezzinghi family on 29 August 1295 further calmed factional tensions within Pisa.76 Three 75 On Guido, see "Fragmenta Historiae Pisanae," col. 664-665. ASPi, Diplomatico Upezzinghi, 29 August 1295; Cristiani, Nobiltà e popolo nel comune di Pisa dalle origini del podestariato alla signoria dei Donoratico, 107-108. 76 166 months later an unsuccessful rebellion erupted, demanding peace with Genoa.77 The following year the Anziani sought and received reconciliation with the papacy. There is even evidence that over the course of the decade the popolo-noble divide was intentionally weakened by the progressive expansion of noble participation on municipal councils (e.g. the Senate, Savi, and Credenza).78 Finally, following the 1299 peace with Genoa, all the families which had rebelled against the commune (except for the Visconti) were given amnesty and readmitted into the city that October.79 This all indicates a concerted and sustained effort on the part of the communal government to abate the factional-familial violence which had tormented the city for nearly a century and to neutralize as many external threats to the commune’s safety as possible.80 By the end of the century, the only clearly defined threat to the city was Aragon’s designs on Sardinia. While the commune pursued a calming of internal tensions, the Anziani sought to extend their power at the expense of the Tre Ordini and Sette Arti. The spotty documentary record for this decade makes dating difficult for specific initiatives, but it seems that 1297 was a landmark year for the further development of the Anziani oligarchy. The Anziani began electing the correctors of the brevi for the Orders and Arti, a task customarily executed by the consuls of the respective groups.81 The reforms of Ugolino della Gherardesca in 1287 permitted the podestà, captain and Anziani to share in the election of the correctors, but there is no evidence of this 77 The rebellion is known through a 1299 document granting amnesty to one of the rebel leaders. ASPi, Diplomatico Roncioni, 26 November 1299; Cristiani, Nobiltà e popolo nel comune di Pisa dalle origini del podestariato alla signoria dei Donoratico, 268. 78 Nobiltà e popolo nel comune di Pisa dalle origini del podestariato alla signoria dei Donoratico, 262-270, esp. note 117. 79 ASPi, Comune, Divisione A, 82, ff. 68, 73, 75 (4, 13 and 27 October 1299); Cristiani, Nobiltà e popolo nel comune di Pisa dalle origini del podestariato alla signoria dei Donoratico, 265-166, esp. note 116. 80 For more on the pacification effort, see Nobiltà e popolo nel comune di Pisa dalle origini del podestariato alla signoria dei Donoratico, 266; Poloni, Trasformazioni della società e mutamenti delle forme politiche in un Comune italiano: il Popolo a Pisa (1220-1330), 167-170. 81 Bonaini, Statuti inediti della città di Pisa dal XII al XIV secolo, 3:143-152, 444-445, 739-741; Castagneto, L'arte della lana a Pisa nel duecento e nei primi decenni del trecento: commercio, industria e istituzioni, 94-95. 167 having been put into practice until 1297.82 Furthermore, the Anziani took over direct control of the artisan guilds that formerly reported to Order of Merchants and the Arte della Lana, while also assuming control of the fondacarius which had belonged to the Order of the Sea.83 By 1304 it became firmly established that all merchant and artisan guilds were to have their brevi housed in the communal chancery and virtually every decision of the orders was subject to review by communal officials.84 The corporate entities, recently so politically influential, were returned to the principal functions they had served decades before as regulators of the markets and artisanmerchant courts. The guilds were tools to serve the economic aims of the commune, no longer bodies that could demand a change of political course.85 The intermittent way these changes were implemented hints at some minor pushback over the alterations, but the fact that the merchant consuls and brevi correctors (breviaioli) often also served as anziani suggests the transition was relatively painless.86 The dating of these changes to 1297—the year Boniface VIII officially granted Sardinia to James II of Aragon—is not a coincidence. After Archbishop Ruggieri’s revolt, especially during the majority of Guido da Montefeltro’s tenure as podestà, the Anziani had little reason to disrupt the status quo because the communal leadership was acting in their best interests (protecting the city and attempting to regain the contado). When the city’s merchants tired of the 82 For the 1287 statute, see Ghignoli, 258-259 (BC 1.157). The fondacarius was the official in charge of the port warehouses, a very important and potentially lucrative position. Trevisan, "Per la storia dell'Ordo Maris di Pisa intorno alla metà del Duecento: il Registro 'Comune A 46'," 334; Castagneto, L'arte della lana a Pisa nel duecento e nei primi decenni del trecento: commercio, industria e istituzioni, 96. 84 Bonaini, Statuti inediti della città di Pisa dal XII al XIV secolo, 2:42; Ticciati, "Mare, Mercanti, Lana: gli 'Ordines' a Pisa nel Duecento e l'evoluzione degli ordinamenti comunali," 285. 85 L'ordine dei mercante a Pisa nei secoli XII-XIII, 188-189, 198. 86 During 1297-1302 the Order of Merchants went back and forth between the Anziani and their own consuls electing their breviaioli. Ibid., 188-189; Castagneto, L'arte della lana a Pisa nel duecento e nei primi decenni del trecento: commercio, industria e istituzioni, 94-96; Ticciati, "Mare, Mercanti, Lana: gli 'Ordines' a Pisa nel Duecento e l'evoluzione degli ordinamenti comunali," 284-285. 83 168 constant warfare disrupting regional trade, the Anziani went behind Guido’s back to conclude a peace treaty with the Guelf League. After Guido’s departure the Anziani naturally enjoyed more power than they had before due to the division of the offices of podestà and captain of the popolo between two people. Although the new officers were typically Guelf and pro-papal, their willingness to pursue the extension of direct communal control in Sardinia was in line with mercantile interests. However, Boniface’s actions in April 1297 jeopardized the economic vitality of the commune and its leading families. These families thus took it upon themselves to safeguard their interests and political influence several months later. The development of pseudo-oligarchies at the apex of the Orders and Arti (and within the Anziani) was a process already underway for many decades.87 By 1297, many of the families which most frequently provided consuls for the Order of Merchants were the same as those which provided anziani and were the most influential in fourteenth-century Pisa.88 The alarm bell rung by Boniface in 1297 awoke the merchant leaders to the perilous position in which they currently stood. The oligarchy of the Merchants realized that while the communal officers since Ruggieri’s revolt had generally acted in their interests, no constitutional changes had been enacted to reverse the potential for podestarial abuse of power for which Ugolino della Gherardesca and Nino Visconti were deposed. As a group, the merchant leaders derived their political power from their leadership of the Order, but the brevi of 1287 had technically put that power at the joint whims of the podestà, the captain of the popolo, and the Anziani. This gave Boniface considerable legal power should he have chosen to have his vicar exercise it. However, now that the podestariate of the commune 87 Cristiani, Nobiltà e popolo nel comune di Pisa dalle origini del podestariato alla signoria dei Donoratico, 211; Ticciati, L'ordine dei mercante a Pisa nei secoli XII-XIII, 184, 188-189. 88 These families also frequently supplied breviaioli for the Order as well. "Mare, Mercanti, Lana: gli 'Ordines' a Pisa nel Duecento e l'evoluzione degli ordinamenti comunali," 285-286. 169 was (vicariously) in the hands of the pope who had given away Pisa’s most valuable possessions, the door was open for further damage to be done if Boniface so instructed by electing papallyapproved brevi correctors. Thus, the constitutional changes in 1297 were intended to transfer the oligarchy from the Order into the Anziani itself and in turn give them direct and unquestioned control over the leadership of the Orders and Arti.89 By further subjecting the Orders and Arti to communal will (instead of vice versa), the Anziani gained power over the major economic sectors of the city, making it easier for this body to pursue directives while making it more difficult for any opposition to effectively contest their decisions. The oligarchy of the Ordine essentially transferred its location from a corporate entity that enjoyed extensive political influence into a political entity proper which controlled all other corporate bodies. Furthermore, the reduction of the Orders after this transference was akin to burning the bridge to power behind them so that future competitors would not be able to gain communal control by the path they had traversed, solidifying their position against future contenders. This streamlining of the communal government was necessary, or at least so it seemed, to stand a chance of opposing the papacy and the Crown of Aragon in addition to Genoa. Pisans knew from firsthand experience that internal communal divisions had enabled the city’s enemies to eat away at her position, hence the pacification movement; the empowering of the Anziani was simply an extension of that, creating a more unified vision of communal government. 89 The information we have on the election of correctors for the corporate entities in this period states that they were elected from solely the Anziani (not the Anziani with the podestà and captain of the popolo) per the regulations set forth in the Brevis Pisani Communis, suggesting that in 1297 a slight alteration to election procedures had been made to remove the participation of anyone except the Anziani. Bonaini, Statuti inediti della città di Pisa dal XII al XIV secolo, 3:143-152, 444-445, 739-741. As for the Anziani, prior to 1307 their members were elected by a group of electors chosen by the Greater Council (Consiglio Maggiore del Popolo); a two-thirds majority granted election. After 1307 the statutes were rewritten so that Anziani term limits were lengthened from two months to two years and outgoing Anziani members directly elected their replacements. Ibid., 1:573 (BP 52), 2:504 (BP 69). On the composition of the Consiglio Maggiore, see Bruno Casini, "Magistrature deliberanti del Comune di Pisa e Leggi in appendice agli Statuti," Bollettino Storico Pisano 24-25 (1955-1956): 112-115, 128-129 (esp. footnotes on these pages). 170 The Order of the Merchants and the Arte della Lana had essentially taken over the Anziani and transferred their leadership to that municipal body. Though this had the potential to strengthen the commune, it also came with some risks. The real danger was the same as with any government in which a small group holds unshakeable power: the needs of the many are not met. For the economic vitality of Pisa, it was fortunate that the group in power came from the Order of Merchants and Arte della Lana, as their industries comprised much of the Pisan economy. Noticeably absent, however, were the minor Arti and the Order of the Sea. Consequently, the interests of these groups attained only secondary importance for the communal government at this time and so long-distance trade and the organization of fleets suffered. Commerce and the Economy THE FALL OF ACRE (1291) AND LEVANTINE CHANGES The Fall of Acre on 18 May 1291 was a pivotal event for Mediterranean commerce. For several decades the Mamluk Sultanate had whittled away at the Crusader states until the last significant Christian stronghold, Acre, finally fell. With the fall of Acre, European merchants lost their last Latin-controlled, Levantine, mainland port. Consequently, the traders that fled Acre were forced to relocate their operations, primarily to Cyprus or Cilician Armenia. This shift disproportionately hurt Venetian and Pisan merchants who had centered their Levantine trade on Acre.90 The Genoese had long since been forced out of Acre and had developed relations in Famagusta and Laiazzo (modern Yumurtalik) instead, easing their transition.91 This is not to say 90 Georg Caro, Genova e la supremazia sul Mediterraneo : 1257-1311, 2 vols. (Genoa: Società ligure di storia patria, 1974), 2:172-174; Dotson, 124; Eliyahu Ashtor, Levant trade in the later Middle Ages (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2014), 17. 91 It is true that after their expulsion from Acre the Genoese made Tyre their new commercial base in Syria, but relations with Cyprus and Cilician Armenia were also pursued as early as 1218 and 1201, respectively. Balard, "Génois et Pisans en Orient (fin du XIIIe - début du XIVe siècle)," 191, 193. 171 that Pisa did not have traders already in these ports, they did. From at least as early as the Third Crusade, Pisans had received extensive privileges in Cyprus for their loyalty to Guy de Lusignan;92 in Cilician Armenia, Pisans had their own consul by at least 1263.93 After 1291, the standing of these ports grew substantially, though it paled in comparison to the continually growing importance of the Black Sea. Though Genoese investment in the Black Sea far outstripped Pisan efforts, at the end of the thirteenth century their Levantine operations were comparable.94 Pisan privileges in the Levant were even so beneficial that as late as the 1330s Tuscan merchants were paying to operate under the Pisan flag of convenience.95 Michel Balard asserted that the reason why Pisan activity here does not appear to have declined after Meloria and Acre was due to the presence of a strong central authority in Cilician Armenia and Cyprus, held up by periodically renewed commercial treaties.96 The presence of a central authority capable of dispensing justice (mostly absent in the Aegean and Black Seas) enabled the depleted maritime strength of Pisans to expand their operations there under the umbrella of legal protections. But to draw the conclusion from this that Pisa was not hobbled would be wrong. Balard’s own study of Famagustan notarial commercial records from the turn of the fourteenth century offers considerable evidence of Pisan decline. First, the largest buildings and ships belonged to the Genoese, suggesting that Pisa was incapable of making comparable 92 Margaret Ruth Morgan, ed. La continuation de Guillaume de Tyr (1184-1197) (Paris: Librairie orientaliste Paul Geuthner, 1982), 147; Müller, 426-427; Marie-Luise Favreau-Lilie, Die Italiener im Heiligen Land vom ersten Kreuzzug bis zum Tode Heinrichs von Champagne (1098-1197) (Amsterdam: Adolf M. Hakkert, 1989), 310; Parker, "Pisan Migration Patterns along Twelfth Century Eastern Mediterranean Trade Routes," 110-111. 93 Rossi-Sabatini, 27. 94 Balard, "Génois et Pisans en Orient (fin du XIIIe - début du XIVe siècle)," 194-195. 95 David Jacoby, "The Rise of a New Emporium in the Eastern Mediterranean: Famagusta in the Late Thirteenth Century," in Μελεται και υπομνηματα [Studies and Notes] (Nicosia, Cyprus: Zavallis Press, 1984), 157. 96 For example, Pisans repeatedly received commercial privileges from King Henry II de Lusignan of Cyprus after Acre’s fall. Müller, 108-111 nos. 73-74; Michel Balard, "I Pisani in Oriente dalla guerra di Acri (1258) al 1406," Bollettino Storico Pisano 60 (1991): 8-9. 172 investments (perhaps partially due to the trade restrictions in the Genoese peace treaties),97 or their shipbuilding industry was in decline (due to the destruction of Porto Pisano),98 or both. Second, while quantitative analysis of the documents shows that all Famagustan merchants had significant regional and long-distance business (approximately 60% to European ports and 40% to Eastern ports), Pisan merchants sent almost nothing back to the metropole despite over 60% of their investments going to European ports.99 Because Pisa had neglected to establish a significant presence in the Black Sea (unlike Genoa and Venice), and lacked any direct access to transalpine Europe, most Levantine Pisan traders invested in trade with Venice, Provence, and Cilician Armenia. The 1299 treaty also played a role here, constraining Pisans to travel mostly on their competitors’ ships (and thus to their competitors’ ports of call). Furthermore, this was also an artifact of the progressive deterioration of communal focus on long distance trade combined with the consequent generational distancing between the commune of Pisa and eastern merchants of Pisan descent. As Balard put it, “towards the 1300s, although Pisa was no longer present in the East, the Pisans were still there.”100 The loss of Acre augmented the importance of the Black Sea, a region in which Pisa never established a competitive presence, permitting Genoese and Venetian growth to far outstrip that of Pisa. Though Pisans on paper maintained a considerable presence in Cyprus, the benefit to the commune was negligible as it was mostly non-Pisan merchants using her flag; what investment Pisans did have on the island only rarely involved the mother city. 97 Recall that Pisan ships were prohibited from sailing beyond Naples. "Génois et Pisans en Orient (fin du XIIIe début du XIVe siècle)," 204. 98 Ceccarelli Lemut, "Pisa nel Mediterraneo durante il XIII secolo," 15. 99 Michel Balard’s chart shows that Pisan investment at Famagusta was split: 29% to Venice, 25% to Cilician Armenia, 16% to Florence, 13% to Provence, 3.8% to Genoa, and only 0.43% to Pisa. Even though only 3.8% of Pisan investments went to Genoa, a surprising 25% of all business conducted involved a Genoese associate. Balard, "Génois et Pisans en Orient (fin du XIIIe - début du XIVe siècle)," 205-206. 100 Ibid., 208. 173 MONETARY MATTERS Though the gold florin had been around since mid-century, it was only by around 1290 that the coin significantly penetrated Tuscan markets outside of the Florentine contado. Florentine dominance over Tuscany—thanks to her political leadership of the Guelf League, military successes against Arezzo in 1289 and Pisa in 1293, and general economic ascendancy from industrialization and banking—increased the desirability of Florentine gold throughout the region.101 Genoa, feeling the economic strain of the long and costly war against Pisa, in 1292 made the mistake of slightly debasing the gold genoin, thus inadvertently ensuring that it would never rival the florin or Venetian ducat.102 The success of the florin in the 1290s greatly increased demand for gold coins, in turn resulting in a rise in the bimetallic ratio between gold and silver bullion, accounting for approximately half of the currency exchange rate increases seen throughout northern Italy, especially after 1295.103 In terms of Pisan coinage, the value of the florin had been relatively stable at 36 soldi (Pisan) from 1277-1296, then in 1296 it jumped to 40 soldi, continued to rise to 50 soldi by 1302, and finally plateaued at 60 soldi in 1322.104 At the same time, silver bullion prices were also increasing in 1294, making it more difficult for mints to obtain silver.105 Silver scarcity increased from 1295 until 1324, exacerbating the plight of the Pisan Zecca (Pisan mint). Guelfo and Lotto della Gherardesca still controlled the mines near Villa di Chiesa in 1294, depriving Pisa of its principal source of silver.106 In desperation, the Zecca asked Pisan citizens to use the high purity coins already in 101 Day, 135. Lopez, "Back to Gold, 1252," 236. 103 The exchange rate between gold and silver coins in Pisa, Lucca, Florence, Genoa, and Lombardy all rose by at least 60-70% from 1295 to 1320. Though alarming, this was not detrimental to Florence and Genoa because they already minted gold coins. Cipolla, 80. 104 Casini, "Il corso dei cambi," 138; Baldassarri, 458-459. 105 Baldassarri, 121. 106 Ibid., 131. 102 174 circulation while it ceased production of the old heavy aquilino grosso da due peso maggiore (then valued at 33 denari minuti) and began production of a debased aquilino grosso di peso minore (with a value pegged at 24 denari minuti).107 The Pisan Zecca hoped that these measures would ease demand while allowing the mint to produce more coins requiring less silver. Though these policies quickly backfired, mint officials cannot be faulted overmuch as the same story played out in mints across Tuscany. Instead of stability, these policies resulted in widespread hoarding and clipping of the older, finer grossi.108 The situation continued to deteriorate until real protectionist measures were implemented in 1319-1325.109 Essentially, gold was becoming more valuable compared to silver while silver bullion itself was also becoming scarcer. The former drove down the comparative value of silver coins while the latter resulted in mints debasing new silver coins and the populace hoarding and clipping old coins of finer silver. The Pisan Zecca’s response to bullion market vicissitudes had significance far beyond mere exchange rate fluctuations. As discussed in chapter 2, Pisan silver coinage dominated Tuscan markets for most of the thirteenth century, even long after the introduction of the gold florin in 1252. Though Florentine gold gradually appeared more frequently in Tuscan business arrangements, the Pisan grosso was still the dominant coin when silver was used. This changed entirely by the 1290s. In 1266 Louis IX introduced a heavy silver coin of high purity called the gros tournois, valued almost 30% more than Italian silver grossi.110 Though not minted on a grand scale, Louis’ crusade preparations and expedition, close ties with Angevin Italy, and of course the Champagne 107 Ibid., 122, 129, 132-133, 457. Ibid., 132-133. 109 Ibid., 133. 110 Françoise Dumas, "Réflexions sur la genèse du gros tournois," in The Gros Tournois: Proceedings of the Fourteenth Oxford Symposium on Coinage and Monetary History, ed. N. J. Mayhew (Oxford: Ashmolean Museum Oxford, 1997), 3-8, esp. 3. 108 175 Fairs all facilitated the rapid circulation of the gros tournois throughout the Mediterranean, as did Charles of Anjou’s Provencal gros which was modeled after his elder brother’s coin.111 It was not until the end of the 1270s that Philip III began issuing the coin on a larger scale.112 The currency’s higher value and usefulness in transalpine commerce were very attractive to Italian merchants. The French coin was so popular by the early 1290s that Guelfo and Lotto della Gherardesca imitated the gros tournois rather than the Pisan grosso when they minted their own coins at Villa di Chiesa (ca. 1290),113 though it is possible that this decision was partially intended as an insult to the Tuscan commune. The rise of the gros tournois in Italy is perhaps best exemplified in the tithe records of Orvieto. For the period 1275-1280 the Orvietani preferred to pay their tithes in Roman grossi and Pisan aquilini rather than with the gros tournois (though gold florins far exceeded all other currencies).114 By 1297 the gros tournois dominated tithe collections, surpassing even payments in gold florins, while not even a single Pisan coin appeared!115 In addition to the growing popularity of the gros tournois, Pisa’s own policies contributed to the displacement of its grosso as the silver coin of choice. For most of the thirteenth century the Pisan grosso was renowned for the consistency of its weight and fineness, making it ideal for commercial transactions. The Pisan Zecca’s response to the bullion crisis of 1295-6—the minting of a new grosso of lower value and fineness—irreparably damaged the reputation of the struggling city’s coinage. John Day’s study of Tuscan tithe collection records offers a startling 111 Marcus Phillips, "The Gros Tournois in the Mediterranean," ibid., 283, 328. Ibid., 285. 113 Mariano Sollai, Monete coniate in Sardegna: nel medioevo e nell'evo moderno (1289-1813) (Sassari: Gallizzi, 1977), 13-22; Philip Grierson and Lucia Travaini, Medieval European Coinage. Volume 14: South Italy, Sicily, Sardinia (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 289-290. 114 Pietro Sella, ed. Rationes decimarum Italiae nei secoli XIII e XIV: Umbria, Studi e testi 162 (Vatican City: Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, 1952), 876, 85, 906; Phillips, 290-291. 115 Sella, 915-916; Phillips, 291. 112 176 picture. In 1296, almost no one in Tuscany paid their tithes using Pisan currency, even tithe payments in Pisa were requested in foreign currencies.116 The gold florin and the silver gros tournois far exceeded other currencies requested for payments. John Day suggested that the payment of tithes in foreign currencies in much of Tuscany may indicate their status as export economies (selling goods abroad results in the accumulation of foreign currency), but Marcus Phillips cautioned that people are always more willing to unload foreign coins before local ones—the local butcher may not accept French coins, but the church accepted all currencies and thus provided a welcome avenue for getting rid of foreign currency.117 Even Phillips accepts that even though this behavior may skew our perception of Tuscan money flows, the sheer number of payments in gros tournois clearly indicates that the coin was widely available. This pattern continued into the fourteenth century as the florin and gros tournois were used increasingly at all levels of the Pisan economy, not just in trade.118 The currency reforms had produced a bad coin that was of no appeal or use to anyone, not even to Pisans themselves, further diminishing the economic importance and influence of the city among its neighbors and further afield. TRADE AND TAXATION With the 1293 Peace of Fucecchio, Florence and Lucca had gained the right to trade taxfree in Pisa and Porto Pisano, thus undercutting a major revenue stream for the Pisan commune. The 1288 and 1299 treaties with Genoa restricted Pisan ships to the upper Tyrrhenian in peaceful years while Genoese ships attempted a blockade to produce the same effect during times of war. These impediments compounded the effects that the enormous losses of men and ships at 116 Lucca was the lone exception, perhaps indicating that Pisa was the principal exporter of Lucchese fabrics at that time. Day, 130-137. 117 Ibid., 137; Phillips, 289. 118 Baldassarri, 136. 177 Meloria and the subsequent destruction of Pisa’s primary port facilities had on Pisan commerce. Consequently, much of Pisa’s shipping business went to foreign contractors as evidenced by the increased presence of other European traders in Tunis and Sardinia, and by Pisan traders aboard foreign ships.119 Florence showed no signs of slowing its economic growth—by the turn of the fourteenth century its woolens industry truly surpassed Flemish ones,120 its currency had supplanted Pisa’s regionally, and it politically and commercially dominated Tuscany121—but Pisa missed out on most of the potential profits from taxation and shipping contracts. Nevertheless, the importance of Porto Pisano for transferring goods between the sea and the Tuscan interior persisted and so by 1297 the Pisan commune made provisions to begin the lengthy process of repairing the port infrastructure.122 The 1299 Genoese treaty demanded an enormous cash payment of 160,000 Genoese lire to secure the release of the captives from Meloria. As mentioned above, Pisan currency was undergoing continuous devaluation, making it increasingly difficult to raise funds. With a significant percentage of Pisa’s market and port traffic exempt from taxation, the commune resorted to other methods of fundraising. It seems that the estimo (property tax) offered a quick way to solve the problem.123 In 1299 the fixed tax rate on property ran as high as 25%, assessed on property’s taxable, not patrimonial, value (i.e. the actual worth of assets, not just the income 119 Petrucci, "Tra Pisa e Maiorca: avvenimenti politici e rapporti commerciali nella prima metà del XIV secolo," 139. 120 Malanima, "La formazione di una regione economica: la Toscana nei secoli XIII-XV," 240. 121 Ceccarelli Lemut, "Pisa nel Mediterraneo durante il XIII secolo," 18. 122 Only by 1297 were there any indications of communal efforts to rebuild the Porto Pisano infrastructure, though it is unclear how much of this work was actually undertaken and when (or if) it was completed. There were provisions to replace or shore up several towers, to install a new harbor chain, and to remove the ships which the Genoese had sunk. Most of this work was only documented from the fourteenth century. ASPi, Comune, Divisione A, no.81, ff. 8v, 18r, 20r, 26r, 38v-39v; Riva, 41, 99, 113-114, 152, 233-239; Bonaini, Statuti inediti della città di Pisa dal XII al XIV secolo, 3:368, 413, 416-417, 431-432; Ceccarelli Lemut, "Assetto del territorio, insediamento ed economia nel Medioevo," 116. 123 Property here did not refer strictly to real estate, but rather all assets, though real estate was by far the greatest store of wealth. 178 they produced).124 For many individuals this was a crippling burden which resulted in the selling of numerous parcels of land to cover tax dues. The enormity of this loss of wealth further exacerbated the depression of Pisan economic activity which had been ongoing since Meloria (see next chapter). The lack of circulation of Pisan coins beyond the Tyrrhenian, and the near total absence of Pisan coin finds from this era even within Pisa itself further attests to the damaged state of Pisan trade.125 Sink or Swim: Striving for the Latter, Achieving the Former Ruggieri’s revolt reignited the struggle against the Guelf League. Although Guido da Montefeltro’s military prowess as podestà permitted Pisa to retake much of the contado, it came at a high price. The contest not only exacted a high annual toll in both men and money, but it also brought about the destruction of Porto Pisano and the excommunication of the commune for hiring Guido. Amidst the Tuscan violence, Genoa resumed its war against Pisa since the latter had failed to honor the terms of the 1288 treaty. What territorial gains the city had made under Guido’s tenure were quickly squandered in 1293 by the communal leaders who desired regional peace at any cost. The loss and destruction of so much of the contado diminished the pool of tax and natural resources available to the commune, while the destruction of Porto Pisano crippled Pisans’ ability to conduct commerce and build ships. The peace terms gave tax exemptions to Pisa’s Guelf neighbors and mandated that the city hire Guelf chief municipal officers, further reducing revenue from Pisan markets while bolstering those of her enemies. Though war had resumed with Genoa, the Ligurian city was thankfully (for Pisa’s sake) too preoccupied by internal factional strife and a costly war with Venice to devote considerable 124 125 Violante, 117. Baldassarri, 135-136. 179 resources to damaging Pisa. Be that as it may, Pisa simply did not have the strength to make a major offensive against her longtime rival. The enmity slowly simmered until the GenoeseVenetian peace of 1299 freed Genoa’s hands to focus on Pisa, forcing the city on the Arno to capitulate for lack of a realistic alternative. The terms of this peace were much the same as in 1288, though with a larger monetary penalty than before. This time Pisa honored the agreement and the long-imprisoned captives from Meloria finally returned to their Tuscan homes. The high price the return of the captives and for peace was an enormous burden for communal coffers, requiring the government to hike tax rates to oppressive levels. The tax burden in turn compelled many Pisans to sell portions of their property, draining a significant amount of wealth from the city that could have been used for more productive economic activity. Perhaps the only communally beneficial turn of events in the 1290s occurred in Sardinia, followed shortly thereafter by the most detrimental event (for Pisa) of that decade. Sardinia was the battleground for the extermination of the della Gherardesca and Visconti noble lines against which the commune had revolted in 1288. In the south, Pisa allied with Arborea to combat Guelfo and Lotto della Gherardesca’s control of western Cagliari. The commune ultimately acquired direct communal control of five-sixths of the former judgeship when the two brothers (and the Pisan ally Mariano II of Arborea) perished in the middle of the decade. Not long after, Nino Visconti met his fate in Gallura, leaving only his child heiress Giovanna behind; Pisa spent the remainder of the decade militarily securing the Judgeship of Gallura. However, at precisely the moment when the Pisan commune acquired direct control of nearly half of Sardinia, their hopes for revival were dashed. Pope Boniface VIII granted Sardinia and Corsica to James II of Aragon in 1297. Sardinia was a vital component of Pisa’s economy; the island held rich silver mines, provided Pisa with natural resources and grain, and was a major entrepôt for Pisan 180 merchants. Though it would take nearly thirty years for James to actively pursue conquest of the island, the inevitability of the event always loomed over the western horizon. With the Peace of Fucecchio in 1293, the Anziani initiated policies aimed at reducing internal and external threats to peace in Pisa while transforming the political body into an oligarchy. External peace had its costs (the treaties with Florence and later Genoa, as well as an expensive reconciliation with Boniface VIII in 1296), as did internal peace (amnesty for exiled rebel families and expansion of noble involvement in the lower magistracies), but ultimately these measures provides more day-to-day stability for the commune. The consolidation of power in the Anziani, meanwhile, involved the attenuation of the trade guilds’ (the Tre Ordini and Sette Arti) political influence through the appropriation by the Anziani of many of their customary powers. These changes deprived other families of potential access to government positions. More importantly, communal policy once again was tied to the wishes of a few individuals rather than to the public weal, or even to the interests of the major economic sectors of the city. Longdistance trade was one of the chief economic sectors to suffer from this policy shift. Disenfranchisement of the Tre Ordini was not the only contributor to the decline in Pisan long-distance trade. The destruction of Porto Pisano, the semi-blockades enforced by the Genoese, and the trade restrictions imposed by the treaty with Genoa made it difficult for Pisan merchants to connect with the East. The 1291 fall of Acre, Pisa’s principal Eastern port, further hampered investment and the movement of goods. The Tuscan commune’s failure to appreciably penetrate the Black Sea became more regrettable with every passing year. Though Pisan expatriot communities grew in Cyprus and Cilician Armenia, they were generally more involved in regional trade or commerce with Venice, Genoa, and Provence, sending almost nothing back to Pisa. 181 The comparative weakness of the Pisan commercial sector—indeed, of the economy as a whole—is evident from the fluctuations of Pisan currency. Though Pisan silver had dominated Tuscany and the Tyrrhenian for most of the thirteenth century, by the 1290s the gold florin and various foreign silver coins had completely replaced Pisan coinage in most places, even in Pisa itself. The tribulations discussed above had weakened Pisan trade and her economy to the point that her currency was no longer desirable. Bullion price changes and the temporary loss of access to Sardinian silver drove the city mint to debase its currency, destroying the long-held reputation for consistent purity and weight which Pisan coinage had built up over the preceding century. The imbalance of trade flows (due to the separation from the East and the impressive growth of the city’s rivals of Florence and Genoa) meant that silver was no longer flowing into the city as it once had. Plentiful access to silver had enabled Pisa to begin minting a grosso early in the century, the absence of access in turn required the Zecca to reduce purity and cut production. This is a clear indicator that the city had fallen into a dire economic situation, one that shall be examined in greater detail forthwith. 182 Chapter 5 – Meloria’s Lasting Economic Effects As valuable as traditional historiographical methods are, they are incapable of telling the full story of the Pisan experience. The limited nature of and inherent biases present within narrative sources precludes any objective study of how the Pisan economy and society fared in the final decades of the thirteenth century. Fortunately, the combination of social network analysis (SNA) with classical statistical methods at long last permits historians to peak at the true socio-economic repercussions of the loss at Meloria. Medieval historians are at a disadvantage compared to scholars of more recent periods when attempting to conduct social network analysis. SNA demands either large or rich (or both) data sets, something not often found among extant medieval source material. One typically has the option of two paths: using an egocentric approach or a whole network approach. Padgett and Ansell’s study of the Medici, for example, utilized an egocentric approach centered on Cosimo de’ Medici to great effect. The work relied heavily on both personal correspondence and official documents, all of which survive in exceptional numbers. This approach is not feasible for thirteenth-century Pisa (nor most other medieval societies). The other alternative is a whole network approach, which attempts to capture all relations between members within a community. This is obviously not possible with any pre-modern source material unless examining sources that provide a representative subset of the society, the structure of which can be extrapolated out to the wider community. Notarial registers offer a particularly useful window into late medieval societies as individuals from all socio-economic backgrounds had need of a notary’s services, providing a vertical cross-section of that community’s business. This was Quentin van Doosselaere’s approach to Genoese commercial agreements within notarial registers spanning several centuries. 183 Genoa’s medieval archives are among the richest surviving in Italy, permitting van Doosselaere to focus his examination on a single type of economic activity and still enjoy a statistically significant sample size. The comparative sparseness of Pisa’s archives1 necessitates a broader approach to the material, building a network of individuals involved in any sort of economic activity rather than just commenda agreements. The variety of documents found in notarial registers means that not all interpersonal connections are alike in either strength or nature, so extra care must be taken when asking questions of the data. The clearest example of the inherent danger comes from studying witness lists.2 Witness lists are deceptive because there are numerous reasons why an individual might witness a document. Perhaps the person was a close friend or family member of one of the document’s participants; perhaps the person happened to be nearby when the document was composed, either working/living in the area or merely the next person waiting in line to have a document notarized; perhaps the person was related to, or in business with, the notary who composed the document itself. Given the multiplicity of reasons why a person might appear in a document, one cannot give equal weight to the numerous relationships found in the documents; a debtor and lender are objectively different than a groom and a bride. Furthermore, the diversity of documents precludes forming any clear metric of determining directionality of relationships. If only lender-debtor relations were examined, then directionality would be informative. For these reasons, witnesses have been excluded from the network analysis and all remaining ties have been left unweighted and the directionality of the relationships have been ignored. 1 After Uguccione della Faggiola was expelled from Pisa in 1316, the rebellious Pisans burned the state archives to destroy his memory. The majority of Pisa’s medieval records vanished in the flames. Herlihy, Pisa in the Early Renaissance: A Study of Urban Growth, 216. 2 See also Vincent Gourdon, "Réseaux des femmes, réseaux de femmes. Le cas du témoignage au mariage civil au XIXe siècle dans les pays héritiers du Code Napoléon (France, Pays-Bas, Belgique)," Annales de démographie historique 112, no. 2 (2006): 33-55. 184 Though the nature of the Pisan sources constrains the variety of questions that can be asked to only a few network measures, these few are nonetheless important and insightful. The person-to-person interactions (1-mode analysis; i.e. only one node type) only permit an examination of how connected individuals are to each other on average. At this level the key metrics are average degree, degree centralization, and connectedness. The degree of a node (person) is simply a count of the edges (ties) connecting the original node with other adjacent nodes; thus, the average degree of a network is merely the arithmetic mean degree of all nodes in the network. This tells us with how many people a random individual would have economic ties. Degree centralization and connectedness both describe the structure of a network, indicating how much activity gravitates around key individuals and the likelihood that two individuals could connect through a chain of relationships of any length, respectively. These are important basic measures of any 1-mode network, but alone they only offer a limited amount of information. Since no ties were assigned weights or directions initially, a large proportion of potential network analyses are not available to this study. However, there is a way to add depth to the network and therefore expand the avenues for analysis. Though Pisan society was only composed of people, the notarial documents themselves offer a filter through which snippets of social interactions are viewed. Thus, we can view not only person-to-person interactions, but also person-to-document interactions (2-mode analysis; i.e. two node types). Whereas 1-mode analysis views people as the connectors between other individuals, 2-mode analysis views economic activity (documents) as the connecting force. The expansion from 1-mode analysis to 2-mode analysis is akin to the difference between a paper map and a globe—though not a precise analogy.3 In any event, the additional dimension to the analysis permits the use of two more 3 Unsurprisingly, network analysis shares many similar terms with cartography. There is a process called “projection” for transforming two-mode networks into one-mode networks to enable one-mode measures of a two- 185 metrics for the Pisan case: reinforcement and the global clustering coefficient.4 Reinforcement essentially measures the likelihood that an individual will repeatedly interact with the same individual(s). The global clustering coefficient, on the other hand, measures the frequency with which an individual’s associates interact together, or how much cliquishness the network displays. On their own, these several network measures and their graphs can only tell so much about medieval Pisa and how it changed over time. However, when combined with quantitative analysis and traditional historiographic practices, deeper insights begin to emerge that would not otherwise be possible with any one method alone. The quantitative analyses conducted in the present study are fairly simple from a mathematics perspective, consisting of only the most basic statistical approaches and therefore not meriting further discussion. To conduct all of the network and statistical analyses, and to produce the network visualizations, I utilized the programs NetMiner 4 and RStudio with the tnet package.5 Social Network Analysis The first step to fully understanding the long-term effects of the war against Genoa is to examine how the social network of Pisa had changed by 1301 as compared to 1272 [figures 5.15.3].6 We are particularly fortunate that the notarial registers of Iacopo di Carraia Gonnelle’s mode data set. However, Tore Opsahl has shown that the entailed data loss from this process should merit the abandonment of the process in favor of a more intricate mathematical approach. Tore Opsahl, "Triadic closure in two-mode networks: Redefining the global and local clustering coefficients," Social Networks 35, no. 2 (2013): 159167. 4 I highly recommend reading Tore Opsahl’s work on 2-mode networks, especially his website https://toreopsahl.com/tnet/two-mode-networks/. 5 For more information on the freely available R and RStudio, visit https://www.r-project.org/ and https://www.rstudio.com/. For more on the tnet package for R, visit https://toreopsahl.com/tnet/. 6 As previously mentioned, the years for which notarial records are best preserved from the same family notary business of Ugolino and Bartolomeo di Iacopo are 1272, 1283-1284, and 1301-1303. Partial years exist from this family of notaries but have been excluded to make better comparisons between the years. 186 Figure 5.1 – 1-mode Pisan social network, 1272-1301 sons have survived from these years, as they are particularly well-suited for comparison; Pisans had been living in relative peace for almost two years in both 1272 and 1301. In 1270 Pisa made peace with Charles of Anjou and with Genoa, also ending the lengthy War of St. Sabas, and in 1299 Pisa again made peace with Genoa, ending the 17-year struggle and at long last granting the surviving captives from the Battle of Meloria their freedom. Our analysis will also touch on the years 1283 and 1284 to see how Pisans behaved in the lead up to, and the immediate 187 Figure 5.2 – 1-mode Pisan social network in 1272 aftermath of, Meloria. Obviously, a society engaged in intensive warfare and one at peace would behave very differently, but comparisons are nevertheless useful. The social network graph reconstructed from the 1272 register of notary Ugolino di Iacopo di Carraia Gonnelle is not very well connected by modern standards (largely an artifact of the nature of the source) but does exhibit recognizable clustering and contains several sizeable 188 Figure 5.3 – 1-mode Pisan social network in 1301 components [figure 5.2].7 When examining a graph of the social network from 1301, it is immediately apparent that some network fragmentation has occurred [figure 5.3]. Although the latter network still contains clusters, the components are typically much smaller. It should be noted that, as compared to 1272, there were approximately 40% fewer documents recorded (even with the 1301 sample including one more month than the 1272 7 A component being the set of all nodes that are connected by at least one edge. 189 sample) [table 5.1]. It is easy to observe that many fewer documents were notarized (at least by Bartolomeo di Iacopo) during this later period, a point to which I shall return later, and this may explain to some extent why we see smaller components than in previous years. However, it should not be assumed that this is the entire story. Comparing various network cohesion measurements between the different years allows us to remove any bias presented by differences in the number of documents recorded. Table 5.1 – 1-mode (undirected) cohesion measures by year pre-Meloria 1284 post-Meloria combined March 29 October 1 April 8 July 16 August 10 November 30 April 8 November 30 March 25 October 4 165 106 67 46 113 100 455 440 301 308 580 297 2.04369 1.91469 2.26182 1.94096 2.16092 2.00741 0.06102 0.15533 0.09095 0.11589 0.05942 0.04491 0.05556 0.08011 0.08807 0.07123 0.10689 * Initial documents only; does not include supplementary documents or records of contract fulfillment. 0.03398 1272 1283 April 19 September 23 # of documents* # of participants (no witnesses) Average Degree Degree Centralization Connectedness date range* 1301 Before proceeding further, it would be prudent to mention several details about the nature of the data and how it was collected. When preparing the data for analysis, I decided to only count the initial document in an interpersonal interaction as distinct. Numerous documents were accompanied by marginal or subtext supplementary information (will addenda, loan extensions, etc.) or confirmations of the fulfillment of the terms of the document (a cassatio), all of a later date. Although these supplements are factored into the analysis, they were not counted as separate documents as they merely continue (or terminate) the specific relationships codified within the original documents. However, since supplementary actions often took place months or even years following the initial agreements, the interactions described within them (and not within the original document) were included within the analysis for the years in which they occurred. For instance, if a merchant gave a loan to a tanner in 1272 and the tanner repaid the 190 loan to an agent of the merchant in 1283, only the relationships and the creation of a distinct document would be factored into the 1272 dataset. The relationships described within the 1283 supplement (the tanner paying the agent and the agent working on behalf of the merchant, but not the initial loan itself) would fall within the 1283 dataset, but without adding to the tally of distinct documents for that year. Importantly, the data presented in table 5.1 excludes any supplements from the years in between those listed (e.g. if a loan was repaid in 1276, that information would not be included). I have done the analyses for both year specific datasets and for larger periods [table 5.2], but for now we shall only examine the year-specific data. Table 5.2 – 1-mode (undirected) cohesion measures by period 1270s 1280s (pre) 1280s (post) 1300s PreMeloria PostMeloria Total # of documents* # of participants (no witnesses) 165 173 46 100 338 146 484 463 717 374 298 1157 665 1709 Average Degree Degree Centralization Connectedness 2.04819 2.10730 1.85890 2.00741 2.11985 1.94576 2.13598 0.06056 0.09714 0.09641 0.04491 0.06092 0.05290 0.04169 0.05490 0.18229 0.05112 0.03398 0.16239 0.02673 * Initial documents only; does not include supplementary documents or records of contract fulfillment. 0.15261 Lastly, it is important to note that between 11 July 1284 and 7 October 1284 the notary Bartolomeo di Iacopo di Carraia Gonnelle mostly stayed in the small town of Bibbona, 55km south of Pisa, which was subject to Pisa and the della Gherardesca family. Although there are only 15 documents from this period (a third of the post-Meloria 1284 documents), Bartolomeo’s working vacation from Pisa unfortunately deprives us of a clear picture of daily life within the commune during the month immediately before and the two months immediately following the Battle of Meloria (6 August 1284). It is not clear whether Bartolomeo mostly remained in Bibbona for the entirety of this period or whether he made occasional trips to Bibbona and returned to Pisa in the interim, it was after all only a day’s ride distant. There is evidence to support either conclusion. Bartolomeo only notarized fifteen documents over the span of three 191 months, and these were clumped to eight different days (even supplementary documents and contract fulfillments appear on these same dates). At the same time, there is one document dated to 1 September 1284 that took place in Pisa; this document appears amid the Bibbona documents, though out of chronological sequence which brings its dating and location into question. Bartolomeo also wrote two cassati to earlier documents in Pisa two weeks after Meloria. Either way, Bartolomeo left almost no record of any documents from Pisa for the three months surrounding Meloria. This lacuna does present some problems in terms of accurately measuring the Pisan social network from that year. In an attempt to make the dataset for 1284 more comparable with the other years, I extended the chronological range of the examination by two months to the end of November (the other years end around the beginning of October). Thus, I have opted to focus more heavily on comparisons between 1272 and 1301, though 1284 will be mentioned from time to time. 1-MODE NETWORK ANALYSIS Referring to table 5.1, we see a noticeable decrease in average degree (from 2.04369 down to 2.00741) between 1272 and 1301. In social network analysis, the degree of a node (i.e. a person in this case) is the number of edges (i.e. the lines in SNA graphs) that are incident with it or, put another way, the number of nodes that are adjacent to it.8 As one might expect, the average degree of a node is just the mean degree value of all nodes within a network.9 Thus, it is apparent that Pisans were, on average, interacting with fewer other people within the context of notarized documents. This downward trend also holds true for the other years in table 5.1, as 8 Stanley Wasserman and Katherine Faust, Social network analysis: methods and applications (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 100; Stephen P. Borgatti, Martin G. Everett, and Jeffrey C. Johnson, Analyzing Social Networks (Los Angeles: SAGE Publications, 2013), 12. 9 Borgatti, Everett, and Johnson, Analyzing Social Networks, 150. 192 well as for the larger periods in table 5.2: 1272 was the year in which Pisans interacted with others the most. There was a notable spike in the data for the first half of 1284, but that can be explained as a result of numerous individuals making preparations to serve in the Pisan fleet; many Pisans paid others to fulfill their naval service obligations, with these arrangements involving several other people to ensure that payment for service was rendered to kin in the event of the surrogate’s untimely demise. Degree centralization is a rather simple measure of network cohesion, referring to the extent to which a network is dominated by a specific node or group of nodes or, in other words, how much a network graph resembles a star (think of an asterisk rather than a polygonal star) with values closest to 1 being the most star-shaped.10 Again, tables 5.1 and 5.2 present values that trend downward over time. Following the trend for average nodal degree, upon which the degree centralization score is based, we see a network that is becoming less and less centralized over time, with fewer and fewer principal actors engaged in multiple relationships with a diversity of people. Once again there is a spike in degree centralization in 1283 and 1284, though this time the culprit is the relatively high number of wills (just over 11% of all documents) that were drawn up or executed in those years. Network graphs of wills are quintessentially star shaped in nature with numerous inheritors tied to a central testator. Despite this spike, the trend is nevertheless significantly downward, falling more than 25% from 0.06102 in 1272 to 0.04491 in 1301. Another measure of network cohesion, connectedness, provides a bit more information in terms of determining how well interconnected Pisan society was during this period, as the measure’s name suggests. "Connectedness is defined as the proportion of pairs of nodes that can 10 Wasserman and Faust, 175-180; Borgatti, Everett, and Johnson, 159-160. 193 reach each other by a path of any length—in other words, the proportion of pairs of nodes that are located in the same component."11 A component, you will recall, is merely the group of all nodes which are connected by edges and, as you can see in figures 5.1-3, there are numerous components within the Pisan network. Yet again the same pattern emerges from the data: a downward trend in the connectedness of the network over time, along with a spike in the 1280s due to the aforementioned reasons (wills and preparations for naval service). Although the nearly 40% decline from 0.05556 in 1272 to 0.03398 in 1301 is notable, comparing the entire preMeloria and post-Meloria periods produces even more dramatic results: a decrease from 0.16239 to 0.02673. This translates to there being fewer people per component on average, and more components overall; the opposite would be true of a healthy and well-connected network. 2-MODE NETWORK ANALYSIS The network measures above tell the story offered by examining 1-mode relationships (person-to-person interactions) but analyzing 2-mode relationships (person-to-document interactions) can provide additional insights into the nature of the Pisan social network and how it changed in response to the war with Genoa [table 5.3, figures 5.4-5]. In 2-mode network Table 5.3 – 2-mode cohesion measures by year # of documents* # of participants (no witnesses) Edges Reinforcement Clustering Coefficient combined 106 preMeloria 72 1284 postMeloria 53 440 308 319 1272 1283 165 460 1301 PreMeloria PostMeloria Total 121 100 338 171 484 595 298 1157 665 1709 641 516 394 379 764 442 1543 895 2692 0.20481 0.15061 0.23236 0.32292 0.21681 0.60832 0.16172 0.47263 0.23815 0.07771 0.01344 0.14378 0.12764 0.09257 0.52008 0.07697 0.34497 0.14827 * Initial documents only; supplementary documents or records of contract fulfillment were not counted separately. However, supplementary documents and fulfillments dated to a later year are tallied in both years (e.g. a loan issued in 1283 and repaid in 1284 would add to the tally for both years since those individuals were active in both). 11 Borgatti, Everett, and Johnson, 153-154. 194 Figure 5.4 – 2-mode Pisan social network before Meloria (person = red circle; document = blue square) analysis, there are two scores with which the present study is principally concerned: reinforcement and the global clustering coefficient. Reinforcement is here defined as the ratio of the number of 4-cycles to the number of 3-paths as proposed by Garry Robins and Malcolm Alexander in 2004.12 Another way to look at it would be to say that the higher a network’s 12 A 3-path connects a person to a document, to another person, to another document; a 4-cycle is similar to a 3-path, where the initial person is also connected to the second document, forming a closed loop. Garry Robins and Malcolm Alexander, "Small Worlds Among Interlocking Directors: Network Structure and Distance in Bipartite Graphs," Computational & Mathematical Organization Theory 10, no. 1 (2004): 69-94; Opsahl, 162. 195 Figure 5.5 – 2-mode Pisan social network after Meloria (person = red circle; document = blue square) reinforcement score, the more likely it is that someone will repeatedly interact with the same person(s). Within the context of the Pisan data, there is a threefold increase in reinforcement over time, rising from 0.20481 in 1272 to 0.60832 in 1301, indicating that at the dawn of the fourteenth century Pisans were much more likely to engage in multiple documents with the same people than they were thirty years prior. 196 The other important measure of a 2-mode network is the global clustering coefficient, designed to determine the extent to which an undirected network has areas of high and low density, the extent to which it displays clustering or cliquishness.13 As the global clustering coefficient represents the cliquishness of a network, a maximally connected network (where every person is connected to every document) would have a coefficient of 1. For undirected 1mode networks the clustering coefficient is the ratio of closed 3-paths to the total number of 3paths, and this has typically been applied to 2-mode networks by first applying the method of projection to turn them into 1-mode networks (where the secondary node set is transformed into the edges that link primary set nodes together) before calculating the clustering coefficient.14 However, since projection necessarily entails some data loss, I have opted to utilize Tore Opsahl’s 2-mode global clustering coefficient which is the ratio of closed 4-paths to the total number of 4-paths, where the closed 4-paths must be closed by being part of at least one 6-cycle (a loop of six edges with five or six nodes) to create triadic closure among three nodes of the primary node set and at least two nodes of the secondary node set.15 As opposed to the reinforcement coefficient, which relates to the frequency with which two individuals appear within multiple documents, the global clustering coefficient relates the frequency with which an individual’s associates interacted together. Using Opsahl’s method, the Pisan data exhibits a rather steep increase for its global clustering coefficient. In 1272 the clustering coefficient is relatively low at 0.07771, increasing 13 R. Duncan Luce and Albert D. Perry, "A method of matrix analysis of group structure," Psychometrika 14, no. 2 (1949): 95-116. For information about computing the local clustering coefficient, see Duncan J. Watts and Steven H. Strogatz, "Collective dynamics of 'small-world' networks," Nature 393 (1998): 440-442. 14 A projection is when you create a 1-mode network by taking the primary nodes (persons, in this case) and connecting them only if they were connected by a secondary node (documents) in the 2-mode network. Wasserman and Faust, 307-312; Borgatti, Everett, and Johnson, 233-242. 15 Tore Opsahl and Pietro Panzarasa, "Clustering in weighted networks," Social Networks 31, no. 2 (2009): 155-163; Tore Opsahl, "Triadic closure in two-mode networks: Redefining the global and local clustering coefficients," Social Networks 35 (2013): 162. 197 Figure 5.6 – 2-mode Pisan social network in 1272 (person = red circle; document = blue square) to 0.09257 in 1284, until jumping up to 0.52008 in 1301, a 669% increase from the initial value. Examining the 2-mode graphs for these years makes this result a bit less surprising. The 2-mode graphs of 1272 [figure 5.6] and 1301 [figure 5.7] offer an easy example. When comparing these graphs, being careful to only look at the portions containing 4-paths, there are noticeable differences in the overall topography. Although figure 5.6 initially gives the impression of being more clustered, the clumpy portions are dominated by branching or outward fanning patterns. 198 Figure 5.7 – 2-mode Pisan social network in 1301 (person = red circle; document = blue square) When looking at figure 5.7, despite the clumpy components being relatively smaller, the clumps contain more densely crisscrossed regions (fanning inward rather than outward). Furthermore, the greater diameter (and increased branchiness) of the major component from 1272 is ultimately harmful to its global clustering coefficient score since there are inherently more 4-paths that 199 cannot be closed (fewer looped paths compared to straight lines). In short, from 1272 to 1301 Pisans became more likely to do business with individuals known to their previous associates. The 1-mode measures of average degree and degree centrality both indicate that Pisans were interacting with fewer people and that even the principal actors within Pisan society were engaging with fewer people and less frequently. The 1-mode connectedness score also speaks to the increasing fragmentation of the Pisan social network and the shrinking of chains of association. Taking both 2-mode coefficients together, we can see that one reinforces the other in the case of Pisa (which is not mathematically likely in a random network). Here, the tendency for Pisans to increasingly prioritize pre-existing business contacts over making new connections has resulted in a network that displays more clustering (mathematically speaking) but has also fragmented further as a result of there no longer being bridges to connect the clusters together. This preference to look to familiar faces when doing business coincided with a shrinking of the social circles within which Pisans operated, likely due to a mix of risk aversion and the removal of keystone individuals who served as a bridge between disparate groups. Quantitative Analysis With the architectural changes to the Pisan social network now firmly established, a close examination of the trends evident within the text of notarial records themselves ought to shed some further light upon how Pisans reacted to the traumatic defeat in 1284 and how they adapted to their new situation over the long term. As mentioned above, more documents exist for the five-month period examined in 1272 than for any of the equivalent six-month periods of the succeeding years. Although it is impossible to know whether or not Ugolino and Bartolomeo di Carraia Gonnelle kept multiple registers simultaneously, there is no indication that Pisan notaries were in the habit of keeping multiple contemporaneous registers at any point in the thirteenth or 200 fourteenth centuries. Based on this assumption, it seems clear that business had slowed down significantly following Meloria [totals available in table 5.1]. There was a 49% decrease from 1272 to 1301 when comparing the monthly average production rate of documents (from 32.4 per month down to 16.5, respectively) with a 99.5% statistical confidence in there being an overall decrease in notarial output throughout Pisa.16 This decline was already noticeable in 1283, but this should not be surprising as Pisa was in the midst of the war with Genoa which began in August 1282 when Judge Sinucello of Cinarca came to Pisa.17 Since the war began, Pisa devoted considerable resources to building its wartime fleet which necessarily required many Pisans to abandon their normal peacetime activities. The fact that Pisan notarial activity had not risen at all over the succeeding 18 years, despite having regained peace with the Tuscan Guelf League in 1293 and with Genoa in 1299,18 suggests that a more fundamental change had occurred. One might argue that the incredible number of deaths at Meloria and in Genoese prisons possibly eliminated the regular customers of Ugolino and Bartolomeo’s notary business, which to a certain extent must have been true, but it would be ludicrous to suppose that Bartolomeo was incapable of replacing lost customers over the intervening years. Indeed, he seems to have done just that. Instead, I propose that the overall amount of business transacted in Pisa had declined in the aftermath of the war against Genoa and, furthermore, the Pisan economy had in fact sunk into a prolonged recession that did not end until sometime after 1301. To support this thesis, we shall 16 Although the sample size is small (5 months in 1272, 6 months in 1301), by using t-table values one can see that the confidence interval of the difference of the mean monthly document production rate is still positive at the 99.5% level. This can be done using the one-tail values from a statistical t-table (widely available) and the formula (𝑥̅1 − 𝑥̅2 ) − 𝑡𝑛∗ 1+𝑛2−2 √ (𝑛1 −1)𝑠12 +(𝑛2 −1)𝑠22 𝑛1 +𝑛2 −2 where 𝑥̅ is the mean, 𝑛 is the sample size, 𝑡 ∗ is the value from the one-tail t- table, and 𝑠 is the sample standard deviation. Using this formula, the data shows a 99.5% confidence level of there being a drop in notarial production in general and a 95% confidence level of that drop being greater than 21.5%. 17 See chapter 3. 18 See chapter 4. 201 delve into many aspects of the available notarial records of the period, beginning with the rising and falling fortunes of some of the city’s most notable families. FAMILIES Without a doubt, the fortunes of many families rose or fell in the aftermath of the loss at Meloria in 1284. Lacking other direct evidence about the difficulties and opportunities specific Pisan families faced, I have tried to judge how “fortunate” various families were based on how frequently their members appear in the notarial registers. Using this inexact metric, it seems that the noble families hardest hit by the war were the Roncioni, della Gherardesca, Sismondi Buzzaccarini, Scornigiani, Pandulfi, and Visconti. The della Gherardesca family’s two branches were particularly hard hit by the war with Genoa. Count Fazio della Gherardesca had been imprisoned in Genoa several months prior to Meloria,19 and was only released in 1299,20 which left him little time to develop extensive commercial ties before 1301. As discussed in chapter 3, Ugolino della Gherardesca did initially profit substantially in the years immediately following Meloria, having gathered considerable political capital to the point that he co-ruled Pisa with Nino Visconti for a few years.21 However, it was not long before the tide of fortune turned against him and he and his progeny were starved to death in 1289, after the 1288 revolt ousted the della Gherardesca and Visconti from power.22 It should therefore come as no surprise that the della Gherardesca and Visconti families appear in considerably fewer documents after Meloria than before. The Scornigiani family was allied to the Visconti and their patriarch was murdered 19 "Fragmenta Historiae Pisanae," col. 648. Adami, 65. 21 Silva, 45; Cristiani, Nobiltà e popolo nel comune di Pisa dalle origini del podestariato alla signoria dei Donoratico, 236, 240. 22 "Fragmenta Historiae Pisanae," col. 651-654; Belgrano and Imperiale di Sant' Angelo, 5:85-88; Silva, 46; Adami, 50-52; Villani, vol. 1, bk. 8, sec. 121 and 128; Bongi, "Cronichetta lucchese," 238. 20 202 by the son of Guelfo Gherardesca in 1287.23 At least one of the Sismondi family, Guinizzello, was briefly imprisoned in Genoa until the Genoese podestà, Oberto Doria, killed him out of dissatisfaction with the peace agreement Guinizzello had negotiated.24 The vicissitudes of the other families are unknown to us. The few noble families who appear to have gained in importance (or at least increased their frequency of business in Kinzica) were the Sardo, Laggi, and Spini families. Members of these families appeared only ten times prior to Meloria, but afterwards they appeared an incredible 64 times with the Laggi family comprising over half of that figure. Unfortunately, little is known about the political activities of these three families at the time, though it would not be outlandish to surmise that they filled in the gaps left by the families who had fallen on harder times. Many popolo families also saw their fortunes rise and fall with the tide of war. In particular, the Rossi, Guercio, Bocca, del Tignoso, Sciorta, Murci, and Bonaposa families appear much less frequently in the registers following Meloria. In contrast, the Pedone, Talenti, and Gambacorta families greatly increased their business after 1284. Not much is known about these families during this period, except for the Gambacorta family appears regularly in the rolls of the Anziani starting in 1297 (as well as the Talenti once).25 This suggests that the Gambacorta were part of the oligarchy at the head of the Order of Merchants or the Arte della Lana which transitioned into the government. From these observations it is at least clear that the political turmoil originating in the war against Genoa greatly upset the balance of power in Pisa, causing numerous families to be laid low while a few other families rose to take their place. 23 "Fragmenta Historiae Pisanae," col. 650; Cristiani, "Gli avvenimenti pisani del periodo ugoliniano in una cronaca inedita," 95. 24 "Gli avvenimenti pisani del periodo ugoliniano in una cronaca inedita," 94. 25 Bonaini, Breve vetus seu chronica antianorum civitatis Pisarum, 654-666. 203 WITNESSES & DOCUMENTS Although I have previously cautioned against the use of witness lists (in the context of notarial records) to make important claims, as there are numerous and indiscernible reasons why a person might witness a document, a brief examination of the witnesses is not without some value. In particular, witness lists taken in the aggregate can inform us as to the demographic composition of those taking part in the documents and the areas surrounding the locations where the documents were drawn up. By far the most common professional category among witnesses were leather workers (81), followed by textile workers (65), churchmen (62), commercial workers (56), and agricultural workers (51). The remaining distinguishable professional sectors were metal workers (35), government workers26 (33), and food suppliers (31). Separate from this were 179 notaries, though this was not surprising. This breakdown of witnesses confirms that the textile and leather industries dominated the Kinzica neighborhood on the south bank of the Arno, even though the woolens industry was generally in the ascendancy during this period.27 Now that some information about the participants in the Pisan documents has been established, we can begin to look at the documents themselves [table 5.4]. The notarial registers from the period under study contain a wide diversity of documents, though all are characterized by two features: they contain (at least in part) some economic activity and provide their participants with a legal record. The most frequently appearing category for documents was debt, with loans (22.1%), loan defaults (2.3%), and debt repayments (10.3%) comprising 32.4% of all records from the period. Trailing debts were the categories of sales (8.9%) and wills (7.2%); the remaining document categories each represent less than 5% of the total. 26 27 This includes public heralds, judges, counts and other professions with political connections. Cristiani, Nobiltà e popolo nel comune di Pisa dalle origini del podestariato alla signoria dei Donoratico, 164. 204 Table 5.4 – Document type distribution 1284 1301 PreMeloria PostMeloria Total 20 21 81 26 107 2 8 5 43 7 50 4 - 4 11 32 11 43 10 7 8 15 7 20 15 35 11 7 2 1 3 4 20 5 25 debt repayment (unspecified) 16 3 4 1 5 1 23 2 25 power of attorney 9 7 2 2 4 3 18 5 23 sale (property) 7 3 3 - 3 9 13 9 22 sale (goods) 13 5 1 - - 2 19 2 21 rental agreement 4 3 - 3 3 10 7 13 20 will execution 2 4 1 5 6 6 7 11 18 societas maris 7 3 6 - 6 1 16 1 17 agistment 6 - 1 - 1 10 7 10 17 military service commutation - 10 4 - 4 - 14 - 14 accomandigia (loan in trust) 1 5 1 3 4 1 7 4 11 loan default 2 1 1 6 7 1 4 7 11 rent payment 1 2 1 2 3 4 4 6 10 indenture contract 1 3 1 - 1 - 5 - 5 investment return - - 2 - 2 3 2 3 5 societas (other) 1 2 1 - 1 - 4 - 4 formation of partnership - - - 1 1 1 - 2 2 profit sharing (boat) - 1 - - - - 1 - 1 shipping contract - 1 - - - - 1 - 1 44 20 18 18 36 18 82 36 118 Document Type 1272 1283 preMeloria loan (all types) 43 23 15 5 debt repayment (all) 27 10 6 sale (all) 20 8 will 3 debt repayment (loan) Other* post- combined Meloria * This category includes court documents, receipts, confirmations of previous documents, marriage contracts, dowry payments, and other documents which either displayed no interesting trends or were too few to provide useful statistics. WILLS Wills present some challenges for economic investigation, but not insurmountable obstacles. There are two fundamental issues with which one must contend when analyzing a will: 205 valuation of non-currency inheritance and proportional distributions of an estate. Many of the Pisan testators bequeathed personal property (mobile and immobile) alongside specific amounts of coin valued in small Pisan denarii (the currency of account). Unfortunately, neither the wills themselves nor any of the other extant documentation from the period allow for values to be reliably assigned to the majority of possessions and lands mentioned within the wills. At the same time, quite a few wills call for a proportional distribution of wealth among inheritors (e.g. “a third of my wealth shall go to…” or “and the remainder of my wealth shall go to…”). Consequently, the present study must be restricted to instances where specific sums were mentioned, even though they were undoubtedly dwarfed by the actual amounts bequeathed to widows and direct heirs.28 Perhaps the most noticeable trend is the dramatic increase in the number of wills recorded during the war years of 1283 and 1284, especially as a percentage of the total number of documents for those years. This is not very surprising as war has a tendency to make one ponder their own mortality. What is surprising, however, is that the frequency of testaments in 1301 remained high relative to 1272 (nearly fourfold more), despite the somewhat peaceful aspect of both years. Furthermore, all the 1301 wills came from healthy individuals while the 1272 wills were all composed by infirm testators. The repercussions of the trauma of Meloria had perhaps taught Pisans to hedge against an untimely and unanticipated death. With such a small dataset, it is impossible to know for certain whether this health disparity is purely an anomaly or indicative of a broader trend. Thankfully, Eleanora Rava’s recent work on Pisan testaments spanning 1240- 28 Twelfth century canon law stated that men had to leave a third of their wealth to their widows, while Roman law required the return of the wife’s dowry (a quite sizeable sum) upon the termination of a marriage, due to death or otherwise. See Rothrauff, 179. 206 1320 provides a more definitive answer. According to her data set, there actually was not a considerable change in the ratio of infirm to healthy testators during this period (1.487 infirmhealthy ratio for pre-Meloria, 1.414 for August 1284-1301). However, for the period 1302-1320, a significant change took place whereby infirm testators were outnumbered by healthy ones (0.953 infirm-healthy ratio), showing an acceleration of the post-Meloria trend.29 In my data set, only one fifth of the 1283 wills and none of the pre-Meloria 1284 wills were made by sick individuals. Although all but one of the post-Meloria 1284 wills were composed in infirmity, five of these were for testatrices (twice as many women made wills in these three months than during any entire year) and one was for a merchant from Messina who had fallen ill. Two of these women were widows and only one woman’s husband is known to have been in Pisa at the time. Therefore, it may be the case that most of these women, since their husbands may have been killed or captured at Meloria and thus were not available to handle the family wealth, were forced to provide for their heirs when they unexpectedly became ill. One should note that for all the other periods combined there were only six testatrices and all but two of those were widows, so the proportions for late 1284 are irregular by comparison [table 5.5]. The other trend within the data collected from Pisan wills is a large increase in the number of religious bodies to which testators donated a portion of their wealth. While in 1272 testators donated to an average of 1.3 religious bodies, this number increased by a factor of ten by 1283. Although the average had fallen a little by 1301 to 7.7 religious bodies per will, this was still well above the figure from 1272. At the same time as Pisans were contributing to more numerous religious entities, the value of these bequests was also shrinking from 4 lire, 5 soldi 29 Though Rava claims in her book that there was no considerable preference for infirm versus healthy testators, it seems that she only looked at the aggregate numbers rather than breaking down the data into temporal periods. Eleonora Rava, "Volens in testamento vivere": testamenti a Pisa, 1240-1320, Italia sacra, n.s. 2 (Rome: Istituto storico italiano per il medio evo, 2016), 73-75 and table 10 of CD supplement. 207 before Meloria to only 19 soldi over the remainder of the century. It would seem that the war with Genoa not only encouraged more Pisans to compose a will, but also exerted a pressure to distribute their wealth more widely to many religious bodies rather than only a few. Interestingly, this pressure appears to have stayed partially in effect at least two years after the end of the war. Table 5.5 – Wills 1284 1301 PreMeloria PostMeloria TOTAL 15 7 20 15 35 5 6 2 4 7 11 0 7 7 0 5 7 12 13 10 10.375 10.2 7.714 10.2 9.133 9.743 8.667 8 12.571 9.875 11.133 4.714 9.7 7.467 8.743 Avg. sum bequeathed per will 22 lire, 3 soldi 150 lire, 14 soldi 418 lire, 7 soldi 62 lire, 9 soldi 254 lire, 2 soldi 56 lire, 17 soldi 225 lire, 2 soldi 55 lire, 4 soldi 155 lire, 3 soldi Avg. value of each bequest 2 lire, 4 soldi 7 lire, 3 soldi 18 lire, 10 soldi 3 lire, 2 soldi 11 lire, 18 soldi 4 lire, 11 soldi 11 lire, 6 soldi 3 lire, 3 soldi 8 lire, 8 soldi Avg. sum per will bequeathed to religious bodies 1 lira, 13 soldi 34 lire, 19 soldi 73 lire, 6 soldi 12 lire, 7 soldi 40 lire, 16 soldi 4 lire, 6 soldi 43 lire, 7 soldi 8 lire, 12 soldi 28 lire, 9 soldi Avg. sum per will bequeathed to persons 20 lire, 10 soldi 117 lire, 15 soldi 360 lire, 10 soldi 52 lire, 11 soldi 196 lire, 5 soldi 49 lire, 14 soldi 188 lire, 8 soldi 51 lire, 5 soldi 129 lire, 12 soldi Avg. value of religious bequests 1 lira, 5 soldi 2 lire, 14 soldi 7 lire, 7 soldi 1 lira, 4 soldi 4 lire 11 soldi 4 lire, 5 soldi 19 soldi 2 lire, 18 soldi Avg. value of personal bequests 2 lire, 7 soldi 14 lire, 14 soldi 28 lire, 13 soldi 5 lire, 6 soldi 17 lire, 13 soldi 10 lire, 11 soldi 19 lire, 8 soldi 6 lire, 17 soldi 14 lire, 16 soldi Ratio of recipients per will (religious : personal) 0.154 1.625 0.795 1.051 0.916 1.636 1.052 1.223 1.114 Ratio of avg. values of bequests (religious : personal) 0.523 0.183 0.256 0.224 0.227 0.053 0.219 0.137 0.197 1272 1283 # of Wills 3 # of testatrices Infirm testators/testatrices preMeloria postMeloria combined 10 7 8 1 2 1 3 2 Avg. # of religious recipients 1.333 Avg. # of person recipients A similar trend is evident in the proportion of coinage bequeathed to religious bodies as to persons. During the 1280s, for every lira that went to religious entities four were inherited by individuals; in 1301 this changed to one lira for every eleven and a half that went to people, but still not quite as disparate as the earlier 1272 proportion of one lira for every thirteen and a half 208 inherited by individuals.30 This points to the conclusion that the severity of the period’s warfare made Pisans considerably more worried for the eternal fate of their souls, as is typical in any time of crisis. Furthermore, it is conceivable that the turmoil resulting from the numerous deaths and captivities during the war—presumably many without having prepared a will—encouraged a generation of survivors to act more cautiously by planning for their unseen demise so as to ease the burden upon their relatives and provide for the salvation of their own souls. Samuel Cohn, in his landmark study of thousands of wills from six cities in Tuscany and Umbria from the midthirteenth to the mid-fifteenth centuries, has even noted that Pisan testators were exceptional for providing for funerary expenses beginning in the late 1270s and for donating to numerous religious institutions, far outpacing its neighbors in both regards.31 The topic of Pisan wills is certainly ripe for more in-depth study, though some scholars have already begun this work.32 RENTAL AGREEMENTS Another document type that exhibits an interesting trend shift is rental agreements. In all three of the earlier years, rental agreements make up roughly 2.6% of the total number of documents, then in 1301 this figure rises to 10%. For the earlier years building rentals (house or storefront) outpaced land rentals (agricultural) 2.3:1, but by 1301 building and land rentals appear in an even 1:1 ratio. So, according to this data, by the early fourteenth century renting Samuel Cohn’s study which incorporated many more wills actually indicates that the number of pious bequests outnumbered personal bequests in the pre-1276 period, though all of the trends present in my data are supported by his findings. His data set incorporates many registers by notaries who worked exclusively for Pisan hospitals, and his research indicates that this greatly influenced testators to donate to religious bodies during this period. Cohn, 100. It should be noted that the notaries Ugolino and Bartolomeo di Iacopo do not appear to have been exclusively employed by the Ospedale di Santa Chiara, hence why my data diverges somewhat from the broader trend in 1272. Rothrauff, 165. 31 However, Cohn notes that Perugians also provided for funeral procedures at some point and that the citizens of Assisi were also likely to donate to numerous religious bodies. The latter is likely explained by the particularly Franciscan orientation of Assisi, which also was characteristic of Pisan religiosity. Cohn, 13-14 , 23, 38, 77-86. 32 Rothrauff; Eleonora Rava, "Eremite in città. Il fenomeno della reclusione urbana femminile nell’età comunale: il caso di Pisa," Revue Mabillon 21 (2010): 139-162; Rava, "Volens in testamento vivere”. 30 209 properties not only consumed a fourfold greater proportion of all economic activity within Pisa (or at least of Bartolomeo’s notarial business), but it had also become much more common to rent land for agricultural production. Kwan Ok Lee and Gary Painter have shown that modern recessions “depressed housing demand, particularly in the rental sector,” which would partially explain the shift away from housing rentals.33 The increased interest in agricultural production suggests that conditions within Pisa had weakened the chief industries of leather, textiles, and commerce, making it more difficult for men to enter and survive in those industries. Simultaneously, although the ratio of structural to agricultural rentals had fallen, the proportion of all rental agreements to the total number of documents had almost tripled. If Pisans were experiencing an economic downturn, the evaporation of available credit, and money supply shortages, this would explain the higher occurrence of rental agreements since a higher proportion of Pisans would be unable to secure or provide enough capital for outright purchase of real estate. To verify that these were the actual conditions with which Pisans were met, we shall have to further investigate several other types of documents from the notarial registers. AGISTMENTS Possibly related to the rental trends are those of agistments. An agistment is a contract whereby an individual (the agister) is paid a wage to take another person’s livestock to pasture for a set period of time; in the Pisan context the agister was paid a set wage and also shared equally in the profits from the livestock. The records of Pisan agistments display two interesting features. First, although there were six agistments in 1272 and ten in 1301, there was only one agistment from the period 1283-4. The most likely explanations for this would be that either the 33 Kwan Ok Lee and Gary Painter, "What Happens to Household Formation in a Recession?," Journal of Urban Economics 76 (2013): 101. 210 men most likely to be hired to pasture livestock were already employed as soldiers or mariners in protection of the city, or the frequent decimation of the Pisan contado by Guelf forces made such employment too risky for most men to accept, or a combination of both reasons. Second, there was a threefold increase in agistment contracts as a percentage of all documents per annum from 1272 (3.6%) to 1301 (10%). Once again, we see Pisan economic activity trend strongly towards agricultural pursuits instead of industrial or commercial activities. Perhaps more interesting is the particularly Pisan quality of agistment agreements whereby profits were shared between the livestock owners and managers. More commonly, agisters were paid a flat fee by the livestock owner for the pasturage and care of their animals. In Pisa, however, it was typical for the owner and manager to split any profits evenly. The tendency of Pisans to resort to profit-sharing arrangements in the face of economic hardship makes sound logical sense. People need to be productive to meet basic needs, so when startup capital is not readily available (from savings or in the form of credit) they will seek alternative economic arrangements that will enable them to meet their needs. This enables the possessors of two factors of production (manpower and property) to forego the third (capital), at least partially, by joining their resources and still producing. INVESTMENTS34 The principal recorded form of investment in Pisa in the late thirteenth century was the societas contract (including the maris, terrae, and general varieties), whereby a stationary investor (known as a commendator or socius stans) partnered with a typically mobile associate (a 34 David Herlihy has claimed that by the 1270s Pisan merchants were rapidly abandoning the use of notaries in favor of insisting that their own records were legally binding. However, he cites only two examples of Pisans stating that their private books should be used in future, which does not seem convincing to me to establish a population-wide trend of behavior. Herlihy, Pisa in the Early Renaissance: A Study of Urban Growth, 9-11. 211 tractator) by investing capital with him for a share of the profits of whatever business he intended to conduct utilizing that capital.35 In the Pisan instance the commendator typically received one third of any profits unless a different rate had been previously negotiated. It seems that anyone with available capital was able to enter into a societas arrangement; craftsmen, churchmen, farmers, leather workers, nobles, and even five women all appear in the documents as a commendator. This was possible since there was no lower limit on the amount of capital one could invest. Indeed, the size of investments varied dramatically from 4 lire up to 600 lire, though the average sums invested progressively grew until the battle of Meloria before plummeting in 1301: 16 lire, 10 soldi in 1272; 104 lire in 1283; 221 lire, 11 soldi in 1284; and 8 lire, 12 soldi in 1301. Within the societas maris records, all but one state the intended destination(s). Ports along the upper Tyrrhenian coastlines appeared ten times: Sardinia seven times, Corsica once, Elba once, and Castiglione della Piscaia (near Grosseto, Tuscany) twice. The wider western Mediterranean appeared in only three documents: Sicily twice, North Africa twice, and even Genoa once. Lastly, longer distance destinations appeared in four documents: Ancona once, Alexandria once, and Acre twice (though here two people invested separately in the same journey to Acre). This information suggests that the majority of Pisan sea commerce was concerned with nearby ports, principally Sardinia, rather than longer distance trade. This notion of disconnect from the East is supported by Michel Balard’s examination of Famagustan records.36 35 Max Weber, The History of Commercial Partnerships in the Middle Ages, trans. Lutz Kaelber (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003); John H. Pryor, "The Origins of the Commenda Contract," Speculum 52, no. 1 (1977). 36 Balard, "Génois et Pisans en Orient (fin du XIIIe - début du XIVe siècle)," 206. 212 At first glance this should not be very surprising. Although most studies of medieval Italian maritime communes have focused almost exclusively on long distance trade,37 logic dictates that every one of these communes must have engaged in more activity closer to home. In the months it took a ship to sail to the Levant and back, another ship could complete multiple regional trips. Also, while typically more exotic goods were traded with distant ports, Pisa depended on nearer regions to source essential raw materials (metals, timber, grain, wool, etc.) and to buy or at least transmit its finished goods. Lastly, the maintenance of political hegemony over Tyrrhenian ports required constant interaction with the metropole, which in turn required the availability of ready transportation. Although this general pattern may be somewhat expected, I would argue that its degree actually indicates that long distance trade had become rather infrequent for Pisan merchants by the beginning of the fourteenth century, at least by the standards of a century prior. One might argue that such a claim is unfounded because the notaries I have chosen to study were located in the Kinzica neighborhood, Pisa’s industrial district, rather than in the older merchant-dominated district of Mezzo,38 and so the documents may not be representative of the habits of most merchant families. The districts of Kinzica and Mezzo, however, were separated only by a 70-meter bridge, hardly an impediment for Kinzicans to seek better investment opportunities across the Arno, had any existed. However, within the contracts examined, the 37 A few of the better studies on the sea trade of Italian maritime cities: Lane; Madden; Caro; Epstein; Quentin Van Doosselaere, Commercial Agreements and Social Dynamics in Medieval Genoa (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009); Heyd; Ralph-Johannes Lilie, Handel und Politik, zwischen dem byzantinischen Reich und den italienischen Kommunen Venedig, Pisa und Genua in der Epoche der Komnenen und der Angeloi (1081-1204) (Amsterdam: Adolf M. Hakkert, 1984); Favreau-Lilie; Salvatori, Boni amici et vicini: le relazioni tra Pisa e le città della Francia meridionale dall'XI alla fine del XIII secolo; Jessica L. Goldberg, Trade and Institutions in the Medieval Mediterranean: the Geniza Merchants and their Business World (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012). 38 Volpe, Studi sulle istituzioni comunali a Pisa : città e contado, consoli e podestà, sec. XII-XIII, 262. 213 majority of the itinerant factors were resident within Kinzica (the few exceptions hailing from either outside of Pisa altogether or directly across the aforementioned bridge). The potential return on investment for the long-distance trade was typically much greater than for more local voyages; the larger time and risk investments necessitated higher returns to make such trips more worthwhile than taking numerous shorter ones. Furthermore, many of the goods imported from afar had higher value to weight ratios than the more mundane raw materials (pelts, grain, timber, etc.), enabling a fully laden ship to bring greater profits. Therefore, since long distance trade had a much higher potential rate of return, it should theoretically always be the preferred type of sea venture in which to invest for a potential commendator when available; short distance sea trade only offered the advantages of lower risk (from storm or seizure) and possibly quicker capital turnover (the tractator was typically not required to return to Pisa within any set period of time, he only had to repay the investors within a few weeks of returning to the home port). Instead, we see that less than a quarter of the extant societas maris contracts ventured further east than Messina or further west than Bougie (modern Béjaïa, Algeria). As such, it stands to reason that there simply were not enough tractators voyaging to the Eastern Mediterranean to compete with the intensive focus on ports closer to Pisa. This was not a new state of affairs for Pisans; well before 1272 Sardinia had dominated communal concerns for so long that the Pisan consuls of Sardinia had seats on the General Council of the Commune of Pisa, a privilege not shared by Pisan officials of any other colony.39 Further evidence of this westward shift of priorities appears in the Breve Curie Maris pisane civitatis drafted in 1297: when discussing the distribution of court senesales (mediators), one third were assigned to the greater Tyrrhenian theater, one third were assigned to North Africa, 39 Dal Borgo, 195-196. 214 and one third were assigned to the entirety of the Eastern Mediterranean.40 This implies that at most Byzantino-Levantine matters occupied only a third of maritime business. Previous chapters discussed the gradual northward shift of maritime trade routes to connect Flanders with the Black Sea and the supplanting of the spice trade with that of textiles; add to this the progressive exclusion of Pisans from the major Eastern markets (Constantinople in 1261 and Acre in 1291) and the closure (at least partial and frequent) of local Tuscan markets caused by Pisa’s everincreasing political isolation amongst its Guelf neighbors, and it is easy to see why long distance trade to the East tapered off. It is true that Pisa maintained a significant presence in Cyprus, Alexandria, and to a lesser extent Armenia, but in most of these ports they were outnumbered by their rivals, the prices were not competitive with those from the Black Sea, and most Pisans doing business there did not send anything back to the metropole. The lack of investment opportunities (or possibly even the demand for them) became more pronounced as time progressed. While the number of societas arrangements remained rather steady in the years before the battle of Meloria (eight in 1272, five in 1283, and seven in pre-Meloria 1284), there only exists a single societas contract after the battle (in 1301). When counting sea voyages alone a similar pattern emerges (seven in 1272, three in 1283, four in preMeloria 1284, and one in 1301), with the decline in the 1280s likely due to many Pisan ships having been requisitioned to fight Genoa, their loss in battle, the destruction of Porto Pisano, and restrictions in the 1288 and 1299 peace treaties. What happened? Taking into account information from earlier in the chapter, it seems likely that Pisan merchants were making fewer trips by sea and, when they did sail, they were not indebting themselves to investors at home even though doing so would have increased the amount of 40 Bonaini, Statuti inediti della città di Pisa dal XII al XIV secolo, 3:383. 215 capital available for commerce. The decimation of the Pisan fleet at Meloria would account for the complete absence of societas maris contracts in late 1284; the loss of so many ships was an enormous financial strain on the unfortunate ship owners. The lengthy captivity and/or death of thousands of Pisans, many of whom were merchants and ship owners, wreaked havoc upon the social network within Pisa itself and likewise would have greatly weakened or destroyed the panMediterranean commercial ties of many merchant families. Accordingly, there were fewer ships to sail, fewer merchants to sail on them, fewer commercial contacts within and without Pisa, and fewer familial resources to risk on a venture. Additionally, the risks to any travelling commerce were considerably elevated following Meloria. For the rest of the century (with two brief exceptions in 1288 and 1299) Genoa maintained a partial blockade of Pisa, harrying ships entering and exiting the Arno. On land, Pisa fought bitterly against its numerous Guelf neighbors until 1293, robbing Pisan merchants of access to regional markets, making travel through Tuscany more dangerous, and permanently solidifying commercial networks among the Guelf cities (with Florence in a domineering position). The tractator’s share of any invested capital would have been a greater proportion of their family’s remaining wealth following the huge financial setbacks of nearly two decades of warfare.41 As such, the fact that tractators were legally liable to their investors for twice the amount of capital invested would have acted as a deterrent to entering into such agreements now that the risk posed by a failed venture was proportionately more financially ruinous, especially as the likelihood of a venture failing was considerably increased from military threats. The 41 This is not to say that every Pisan family suffered equally, or even that every family suffered in the long term. Indeed, quite a few families turned the crisis into an opportunity and can trace the ascendancy of their family to this period. However, it does seem that the “old guard,” the families best positioned to offer investment opportunities prior to Meloria, were the ones most likely to have served in the Meloria fleet and potentially been killed or captured. Additionally, there was the 25% estimo property tax from at least 1299 that was quite burdensome on all Pisan citizens. 216 combination of reduced opportunities and proportionately increased personal risk for the tractator thus resulted in fewer societas arrangements being offered by travelling merchants. If nothing else, perhaps the fact that during the latter half of the thirteenth century many of the powers of the Order of the Sea were absorbed by the Anziani may be indicative of the longer trend of a general waning of importance (and vitality) of long-distance trade in Pisa.42 Similar pressures also acted upon the commendator side of the equation to reduce demand for investment opportunities. Familial tribulations stemming from the wars against Genoa and the Guelf League had damaged the Pisan social network, making it more difficult for investors to find a tractator whom they felt they could trust. Furthermore, modern economists state that economic depressions are typically characterized by decreased business activity and income and increased unemployment and financial uncertainty.43 Most investors only invest using disposable (or at least not immediately essential) resources, so a decrease in income and an increase in uncertainty about the future would have greatly reduced the portion of Pisans willing to risk their capital on ventures that would not show a return for months. With an uncertain future, people prioritize short term survival over long term gambles. In short, societal economic hardship had fostered risk averse habits among Pisans. We even see some small attempts to mitigate risk within the last two societas maris contracts (25 May 1284 and 1 September 1301). These contracts exhibit a unique feature among Pisan societas maris agreements: a specified due date for return on investment. The majority of societas maris contracts did not prescribe a date by which the tractator must return and settle accounts, which makes sense considering the high number of uncertainties entailed in sea travel and conducting 42 Isoppo, "L'ordine del mare nello svolgimento sociale e costituzionale del comune pisano secoli XIII e XIV," 363ff; Ticciati, L'ordine dei mercante a Pisa nei secoli XII-XIII, 182-183, 188-189, 198. 43 N. Gregory Mankiw, Macroeconomics, 7th ed. (New York: Worth Publishers, 2010), 4-6; Matthew Bishop, Essential Economics (London: The Economist, 2004), 68-70, 220. 217 business in foreign markets. Instead, the tractator was simply required to settle all accounts within two to four weeks of returning to Pisa. The inclusion of a legally binding return date surely was an attempt by the investors to reduce their risk and ensure a quicker return of their capital and any profits. The nature and depth of the relationships between the involved parties is unknown, but it is possible that they were not very familiar with each other (recent circumstances having deprived them of more familiar business partners) and thus used legal means to replace the unwritten trust that would normally have been present in such an arrangement. Unlike today where one typically invests through impersonal corporate banks or faceless internet sites, medieval business relied heavily upon building trust, either through personal acquaintance or word of mouth from a reputable source (hence the legally binding quality of having reputable people witness documents). Financial hardship entails a greater commensurate level of trust to engage in risky economic activities, but with a damaged social network there were fewer trusted people to which individuals could turn. Together, this two-fold consequence of war was responsible for cutting the frequency of societas arrangements in Pisa to almost nothing by 1301. SALES The records of sales allow for a bit more insightful analysis, given that they are the second most numerous category of document with 43 recorded sales. As shown in table 5.4, although sales made up 11-12% of the total number of documents in 1272 and 1301, this figure fell to 7.5% in 1283 and further to 3.5% in 1284 with no sales in the months following Meloria. This drop surely resulted from the ongoing warfare that began in late 1282. The details of the sales, however, are much more interesting. The most striking change is the total disappearance of livestock from sales records. In 1272 there were ten sales of livestock, fully half of the total, but the only other livestock sale for 218 the remainder of the period took place in April 1283. Recalling the discussion of agistments above, the disappearance of livestock sales during the 1280s may be explained both by the utilization of pastoral workers in military service and by the insecurity of pastoral lands in general. But the connection to agistments does not end there. In 1272 livestock sales made up 6% of all documents; in 1301 the increase in agistments since 1272 accounted for a 6% share of the annual document total. This correlation goes beyond mere coincidence. If Pisa was still in the midst of an economic recession in 1301, this would help explain this behavioral shift. Monetary scarcity, financial uncertainty, increased unemployment would all discourage lower income families from making big purchases on perishable assets (livestock). If we hold as true that all potential livestock sales were converted to agistment arrangements, then that changes how we must view the annual totals of sales. Excluding livestock sales, we now see that there was actually a twofold increase in total sales from 1272 to 1301 as a proportion of all documents (from 6% up to 11%). To explain this, we must further categorize the various sales records. For simplicity’s sake we shall divide sales between moveable goods (agricultural produce, textiles, etc.), residential properties (houses), and productive properties (shops, land, ships) as displayed in table 5.6.44 In 1272 the ratio between the three types was almost even, but Table 5.6 – Sales 1272 1283 1284 1301 PreMeloria PostMeloria Total 3 4 1 2 8 2 10 residential property 3.5* 0 0 2 3.5 2 5.5 productive property 3.5* 3 3 7 9.5 7 16.5 moveable goods *One property contained a domicile along with arable land and a mill. 44 Technically ships are moveable, but the enormity of their expense and the manner in which they enable other economically productive activities makes them more similar to real estate than to a bushel of grain or to a calf. 219 then in 1283 residence sales evaporated leaving a near balance between goods and productive property. The following year goods nearly vanished as well while productive property remained unchanged. By 1301 goods and residences had mostly recovered, but productive property sales had far outpaced them both. The resilience of sales of moveable goods for most of the period is understandable as industries and fields generally continue to produce at some level every year regardless of external events. The disappearance of residential property sales during the 1280s, like so many other things, makes sense in light of the ongoing warfare of the period encouraging people to prioritize more essential expenses rather than purchasing a home. The dramatic increase in productive property sales in 1301, once again, is indicative of a shift towards agricultural production. While most of the purchasers of these properties were probably not intending to work the land themselves, the fact that they chose to invest in agriculture rather than other commercial activities is the important feature.45 Conversely, real estate has long served as a store of wealth and in difficult times people are often forced to liquidate immobile assets to make ends meet. Evidence of this behavior comes from 1299 when the burdensome 25% estimo (property tax) was instituted in Pisa which resulted in numerous Pisans selling off parcels of land to meet the onerous tax obligations.46 This tax remained in effect until 1302-3. The use of credit in sales agreements deserves deeper study. Of 43 total sales, fourteen were made on credit. Livestock sales were never made on credit, perhaps because animals were particularly perishable and easily lost value; there would be little benefit in a seller reclaiming a dead horse from a buyer in default of his debt. If livestock sales are again removed from the picture, the ratio of cash to credit sales rises to 9:7, almost parity. When divided by year another 45 It should be noted that within the “productive property” sales category, sales of ships or shares of a ship occur once in 1272, once in 1283, and twice in 1301. Removing these sales does not appreciably alter the relationship with the other categories of sale. 46 Violante, 117. 220 picture emerges. In 1272 60% of sales were on credit, in 1283 it was 71%, in 1284 it was 50%, but in 1301 the percentage of sales on credit dropped to 9%. This is the clearest evidence yet that at the beginning of the fourteenth century Pisa was experiencing a deep credit drought as part of a larger economic downturn. LOANS With a total of 107 discreet instances, personal lending arrangements dominated economic activity in Pisa within the context of notarial records [table 5.7]. As a percentage of total documents per annum, lending remains almost even over time, only slightly decreasing from 26% in 1272 to about 20% for the other years. However, and this also applies to all of the documents discussed above, one must remember that the rate at which documents were produced declined by 40% after 1272, implying a dramatic slowdown in economic activity as a whole. This is exemplified by the 50% decrease from 1272 to 1301 in the total number of loans extended. Throughout the period, the professional categories most likely to extend credit were those in agriculture (13 times, 11 of which were vintners), merchants (13), and those working with textiles (12). At the same time, those asking for credit were most likely to work in the Table 5.7 – Loans 1284 # of loans (all types) # of accomandigia agreements # of non-monetary loans mean (avg.) loan amount median loan amount average loan term 1272 1283 preMeloria postMeloria combined 1301 Pre-Meloria Post-Meloria Total 43 23 15 5 20 21 81 26 107 1 5 1 3 4 1 7 4 11 2 3 1 3 4 1 6 4 10 8 lire, 14 soldi 17 lire, 1 soldi 28 lire, 8 soldi 15 lire 26 lire, 14 soldi 27 lire, 19 soldi 14 lire, 10 soldi 26 lire, 15 soldi 17 lire, 5 soldi 6 lire 7 lire, 7 soldi 11 lire 15 lire 11 lire 4 lire, 17 soldi 7 lire, 17 soldi 5 lire, 17 soldi 7 lire, 10 soldi 110 days 102 days 98 days* 57 days 88 days* 81 days 105 days* 76 days 98 days* *One loan from 1284 had a term of ten years; this outlier was omitted from the calculation of the averages. 221 leather industry (27 times), followed distantly by notaries (13). Unfortunately, of all creditors and debtors, only approximately one third had identifiable professional information. It should be noted that I have included accomandigia arrangements as a subset of loans. The term accomandare has multiple applicable definitions, including: (1) to place on deposit; (2) to entrust; and, (3) to furnish money or goods for investment.47 The Pisan examples under study fall under all three definitions. The first definition would be the closest to a normal loan and this usage appears seven times (once in 1272, twice in 1283, and four times in 1284), all seven times the loan is in coin. The second definition is more of a safekeeping arrangement for either possessions or for coinage. This sort of accomandigia appears twice in 1283 and once in 1301. The last definition would be the closest we come to a prototypical commenda commercial partnership, though this only occurred once in 1283.48 Despite the varying definitions, they were all essentially loans at their core; something of value was given for a limited time period with penalties attached for late return. The feature that appears specific to accomandigie, as apart from other loans, is an increased level of personal trust between the parties involved as evidenced from the omission of a guarantor in most instances (whereas all other loans always involved at least one guarantor). Loan amounts, just as today, varied widely depending on the needs of the borrowers involved. Looking at the mean value of loans from year to year gives the impression that loans were for ever more money as time went on. However, a few large loans can easily skew mean values. Perhaps a better representation of the character of loans in Pisa would be to examine the median values. Using this metric, it is apparent that Pisans typically sought loans of around 6 or 47 Florence Edler, Glossary of Medieval Terms of Business: Italian Series 1200-1600 (New York: Klaus Reprint, 1970), 21. 48 Weber, ch. 2 and 4; Pryor, "The Origins of the Commenda Contract," 6-7. 222 7 lire. The median value of loans fell from 1272 to 1301 by just over a lira—from 6 lire down to 4 lire, 17 soldi. This figure appears to have risen quite a bit in the 1280s prior to Meloria, but only two pecuniary loans exist from the latter half of 1284. The disparity between before and after Meloria is more pronounced when comparing the pre- and post-Meloria loans collectively, with a median value difference of 2 lire. Another change is apparent in the length of loan terms. In almost every instance, loan agreements stipulated a specific date by which repayment was due. The penalty for late payment was usually twice the value of the loan plus any expenses entailed for collection. Although the individual terms varied substantially, most were for between two and four months. At the beginning of the period the average loan term was 110 days. This figure dropped slightly in 1283 before plummeting after Meloria. By 1301 the average loan term was a full month shorter, at 81 days, than it had been in 1272. The decrease in the 1280s was likely due to the increased risk and uncertainty that accompanies warfare, but what caused the further shortening in 1301? It is tempting to assume that the lengthy continuation of warfare against Genoa and Tuscan Guelfs simply extended the downward trend initiated in the early 1280s, even though Pisa had already been at peace for over a year by April 1301. Instead, an examination of debt repayment patterns may shed some light on the situation. DEBT REPAYMENTS As shown above in table 5.4, debt repayments were the second most common type of document after loans. The documents referred to in this table are standalone debt repayments, repayments of outstanding debts resulting from economic activity (of any sort) documented by other notaries. The year to year decline in frequency of this type of document is indicative of an underlying problem: people were less and less likely to repay their debts. Though it is possible 223 that Pisans may have become increasingly apt to resolve their debts in the presence of the notary who drew up the initial document, this explanation seems unsatisfactory in the absence of any factors to explain such a widespread change in societal behavior. To determine whether Pisans actually were failing to repay their debts, one must turn to other evidence for confirmation. There exists debt repayment information of another type, the supplementary cassatio (“nullification”) that follows many documents. Cassati were typically concerned with the meeting of outstanding economic or other obligations stipulated by their principal documents, confirming or denying for legal reasons whether the terms of the agreements were met. Sometimes documents possessed multiple cassati if obligations were met piecemeal on different dates. Of the 134 documents where credit was issued (sales on credit, investments, loans, agistments) which also stipulated a specific date for contract fulfilment, only 86 have cassati indicating that the terms were at least partially met [table 5.8]; that is not to say that 46 contracts were not fulfilled, only that we have no information about them. When looking at this broader collection of documents it is apparent that, unlike when taking loans alone, the average stipulated terms for repayment remained virtually unchanged at close to 160 days when comparing 1272 to 1301. The dip in the 1280s, as posited so often before, was due to the increased uncertainty and risk inherent in war. Table 5.8 – Information from the cassati of credit-issuing documents # of repayments # of late repayments 1272 1283 1284 1301 Pre-Meloria Post-Meloria Total 37 19 13 17 67 19 86 22 13 9 13 45 14 59 59.5% 68.4% 69.2% 76.5% 67.2% 73.7% 68.6% avg. original term 160 122 145 157 151 142 149 avg. actual time 384 402 379 267 399 240 364 avg. days late 224 280 234 110 248 98 215 % delinquent 224 Calculating the disparity between the original term limits and the actual dates upon which the debts were (at least partially) repaid reveals several striking trends. First, there is a clear upward trend in the percentage of borrowers who exceeded the deadlines stipulated in their contracts. The percentage was already quite high in 1272 at 59.5%, but this figure steadily increased to the alarming delinquency rate of 76.5% by 1301. If loans are singled out, the trend becomes even more astonishing [table 5.9]. The delinquency rate of loans in 1272 already began almost 10% higher than that of credit-issuing documents as a whole, but by 1301 only 9% of loans were being repaid on time. Is it any wonder that credit was evaporating with such enormous risk attached? Oddly, the average number of days past due that payments (partial or otherwise) were received trended downward significantly throughout the period, the average in 1301 being roughly half what it was in 1272. Nevertheless, it seems this was too little too late. Table 5.9 – Information from the cassati of loans (without accomandigie) 1270s 1280s 1300s Total # of loan repayments 29 18 11 58 # of late repayments 20 12 10 42 69.0% 66.7% 90.9% 72.4% % late avg. term (days) 120 95 75 104 avg. repayment time (days) 457 361 229 384 avg. days late 337 266 154 280 Sufficient Evidence of Economic Recession? Although the discussion thus far has ranged widely across the Pisan economic landscape, we must return to the central question: is there sufficient evidence to show that Pisa experienced a prolonged economic recession as a consequence of the war against Genoa? To answer this question, we must first define the term “recession.” Though the term has been defined variously by many economists, we shall default to one of its simpler definitions: a period of slow or 225 negative economic growth.49 Typical macroeconomic indicators of a recession include decreased economic activity (consumption, investment, exports, etc.), decreased consumer confidence (how positive individuals feel about their economic prospects), decreased money supply, and increased unemployment. The data presented above provide direct support for all of these macroeconomic indicators. There was certainly an overall decline in economic activity as evidenced by the 40% decrease in the annual document production rate of the notaries under study. Over the same period there was a significant decrease in investments in long distance trade. Likewise, sales of moveable and residential properties declined after 1272. This decreased activity, as shall be shown momentarily, was both a consequence and a cause of Pisa’s economic downturn. Two years of decreased activity due to the repurposing of men and vessels for warfare began a downward trend that was exacerbated by the defeat at Meloria, resulting in a self-perpetuating cycle. The northward shifting of Mediterranean trade patterns (towards the Black Sea and Northern Europe) and the loss of Christian control over Acre in 1291 certainly did not help the Pisan economy in this regard, nor were changing consumer preferences in favor of Flemish and Florentine textiles instead of the spices which Pisans traditionally imported from the East or the leathers which the city produced. A decade of rapid devaluation of the silver Pisan denarius and grosso coinage (as compared to the gold florin) that began in 1295, caused by the Pisan mint flooding the market with coins of decreased silver purity, only made things worse.50 Consumer confidence measures the overall level of optimism individuals in a society have about their personal finances and security. When confidence is high, consumers spend more 49 Bishop, 220. Cipolla, 55-57; Casini, "Il corso dei cambi tra il fiorino e la moneta di piccioli a Pisa dal 1252 al 1500," 138; Baldassarri, 457-459. 50 226 money; when confidence is low, consumers are more apt to save their wealth. Although modern measures of consumer confidence rely on personal surveys, no such materials exist for medieval Pisa. However, many features from the data enable us to roughly infer trends in consumer confidence levels. The biggest indictors in this regard are the numerous signs of risk averse behavior and unwillingness to trust. The decline in long distance trade investment suggests reduced confidence. The decreased frequencies of sales on credit and the issuing of loans, as well as the shortening of the lending periods, also indicate decreased confidence. Creditors at this time were individuals, not multi-billion-dollar corporations, and thus were subject to the same concerns as their debtors. The fragmentation, clustering, and reinforcement evident in the analysis of Pisa’s social network exemplify and explain these risk averse tendencies. The removal of key “bridge” individuals made it more difficult for Pisans to find new, trust-worthy individuals with which to engage in business. This fragmentation, along with outside pressures to become more risk averse, further encouraged clusters of individuals to do business with those familiar to them rather than to expand their business horizons, thus limiting the opportunities for business and slowing down economic activity. Lastly, it should come as no surprise that, generally speaking, communities that have suffered major military defeats exhibit decreased confidence and risk averse behaviors to cope in the immediate aftermath; case studies have shown that the resultant risk averse habits can take over a decade to go away, often leading to further economic hardship, and there is no reason to think that Pisa would have been an exception.51 Even today it is difficult for economists to accurately gauge the money supply in a given economy; fortunately, the Pisan records offer ample clues to changes in the relative money 51 Andrés Moya, "The Behavioral Consequences of Violence: Mental Trauma, Economic Behavior, and the Creation of Chronic Poverty in Colombia" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of California, Davis, 2013), 39-41. 227 supply level. Typically, GDP is closely related to the money supply and, since we know that economic activity as a whole had declined in Pisa, we have our first good indication of decreased supply. The risk averse behaviors just mentioned are also tied closely to this matter. During a money shortage, there is less money available for giving credit and for investing, both of which were evident in Pisa. The decrease in the median value of loans also indicates a reduction in the ready availability of coinage. Furthermore, a money supply shortage would explain the dramatic increase in debt delinquency rates in 1301. The very fact that a 25% estimo was necessary highlights the Pisan government’s dire need for coin, and in turn unloaded that plight onto individual families. The increase in agistment agreements also indicates a reduced money supply; lacking free coin, or not wishing to risk it in purchasing livestock, individuals were prone to work someone else’s assets for a share in the profits, thus avoiding any capital expenditure of their own. Add to this the onerous cost of paying for the provisioning of thousands of captives in Genoese prisons, and it is easy to see that most families would have experienced considerable money shortages. Although there exists almost no direct information about unemployment and poverty rates in thirteenth-century Pisa, we are not left with nothing. The donation patterns evident from the surviving wills offer some clues. Certainly, none of them explicitly states how many Pisans were suffering unemployment, but they do indicate that Pisans were much more likely to make bequests to multiple religious bodies starting in 1282 than they were prior to that date. Furthermore, later testators more frequently stipulated that a portion of their estate go to the benefit of hermits, paupers, and the needy. 228 The importance of charity for salvation had been increasing since the end of the twelfth century,52 and Samuel Cohn’s research indicates that there was a general increase in the amount of bequests to religious bodies and the poor across the region during the second half of the thirteenth century.53 However, Cohn notes that Pisans exhibited a particularly mendicant spirituality as compared to their neighbors, and Elizabeth Rothrauff identifies an increase in Pisan charitable giving, especially to hospitals (which cared for the poor), from 1276 to 1325, outpacing such trends among neighboring cities.54 Rothrauff believes that the huge demographic shift in Pisa caused by warfare at the end of the thirteenth century (particularly Meloria) brought a large number of Pisan women to poverty, “prompting the commune to try to help ease the financial and social woes of women whose husbands had predeceased them."55 Eleanora Rava expands on this notion by focusing on the dramatic increase in Pisan bequests to hermits from 1280 to 1320. Contrary to contemporary heremetical trends in Italy, Rava points out that there is no Pisan evidence suggesting hermit dependence on local civil or ecclesiastical institutions, likely due to most of the emerging group of hermits [recluses] being women (72% were unmarried orphans), many of whom could not even afford entry into religious institutions: “the type of Pisan recluse is that of a woman with scarce economic possibilities, almost always an orphan or widow, often native to the countryside or resident in places with a strong demographic concentration; and the fortune of the Pisan recluse [movement] coincides with a female [demographic] surplus.”56 All of this points to a dramatic increase of impoverishment in Pisa, Little, 21-39; Parker, "Papa et pecunia: Innocent III’s Combination of Reform and Fiscal Policy to Finance Crusades," 6-8. 53 Cohn, 31-71. 54 Ibid., 38-39; Rothrauff, 169. 55 Rothrauff, 193. 56 Rava, "Eremite in città," 157-158. 52 229 especially among the female population, coincident with a profound decrease in the male workforce. So, it appears that late thirteenth century Pisa displayed all the hallmarks of enduring a prolonged recession, despite our lack of “hard” measures common to evaluations of modern economic situations. In fact, I would argue that in many ways the recession that resulted from the Battle of Meloria resembled a “balance sheet recession.”57 A balance sheet recession is when either high indebtedness or a collapse in the value of assets (e.g. land) influences people to pay down their debts instead of spending or investing, which in turn slows economic activity. The incredible number of deaths and captures that occurred during the battle robbed Pisa of a significant percentage of its working-age male population. Such a loss would have rendered large tracts of land unproductive due to a shortage of laborers to work the land. In the Late Middle Ages, land acted as the principal store of wealth, and in Tuscany that land also generated a fair amount of wealth on its own. If many of these landed assets suddenly became unproductive (from lack of workers, destruction during warfare, or loss of ownership to the Guelf League), this would have an enormous negative impact on communal and individual landowner incomes (tax revenues and productiveness, respectively) and on the market value for that land. This in turn would encourage people to pay down their debt (save) rather than to spend or invest their money. Beyond the aforementioned reductions in spending and investment, there is evidence of these circumstances. A decline in the value of agricultural land made real estate a buyer’s market, and indeed there was an increased focus on the purchasing and renting of agricultural lands, especially after the heavy tax of 1299. Also, although debt payments were increasingly likely to 57 Richard C. Koo, "The World in Balance Sheet Recession: Causes, Cure, and Politics," Real-world Economics Review 58, no. 12 (2011):19-37. 230 occur late, there was a noticeable decrease in the number of days overdue these payments were made, suggesting that Pisans were actively trying to pay down their debts. The sequence of events appears to fall in line with the “paradox of thrift” concept popularized by John Maynard Keynes.58 Put simply, the paradox of thrift states that an increase in personal saving habits results in a decrease in demand throughout the economy, lowering output, which in turn lowers total saving because general income has been decreased; this easily creates a negative feedback loop. The initiation of warfare with Genoa in late 1282 began a period of belt-tightening as economic activity was restrained while men and ships were being repurposed for non-economic activities. This slowing of the economy began a fall in consumer confidence and an increase in risk aversion as the social network began to fragment a little in the absence of numerous participants. The major defeat at Meloria exacerbated these trends, spurring people to save even more, thereby only worsening and prolonging the recession gripping Pisa which spilled into the fourteenth century. 58 John Mackinnon Robertson, The Fallacy of Saving: a Study in Economics (London: S. Sonnenschein & Co., 1892), 131-132; John Maynard Keynes, The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 84; Paul A. Samuelson, Economics, an Introductory Analysis (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1948), 269-271. 231 Chapter 6 – Making Sense of the Thirteenth Century The Four Pillars of Pisan Decline By now it should be clear that the causes of Pisan decline over the course of the thirteenth century were numerous and diverse. It would be wrong to attribute the disintegration of Pisan preeminence in the Mediterranean to any single factor. Instead, it is more instructive to categorize the causes as best we can into four overarching themes: stubborn imperial allegiance, Sardinian aspirations, failure to adapt swiftly to market changes, and the aftermath of the Battle of Meloria. Though there are of course numerous connections linking these four themes, they are distinct enough to merit individual treatments. IMPERIAL ALLEGIANCE AT ALL COSTS The 1081 agreement1 with Emperor Henry IV was a turning point in Pisan communal economic strategy. For over a century prior, Pisa’s primary foreign policy was one of proactive defense against Muslim piratical incursions by way of forming multi-city fleets and sacking distant strongholds.2 This strategy generally proved lucrative, though only afforded infrequent infusions of wealth into the communal economy. In 1081, however, Pisa gained its earliest known commercial privileges, changing the city’s approach to securing wealth from foreign lands. Instead of one-time windfalls, the commune began to enjoy the steady flow of commercial profits, with the diplomatic endeavors enabling merchants to better exploit these advantages and build upon them. It was likely not by coincidence that this changed approach occurred 1 2 von Gladiss and Gawlik, 2:442-443. Maragone, 4-8. 232 concurrently with Pisa’s political evolution into a commune.3 The advantages of more diplomatic relations with foreign cities soon became manifest during the first century of the crusade movement as Pisa negotiated commercial privileges with the numerous political leaders in the Mediterranean—Latin, Greek, and Muslim.4 This new policy brought great prosperity to Pisa, enabling the city to become one of the great powers in the Mediterranean during the twelfth century. Importantly, the multi-generational success of this approach conditioned the commune to rely on negotiating agreements with strong central authorities who could ensure that Pisan rights were respected in their ports and markets. Over a century of burgeoning economic and political importance from allying with the German emperors and securing ever better commercial privileges in the East may have led Pisan to overestimate its position at the turn of the thirteenth century. Having recently lost a strong imperial ally with Henry VI’s death in 1197, there was no ready replacement to combat the antiimperial cities of Tuscany. Perhaps to win the favor of Philip of Swabia (who took control of Germany in 1198), either for the commune or just for themselves, two Pisan nobles smuggled a Hohenstaufen relative and contender for the Byzantine throne out of Constantinople. When Pisan involvement in the escape of Prince Alexius (future emperor Alexius IV) was discovered by emperor Alexius III, Pisa lost its privileged position in the Byzantine Empire and the Genoese began supplying naval services for the Greeks instead.5 Though the Fourth Crusade initially put Prince Alexius on the throne, the crusaders soon sacked the city and carved up the empire among the various Latin participants, destroying the Pisan quarter and greatly elevating the position of 3 On Pisa being one of the first Italian communes to come into existence, see Daniel Philip Waley, The Italian CityRepublics (London: Longman, 1988), 9, 32-34. 4 For an extensive treatment of Pisan diplomatic relations in the Eastern Mediterranean during the twelfth century, see Parker, "Pisan Migration Patterns along Twelfth Century Eastern Mediterranean Trade Routes," 97-116. 5 Whether the escape had been sanctioned by the commune or was merely the work of two enterprising members of leading Pisan families matters little as the consequences affected the entire community. On consequences for Pisa, see Brand, 4-5, 215-216. 233 Venice, arguably the stronger of the Italian maritime cities at the time. Meanwhile, no aid was forthcoming from Germany, leaving Pisa alone to combat its local foes. The German imperial concessions never came free of charge, however, obligating Pisa to support imperial efforts to subdue neighboring unruly communities. Though Pisa was unquestionably the economic leader of Tuscany, Pisan military support for the German emperors created a rift between Pisa and many other cities in the region, seeding animosity with Lucca and Florence (and others) that would continue to fester for centuries. This division ultimately found its clearest expression in the factional Guelf-Ghibelline conflicts of the thirteenth century. Pisa became the focus of Guelf attacks against the emperor and Ghibellinism in Tuscany. As these threats grew over time, especially after the Guelfs formed a league against the imperial agenda, Pisa in turn relied increasingly on imperial military support to safeguard the city’s position, perpetuating the cycle of violence. The proliferation of warfare damaged Pisan commerce regionally as Tuscan cities began relying less on Pisa’s port and shipping services. This was a significant loss of potential revenue as Tuscany’s rising manufacturing centers were predominantly Guelf. Furthermore, the practice of war itself was considerably expensive, depriving the commune of resources that could have been utilized for economic purposes. Though imperial alliances had brought a good deal of military security at home and undisputed commercial advantages in southern Italy, following Frederick II’s death the commercial advantages mostly disappeared as successive Hohenstaufen rulers were less capable. The allure of a strong military ally remained a solid incentive for imperial alliance, but the need for such was almost wholly a product of the local enmity created by Pisan complicity in the subjugation of Tuscan communities. The potential military benefits quickly outweighed the economic incentives of such an alliance, as the animosity between Pisa and the Guelf cities 234 provoked further violence even after the emperor had been removed from the Tuscan equation. The alliance with Manfred was reasonable given his control of Sicily and Hohenstaufen lineage. By the end of 1266, Charles of Anjou was firmly in control of Sicily and southern Italy. He demanded reparations from Pisa for their military and corsairial attacks, but the commune refused to pay.6 The consequent expulsion of Pisan merchants from Sicily and Charles’ entrance into the Tuscan military theater were gravely damaging to the city. Sicily was a vitally important crossroads for long-distance commerce in the Mediterranean and the island’s markets were major centers for trade. Furthermore, Sicily was one of the most important granaries for Tuscany; access to Sicilian grain markets was not only important for regional commercial hegemony, but also for internal civic stability in years of poor local harvest. Additionally, the arrival of Angevin might on the side of the Guelf League put Pisa in a desperate situation. By this point the city had few remaining Ghibelline allies in Tuscany and the alliance with young Conradin did not provide substantial assistance against the combined might of Anjou, France, Genoa, the papacy, and the Guelf League. In this light, the refusal of Pisa to bend the knee to Charles makes little sense. Even after Conradin perished in battle, Pisans persisted in the fight for years before a lasting peace was reached. This further lapse of judgement is perhaps indicative, once again, of Pisans overestimating their influence and military capacity. Nevertheless, peace with Anjou was finally reached in the early 1270s as Charles turned his attention to Liguria. On the eve of the Sicilian Vespers a decade later, Pisa finally allied with Charles at the worst possible moment. In 1282 Charles lost control of Sicily and Aragon was poised to conquer it without a fight, yet Pisa continued to uphold its pact with Charles instead of pursuing a better arrangement with Peter III. There are many potential reasons why Pisa made 6 Filangieri, 1:28-29, 56-57. 235 this unlikely decision, none of which are satisfactory. Perhaps Pisans feared Aragonese control of Sicily would make the rising star of Catalonian merchants unstoppable in Mediterranean commerce. Perhaps Pisans feared an alliance with Aragon might call Charles back into Tuscany. Perhaps Pisans felt that Charles’ control of southern Italy would give him the upper hand in retaking the island. Though all are possible, the severity of Pisa’s misstep once again calls into question the commune’s ability to weigh its options objectively. Pisa had benefitted considerably from the Hohenstaufen conquest of Sicily, had foregone the Angevin conquest, and now also missed out on the Aragonese one. The Aragonese conquest, however, did prove very profitable for one Italian commune, though this time it was Genoa while the Pisans were once again expelled. Perhaps out of envy for their wasted opportunity, Pisa broke the peace with Genoa later in 1282 in a failed attempt to gain control over the island of Corsica. The Angevin-Guelf alliance permanently destroyed the Ghibelline cohort of Tuscany, leaving Pisa without any powerful allies to defend its severely damaged contado. Perhaps even worse than the losses of men and resources was the empowerment of Florence in the region. Florence was already experiencing tremendous growth from the development of its woolens industry; the alliance with Charles of Anjou brought in further profits and economic influence in the region. As the largest and wealthiest city in Tuscany, Florence had become the de facto leader of the Guelf League. The progressive guelficization of Tuscany further solidified the city’s economic and military influence in the region, pushing it further down the path towards regional hegemony which came to fullest expression in the fourteenth century. Situated so close to Pisa, the empowerment of Florence could only come at the expense of Pisan influence. Having thoroughly isolated itself by 1284, Pisa fell prey to the combined onslaught of the Genoese and the Guelf League. Warfare with the Guelf cities lasted for a decade and brought 236 Pisa to the brink of destruction on multiple occasions. Almost devoid of allies, Pisa struggled to maintain its existence. The traumatic defeat at Meloria had depleted the city’s resources to the point where it could not protect its own contado from conquest, nor could it protect its greatest asset, Porto Pisano, from demolition. The twofold loss of land and port, alongside the exorbitant annual costs of war, further attenuated communal income and access to resources, preventing Pisans from financing the restoration of vital economic infrastructure. The prolonged struggle and the diminution of the Pisan economy left a great void in the commercial landscape of Tuscany and the wider Mediterranean, into which Florence, Genoa, and Aragon stepped. Ultimately, the isolation caused by the imperial strategy contributed significantly to the enfeebling of Pisan commercial and political influence both in Tuscany and at sea. SARDINIAN ASPIRATIONS Though control over Sardinia had been (violently) contested between Genoa and Pisa since the early eleventh century, it would not be until the early thirteenth century that individual Pisan families turned their territorial ambitions to the island. Taking inspiration from the late twelfth-century conquests of Guglielmo di Massa (who only swore loyalty to Pisa after the conclusion of his campaigns), in 1207 the Visconti family acquired the judgeship of Gallura at a time when the family frequently held consulships and even the office of podestà. Over the next several decades, the Visconti family steered communal policies towards deeper involvement in Corsica and Sardinia. Ubaldo I Visconti’s domination of Pisan politics 1215-1229 resulted in a considerable shift of communal insular policy, as well as dramatic experiments in governmental organization. During the many years in this period when Ubaldo served as podestà, he appropriated communal military resources to further his territorial ambitions. Though his office 237 had not yet acquired a plenitude of power over the commune, he succeeded in prosecuting his agenda by appealing to the masses. Pisan prosperity in the twelfth century resulted in demographic growth and immigration from the contado. As these newcomers composed a rising percentage of the city’s population, they began to seek avenues for political participation. The most readily available avenue was through the creation of artisan guilds and merchant orders which, through their influence over the city’s markets and industries, gained collective bargaining power in the government. Ubaldo Visconti exploited this development by appealing to these popular groups to support his plans which were beyond the scope of the old consular aristocracy (a mix of nobles and wealthy shipowners). Though this strategy was successful in extending Visconti and communal control in Sardinia, it came at a cost. The rise of new political groups created tensions in the city. At the same time, other leading families (the della Gherardesca clan chief among them) envied Visconti territorial expansion and wished to mimic it. This combination of pressures resulted in the rise of factions in Pisan society which fought almost incessantly. The severity of the internal discord during the first half of the thirteenth century is best exemplified by the fact that communal government structure changed drastically on an almost yearly basis for nearly forty years. The issue was so severe that on at least two occasions the city was incapable of forming a government at all. The turmoil of the situation simultaneously permitted the Visconti and della Gherardesca families to extend their influence and territorial holdings while also permitting the various nascent corporate entities of the city to extend their involvement in municipal politics. The renewed interest in Sardinia brought Pisa into direct conflict with both Genoa and the papacy, especially because of the commune’s imperial affinity. Throughout the thirteenth century, the papacy repeatedly objected to Pisan efforts to extend its control over the island. On 238 numerous occasions the commune was threatened with (and often received) excommunication. For their part, the Genoese also competed for influence in northern Sardinia, typically from their Corsican base of Bonifacio. Frederick II named his son, Enzo, king of Sardinia against papal wishes in 1238, allowing Ugolino della Gherardesca to insert himself as heir by arranging for his son to marry Enzo’s daughter. This act, in addition to many other transgressions, spurred Gregory IX to call a council in 1241 to depose the emperor. Pisa, contractually obligated to aid the emperor, fought and captured the Genoese fleet that was transporting a large portion of the bishops loyal to Gregory. Not only did this reignite war with Genoa, but it also earned Pisa the papal ban of excommunication for sixteen years. Once Frederick II’s death permitted the revival of the Guelf League, Genoa formed an anti-Pisan alliance. Fighting a war on two fronts without an imperial ally did not go well for Pisa and, following the 1254 defeat at Pontedera, popular dissatisfaction with the leadership of the old consular aristocracy overflowed. The popolo uprising elevated the political position of the people and corporate entities which had been exploited for the nobility’s Sardinian designs, substantially broadening the demographic scope of the communal government. Suddenly, the direction of the city was no longer solely in the hands of the old consular aristocracy; that power was now shared with the lower classes, typically through organizations whose interests focused more on local markets and industry rather than strictly on long-distance trade and territorial gains. Ironically, Sardinia was an ideal target for these new desires as the island was a major supplier of raw materials and a consumer of Pisan finished goods. The exploitation of communal political instability by the most powerful noble families to further their Sardinian goals resulted in the weakening of the city’s economy by diverting resources, the gradual westward shift of 239 communal maritime and commercial focus, and, in 1254, the partial displacement of aristocratic political control by the very groups they had empowered. The earliest expression of the new public weal can be found in the response to the Genoese conquest of Cagliari in 1256. The Pisan commune reacted swiftly in conjunction with the major noble families. Upon the expulsion of the Genoese, the commune divided the judgeship among the Visconti, della Gherardesca, and da Capraia families while keeping the port of Castel di Castro under direct communal control. The distribution of lands to the nobility was primarily intended to pacify the warring factions in the city, but the communal retention of Castel di Castro speaks volumes about the new municipal leadership. This was likely Pisa’s first (and almost last) attempt at true territorial colonization outside of Tuscany. Pisa typically only maintained enclaves within foreign port cities ruled by strong central authorities capable of enforcing commercial privileges, rather than attempting to create or govern a port town outright. Castel di Castro is the first instance of the commune exerting direct control over an entire city. The territorial-colonial strategy came to work well for Genoa and Venice, but Pisa never experimented with this model.7 This market was the only one sufficiently important to the interests of the new communal leaders to warrant tighter control. Though the Anziani had hoped to end factional strife through the expansion of noble assets, the decision ultimately led to more intensive internal discord in the 1270s, 1280s, and early 1290s. The situation became so intense that various families were exiled from the city, many of whom then allied with either the Guelf League or Genoa, strengthening Pisa’s enemies, and turned their private resources against Pisa. The commune could not overcome such an alliance in the 1270s and was forced to readmit the exiled families into the city and government. 7 The only notable exception was the short-lived colony of Porto Pisano in the Sea of Azov. 240 It is likely due to the influence of these contentious families that the commune decided to house the fugitive Corsican lord, Sinucello of Cinarca, from his Genoese pursuers. Perhaps they hoped to exploit Sinucello to regain the influence over Corsica which their ancestors had lost a century prior, perhaps they were responding to the uncertainty of the Sicilian situation. Either way, the move brought down the wrath of Genoa upon the Tuscan city, soon resulting in the catastrophe at Meloria. Reeling from the trauma, the city gave unprecedented authority to one of the factional leaders, Ugolino della Gherardesca, resulting in far-reaching constitutional changes for the municipality. The concentration of power in the hands of one man did not sit well with the other families and so factional tensions began to rise once again, forcing Ugolino to allow his relative and rival, Nino Visconti, to share in his power in 1286. That same year Ugolino appointed his son, Guelfo, to govern Castel di Castro after rewriting the communal brevi to appropriate this right from the Anziani.8 The Anziani had specifically retained communal control over Castel di Castro when Cagliari was divided so that it would not become a battleground for lordly ambitions and a cause for factional violence.9 By circumventing this safeguard and taking control of the city, Ugolino jeopardized the commercial interests of numerous popolo families which were heavily invested in the Cagliari market—and whose members often served as Anziani— thus further inflaming factional stress. Ugolino’s ambitions in Sardinia were no secret, he reportedly instructed his son to take control of as much of Cagliari as possible, and in 1287 Ugolino had Anselmo da Capraia assassinated to facilitate the capture of his third of Cagliari.10 Even after Ugolino was forced to 8 Ghignoli, 74 (BC 1.39), 113 (BC 1.56). Petrucci, Re in Sardegna, a Pisa cittadini: ricerche sui domini Sardinee pisani, 110. 10 Schmeidler, 209; Cristiani, "Gli avvenimenti pisani del periodo ugoliniano in una cronaca inedita," 94-95. 9 241 accede to the Genoese peace treaty of 1288, he still encouraged Guelfo to attack the Genoese from Castel di Castro even though the treaty called for the city to be ceded to Genoese governance. All these factors contributed to the boiling over of tensions in Pisa which resulted in Archbishop Ruggieri’s revolt. Many families were exiled and joined the Guelf League while Guelfo continued his efforts to subjugate Cagliari. Guelfo’s refusal to relinquish Castel di Castro to Genoa ultimately resulted in the renewal of war with the Ligurian republic, forestalling the return of thousands of captive Pisans for another decade, and exacerbating the already tenuous condition of the Pisan economy. If the 1254 popolo revolt facilitated a shift of focus towards local markets, the creation of the Arte della Lana (ca. 1266) solidified this change. The minor Arti already controlled one third of the Anziani, with the merchant orders typically filling the remaining seats. The elevation of the woolens industry to the status of “order” ensured that communal policies would continue to diverge from the strictly maritime-trade focus of previous generations. The new leaders were naturally more concerned with local and Sardinian markets as suppliers of wool and consumers of woolens. When merchant control over Castel di Castro was jeopardized by the governance of Guelfo della Gherardesca, the popolo eventually rose up and overthrew Ugolino della Gherardesca and Nino Visconti. The appointment of the forceful Guido da Montefeltro, however, delayed communal focus on Sardinia for several more years until the renewed threat of the Guelf League was dealt with. Once Guido left office in 1293, the Anziani could once again turn the city’s military resources to the sea. Though too weak to fight Genoa head on, Pisa turned its attention to Sardinia. The della Gherardesca and Visconti families had abused their plenitude of power to further their territorial ambitions at the expense of the commune and its merchant population and so, once the merchant orders regained political control, they sought vengeance. 242 For the next few years the commune progressively conquered Gallura and most of Cagliari, bringing communal control over the island to its greatest historical extent. These gains were cut short in 1297 when Boniface VIII granted Sardinia and Corsica to James II of Aragon. With the economic future of Pisa suddenly thrown into jeopardy, the landed merchant order leaders which dominated the Anziani sought to safeguard their personal interests by turning the governing body into an oligarchy, sealing itself off from future contenders by appropriating many of the functions of the other orders and minor arti which had enabled the popolo to gain influence in the first place. Consequently, once again the commune was put into the hands of an isolated group of individuals, permitting the interests of the leadership and the commune itself to diverge. The reduction of the guilds to subservience to the Anziani cut off the ability for the city’s chief economic sectors to act as vehicles for political change driven by popular desires. Though the leaders of the two largest economic blocs (spice merchants and the woolens industry) thankfully shared in a decent proportion of the commune’s interests, longdistance maritime trade was not among them and so this practice and the organization of fleets suffered from lack of investment and communal backing. Incapable of prosecuting the war against Genoa any longer once the Ligurian republic agreed to peace with Venice, Pisa’s leaders were forced to quickly concede to harsh terms for peace in 1299. The terms were almost identical to those of 1288. Ugolino and Guelfo della Gherardesca’s aspirations in Sardinia had prolonged the conflict for a decade and, ironically, profited their family and commune not at all. IGNORING STRUCTURAL CHANGES IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY The decline of the Pisan position within the wider medieval global economy can be attributed just as much to Pisa’s failure to take action as it can be attributed to the activities previously discussed. Despite over a century of unprecedented growth due to involvement in the 243 spice trade, numerous structural changes were just getting underway at the turn of the thirteenth century. A plethora of forces conspired to alter the geography of long-distance trade, change consumer demands, and replace the preferred currencies of commerce. In 1200, Pisan merchants maintained considerable enclaves within the major eastern ports of Constantinople, Acre, and Alexandria. By 1300, the Pisan presence in these cities was virtually nonexistent. The aid given to Prince Alexius had stripped the Tuscan merchants of their favored status in Constantinople just before the Pisan quarter was gutted by the fires of the Fourth Crusade. Though Pisans had their privileges renewed by at least 1207, the evidence suggests that Pisan investment in the city fell far short of pre-crusade levels. The same story repeats in Egypt, where the Fifth Crusade resulted in the expulsion of Pisan merchants in 1221. Several years later trade privileges were restored but, again, investment in the region fell short of earlier levels and proceeded to decline over the course of the century. Pisans did retain a tight grip on Acre, arguably the most important port in the Eastern Mediterranean early in the century, but while Pisa narrowed its geographic focus, her competitors were widening theirs. At the other end of the Mediterranean, despite the success of the Balearic Crusade of 1113-1115, Pisan merchants rarely frequented Iberian ports, mostly leaving Genoa to dominate trade along that coast. By the late twelfth century, Pisa had lost a war with Genoa for commercial dominance of nearby Provence. The region’s primary ports soon thereafter developed their own merchant marine. Though both Pisa and Genoa concluded numerous commercial treaties with these cities in the decades surrounding the turn of the thirteenth century, there is surprisingly little evidence of Pisans conducting any actual commerce along the French Midi. Pisan shipowners may have moved foreign merchants and their wares busily to and from these ports, but this did not permit the commune to share in the commercial profits of the goods exchanged. 244 The economic growth of the continental interior over the course of the eleventh and twelfth centuries had given rise to the Champagne fairs which, by the late twelfth century, became the key distribution point for connecting England and the Low Countries with the Mediterranean. Initially, Italian merchants reached Champagne via an overland route through eastern France, perhaps explaining why Lombardy developed a woolens industry before the rest of Italy. 11 The rise of the woolens trade at precisely the moment when Pisa lost the Provençal contest with Genoa gave the latter city an important advantage moving forward. This was particularly true after Louis IX turned Aigues-Mortes into France’s principal Mediterranean port mid-century to facilitate his crusade preparations, thus the Rhône quickly became the chief conduit to Champagne for Mediterranean merchants.12 Pisa did regain scattered commercial privileges, but the decision of the commune’s merchants not to pursue investment in the Champagne fairs (and in the woolens sold there) ultimately caused the city to suffer enormous losses of potential revenue, likely even playing a role in the comparatively late development of a native woolens industry in Pisa. By the early thirteenth century, Pisa’s population had reached its pre-modern zenith at somewhere around 30,000-40,000 inhabitants. While most other cities in central and northern Italy continued to expand, Pisan demographic growth stagnated—a good indicator of a troubled economy. The nearly continuous state of warfare Pisa experienced throughout the thirteenth century surely played a hand in reducing the rate of growth, as did political isolation and religious excommunications to a certain extent, but these factors do not account for the severity of the situation. A simple comparison between Florence and Pisa illuminates the culprit: the lack of a native woolens industry. The development of woolens in Florence was directly responsible 11 12 Goldthwaite, 128. Ibid. 245 for the majority of the dramatic and sustained population (and therefore economic) growth the city experienced. The financial prospects offered by Florence drew immigrants from all across Tuscany. In the twelfth century, the explosion of long-distance trade had drawn migrants to Pisa, but as this pull was eclipsed by the potential profits and opportunities afforded by the Florentine woolens industry, Pisa lost its immigrational allure. The economic incentives to move to Pisa could no longer compete with those of neighboring cities, and so the commune ceased to expand. Even once the city finally developed a woolens industry of its own mid-century, it could not compete with the mature industries of its neighbors. Population growth remained flat, unable to exceed mere replacement as escalating military conflicts continued to drain the commune of able-bodied men. The lack of population growth, besides being an economic red flag, may have fatally influenced communal foreign strategy. Following the Fourth Crusade, Venice initiated a strategy of territorial colonization in the Aegean.13 Genoa soon began contesting Venetian dominance in the region, but only after the Nicaean Byzantines retook Constantinople in 1261 did the Genoese substantially undertake a colonial policy, predominantly in the Black Sea and eastern Aegean. Venice and Genoa, encouraged by the expansionary pressures of sustained population growth at home, were both capable of establishing territorial control utilizing their excess populations. Pisa, devoid of such outward pressures, did not pursue a colonial strategy beyond nearby Sardinia. It is dubious whether the commune could have mimicked its maritime competitors. The one known Pisan colony in the Black Sea (the not so creatively named Porto Pisano) was much smaller than nearby Genoese Caffa and Venetian Tana, but soon lost much of its importance.14 13 Peter Lock, The Franks in the Aegean, 1204-1500 (London: Longman, 1995), 142-155. Very little is known about this colony, though the infrequency with which it was mentioned compared with nearby Caffa and Tana provides clear evidence that it was at best a secondary port. Jacoby, "Pisan Presence and Trade in Later Byzantium."; Khvalkov, 114. 14 246 The colonial model quickly became the dominant maritime strategy in the Mediterranean Sea, but Pisa was left out of this development. The Pisan strategy had always depended upon relying on strong foreign powers to protect the negotiated commercial rights of Pisan merchants, but Pisa lacked the manpower to establish foreign ports and become a dispenser of justice in its own right. The failure of Pisa to respond to the development of Black Sea markets and the northward shift in Eurasian trade routes ca. 1260 was but another major misstep on the part of the commune. Though the demographic situation made extensive colonization impossible for Pisa, merchants still had the option to pursue the time-honored itinerant approach. Even though Pisa had won commercial privileges from Constantinople soon after the Fourth Crusade and from Nicaea by 1231, the city did not exploit these opportunities. In 1261 Venice and Genoa already had a several-decade head start in the region, but still Pisan merchants did not heed the changing winds of commerce. By century’s end, even after the loss of Acre, the Pisan merchants at Famagusta completely ignored Constantinople (and ports beyond). The more northerly the trade routes migrated, the more Pisan merchants inexplicably abandoned those markets despite the existence of commercial privileges. While Pisa ignored monumental structural changes, the commune’s chief competitors reaped the rewards. This was not merely a case of a missed opportunity for Pisan merchants; the enormous profits Genoa reaped from exploitation of the Black Sea put the Ligurian commune at a great advantage in its contest against Pisa. Economic prosperity drove the population growth which enabled its colonial strategy and allowed the commune to replenish its military forces. The added wealth financed the construction of the vast war fleets which sailed against Pisa in 1284, maintained naval semi-blockades for over a decade, and brought Venice to heel at the battles of 247 Laiazzo and Curzola. Genoa did all this while simultaneously maintaining a merchant fleet that spanned the entire Mediterranean Sea and even began venturing into the Atlantic Ocean. MELORIA AND ITS CONSEQUENCES The fateful decision to engage the larger Genoese fleet at Meloria, itself yet another gross miscalculation of Pisan strength, had dire consequences for the fate of the Tuscan commune. In isolation, it is possible the fallout from the defeat would not have resulted in the end of Pisan commercial and political relevance. In combination with the numerous other factors previously discussed, however, the commune of Pisa had little hope for survival. The immediate aftermath of the trauma and the drastic responses undertaken by the commune over the ensuing decades insured that Pisa would never again be considered a Mediterranean power of significant standing. Meloria’s consequences were numerous and far-reaching. Immediately after the battle, the communal leaders in desperation granted Ugolino della Gherardesca a plenitude of power, setting the precedent for the future of Pisan politics well into the fourteenth century and resulting in the political and factional troubles mentioned earlier. The most painful cost of Meloria, however, was the human one; in a single afternoon Pisa lost perhaps a quarter of its population to the sea or to Genoese prisons. This cost alone was terrible to bear, but the vengefulness of Oberto Doria in refusing to ransom his captives or accept a surrender severely impeded Pisan economic recovery during the fifteen-year captivity. The city had already experienced several decades without population growth, and now the demographic shock of the defeat resulted in a significant gender imbalance. The prevalence of widows (or wives of captives) and unmarried women altered the social consciousness of the entire city towards community welfare, as evidenced by the increase in donations to religious institutions. At the same time, the removal of numerous heads of households had catastrophic financial implications. These individuals could 248 not engage in commercial activity while imprisoned, obviously, so their capital was employed by their less-experienced progeny or spouses (or not at all) while also dwindling to pay for their prison provisions. The removal of so many components from the city’s social network hindered the ability of the survivors to forge new business connections, slowing the economy. The loss of much of the Pisan fleet was also a mighty blow to the city’s economic prospects. Not only was this a huge loss of capital but, since it took months to construct new ships, this also hampered the business movements of Pisan merchants and reduced the revenue generated from merchants employing Pisan ships. The subsequent destruction of Porto Pisano, however, was arguably more economically damaging. Porto Pisano was vital to the Pisan economy as transit trade accounted for a significant portion of communal income. The destruction of the harbor and port infrastructure reduced the utility of the port for Pisan and foreign merchants alike. The destruction of the shipyards simultaneously prevented Pisa from replacing many of the ships it had lost, forestalling the restoration of both an effective naval defense and a viable maritime commercial force. With no port and few ships, Tuscan merchants (Pisans included) began booking passage on foreign vessels and, since Pisa was unable to begin properly restoring these facilities for at least a decade, this trend became the new modus operandi. This was but one of many negative feedback loops Pisa suffered in the thirteenth century: the port destruction reduced commercial revenue, which in turn prevented the financing of port restoration, which reduced commerce, etc. The necessity of utilizing foreign shipping for commerce resulted in the opening of Maghrebi and Sardinian ports to competitors, further empowering them economically and politically. Whereas before Pisa had near monopolistic control over the ports of Tunis and Castel di Castro, after 1284 these destinations were frequented by the ships of Pisa’s commercial competitors, especially Catalonia. 249 Many factors caused communal income to suffer, despite the ever-increasing need to finance their fight for survival, particularly as Pisa’s currency lost value. Genoa first robbed Pisa of its fleet, then conspired with the Guelf League to destroy Porto Pisano and seize the Pisan contado. Any one of these losses alone would have been a major blow to the economy, but all three at once was truly catastrophic. Beyond the clear military dangers posed by fighting a war on many fronts, the multiplication of Pisa’s foes required a significant increase in communal spending to counter the new threats. The destruction of Porto Pisano meant less market and transit tax revenue while the destruction of the fleet equated to a decrease in the taxable wealth of citizens. A significant portion of communal tax revenue came from the contado, essentially subsidizing the cost of urban living,15 supplying the city with raw materials, food, and men, while also being a major consumer of the city’s finished goods. In addition to making permanent Pisa’s contado losses, the 1293 Treaty of Fucecchio exempted merchants of Guelf cities from Pisan taxation; this was a crushing blow to Pisa since the commune relied heavily on the transit trade and was an important Tuscan market. During the lengthy absence of familial patriarchs, taxes and forced loans frequently went unpaid, necessitating burdensome tax revisions that further depressed the already struggling communal economy. The terms of the two treaties with Genoa were particularly damaging for their inclusion of hefty monetary payments, the cession of strategic commercial locations, and the temporary prohibition of travel beyond the upper Tyrrhenian Sea. The state of continual warfare itself hampered commercial activity, especially investment in long-distance trade, causing the already decaying relationship with the eastern Mediterranean to deteriorate to almost nothing. 15 Herlihy, Pisa in the Early Renaissance: A Study of Urban Growth, 127. 250 In the end, lack of funds goes a long way towards explaining why Pisa was incapable of recovering from Meloria. Even though Pisa, Genoa, and Venice all experienced enormous defeats in the thirteenth century,16 Genoa and Venice were much more resilient and commercially successful by the end of the century, thanks primarily to the Black Sea and transalpine trades. This added commercial success provided these cities with considerably more revenue than Pisa was able to draw from, so it would have been proportionately much harder for Pisa to finance rebuilding efforts. Genoa’s pyrrhic victory at Curzola in 1298 was as damaging to the Genoese fleet as it had been to the Venetians, so much so that admiral Lamba Doria was unable to take the fight to Venice for a coup de grâce. That Pisa did not even attempt to strike at Genoa after the Ligurian fleet had been so damaged indicates just how anemic Pisan naval power had become. Less than a year later, Genoa and Venice negotiated a peace as equals. By contrast, decimated though Genoa’s fleet was, merely the threat of its undivided attention forced Pisa into submission in 1299. The additional impediments Pisa faced, and which Venice did not, may make this seem like an unfair comparison, but it is important to remember that the bulk of these difficulties were of Pisa’s own creation. Pisa and Venice were effectively equals at the beginning of the thirteenth century, but a century’s worth of fateful decisions brought the communes to the point where one could take a traumatic naval defeat in stride while the other could not. Pisan society also underwent psychological changes due to the shock of Meloria and the prolonged period of warfare that followed, the evidence of which can be found in the city’s notarial records. Such a significant loss of life encouraged even healthy Pisans to dictate final testaments. In these wills, Pisans became more concerned with making charitable donations and spreading these gifts to numerous institutions, attempting to provide for the community’s 16 Genoa was defeated by Pisa at Giglio in 1241, Venice was defeated by Genoa at Curzola in 1298; in both instances the republics lost the majority of their ships and several thousand men. 251 orphans and widows should the vagaries of war unexpectedly intrude on one’s family. The removal of so many individuals from the economic landscape also naturally resulted in the fragmentation of business networks, but a new risk-averse mentality pushed that fragmentation beyond mathematical expectations. Political uncertainty, personal income uncertainty due to the economic issues mentioned above, and poor communal monetary policy coalesced to stoke riskaverse behaviors such as a hesitancy to trust others and the hoarding of money. Pisans were consequently less likely to engage with unfamiliar people, limiting opportunities for economic activity. This in turn caused money supply shortages and credit droughts, exacerbating the situation by preventing potential actors from engaging in revenue-generating economic activity in yet another vicious cycle. Stubborn Persistence into the Fourteenth Century As the dawn of the fourteenth century finally brought peace with Genoa, along with the return of the long-detained captives from Meloria, Pisa did not appreciably alter its course, blind to the mistakes of the previous century. Sardinia continued to occupy ever more of the commune’s attention while governance of the city continued to divorce itself from the populace, first through the ossification of the Anziani oligarchy and later by the replacement of the popolo government by a series of actual lordships over the city. The commune even repeatedly resurrected the failed imperial strategy with dire economic consequences. The Pisan economy also intermittently deteriorated further amid renewed Guelf-Ghibelline struggles in the region. The only notable departure from previous trends was a new, amicable relationship with Genoa, though born more out of necessity than equality. The specter of Tuscan Ghibellinism was resurrected in the first years of the fourteenth century under the guide of the White Guelfs of Florence. The White Guelfs were characterized 252 by predominantly regional economic interests (like trade from Pisa to Bologna) while the Black Guelfs pursued long-distance ties ranging from the papal curia, to France, and of course Naples.17 Since the Black Guelfs won the fight for control of Florence in 1302, the exiled White Guelfs naturally gravitated to Florence’s long-standing enemies, such as Pisa, reigniting factional violence in Tuscany. Pisa and the Guelf League began clashing in the field shortly thereafter. As part of this struggle, Lucchese and Florentine ambassadors began efforts to ally with James II of Aragon in 1306, encouraging him to conquer his papally-donated fief of Sardinia.18 Fearing an Aragonese-Guelf alliance, Pisa sent its own ambassadors in turn, though James hesitated to give any firm responses, preferring instead to let the two sides bid against each other. Pisa quickly reverted to its traditional “imperial” strategy by offering the voluntary submission of Pisa (and therefore Sardinia as well) to James II as “king of Pisa, Sardinia, and Corsica.”19 James was interested, but the offer ran afoul of the papacy and thus was not ratified. Over the preceding few years, the Anziani continued to solidify their oligarchic control over the commune. In 1304 the council assumed direct control over the urban Arti, further sapping the strength of the Tre Ordini which had regulated the Arti for most of the thirteenth century.20 The Anziani then rewrote their own election procedures in 1307 to remove the Greater Council; thenceforth the outgoing members would choose their own replacements and their term 17 This is of course a dramatic over-simplification of the matter, highlighting solely the characteristics most germane to Pisa’s situation. Abulafia, "Southern Italy and the Florentine Economy, 1265-1370," 387. 18 Pietro Silva, "Giacomo II d'Aragona e la Toscana (1307-1309)," Archivio Storico Italiano 71, no. 3 (271) (1913): 32; Vicente Salavert y Roca, "Il progetto di cessione della repubblica di Pisa al regno d'Aragona," in Atti del V Convegno Internazionale di Studi Sardi (Cagliari: Centro Internazionale di Studi Sardi, 1954), 110-111; Cristiani, Nobiltà e popolo nel comune di Pisa dalle origini del podestariato alla signoria dei Donoratico, 281. 19 Salavert y Roca, "Il progetto di cessione della repubblica di Pisa al regno d'Aragona," 114; Cristiani, Nobiltà e popolo nel comune di Pisa dalle origini del podestariato alla signoria dei Donoratico, 285-286. 20 Bonaini, Statuti inediti della città di Pisa dal XII al XIV secolo, 3:150-151; Castagneto, L'arte della lana a Pisa nel duecento e nei primi decenni del trecento: commercio, industria e istituzioni, 96. 253 of office was extended from the traditional two months to an entire year or more.21 The members of the Anziani effectively sealed themselves off from the rest of the populace, largely divorcing the popolo from political expression. The members of this oligarchy had extensive economic interests in Sardinia, as did the entire commune’s economy by this point. The severity of the threat to Pisan control over Sardinia forced the Anziani to hedge their bets on James II by simultaneously exploring alternative strategies, should their offer of submission not succeed. With a peace treaty having been in place for almost a decade, Pisa swallowed its pride and sent an embassy to Genoa in 1308 seeking to form an anti-Aragonese alliance.22 While this was going on, Pisa also invested heavily in fortifying Cagliari against a possible invasion.23 Even while the commune negotiated with James II, ambassadors were sent to Henry VII shortly after his election as King of the Romans (king 1308-1313; emperor 1312-1313).24 Once Henry VII began his descent into Italy, the commune leapt to his side; negotiations with James II had recently cooled and Pisans had a longer tradition of alliances with German rulers anyway. As part of this renewed imperial fervor, Pisa appointed the son of Guido da Montefeltro, Federico, to the offices of both podestà and captain of the commune.25 Desperate for a chance to regain past glories, Pisa most likely gave Federico such extensive powers in an attempt to win imperial favor.26 Federico was thankfully not a tyrant, though he did oversee the meetings of the Anziani. 21 Bonaini, Statuti inediti della città di Pisa dal XII al XIV secolo, 2:605-612 (BP105); Ferruccio Rizzelli, "Gli anziani nel governo del Comune pisano," Archivio Storico Italiano 39, no. 245 (1907): 59-61; Cristiani, Nobiltà e popolo nel comune di Pisa dalle origini del podestariato alla signoria dei Donoratico, 209-210. 22 Salavert y Roca, "Il progetto di cessione della repubblica di Pisa al regno d'Aragona," 112. 23 Tommaso Casini, "Le iscrizioni sarde del medioevo," Archivio Storico Sardo 1 (1905): 339-342 no. 41-43; Besta, 1:267. 24 Robert Davidsohn, Geschichte von Florenz, 7 vols. (Berlin: E. S. Mittler und sohn, 1896-1927), 3:364; Silva, "Giacomo II d'Aragona e la Toscana (1307-1309)," 52; Cristiani, Nobiltà e popolo nel comune di Pisa dalle origini del podestariato alla signoria dei Donoratico, 285. 25 Bonaini, Breve vetus seu chronica antianorum civitatis Pisarum, 668. 26 Albertino Mussato, "Albertini Mussati paduani historiographi et tragoedi de gestis Heinrici VII Caesaris Historia Augusta," ed. Lodovico Antonio Muratori, Rerum Italicarum Scriptores, 1st ser., 10 (Milan: Societatis Palatinae, 1727), col. 404-405; Ceccarelli Lemut, "I Montefeltro e il Comune di Pisa tra XIII e XIV secolo," 15-16. 254 Instead, he focused on improving imperial ties. To this end, he sent Fazio della Gherardesca on an embassy to Genoa to meet with Henry VII in December 1311. Three months later, Fazio returned to Pisa with the emperor-to-be in tow.27 When it was confirmed that Henry would travel to Pisa, Federico resigned, and his offices were once again split between separate individuals. Pisa was fortunate that Federico was a benign ruler, but the renewed tendency to concentrate great authority within a single figure would soon cause the commune great harm. Henry VII’s stay in Italy was short but not without consequence. While in Pisa, Henry resided at the homes of the Gambacorta and Gherardesca families,28 presaging the families which would come to control Pisa for much of the century. Henry also personally appointed the members of the Anziani in March and April 1312, despite the communal discontent this created.29 The cost of imperial favor was incredibly high, owing in part to the growing costs of military campaigning. To meet Henry’s financial demands Pisa instituted heavy taxes, even going so far as to tax ecclesiastics (which was prohibited by the city statutes).30 When Henry unexpectedly perished at Buonconvento on 24 August 1313, Pisa had reportedly spent 2,000,000 florins with nothing to show for it;31 the city had gambled everything away on the imperial strategy once again. As had happened so often before when Pisa suddenly faced a grave threat, the city invited a strong man to take up the mantle of podestà and captain of the commune and of the war. This time, within a month of Henry’s passing, the commune chose Uguccione della Faggiola, 27 Villani, 2: bk. 10, sec. 37, pp.237-238. Weiland, 4.2: 743 no. 753 (13 March 1312), 762 no. 768 (11 April 1312); Cristiani, Nobiltà e popolo nel comune di Pisa dalle origini del podestariato alla signoria dei Donoratico, 291. 29 Bonaini, Breve vetus seu chronica antianorum civitatis Pisarum, 671; Cristiani, Nobiltà e popolo nel comune di Pisa dalle origini del podestariato alla signoria dei Donoratico, 293. 30 Nobiltà e popolo nel comune di Pisa dalle origini del podestariato alla signoria dei Donoratico, 292. 31 Iannella, 60. 28 255 formerly the imperial vicar to Genoa.32 Though Uguccione was militarily successful against Pisa’s local enemies, even conquering Lucca, he ruled the commune as a tyrant. He forced sweeping constitutional reforms to enfeeble the Anziani while garnering the support of the Sette Arti and the nobility.33 Despite all of this, Uguccione’s draconian methods sowed deep discontent and the city revolted in 1316 while he was in Lucca.34 To purge the city of the tyrant’s legacy, the populace set fire to the city archives, much to the dismay of later historians.35 Nevertheless, the stage had been set for a true lordship over Pisa as Uguccione had rendered the Anziani toothless. Immediately after Uguccione’s expulsion, the della Gherardesca counts of Donoratico (the rival branch to Pisa’s previous lord, Ugolino della Gherardesca) seized control of the communal government and served as lords of the city for the next thirty years, soon abandoning the titles of podestà and captain as they had lost their political utility.36 Once peace with Genoa was reached in 1299, Pisan maritime commerce was finally free to attempt a rebound. Though the long-distance trade had withered beyond repair, at least the commune now had safer travel to Tyrrhenian ports, especially Sardinia. With somewhat improved communal revenues from Sardinia, in 1304 Pisa expanded the process of restoring 32 ASPi, Comune, Divisione A, 85, f. 51r; Cristiani, Nobiltà e popolo nel comune di Pisa dalle origini del podestariato alla signoria dei Donoratico, 294. 33 ASPi, Comune, Divisione A, 85, ff. 5, 37, 48, 89v-90v, 102v, 103v, 104, 105, 108v; Pietro Vigo, Uguccione della Faggiuola potestà di Pisa e di Lucca (1313-1316): monografia storica di Pietro Vigo, coll'aiuto di nuovi documenti (Livorno: Francesco Vigo, 1879), 161-163 no. 20; Iannella, 68-69; Cristiani, Nobiltà e popolo nel comune di Pisa dalle origini del podestariato alla signoria dei Donoratico, 294-302. 34 A great example of Uguccione’s harsh methods comes from 22 March 1314, when he rejected a peace treaty with the Guelf League and Robert of Naples by imprisoning and decapitating the Pisan ambassadors to the treaty talks, members of the Bonconti family. Vigo, 26; Emilio Cristiani, "Il Trattato del 27 febbraio 1314 tra Roberto d'Angiò, Pisa e la Lega Guelfa toscana alla luce di nuovi documenti," Bullettino dell'Istituto storico italiano per il Medio Evo e archivio muratoriano 69 (1956): 261-262; Nobiltà e popolo nel comune di Pisa dalle origini del podestariato alla signoria dei Donoratico, 296. 35 Herlihy, Pisa in the Early Renaissance: A Study of Urban Growth, 216. 36 For more on the Donoratico period, see Giuseppe Rossi-Sabatini, Pisa al tempo dei Donoratico (1316-1347): Studio sulla crisi costituzionale del comune (Florence: G. C. Sansoni, 1938). 256 Porto Pisano which had been initiated (at least on paper) in 1297.37 The silting up process of the harbor over almost two decades of neglect, however, left the majority of the ruined twelfthcentury port facilities abandoned, surrounded by wetlands.38 The port itself did eventually regain some of its past importance by mid-century as its location at the mouth of the Arno held undeniable importance for Florence and other Tuscan communities, though the port was now dominated by foreign rather than Pisan ships.39 The communal economy, however, did not enjoy a similar renaissance. The end of the thirteenth century wrought significant economic damage and, though peace with Genoa was beneficial, the resumption of factional warfare in Tuscany was exceptionally expensive, especially when incorporating the brief entrance of Henry VII. To meet rising military expenses, the commune relied increasingly on prestanze (voluntary forced loans) to supplement tax revenue; under Uguccione della Faggiola prestanze forzare (involuntary forced loans) became the norm.40 By 1325 the communal public debt was already 140,000 lire—equal to the combined sum of gabelle (tax on goods) revenue from the city, quarters, and contado for all of 1313—, the city frequently contracted out or sold tax farming rights, and the communal treasury was often empty.41 The city’s economy was already in dire shape and the worst was yet to come. 37 ASPi, Comune, Divisione A, 83, ff. 7r, 11v, 12, 20r, 31r, 32v, 43v, 45, 47r; Bonaini, Statuti inediti della città di Pisa dal XII al XIV secolo, 3:368, 413, 416-417, 431-432; Ceccarelli Lemut, "Assetto del territorio, insediamento ed economia nel Medioevo," 116. 38 ASPi, Comune, Divisione A, 120, f. 66r; Ceccarelli Lemut, "Assetto del territorio, insediamento ed economia nel Medioevo," 116. 39 "Assetto del territorio, insediamento ed economia nel Medioevo," 116; Goldthwaite, 148. 40 Cristiani, Nobiltà e popolo nel comune di Pisa dalle origini del podestariato alla signoria dei Donoratico, 273; Violante, 120-121. 41 Bonaini, Statuti inediti della città di Pisa dal XII al XIV secolo, 2:538 (BP 99); Rossi-Sabatini, L'espansione di Pisa nel Mediterraneo fino alla Meloria (1284), 47, 51; Casini, "Magistrature deliberanti del Comune di Pisa e Leggi in appendice agli Statuti," 104; Cristiani, Nobiltà e popolo nel comune di Pisa dalle origini del podestariato alla signoria dei Donoratico, 230; Violante, 121. 257 In 1321 Pisa insulted Judge Ugone of Arborea by forcing him to pay 10,000 gold florins in order to claim his rightful inheritance. Angered, Ugone made a clandestine alliance with James II of Aragon and Branca Doria of Genoa aimed at wresting control of Sardinia from Pisa.42 Pisa fought as best they could, but on 31 May 1323 James II reportedly sent a fleet of three hundred ships to conquer Sardinia.43 Against such an overwhelming force Pisa stood little chance. A little over a year later, Pisa surrendered Cagliari to Aragonese control, essentially ending Pisan influence over Sardinia.44 The counts of Donoratico were not hard hit by the loss, as they quickly negotiated the recognition of their Sardinian fiefs for an annual census of 1,000 florins.45 Pisa, however, spiraled into yet another deep and prolonged economic recession.46 Marco Tangheroni estimated that Pisa reaped perhaps 100,000 florins annually from Sardinia, comprising approximately 40% of total communal revenue.47 If the events of the thirteenth century had not already ensured that Pisa would never again rise to commercial and political prominence, then the loss of Sardinia was the proverbial nail in Pisa’s coffin. Final Thoughts By now it should be clear that Pisan decline was the result of a multiplicity of factors spanning the entire thirteenth century. The commune’s willful ignorance of changing economic structures and external political trends prevented the city from adapting as swiftly as its neighbors and more distant competitors did. The several decades delay in reacting to woolens in 42 Jerónimo Zurita, Anales de la Corona de Aragón, compuestos por Jerónimo Zurita, 8 vols. (Zaragoza: Institución Fernando el Católico, 1967-1977), 3: bk. 6, sec. 43, pp. 157-163; Villani, 2: bk. 10, sec. 196, pp. 384-385; Besta, 1:275-176. 43 Zurita, 2: bk. 6, sec. 45, pp. 166-172; Villani, 2: bk. 10, sec. 210, pp. 392-393; Besta, 1:279. 44 Tola, 1:675 no. 28 (19 June 1324); Mariano Arribas Palau, La conquista de Cerdeña por Jaime II de Aragón (Barcelona: Horta, 1982), 253 (19 June 1324); Besta, 1:286; Petrucci, Re in Sardegna, a Pisa cittadini: ricerche sui domini Sardinee pisani, 132. 45 Besta, 1:286; Petrucci, Re in Sardegna, a Pisa cittadini: ricerche sui domini Sardinee pisani, 132-133. 46 Tangheroni, Politica, commercio, agricoltura a Pisa nel Trecento, 79-80, 103-107. 47 Ibid., 80. 258 the early thirteenth century, and to moving trade routes later, directed the spoils of commercial opportunism away from the city. Following Frederick II’s death, imperial involvement in Italy never again became advantageous, especially amid the continuous ascendancy of Guelfism in Tuscany. Adhering to antiquated policies of imperial allegiance time and time again came at enormous cost for Pisa and precluded any chance of mending damaged relationships with its neighbors. Meanwhile, demographic issues and internal political instability steadily weakened the commune and left the city open to exploitation by parties whose interests did not necessarily align with the public good. The defeats at Meloria in 1284 and at Cagliari forty years later were both watershed moments in the decline of Pisan fortunes. Previous historians have variously given more48 or less49 weight to the defeat at Meloria, stressing the finality of the event or the continuation of economic activities, respectively. As is the case with so many historical debates, the truth lies somewhere between the extremes. Though it is certain that commerce continued (even longdistance trade) long after Meloria, the defeat certainly marked the end of an era. The commune abandoned efforts to engage with expatriate communities in the East and focused all its commercial and political attentions on Tuscany and Sardinia. Pisan involvement in affairs outside of the Tuscan-Tyrrhenian sphere virtually ceased. The drastic shrinking of the geographic scope of Pisan trade and political influence after the battle is the clearest indication that the city had gone from a Mediterranean power to a Tyrrhenian one at best.50 48 Volpe, "Pisa, Firenze, Impero al principio del Trecento e gli inizi della Signoria civile in Pisa," 314; RossiSabatini, L'espansione di Pisa nel Mediterraneo fino alla Meloria (1284), 111; Cristiani, Nobiltà e popolo nel comune di Pisa dalle origini del podestariato alla signoria dei Donoratico, 21-22; Balard, "Génois et Pisans en Orient (fin du XIIIe - début du XIVe siècle)," 208. 49 Tangheroni, Politica, commercio, agricoltura a Pisa nel Trecento, 77-82; Malanima, "Pisa and the Trade Routes to the Near East in the Late Middle Ages," 356; Ceccarelli Lemut, "Pisa nel Mediterraneo durante il XIII secolo," 18. 50 Melis, 226. 259 The loss of Sardinia in 1324 similarly functions as a dividing line in the history of Pisan decline. Historians generally have been in closer agreement on the import of the event for the destruction it caused the Pisan economy.51 The narrowed geographic scope of Pisan interests had brought the city’s economy to depend on continued communal control of Sardinian ports, much as the city had come to depend on the existence of a strong imperial ally for military support and commercial concessions a century earlier. When the indispensable element was removed from the equation, Pisa spiraled into disarray.52 The loss at Meloria represents the reduction of the Pisan sphere of influence from the Mediterranean down to the Tyrrhenian, the loss of Cagliari signals the further reduction of communal relevance from a Tyrrhenian power to a purely Tuscan one. Though it would take another eighty years, Pisa finally lost even that mantle when Florence conquered the city in 1406. 51 Gioacchino Volpe stated that 1324 definitively ended the Pisan seafaring tradition completely, while Marco Tangheroni showed that while the loss of Sardinia sent Pisa into a prolonged depression, there were signs of some economic recovery in the second half of the fourteenth century. Volpe, "Pisa, Firenze, Impero al principio del Trecento e gli inizi della Signoria civile in Pisa," 314; Tangheroni, Politica, commercio, agricoltura a Pisa nel Trecento, 80. 52 Economic depression after 1324; factional warfare from Frederick II’s death ending in the popolo rebellion in 1250-1254. 260 Appendix – Getting Started in Social Network Analysis Since the early 1990s, advances in computing power have enabled sociologists to develop and utilize a new research tool known as social network analysis (SNA). The methods and applications of SNA are varied and numerous, depending heavily on the source material, the questions one wishes to ask, and the nature of the network itself. John F. Padgett and Christopher K. Ansell first revealed the potential utility of SNA for historical research in their groundbreaking 1993 study on the Medici family in the early fifteenth century.1 Since then, additional studies have appeared periodically which applied SNA methods to historical problems, though most have focused on modern or early modern subjects due to the nature of the source material. One important exception is the 2009 work of Quentin van Doosselaere on medieval Genoese commercial agreements.2 Van Doosselaere’s work with Genoese notarial records directly inspired the fifth chapter of the present study which, hopefully, in turn will inspire other historians to explore the potential utility of social network analysis. Though still very much in its adolescence, the field of social network analysis is far too vast to permit a full discussion and explanation here. There are numerous approaches, many of which are simply not applicable to historical inquiry; even among those potentially suitable for historical problems, one must be very careful in the application of SNA to one’s dataset and the questions that are asked of it. SNA methods are merely mathematical processes that will produce values regardless of whether they have any scholarly significance, so it is vital that the right methodology be chosen to fit the problem at hand and that only the right questions are asked of the data. A thorough navigation of these issues would fill a book (and I can recommend several), 1 John F. Padgett and Christopher K. Ansell, "Robust Action and the Rise of the Medici, 1400-1434," American Journal of Sociology 98, no. 6 (1993): 1259-1319. 2 Van Doosselaere. 261 but here I will attempt to provide a basic guide for those new to SNA, speaking from my experience applying it to medieval Pisan notarial registers. Those interested in SNA should first read Scott Weingart’s Networks Demystified series of blog posts.3 Weingart provides ready answers to questions on whether SNA is appropriate for various datasets and historical problems. Another useful resource is the online beginner’s guide by HistoricalNetworkResearch.org.4 The next item on any historian’s SNA reading list should be Analyzing Social Networks, by Stephen Borgatti, et al.5 This relatively short text offers succinct but accessible explanations of the most common SNA techniques. A more extensive theoretical explanation of SNA can be found in Wasserman and Faust’s 1997 tome, though the speed with which computing has advanced leaves the work feeling a bit dated in terms of application.6 In fact, I would recommend reading Bonnie Erickson’s review essay on their book before delving into Wasserman and Faust’s work.7 With a basic grounding in SNA in hand, one should next turn to questions of historical applications. Charles Wetherell’s 1998 essay offers a good starting point for such considerations.8 Another cautionary text came from Robert Morrissey in 2015; although he triumphs the utility of historical SNA, he cautions against forcing an SNA approach where one is not merited.9 That same year, Claire Lemercier also provided a primer for historians, once again Though websites are notoriously impermanent, hopefully Weingart’s blog will remain accessible until a better publication written for beginners is produced. Scott Weingart, "Networks Demystified, 1-9," The Scottbot Irregular (blog), posted January 21, 2015, accessed December 28, 2016, http://scottbot.net/tag/networks-demystified/. 4 Historical Network Research, "First Steps," accessed December 28, 2016, http://historicalnetworkresearch.org/resources/first-steps/. 5 Borgatti, Everett, and Johnson. 6 Wasserman and Faust. 7 Bonnie H. Erickson, "Social networks and history: A review essay," Historical Methods: A Journal of Quantitative and Interdisciplinary History 30, no. 3 (1997): 149-157. 8 Charles Wetherell, "Historical Social Network Analysis," International Review of Social History 43, no. Supplement S6 (1998): 125-144. 9 Robert Michael Morrissey, "Archives of Connection: 'Whole Network' Analysis and Social History," Historical Methods 48, no. 2 (2015): 67-79. 3 262 warning of the many pitfalls along the path to conducting a valid SNA study.10 The overriding theme of these works is that while SNA is a powerful tool, it is only useful under a very strict set of circumstances. Once one determines that social network analysis is appropriate for their topic, it is time to start preparing the data. A useful starting point is Sean Everton’s 2004 guide to network visualization.11 The first chapter includes some advice on creating tables in Microsoft Access that will be usable with most SNA software packages. Perhaps the most useful article at this stage would be Mark Huisman and Marijtje van Duijn’s extensive review of the several dozen most prominent SNA software packages as they existed in 2011.12 This review article provides an extensive breakdown of the strengths and weaknesses, the functionality, and their scholarly opinions of dozens of programs. It is important to note that as UCINET is one of the oldest SNA software packages, it appears the most frequently in SNA literature; however, UCINET is not necessarily the ideal solution for every problem, it is up to each researcher to determine which software best meets their needs. Another valuable historical SNA resource comes from Marten Düring, who has provided an easy to follow online tutorial for aspiring SNA practitioners to dabble with.13 Though there are dozens or hundreds more books, articles, and websites dealing with SNA, the sources mentioned above are the best starting point for any historian new to networks. After reading these sources, any historian should have sufficient understanding to begin exploring the ancillary literature and start conducting their own network analyses. 10 Claire Lemercier, "Formal Network Methods in History: Why and How?," in Social Networks, Political Institutions, and Rural Societies, ed. Georg Fertig (Turnhout, Belgium: Brepols, 2015), 281-310. 11 Sean F. Everton, A Guide for the Visually Perplexed: Visually Representing Social Networks, 4th ed. (Stanford: Stanford University, 2004). 12 Mark Huisman and Marijtje A. J. van Duijn, "A Reader's Guide to SNA Software," in The SAGE Handbook of Social Network Analysis, ed. John Scott and Peter J. 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Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003. Wetherell, Charles. "Historical Social Network Analysis." International Review of Social History 43, no. Supplement S6 (1998): 125-144. 279 Winter, David Alexander. "Die Politik Pisas während der Jahre 1268-1282." Ph.D. dissertation, Halle-Wittenberg, 1906. Yver, Georges. Le commerce et les marchands dans l'Italie méridionale au XIIIe et XIV siècle. Paris: Fontemoing, 1903. 280 Vita Auctoris Matthew E. Parker is a native of Atlanta, Georgia, where he earned a B.A. in History and Economics from Emory University in 2006. In 2010 he moved to St. Louis, Missouri, to pursue a M.A. in Medieval History from Saint Louis University, which he obtained in 2012. His continued research towards a Ph.D. at the same institution has led to the publication of articles in Viator (2014) and the Mediterranean Historical Review (2017), as well as a chapter in the edited volume Papacy, Crusade, and Christian-Muslim Relations (Amsterdam University Press, 2018). During the course of his research assistantship with the Center for Medieval and Renaissance Studies, he helped organize several international conferences including the Annual Symposium on Medieval and Renaissance Studies and the International Symposium on Crusade Studies. The latter led to his editing a volume of collected works entitled Crusading in Art, Thought, and Will, published by Brill in 2018. 281

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